But in reviewing, evaluating, and adjusting the future direction of the ROC's "mainland policy," decision-makers must never ignore nor underestimate what the Chinese Communists have harvested from their tactics against Taiwan in recent years. Only by keeping past experience in mind can the ROC be sure that the Taiwan-mainland interactions will not bring adverse effects on its long-term national security and the expansion of its external relations. The so-called "united front tactics" launched by Peking over the past few decades fall into two general areas.
First, the field of international affairs: Ever since U.S. President Richard Nixon visited the mainland in 1972, the Communists have engaged in a series of united front offensives against Taiwan with fruitful results. They have not only forced the ROC to pull out of the United Nations and its subordinate organizations, but also have done their best to win over those countries with diplomatic relations with the ROC. As a result, the ROC has been isolated internationally—it currently maintains official ties with only 22 countries, and holds membership in merely eight intergovernmental organizations. In their attempt to suppress the ROC's activities in the international community, the Communists have already scored significant victories.
Second, the domestic field: Peking's tactics against the ROC achieved limited results because the internal solidarity of Taiwan effectively blocked both Communist threats and allurements. For example, over a 16-year period the ROC successfully boycotted their "three links, four exchanges" proposals (that is, links through mail, transport, and trade, plus economic, technological, cultural, and sports exchanges).
The ROC's mainland policy remained basically the same until last October, when the government announced that it would allow residents in Taiwan to visit their families and relatives on the mainland. Since then, ROC policies and measures toward the mainland have become more liberal. Many long-standing restrictions have been relaxed or lifted in the past year; these have resulted in the opening of imports of mainland pharmaceutical raw materials, granting of permission for reprinting "non-political" mainland publications, relaxing of import restrictions on mainland agricultural and industrial raw materials, and allowing of mail to be sent to the mainland through the Red Cross Society of China in Taipei.
These new policies can be regarded as the ROC's reply to the "three links, four exchanges" proposals made by the Communists. But, as can be expected, these fast changes have caused some problems of adjustment in the ROC's long-held stand and feeling toward the mainland. Since Taiwan has fewer chips to play in international politics, it must endure the anxiety and pressure of knowing "one mistake loses all." The principles of prudence and patience must therefore be kept firmly in mind.
The ROC government and people should both reach the following consensus: A more liberal mainland policy is necessary, and any measure that can reduce the long-time hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, or even promote mutual understanding, will be helpful not only to future Taiwan-mainland relations but also to the security of the Western Pacific region.
Unlike the ROC's policy of allowing residents to visit relatives on the mainland, Peking's "three links, four exchanges" proposals are formulated on different principles. Instead of humanitarian reasons, these are a key part of its political strategy. ROC leaders should therefore carefully avoid being taken advantage of by Peking's united front strategy while taking further steps in the new "mainland policies." President Lee Teng-hui raised the same warning during a meeting of the ruling Kuomintang's Central Standing Committee earlier this year: "The contacts between the two sides is not a passionate, romantic illusion, but a very serious topic." Clearly, whatever the ROC's new mainland policy will be, national security and social stability have to remain high priorities.
Priorities in developing a proper mainland policy are indeed essential. The ROC leadership must determine the best premises upon which to operate, and should constantly review and evaluate all measures with the goals of revising and strengthening past policies and drafting new ones that will be even more effective. For example, while the ROC repeatedly emphasizes the humanitarian consideration of its family visits policy, and the economic advantage of opening Taiwan to imports of mainland materials, the Communists across the Straits instead highlight only the political significance of these policies. Given this situation, ROC decision-makers should always question whether security is strengthened or not, and whether or not a more liberal mainland policy will result in breakthroughs in the ROC's external relations. The latter question prompts yet another: Will Peking renounce the use of its united front offensive against the ROC in the international community?
In the development of the ROC's mainland policy thus far, many observers have gained the impression that most governmental agencies seem to be quite self-centered, an orientation that impairs the development of a coherent and effective mainland policy. That is to say, each governmental agency handles its own affairs while overall coordination and planning are neglected. In addition, a clear concept of linkage among a liberal standpoint, national security, and a diplomatic breakthrough is still lacking. Both of these issues make the problem even more complicated.
On the other hand, the Communists use the "three links, four exchanges" as a tactic for integrating Taiwan-mainland relations, which is to the ROC's disadvantage as long as it wants to continue its current mainland policy. The Executive Yuan's plan to set up a working group on mainland issues is a step in the right direction to help monitor the rapidly-changing situation. The concept of a "liberal as well as safe" policy should be stressed so that leaders will be reminded to base their decisions on integrated political, diplomatic, and security considerations. Such an approach will greatly assist the ROC in achieving its long-range goals.
The ROC government's decision to adopt a more liberal mainland policy is basically a positive and active move. In the past months, however, Peking has not reciprocated with well-intentioned or clear signals. There is no indication that the Communists expect to change their tactics of attempting to weaken the ROC's voice in the international community and trying to undermine the solidarity of the island. Thus, while the ROC pursues its more open policies toward the mainland, more effective measures must be found at the same time to force Peking to give up such united front offensives as trying to isolate the ROC internationally and pressing the U.S. to reduce its ROC arms sales.
In actual practice, mutual contacts between Taiwan and the mainland can be undertaken in three stages: indirect one-way, indirect two-way, and direct two-way. But the ROC must have clear proof that Peking is sincere in undertaking a "peaceful race" and no longer emphasizes the "three links, four exchanges" before it enters a new stage.
The speedy development of the ROC's mainland policy has thus far brought about some worrisome phenomena. Some people, for example, have demonstrated excessive eagerness to make investments on the mainland; some emphasize "unification" and wish it would come soon; others advocate the so-called "self-determination," which means the future of Taiwan should be determined only by people living on the island. None of these is realistic nor to the ROC's advantage, at least given the current situation. The government must therefore be extremely careful in dealing with these various points of view.
Above all, a consensus should be reached among all the people on Taiwan. While a greater flexibility in the ROC's overall mainland policy is worth affirming and supporting, everyone should take a slow, prudent approach to the issue, at the same time strengthening the links among the ROC's security, stability, and diplomatic policies.
The government's decision to initiate a more liberal mainland policy is highly appropriate. As the late President Chiang Ching-kuo once said: "Times are changing, environments are changing, and circumstances are changing." But shifts in governmental policy must first acquire a consensus among the people. Otherwise, divergence in public opinion might not only slow down progress, but also result in undesirable social fragmentation and confrontation.
When the ruling Kuomintang drafts any new policy shift toward the mainland, it should take into account the possibility that Peking will continue pursuing further united front strategies, and it should play a more active leading role in consolidating Taiwan's security by promoting more freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Through this approach, the outstanding achievements already made by the 20 million people in the ROC on Taiwan can bring considerable influence to bear on the one billion Chinese on the mainland. —(Dr. Kau Ying-mao is a professor of political science at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.)