Taiwan Today

Democratic elections, complete with energetic campaigning, have become a common aspect of life in the ROC on Taiwan. But the elections held last December 3 had a special importance. Three strong political parties vied for three of the most prominent political offices on the island: the provincial governor and the mayors of the special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung. Prior to this election, all three offices had been appointed. After approval by the central standing committee of the Kuomintang (KMT), the country’s ruling party, the ROC president appointed the mayors; the premier nominated the governor, who was then confirmed by a vote of the Provincial Assembly.

Today, the expression “ruling party” is well on its way out of the political vocabulary. It is being replaced by the more accurate term “majority party.” The change in terminology is an indication of how far Taiwan has come in its democratic development, especially in the past decade. From an island under martial law and one-party dominance has emerged a healthy multiparty democratic environment.

Impressive as this may be, the process of democratization is still under way. The national legislators will run for re-election for the first time at the end of this year and the first direct election for ROC president is slated for 1996. Moreover, various democratic institutions, including private civic interest and political action groups, have yet to take deep root. And the political system itself is still maturing. For example, legislative support systems, including a legislative research arm and adequate legislative committee staffs, are still being formed, and the judicial system is being reviewed for possible overhaul. Even the concept of national identity, in the context of cross-strait relations with Mainland China, has yet to be resolved.

From any perspective, however, the December elections were a milestone in democratic development. In order to plumb the depths of the social and political changes indicated by the election, the Free China Review compiled this special section on Post-Election Analysis. The first article was written especially for this magazine by a long-time observer of Taiwan’s elections at all levels: James A. Robinson, professor emeritus and regents professor of political science at the University of West Florida. Following his analysis are edited versions of two public speeches on the elections. These were given by Antonio Chiang (江春男),publisher of The Journalist, one of Taiwan’s top political magazines, and by Chu Yun-han (朱雲漢), professor of political science at National Taiwan University and director of research at the Institute for National Policy Research. Both presentations were given on December 7 at a seminar sponsored by the China News, an English-language daily published in Taipei, and the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The section closes with interviews by the Free China Review with Hsieh Fu-sheng(謝復生), professor of political science at National Chengchi University, and Hu Fu(胡佛), professor of political science at National Taiwan University.

Professor James A. Robinson,
University of West Florida:

The most important election in decades. The first elected governor in 400 years. Record voter turnouts. Biased TV coverage. The most expensive campaign ever. Corruption and intimidation charged. Huge popular rallies. Prelude to the 1996 presidential election. The rise of the most democratic society in Asia.

Such were the headlines during the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s December 3, 1994, elections—and they were not just so much hyperbole. More than 10.5 million voters went to the polls after the most spirited campaign period in memory. Candidates from three major parties as well as a number of independents vied for seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the city councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung.

But voter attention focused overwhelmingly on the races for Taiwan governor and the mayoral races for the island’s two largest metropolitan areas. It was the first time voters were able to elect their own governor and, although the city councils for both Taipei and Kaohsiung have been popularly elected for decades, it was the voters’ first chance since 1964 to elect the Taipei mayor and the first time since 1979 to select the mayor of Kaohsiung.

Taiwan residents have always taken elections seriously, but the turnout on this Election Day reached record or near-record highs. In Kaohsiung, a stunning 80.58 percent of eligible voters cast ballots for mayor. The turnout for the gubernatorial and Taipei mayor races exceeded 75 percent, significantly higher than the norm of 70 percent established over decades of elections to the assembly and city councils. Fair weather islandwide and a national holiday played a part in bringing out the vote, but the main draw was no doubt the novelty of having the three offices simultaneously contested for the first time. The keen three-party competition between the Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the New Party also built the campaign fervor to extraordinarily high levels. Starting in early November, island conversations seemed invariably to gravitate toward one topic: the elections.

Taiwan voters have been active participants at the ballot box ever since elections were instituted for local-level offices in 1950. Voting rates typically hover at 70 percent. This ranks quite high among the handful of countries that allow people to elect their own officials. The continuing high participation rate indicates that more than novelty or pride are motivating factors. Local voters see themselves as active participants in the political process. Their continuing interest in balloting indicates that voter turnout need not decline as people become used to democratic experience.

