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Taiwan Today

Taiwan Review

After Morakot

November 01, 2009
A National Airborne Service Corps helicopter performs rescue work along the flooding Taimali River in Taitung County.

PHOTOS BY CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY

The worst weather-related disaster in decades hit Taiwan hard, but the government is responding with a comprehensive reconstruction effort.

On August 14, 2009, President Ma Ying-jeou convened the first national security meeting since he took office in May 2008. In response to the hundreds of deaths and large-scale damage caused by Typhoon Morakot, which brought record rainfall to southern Taiwan from August 7 to August 10, the president ordered the marshalling of all available resources for relief and reconstruction efforts. In addition to the mobilization of all students at the Central Police University and Taiwan Police College, Ma directed that all military personnel, apart from the minimum number required to ensure Taiwan’s defense, should prepare to take part in the rescue and relief effort.

At the meeting, Ma lauded the rescue of more than 2,200 survivors on August 13 by the military and the Ministry of the Interior’s (MOI) National Airborne Service Corps, noting that Taiwan had never seen so many people rescued by helicopter in a single day. By the end of August, the total had reached nearly 10,000. All told, more than 4,400 military flights and more than 270 MOI flights transported around 24,000 survivors and carried relief materials, according to the National Rescue Command Center under the Executive Yuan.

Extreme Weather

Few could have predicted the need for such a massive mobilization in early August as Typhoon Morakot was approaching Taiwan. After making landfall, the typhoon’s center tracked across the northern part of the island, which nevertheless escaped the brunt of its destructive force due to the storm’s much stronger peripheral air circulation in the south. Morakot’s slow movement across the island resulted in torrential, prolonged rainfall in central and southern Taiwan. Some of the hardest-hit areas received more than 1,000 millimeters of rain in a single day and nearly 3,000 millimeters during the four days the typhoon and its remnants lingered over the island. Rainfall in Taiwan usually totals between 2,000 to 2,500 millimeters on the plains and up to 4,000 millimeters in mountainous areas annually. On August 8, a mountain area in southern Taiwan’s Pingtung County set a one-day record for the island by receiving 1,403 millimeters of rain. The previous one-day record was the 1,222 millimeters Typhoon Amber dumped on Hualien in eastern Taiwan in 1997.

The continuous rainfall hindered immediate rescue efforts, President Ma explained in response to criticism that the government had been somewhat slow to start search and rescue operations. According to Joses Wu, deputy director-general of the Water Resources Agency, the typhoon’s extreme rainfall fits an emerging pattern in Taiwan, which in recent years has seen more annual rainfall but fewer rainy days. A possible result of global climate change, this type of weather pattern could become more extreme if temperatures continue rising.

According to the MOI’s Department of Household Registration, as of mid-September, more than 600 people were confirmed to have died as a result of Morakot, with around 150 missing or unidentified. The greatest concentration of casualties occurred in Xiaolin Village, Kaohsiung County, southern Taiwan, which was swallowed up by mudslides that buried hundreds of residents alive. Most of the survivors in Xiaolin and other villages that were destroyed were first housed in temporary shelters, then moved to military camps and government housing for veterans to await the construction of permanent homes.

Morakot also damaged about 250 sections of road and railway systems. Most notable was the Shuangyuan Bridge linking Pingtung and Kaohsiung counties, which saw a lengthy section of its 2-kilometer span washed away by the flooding Gaoping River. Agriculture and aquaculture losses resulting from the typhoon are estimated at more than NT$16 billion (US$484.8 million), according to the Cabinet-level Council of Agriculture (COA). In some aspects, such as the numerous broken bridges, the typhoon was a more destructive force than the massive earthquake that struck Taiwan on September 21, 1999, which registered 7.3 on the Richter scale and killed more than 2,400 people.

Improved Forecasting

The Control Yuan, the government’s highest watchdog body, has begun evaluating the performance of the Central Weather Bureau (CWB) under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) in the days before and during Morakot. Meanwhile, the CWB, the only organization with the legal authority to release weather forecasts in Taiwan, plans to improve its hazardous weather monitoring and forecasting systems in a six-year project that will start in 2010 and cost about NT$1.9 billion (US$57.6 million). Among other things, the current system, which provides forecasts for Taiwan’s 16 counties and seven larger cities, will be expanded to include forecasts for more than 300 townships. Updated weather information will be available to all township residents every three hours, a major improvement over the current 12-hour interval for cities and counties. The upgraded system is expected to provide more timely warnings for both local residents and disaster management agencies about dangerous weather conditions such as typhoons and torrential rainfall.

 

Former Premier Liu Chao-shiuan, third right in white cap, travels flooded streets by raft in Linbian Township, Pingtung County to inspect rescue and relief work.

In the face of one of Taiwan’s worst weather-related disasters, President Ma chose not to issue an emergency order, as some had called for. Ma explained his decision by saying that the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act, which was promulgated in 2000 in response to the 1999 earthquake, already provided an adequate framework for disaster management.

