China's 2006 National Defense Report outlined its definition of the PRC's defense policy in the 21st century. It focused on the need to deter potential threats to China's unity ("separatist movements" named among them) by bolstering all aspects of national security.
The first objective is the building of national defense to protect national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development. This includes defending China's territory and borders, and opposing Taiwan independence.
The target of defense modernization is to achieve an all-round, coordinated development of China's armed forces, with a focus on informationization--weaponry and technologies that use information acquired from a target. The PLA is stepping up its efforts to build systems for fighting informationized wars through constant scientific and technological research.
A military strategy of active defense is also to be implemented. The ground forces aim to move from regional defense to trans-regional mobility. The navy aims to extend the strategic depth of its offshore defensive operations. The air force aims to become more than a territorial air-defense force. China's missile force aims to raise its capacity for strategic deterrence and conventional strikes under conditions of informationization. And while China plans to improve its nuclear arsenal, it stated its intention to remain committed to a "no first use at any time and under any circumstances" policy.
The NDR, either intentionally or unintentionally, discloses the strategic objectives and interests driving China's defense modernization. It treats what it terms as "separatist movements," such as pro-independence forces in Taiwan, as a direct and imminent threat to its security and unity.
Therefore, most analysts of China's military affairs consider that the goal of the PRC's recent military buildup has been to acquire the ability to coerce Taiwan into accepting a one-China solution to the cross-strait dispute, or to at least prevent Taiwan from moving toward independence if the island did not accept the former proposal.
Beijing's refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and the increasing numbers of short-range ballistic missiles deployed in areas facing Taiwan are hard evidence of China's determination to use force against "separatist movements."
The decision to transform the PLA from a traditional ground force into a high-tech informationized unit leads many analysts to believe that the objectives driving this buildup could lie beyond the Taiwan issue. It has become clear that a long-range goal of China's leaders is to obtain recognition for China as a great power.
Two factors construe a great power: one is a strong economy, the other is military power. China has the former, but in terms of military strength, it is behind the rest of the pack. At a minimum, such status would presumably require high-tech weapon systems and platforms, air and sea refueling capabilities, global communications systems in friendly countries. China has yet to fully develop all these areas.
As China's military capabilities extend, the country may gain a paramount position in East Asia. Apart from coercing Taiwan and interdicting U.S. naval intervention, pursuing a denial strategy for maritime areas close to China and around Taiwan would be a limited and logical regional objective within China's reach.
Such an objective would also be within the parameters of the PLA's current guidelines. Issued in 1993 and known as the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period, they characterized the most likely type of future conflict as being a "local war under modern high-tech conditions." However, by 2002, the Central Military Commission--the military's decision-making body headed by PRC President Hu Jintao--had replaced this concept with a "local war under modern informationization."
This move indicates that current military strategy is flexible, with new elements and features being added as part of a constant modernization program. China's strategic analysis includes at least six strategic-level issues that the guidelines are expected to address. These are: the global security environment and what it means for the security of China; adjusting the content of defense strategy to cope with the changing nature of warfare; articulating the strategic missions and objectives of the armed forces; issuing guidance for combat preparations (this identifies the types of war the PLA must be prepared to fight); identifying the main strategic direction (a contingency-based assessment); and determining the focus for army building.
It appears to the outside world that China is determined to create a military that can fight and win on its peripheries, and deter intervention by outside forces.
China's military books, journals and newspapers suggest the PLA will try to follow certain strategic principles if it has to fight a war in the future.
The first of such scenarios is seizing the initiative early in a conflict. Another is pre-emption. Avoiding direct confrontation with a stronger adversary is a principle that was commonly practiced by the PLA in previous conflicts.
Some of China's analysts believe that a militarily superior adversary might be sensitive to casualties and that the sudden destruction of a significant portion of its forces would result in a severe psychological shock and a loss of will to continue the conflict. Therefore, raising the cost of a war has become a strategic principle. For example, if China's aims are limited, the PRC can better create such a situation.
China's leaders used to consider economic development of the nation a priority. Military modernization was subordinated to economic modernization. However, the National Defense Reports of 2004 and 2006 indicate that military modernization has been put on an equal footing with economic modernization. This is in line with the PRC's interest in protecting its economic development and maintaining a stable environment. The most obvious indication of this parallel emphasis on defense and economics is the substantial increase in defense spending between 2003 and 2007.
The PLA identifies warfare across the battlefield in terms of five dimensions: land, sea, air, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. Commenting on China's current space activities, Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that, "Beijing's investments in counter-space technology are driven by uncompromisable strategic concerns. In the near term, China focuses on developing all possible means of defeating the superior U.S. conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan."
China's experts have also expressed the belief that controlling space will be of tremendous significance in future information warfare. Therefore, the PLA is not only developing "hard" strike capabilities such as the anti-satellite missile demonstrated in January 2007, but is also developing "soft" strike alternatives against space-based information systems.
Throughout China and its borders, the PLA is able to provide real-time support for joint military operations with communications and data relay satellites. The command, control, communication and targeting architectures already fielded, or under development by the PLA, are necessary and appropriate responses for a growing military power in the information age if that nation desires to keep pace with improvements in armaments and technology. There is evidence that China is close to achieving a viable anti-access strategy that would impede other militaries conducting operations in the Western Pacific region.
The PLA Navy's recently developed offshore active defense strategy, for example, is based on a perceived need to protect economic lifelines and natural resources. The geopolitical situation requires the navy to control the Yellow Sea, much of the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the very northern portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.
The navy faces tremendous challenges in controlling this vast, heavily traveled area. While it is stressing naval operations assisted by satellite systems, its lack of aircraft-carrier battle groups and limited land-based naval aviation units means it cannot yet exercise around-the-clock sea control inside the area.
The navy has, however, made progress in terms of implementing anti-access strategy in areas of future conflict, such as Taiwan. New diesel-electric submarines that can launch anti-ship cruise missiles and surface warships equipped with supersonic anti-ship missiles are indications that China is enhancing its offensive capabilities.
There is no sign that China is moving toward developing a "blue-water navy." However, debates among naval experts and strategists over the construction of aircraft carriers suggested China may be at a junction of revising its maritime strategy.
Regarding air power, as noted in the report, the PLA Air Force is trying to speed up its transition from a territorial air-defense force to having increased capabilities in the areas of air strike, air and missile defense, early warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projection.
The airforce is in need of more advanced aircraft integrated with effective support systems; it would rely heavily on networking and informationization to employ air power effectively. These aspirations will likely be constrained by the current technological limitations of China's aviation industry, and by the resources made available to support the air force's modernization.
In the past, the PLA's Second Artillery Corps was the only unit that deployed both conventional and nuclear-tipped missiles. With an emerging military doctrine that features long-range precision strikes by conventional short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the responsibility of launching those missiles has gradually been given over to the commanders of the country's various military regions.
The SAC is now responsible for nuclear deterrence and receiving orders directly from the CMC. With the new emphasis on space, the SAC could assume new responsibility for China's anti-satellite weapons, its computer-network attack capabilities, or radio frequency and laser weapons.
China's goal for military modernization is to develop a force equipped with the skills and weapon systems that can fight and win, at least, a local war under informationized conditions. How and when China is to achieve this objective are issues requiring constant attention and analysis.
Published reports and strategic doctrines already set out a road map. However, factors such as defense spending over the next decade or so, military research and development, and--most importantly--how China sees its power, are key elements in deciding whether China is to become a true regional or even global power.
Copyright 2008 by Andrew N.D. Yang
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