Prior to Election Day, dense crowds attended huge public rallies throughout the island. Some of the largest were in Taipei. One week before the election, the DPP drew fifty thousand for a Saturday night festival of speeches and songs. And on the last two nights of the campaign, the New Party filled the plaza around the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and a city baseball stadium with more than fifty thousand each. From Keelung in the north to Kenting in the south, streets, buildings, taxis, and buses displayed colorful banners, posters, candidate photos, and election slogans. And every newspaper and magazine was crammed with political ads, surpassing anything seen previously.

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions to the island’s political development was the first-time televised debates among mayoral candidates in Taipei and Kaohsiung. Although the gubernatorial candidates did not debate on television, they appeared several times together, with each presenting prepared statements on their platforms. This use of the media established precedents that are likely to be followed in coming years.

Excitement and tension swept the island during the weeks before the vote. Anxieties about potential violence also heightened, especially on the last two or three days before the election. On December 1, Premier Lien Chan authorized special security measures after meeting with the Cabinet, and the Minister of the Interior summoned seventy thousand police to be ready for deployment. The National Police Administration also brought out barbed wire, riot gear, and other security equipment on election eve—just in case. Meanwhile, prosecutors at the Ministry of Justice reported more than six hundred allegations of election-related improprieties, including vote-buying.

As the high feelings crescendoed with the Election Day victory celebrations that kicked off around 9:00 PM at the winners’ campaign headquarters, it became clear that violence would not be a problem. The news media reported the balloting results as they came in, and by the time the official counts appeared on the computerized bulletin boards at the Central Election Commission’s tally center at Taipei City Stadium, the results were already clear—all three major political parties had reason to celebrate.

In Taipei, DPP Legislator and former City Council Member Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) became Taipei’s mayor. It was another first. This is the highest-visibility administrative office yielded thus far by the ruling KMT to the opposition as a result of an election. (In the last popular election for mayor, in 1964, independent Henry Kao defeated the KMT candidate. But the ruling party then altered the rules and made mayors appointive in cities of one million and larger.) Chen’s election took the island another major step forward in its democratization. To the tradition of regular elections, voters have added the ultimate in democratic practice: voting one party out and another in. The mayoral victory in Taipei was especially symbolic for the DPP because it is the capital city and the residence of the largest concentration of mainland-born citizens and their descendents.

To the competition between the DPP and KMT was added a third party challenge from the energetic and enthusiastic New Party. The New Party had been founded only fifteen months earlier by dissidents within the KMT. Led by legislators Jaw Shau-kong (趙少康) and Wang Chien-shien (王建煊), the New Party had won few votes and fewer offices in the late 1993 and early 1994 county and local elections. This time, with the dynamic and experienced Jaw as its candidate for Taipei mayor, the New Party threatened to win a vital contest in its own right.

In the race for Taipei mayor, the size and spirit of the New Party, DPP, and KMT rallies were something rarely seen before in Taiwan. Friendly, chanting crowds interacted enthusiastically with party speakers and entertainers. These enormous gatherings and congregations of cheering supporters were preceded by miles-long caravans of taxis, private cars, trucks, and buses bearing party pennants and flags, filling the streets that led to the rally sites. Were winning platforms and victorious candidates decided according to crowd size and collective noise, the Taipei mayoral race would have been difficult to decide. But in the end, the election result was decided by democratic ballot, not by decibel levels and stomping feet.

The landslide victory by James Soong (宋楚瑜) over DPP candidate Chen Ding-nan (陳定南), New Party candidate Ju Gau-jeng (朱高正), and independent candidates Tsai Cheng-chih (蔡正治) and Wu Tzu (吳梓) was distinctive for several reasons. Although a long-time member of the KMT and a party functionary virtually all his adult career, Soong never had run for public office. He climbed to prominence on the rungs of party and bureaucratic ladders. He had been secretary and translator for the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, director of party propaganda and government information, deputy secretary-general of the party, and then its secretary-general after Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Chingkuo as party chairman.