In response to criticism concerning the initial lack of rescue coordination among different levels of government, the president proposed strengthening existing systems by creating a disaster prevention and rescue agency to take over the disaster management work of the National Fire Agency (NFA), which operates under the MOI. Established in 1995, the NFA’s mission has expanded from fire control to include the day-to-day response to various events including typhoons, earthquakes, explosions and air crashes. It does so in accordance with the policies of the Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council, which was formed under the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act. Under that act, the premier is designated as the convener of the council.

In times of a major disaster like Morakot, the coordination of emergency services falls to the 24-hour Central Emergency Operations Center under the MOI. After Morakot struck, the premier assigned MOTC Minister Mao Chi-kuo to command the emergency operations center during the initial rescue period.

Other post-Morakot government plans include forming, staffing and providing facilities for disaster management bureaus in county governments. More helicopters and other rescue equipment will be purchased. Ma also called for the military to include disaster prevention and rescue as one of its central missions and as an integral part of budgeting and personnel systems. Accordingly, the Ministry of National Defense will make disaster management one of its major policy focuses in its next white paper on national defense.

Focus on Reconstruction

The reconstruction stage of the government’s response to the typhoon began on August 15 with the formation of the Executive Yuan’s Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Commission, which is tasked with supervising the work. The commission was established in accordance with the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act, with the premier acting as convener and vice premier acting as deputy convener. Accordingly, former Premier Liu Chao-shiuan and former Vice Premier Chiu Cheng-hsiung served in those roles. August 28 saw the promulgation of the Special Statute Governing Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction, which carries a NT$120 billion (US$3.6 billion) budget. On September 10, with more than 90 percent of the approximately 5,000 survivors housed in temporary accommodations and more than 80 percent of relief funds distributed to individuals and households, Liu stepped down as premier to take political responsibility for the government’s response to the disaster. Wu Den-yih, Liu’s successor as premier and a former legislator and secretary-general of the ruling Kuomintang, and new Vice Premier Eric Li-luan Chu, former magistrate of Taoyuan County, vowed to focus on the reconstruction work begun by Liu’s Cabinet.

 

President Ma Ying-jeou, second right, on his way to viewing a collapsed river dike in Gaoshu Township, Pingtung County

Tsai Hsung-hsiung, chief executive officer of the Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Commission, points out that even as the commission began working on reconstruction plans, earlier jobs such as cleanup efforts to remove sludge in flooded areas, as well as driftwood from farmland, ports, dams and waterways, were still continuing. “We are trying to avoid interrupting the previously begun stage of post-disaster work,” says Tsai, who also concurrently serves as minister without portfolio and minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), which is responsible for drafting the general reconstruction guidelines for disaster areas. The CEPD plan divides the more than 10,000 square kilometers of land affected by mudslides, flooding or land subsidence with subsequent inundation by seawater into 15 reconstruction zones spanning seven counties or 57 townships in central and southern Taiwan.

Local Governments Shine

In some of the areas hit hardest by Morakot, the response to the disaster by local governments has been quite effective. The Pingtung County Government, for example, worked with scholars and experts from National Pingtung University of Science and Technology (NPUST), National Taiwan University (NTU) and the National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction under the Cabinet-level National Science Council to perform a scientific survey of flooded areas and produce lists of affected households. By August 22, relief funds had been allocated to the designated households in some of the most affected townships, including those of Donggang, Linbian and Jiadong in Pingtung County.

 

The Dalai Lama conducts a ceremony at the site of Kaohsiung County’s Xiaolin Village, which was destroyed by massive mudslides caused by Morakot.

Su Ming-daw, a professor in NTU’s Department of Bioenvironmental Systems Engineering, participated in the Pingtung relief project and witnessed the great effort put forth by his students, members of the Taiwan Geographic Information Society, of which he is the president, and local government officials. While he was waiting at the Kaohsiung High Speed Rail station to catch his train back to Taipei, Su recalls being touched when he saw a group of young people trying to clean off the mud caked onto their clothing from performing volunteer work in the disaster area. “At that time, my heart opened very, very big,” he says.

Most of the survivors of the Morakot disaster hail from aboriginal communities in mountainous areas. “The reconstruction work in tribal areas must not be considered just from the Han people’s geographic or engineering viewpoints,” says Lin Wan-i, a professor in the Department of Social Work at NTU and former minister without portfolio. “The government shouldn’t force the aborigines out of the mountains but rather should take into account their history, culture, society and livelihood, which are closely interconnected.”

CEPD Minister Tsai points out that the research and preservation work done by the Cabinet-level Council for Cultural Affairs and constant dialogue with affected indigenous peoples will serve as the basis of rebuilding aboriginal communities in accordance with their living, religious and cultural traditions. “In terms of relocation to avoid future disasters,” Tsai says, “there are different considerations and arrangements for those survivors that provide for some to live in their original villages or townships and some to live outside them.”

The requirement for relocation, if necessary, is primarily the result of environmental and land conservation factors, as are the CEPD’s reconstruction zoning plans, which distinguish among areas of land where development is prohibited, restricted or otherwise unsuitable for development. At the national security meeting on August 14, President Ma urged renewed discussion of the MOI’s draft National Land Planning Act. First promoted more than a decade ago, the act would set comprehensive guidelines for the development or management of various land areas such as aboriginal villages, farmland, mountain slopes, seacoasts and outlying islands. However, persistent controversies concerning the designation of such zones and ownership disputes among different ethnic and social groups continuously interrupted the legislative process before the shock of Morakot once again pushed it into the spotlight.

