When this issue of the Free China Review is off the press, the Baguio SEATO Conference will meet in less than a week. While we would yield to none in offering our best wishes to the participants for every success at the conference, a brief review of its historical antecedents leaves us in little doubt that not too much may be expected of SEATO.
When President Chiang Kai-shek met President Elpidio Quirino of the Republic of the at in July, 1949, the idea was broached that some sort of an organization of an anti-Communist nature would strengthen the security of the Republic of the t and the Republic of China. A joint communique was issued at the end of the meeting. When President Chiang Kai-shek met President Syngman Rhee of the at Chinhae shortly thereafter, the procedure was repeated and a joint communique was also issued.
In May, 1950, seven nations - , , , , , and the - met at with the ostensible purpose of discussing mutual security in a world which was threatened by the aggression of International Communism. During the preliminary exploratory stage, the Republic of China made it amply clear to the host state that, unless it was the intention of the conference to discuss matters on the basic premises of anti-Communism and ways and means of common security, the Republic of China was not keen on associating herself with such a conference. The agenda of the conference was very much watered down. Under the influence of , and , the conference did not discuss military matted, ignored the Communist menace altogether and pledged political, economic and cultural cooperation among the participating countries. The delegates probably all had a good time together, but little was accomplished. As the was not too eager to assume any large part in the proceeding, of the conference, she was represented by an observer.
Since then, the has concluded collective security pacts with and , , the and . In these pacts, only two types of action were contemplated. One is for diplomatic consultation whenever "the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened," (-Philippines Pact, Article III; U.S.-Australia-New Zealand Pact, Article III) The other is that, in the event of an external attack, each party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process." (U. S.-Philippines Pact, Article IV; U.S.-Australia-New Pact. Article IV)
As we editorially commented in the July, 1953 issue of the Free China Review, "to have a security part which provides merely, for diplomatic consultations is to have no security pact at all. Without a pact, we know of few circumstances where diplomatic consultation may not be held between friendly governments: As to acting in accordance with either party's constitutional process. a citizen of a friendly country usually does, not hope and certainly has no right to expect the authorities of another country to act in defiance of their constitutional process." We then concluded, "a pact that has no teeth in its provisions for sanction can at best be a palliative to a dire situation or an emotional sop to grave physical ills."
It was only after the fall of Dienbienphu in when the fate of was sealed that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles began to canvass in mid-April this year the possibility of a Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). On August 14, the governments of , , the , , the United States, , and the made identical statements to the effect that, the situation in Southeast Asia makes it necessary to establish in accordance with the aims and principles of the U. N. Charter an organization for collective security, so that the structure for peace in Southeastern Asia and the general area of Southwestern Pacific may be strengthened.
The had wished that all Colombo Plan countries - , , , and - would attend. Of these, only will attend, a fact which is not likely to encourage the to take a leading part in the proceedings. That the conference may put teeth into any final instrument providing for more positive action than "diplomatic consultations" and acting in accordance with each contracting party's "constitutional process" is unlikely. That the conference will come out in unequivocal terms against International Communism is an even more remote probability. We fail to see what may offer beyond the terms of the bilateral treaties of collective security with the on the one side and and , the , and on the other.
The Republic of China, as we see it, finds it appropriate to repeat today what Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh stated on May 28, 1952: "Any Pacific alliance to combat the Red menace will be a failure unless and until the participating countries declare the Communist Party illegal and strive to eliminate all Communists from within their borders ... It will be of no use to form such an alliance unless and until the pact is anti-Communist in nature."
After the washout of such comforting slogans as "the policy of containment," "the policy of liberation," and "immediate massive retaliation," we regret not having seen any evidence to support the hope that the coming conference will not follow the way of these once comforting slogans.
NEATO (Northeast Asian Treaty Organization) has received some attention in the press early in August. An INS story dated August stated that "the has informally sounded out , and about organizing a three-power Northeast Asian defense alliance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed at his news conference on August 3 that the has considered the possibility of such an alliance." The INS story went on to say that "other officials said on August 4 that in the past few weeks Dulles has discussed the plan 'a number of times' with his advisers and that 'highly informal' talks already have been held with envoys of the Asian nations. No decision has been reached and none of the three Asian powers has indicated acceptance of the idea."
Even the INS story recognized that "there are formidable difficulties in the way of such a pact." First, the Koreans whose country was occupied for more than 40 years by consider the Japanese as much their enemy as the Communists. Even if such outstanding questions as Japanese property in , the Rhee line on fishing in international waters and Koreans residing in have been solved to the satisfaction of both parties, the psychological predisposition of the Koreans against the Japanese will still block the way.
The Japanese have a "no war" clause in their Constitution. Sentiment in tends to the preservation of 's advantage in bargaining with the in her fence-sitting position. She has a strong excuse in the threat of the Moscow-Peiping treaty of 1950 which singled Japan out as a possible threat and provided that the signatory parties will work together to halt any "aggressive" move by Japan or her allies.
INS reported that, despite such difficulties, officials believe it is worthwhile to make a try for the pact. These officials reason that, , and the Republic of China together have the greatest anti-Communist military force in and also have the largest potential. Therefore, State Department planners think that any rational system of defense in would have to include these countries.
Walter H. Waggoner. correspondent of The New York Times, reported the same answer of Secretary of State Dulles in the following terms: "A security pact linking the with . and Nationalist China has been considered here as a way to strengthen further the defenses of the ... No decision had been reached to push forward such an alliance ... But thought had been given to the idea, and it had come under preliminary investigation and examination.
The INS story was good, wide-awake reporting spiced with a little legitimate editing, but we prefer to think of the Times story as having stuck closer to the actual words used by Secretary of State Dulles. NEATO has not grown beyond the "preliminary investigation and examination" stage. We do not expect the idea to develop very much farther and we have no reason to lope that it will, in the foreseeable future, he realized in actual fact in international relations.
The realistic approach to the problem is still through the extension of the scope of bilateral treaties of collective security. To those now existing, it would not be a staggering burden for the United Slates to add a treaty between the and the Republic of China and another between the and the Royal Thai Government. There lies the way, only the will is wanting. Should the government wish to add to these bilateral treaties other cross-ties by linking the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines together in one international instrument, or the U. S., the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China together in another single instrument, we see no ground to suppose that such multilateral treaties would weaken collective security in Eastern Asia or the general are of Southwestern Pacific.