Soong’s period as party leader and confidant of the new president coincided with numerous reforms in both the KMT and the government. But when the DPP scored impressive gains in the 1992 elections for the Legislative Yuan, Soong offered his resignation to take responsibility. Worn by years of party controversy, his future was unclear to observers. Premier Lien appointed him governor of Taiwan province in 1993, making him the first mainland-born governor in a generation. This post had long been reserved for a Taiwan-born politician as part of the KMT’s “Taiwanization program” initiated in the 1960s by President Chiang Ching-kuo. President Lee had served in this post before becoming vice president, as had Premier Lien before being appointed to head the Cabinet.

Soong used the appointment as governor as a steppingstone to being elected to the office. But many political observers pointed out that he was working against strong odds. They said it would be difficult indeed for a mainland-born KMT stalwart to win the allegiance of the island’s Taiwan-born voters, which make up 85 percent of the electorate.

Soong proved them wrong. In eighteen months of nonstop activity, he reportedly visited every one of the province’s 309 towns and townships. He also became a familiar name through his cultivation of the mass media, especially by vigorous and thorough exposure of his ceremonial visits by local newspapers (including provincially owned papers), weekly paid advertisements in Taipei publications, and islandwide coverage through the provincially owned Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV). Soong was able to reverse the odds and become the hands-down favorite KMT candidate, sidelining the popular Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄), whose considerable experience as Minister of Interior and respect among Hakka Chinese made him a likely and popular candidate. Minister Wu (now secretary-general to the president) withdrew rather than contest Soong, who was then easily nominated by KMT leaders and cadres.

Soong campaigned intensely from August to December. Because of concern in his entourage about DPP opponent Chen Ding-nan, Soong’s campaign became a relentless and costly enterprise. Chen, a former independent magistrate of Ilan county, member of the Legislative Yuan, and recent convert to the DPP, did not have as well-organized and well-backed a campaign. He had narrowly won the nomination in July, and in the weeks leading up to the election, other DPP leaders were not as supportive as their counterparts in the KMT were of James Soong. Nevertheless, Soong ran as if Chen was at his heels the whole race. In the end, Soong won by more than 1 million votes. Chen, with ineffective support and by some reports determinedly inactive participation from DPP county magistrates and city mayors, won only Ilan among the province’s twenty-one counties.

In addition to the three high-profile contests for executive offices, simultaneous elections also produced new city councils in Taipei and Kaohsiung and new members of the Provincial Assembly. The KMT saw its majorities diminished in all three, leaving it with only a plurality in the Taipei City Council. The big winner there was the New Party, with eleven of fourteen candidates in Taipei winning seats. Several of them came in at the top of the vote in the multi-member districts that are the hallmark of Taiwan’s legislative electoral method. The New Party also won two seats in the Kaohsiung City Council and two seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly.

James Soong’s decisive victory in the gubernatorial race has initiated a re-examination of one major campaign issue: the “provincialism complex”—an attempt to divide most of the island’s population between those with family roots in Taiwan prior to 1949, so-called Taiwanese, and those who came after the fall of the mainland to the Chinese Communists, called mainlanders. The status of children born of mixed parentage from these groups is problematic.

Although the population of the province is overwhelmingly Taiwanese, a mainland-born KMT stalwart was accepted. Some attribute this to the KMT’s experienced and advantaged organizational resources. But these are insufficient to explain Soong’s success, because they were also available to Huang Ta-chou (黃大洲), the KMT’s candidate in the Taipei mayor’s race, who nevertheless suffered a humiliating defeat. Nor can the outcome be put down to vote-buying, a problem at last universally acknowledged by the government and also more vigorously prosecuted. Soong’s enormous outlay of NT dollars is widely believed to have gone to more substantial purchases such as travel, advertisements, staff salaries, printing, and communication than to the traditional vote-bribery.