Land planning is a pressing issue because improper land use can compound the effects of heavy rainfall. One of the environmental factors that may have contributed to Morakot’s mudslides is human development on steep mountain slopes, as clearing trees and other vegetation with strong root systems to make way for roads, buildings and crops can weaken soil structure. “Road construction in the mountains is the most harmful thing because it leads to extensive development activities along the roads,” Tsai says. The CEPD minister cites the overuse of slopeland for growing fruit, tea and betel nut as a major problem in some Morakot disaster zones, as the widespread clearing of areas to make room for crops can destabilize slopes.

Tsai points out that while the National Land Planning Act has not yet been promulgated, quite a few regulations meant to guide land development have been put into place. Enforcing the regulations, however, has proven to be a problem. In the early 1970s, regulations guiding land development began to extend beyond urban areas with the passage of legislation such as the Construction Act in 1973. That act established management categories for non-urban lands, including forests, slopeland, scenic spots and national parks; agricultural areas; industrial zones; and residential districts. In 1976, the Slopeland Conservation and Use Act was passed, followed in 1994 by the promulgation of the Water and Soil Conservation Act, which empowers the COA and local governments to take legal action against violators. Responsible for issuing mudslide warnings, the COA currently monitors more than 1,500 river or creek basins that have been identified as susceptible to the slides.

Key Factors

In the event of a major calamity like Morakot, it can be hard to determine the extent to which environmental factors or human involvement are to blame, but there is little doubt that improper development can make things worse. Tsai says that, with its high population density and relatively unstable geology, Taiwan should learn to make peace with the natural environment instead of continually challenging nature with engineering projects. “We must know when and where to avoid any development and just take a rest,” the minister says.

Ting Cheh-shyh, an NPUST professor of civil engineering, echoes Tsai’s point, saying that it is impossible to construct engineering projects quickly enough to catch up with environmental and climate changes. Ting, director of his school’s water resources education and research center, says that the values and concepts of national land planning and development should be realized through the coordination of legislative and regulatory efforts. Among other things, Ting suggests that greater effort should be made to monitor and limit the impact of construction work and urban development in areas vulnerable to flooding or mudslides.

The CEPD’s Tsai says that the government will guide reconstruction work according to comprehensive management principles. With respect to rebuilding transportation links, for instance, “roads, bridges and rivers will be jointly examined and managed together,” he says. The reconstruction chief’s proposal to channel floodwater to lower regions or temporary retaining ponds instead of relying solely on engineering efforts such as reinforcing riverbeds is echoed by Hong Hui-xiang, director of the board of the Pingtung Environmental Protection Union, a branch of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union. Hong points out that watercourses like the Linbian River, which flooded Linbian Township as Morakot dumped rain in the area, should not be contained by extended dikes as they are now, but rather be allowed to follow their natural course, with proper diversion channels directing floodwater to less developed areas when necessary. “Public policies should take all relevant factors into account to avoid too much reliance on construction and too little concern over environmental impact,” he says.


Major points excerpted from the
Special Statute Governing Morakot
Post-Disaster Reconstruction

•The reconstruction work shall recognize the central value of people and their lifestyle, with emphases on pluralistic cultural features, community participation, national land security and environmental resource conservation.

•Representatives of disaster survivors and aboriginal peoples shall compose no less than one fifth of the 33 to 37 members of the Executive Yuan’s Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Commission.

•Post-disaster reconstruction plans submitted by individual governmental organizations shall involve rebuilding of homes, facilities, businesses, lifestyle and culture with adequate recognition of national land protection.

•The central government shall establish service centers in disaster areas to provide welfare services such as psychological care, schooling and employment.

•Companies that win bids for construction work shall put disaster survivors on their employment priority lists and by doing so shall be awarded compensation by the government.

•Enterprises that experience operational difficulties resulting from the typhoon shall receive relief funding from the central government. Enterprises shall receive a tax deduction for any donations to disaster survivors.

•Reconstruction work shall respect local people, communities, tribes, culture and lifestyle in disaster areas. Regarding areas of land that are dangerous or illegally developed in disaster areas, central and local governments shall reach consensus with local residents to specify regions where habitation or development is restricted or people are obliged to move out. Those obliged to move will be properly accommodated.

•To avoid the spread of infectious diseases in disaster areas, the Cabinet-level Department of Health shall prepare relevant medical resources including vaccines, medicine and equipment, as well as sufficient medical staff. Temporary medical stations shall be formed if necessary.

•Those listed as missing as a result of Typhoon Morakot shall be investigated and recognized as dead, if applicable, by prosecuting authorities as requested by legal heirs.

•This statute shall be effective for three years following its promulgation.

This excerpt from the Special Statute Governing Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction is offered for general information only and is not an official translation. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and English texts, the Chinese text shall govern.

Write to Pat Gao at kotsijin@gmail.com

                                            

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