When Lungmen was initiated in 1980, conditions for its success were highly favorable. The Chinshan, Kuosheng and Maanshan nuclear power stations were already in operation, and well-qualified local personnel were available for construction of the plant.
But in the years lost to repeated stopping and restarting of the project before work officially began in 1999, Taiwan Power Co.’s experienced personnel were no longer with the firm. Taipower was 15 years past completion of the second power-generating unit at Maanshan in 1985, and 20 years beyond construction of the plant there.
Moreover, the manufacture of nuclear reactors internationally had come to a halt due to the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. Contractor General Electric Co. also had not built an atomic power station in 20 years, and subcontractors Toshiba Corp. and Hitachi Ltd., responsible for the reactors and steam turbines, were new to the industry.
Work on the facility’s engineering, machinery and instrumentation and control systems is now nearly complete. The remaining engineering problems are minimal, as questions about concrete bonding that resulted after the administration of former President Chen Shui-bian left rebar and tie wires exposed to the elements for six months while construction was suspended have been resolved.
Other setbacks such as general contractors and consulting firms abandoning the project are real cause for worry, however, even though the plant buildings appear to be up to scratch as far as engineering standards are concerned.
(CNA photo)I&C system architecture remains a serious cause for alarm. The Chen administration’s sudden suspension of work in 2000 resulted in havoc for later component contractors, including those for the reactors. Nor did that administration provide for the needed workers and funding when work was resumed. Construction standards are likely to have been compromised by the many tricks firms played to ensure they got paid.
At least 40,000 I&C nodes will have to be connected to bring the plant on line, but because of the many changes in contractors the entire system has become very confused. The fact that in the early stages subcontracting began before the overall design of the plant was finished is a major reason for the continuing problems.
Taipower’s biggest mistake was failing to base the design on the blueprint and construction experience of Japan’s Kashiwasaki-Kariwa facility, built during the same period.
As a result, the company redesigned every single coupling mechanism, and subcontracted each one out, resulting in today’s interface questions and safety concerns.
Quality control after subcontracting was left up to contractors, which of course led to unreliable evaluations. In addition, the efforts of supervisory units in the Atomic Energy Council and Ministry of Economic Affairs were hampered by staff shortages.
Over time, I&C components became obsolete as work repeatedly halted and restarted, and warehousing was not carried out according to specifications. Documentation on this aspect of Lungmen is not to be trusted.
Even basic geological and seismic data are out of date. Information regarding nearby undersea volcanoes and the Manila subduction zone has not been updated since work began over 20 years ago. Moreover, the facility’s earthquake resistant design needs to be tested against the latest seismic data. On this point Taipower has been especially negligent.
The Lungmen plant has been a snafu from the get-go, leaving it with minimal credibility at best. But nuclear safety is a professional issue that cannot be handled through the exaggerated rhetoric of politics. Only when all questions regarding the station have been clarified will there be sound basis for a referendum. (THN)
(This commentary originally appeared in the United Daily News March 4, 2013.)