Moreover, it was clear that Taiwanese voters did not take well to the DPP slogan in the gubernatorial campaign: “Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese.” Their rejection admittedly surprised a number of local and foreign journalists and political scientists who were trying to take readings of provincial public opinion. The polls oftentimes failed to help clarify the picture, in part because many people do not understand or trust polling techniques.

It is less difficult, however, to draw implications from the voting results. Post-election interpretations often confuse motives with effects. Whatever the intentions of provincial voters, the consequences of their electoral choices promoted the status quo and preserved stability in the democratic transformation of Taiwan and the mid-course of pragmatic maneuvering between independence and reunification.

If this was the mandate of voters, it coincides with the major trend lines discernible in Taiwan politics since before Chiang Ching-kuo formally launched what is now known as the Democratization Period. Taiwan now enjoys standing as the most democratic polity in Asia besides Japan. Although its process of democratization is still incomplete, Taiwan’s record of frequent, free, and fair elections entitles it to some kind of prize for moving itself from a rigid society under martial law to a freewheeling electoral democracy.

The current agenda for democratic reform is rather clear. Some of the major challenges include perfecting electronic media coverage of parties and candidates in order to increase the flow of objective reporting and analysis as well as to decrease bias and propaganda. Another challenge comes from the continually more exorbitant campaign expenses. Taiwan earns world respect for its growing wealth, yet Japan and the United States have per capita incomes two and a half times greater. Taiwan elections, however, are more expensive than those in Japan or the United States. And campaign costs could well soar even higher when parties and candidates are allowed to buy time on television.

Despite its remaining imperfections, Taiwan’s democratization is a notable achievement. It is also distinguished for having been realized with minimum violence or threats of violence. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Republic of China, was an apostle of Asian—or more exactly—Chinese democracy. He was also an advocate of gradualism, of democratic principles nurtured during a period of tutelage. Over the decades, the island’s political elites have gradually devolved political power from a narrow band of participants to virtually all adult citizens who desire to participate. Gradual, peaceful transformation has been the KMT’s objective. More rapid, but also non-violent transition has been the opposition party’s goal. In tandem they have cooperated to make the so-called Taiwan Experience more than an example of economic growth. They have given the world an unusual lesson in the devolution of power through democratic processes rather than the replacement of power by revolution.

For these reasons, the significance of the 1994 elections is much larger than a listing of which candidates from which parties won offices on a small island of 21 million people. It testifies to the fact that within a generation and a half, leaders and followers can work together to transform a non-democratic polity into an increasingly democratic one. Moreover, it has been done in a region of the world said to be inhospitable to the idea.

The suggestion by some inside and outside Asia that Taiwan has imported an ill-fitted suit of electoral clothes is but a variant of assertions that Asian values and institutions conflict with Western values and institutions. So far as the appropriateness of democracy to Taiwan is concerned, it is worth remembering that Sun Yat-sen mixed Chinese nationalism with Western ideas, but he also modified them to fit the contexts established by Chinese history and culture. Moreover, particular electoral procedures have been borrowed not exclusively from American or European practice but from elsewhere in Asia. For example, Taiwan’s unusual “single-vote, multiple-seat” legislative constituencies apparently derive from Japan, which introduced this method in 1925 and retained it until 1994.

Taiwan, thus, may be said not only to be an instance of gradual, nonviolent democratization, but also a blend of practices and institutions that is at once universal and provincial. Taken together these offer a formula for continuing peace and well-being for the people of Taiwan.

Antonio Chiang,
publisher of The Journalist:

As a professional journalist, I have spent much of my time recently trying to make some sense of the election and its nuances. Seeing the trees is easy enough, but understanding the forest is more difficult.

We have had many elections and they can give people the impression that Taiwan is chaotic because the campaigns often sound so negative. They make many people very worried. But in the end, we know that each election is like a noisy temple ceremony that evokes ghosts or spirits. After the ceremony is over, the ghosts leave and people return to their normal lives. Every year or so over the past decade, there has been some kind of election; they are an essential part of our transformation from an authoritarian government to a democratic one.

Our democratic development has broken down all kinds of political taboos and has created a marketplace of ideas. Slogans and rhetoric during campaigns are no longer so frightening. People end up with clear choices—and in this election they got clear results. One of the best results was that no party was totally defeated. Each had its own victory. The DPP won the Taipei mayor’s race; the KMT won the Taiwan governorship; and the New Party proved that it is going strong because it was the first time for it to garner so many votes. Taiwan actually has a very stable political undercurrent, even though the surface is sometimes unstable, even scary. People listen to the rhetoric, but then you see everyone making distinct decisions.

This election has changed our political landscape. The KMT is so divided that sooner or later it will lose power. It has already been in power long enough to break the world record. But the DPP is to some extent self-defeating in the way it protests. Otherwise, it would already be the ruling party. Although it has been a spokesman for the Taiwanese people, the DPP has many internal contradictions. The New Party is good for our political system, because now we have three political parties that cover all aspects of Taiwan society, that cover all kinds of aspirations.

The New Party is a new phenomenon and it’s very important to our political culture. Like new parties in Eastern European countries like Poland, the New Party acts as a reformer of the old ways and old uses of power. It is now challenging both the KMT and the DPP, and this is very important in our political development. Over the past decade, only the DPP was in opposition to the KMT.

The idea of a “loyal opposition” is a new development in Chinese tradition, and it’s very difficult for the concept to take root. But we are becoming used to this kind of opposition because of the DPP. And now we have the New Party to oppose the opposition. In the future, no party will be able to assume a clear majority in the Taipei City Council, the Provincial Assembly, or even the Legislative Yuan. It will be difficult for any party to dominate political power.

During this election campaign, there was a lot of debate among the parties about the unification and independence issues. But from my contact with people in all three parties, I know that almost all of them say one thing but do another. Actually, there is a strong consensus. During elections people act as though they are each other’s enemies, but when you listen to their real voice, you know that the DPP is not so pro-independence or anti-unification and the New Party is not for immediate unification. In fact, all the parties are interested in protecting the status quo.

The unification issue is a very disturbing, ambiguous, elusive issue. Taiwan is already a de facto independent, sovereign country—no one can deny that. But independent from what? Are we like Tibet? What is our status? People exaggerated their stances on this issue during the campaign, so I’m not too worried. In fact, people in all three parties have high stakes in the interests of Taiwan. Everybody showed that they identify with Taiwan interests.

The parties are also very practical—even the DPP is essentially a middle-class party. People in all the parties have friends and relatives with businesses in Mainland China. In private discussions, people are very practical—they are calculating their risks. They know that they have to build up a working relationship with Mainland China. As a result, we can be sure that our relationship across the strait is not going to be jeopardized, no matter who is in power.

The message of this election is that we should go faster in our constitutional development. The governor is now the highest popularly elected official. The premier is not popularly elected and neither is the president; this means that in terms of voting alone, the governor is the most popular political figure. In the next two years, we should continue with reform. Otherwise, in the long term, the governor will be a much more powerful position than the premier and president because he will have the direct support of the voters. I think we can expect to have lots of arguments and fights during the next two years over the details of constitutional reform.

This election also has made some people overseas very unhappy. They think Taiwan is becoming democratic too quickly. They say that Chinese don’t need democracy, or that they can’t handle it. They also say that democratic development moves Taiwan away from Chinese culture. Many liberal people in Hong Kong are glad to see Taiwan’s democratization, but others worry that Taiwan is distancing itself from Mainland China. And in Singapore, which is also basically a Chinese society, the senior minister—[former premier] Lee Kuan Yew—is not so happy about Taiwan going toward democracy because it goes against the principle of what he calls “Asian values.”

Taiwan is the only Chinese society—not the mainland, not Hong Kong, not Singapore—that has enjoyed a continuing opposition party. And Taiwan also has a much freer media, with the exception of television. These fruits of democracy have come over a long time, and people do not want to give them up. We realize that it is easy to fall back to the old kind of politics, and at least people here try hard not to do so. Because the turnout for the election was so high—more than 70 percent—it shows that there is really great political participation by the people. This is an indication that Taiwan is becoming a mature democratic society.

Chu Yun-han,
professor of political science,
National Taiwan University:

On election night, I was invited by the Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) to be interviewed live at the studio. Just as the ballot counting started, I was pondering what to say if the DPP were to win the gubernatorial race. What first came to mind was that TTV was going to get a new board of directors [the station is owned by the provincial government], and that this would be just the tip of the iceberg [as far as change was concerned].

Winning the gubernatorial race was a crucial battle if the KMT was to continue its governing position. The provincial government controls one of the three main television stations; it controls the bank that issues NT dollars, the Bank of Taiwan; and it controls the three most important commercial banks. Moreover, approximately a third of a million people work for the provincial government. So winning the gubernatorial election was really crucial.

I think that the KMT was quite relieved. The landslide victory was beyond their expectations. But the importance goes beyond the provincial government’s control of revenues. Control of the governor’s office itself is even more important. If the DPP had won, the KMT’s grassroots support could have been undermined in every county. In every county, there are usually two or three competing local factions that are typically affiliated with the KMT. These factions have representatives in the provincial assembly, where they can draw a lot of gravy, a lot of pork barrel, a lot of special privileges.

If the DPP controlled the governor’s mansion, they would control the banks and their granting of soft loans; they could ask the tax man to re-examine the books—a lot of things that would really put the local politicians in jeopardy. This is the kind of nightmare that has haunted the KMT for quite some time, especially in the last few weeks before Election Day when a lot of rallies seemed to indicate that the DPP might have a chance to win the governorship.

The governor’s race was also important to the KMT because it was a test of the party’s legitimacy. Previously, the party had never been put to a direct test, a true test before such a broad portion of the electorate. The KMT has a clear majority in the Legislative Yuan and also a majority of county chiefs and city mayors. But people always questioned how much the KMT enjoyed genuine popular support.

In the past, the KMT didn’t confront the DPP directly. Instead, the competition was really on the local level, between local politicians and local factions. Politicians at this level had their own networks and campaign organizations, and they raised their own campaign funds. They won their votes by various means, sometimes through their own networks, through vote-buying, or because they could provide certain services [to their constituents].

In the past, it was difficult to tell if voters supported the candidates or just wanted to return a favor to them. It was never clear if the voters really supported the incumbent party. So this election was a new game for the KMT. This time, the party couldn’t rely on local cadres or on the traditional methods of mobilizing the vote. Instead, it had to rely more on the media, primarily television, and also on the bureaucracy—the entire state apparatus. The KMT also relied on social groups and associations that leaned toward or were close to the party. As a result, this election was an important litmus test. It was a way to find a new campaign strategy. If the KMT hadn’t won the governorship, I don’t think it would be confident about winning the presidential election [in 1996] or the important elections next year for the national legislature.

On the other hand, the DPP thought that it was not yet ready for the presidential race. It needed an important steppingstone, and the gubernatorial race was the most likely one. Party members now realize that they need to develop a nationwide campaign organization. They need to get more people to identify with the DPP, and they also need to build up the caliber of their prominent leaders and put them on an equal footing with the KMT. Usually, KMT government officials are better known and better respected by the mainstream of society.

The DPP has a lot of basic soul-searching to do after this election, especially because this time there was a drop in the overall percentage of votes from what the party received in the last local elections for county chiefs—roughly 3 to 5 percent lower than last time. They have to pay attention to momentum. This is even more important because this election had a very high turnout. The turnout was unprecedented.

If the partisan division of the vote in this election is compared with the past, it shows that many people who never voted before did vote this time, and most of them voted for the KMT. This means that the voters did not want any major rupture or discontinuity. They understood the importance and consequences of this gubernatorial race. They knew that if the KMT lost, they were going to be in trouble. It would mean that it would be more difficult to beat the DPP next December, which would mean that the KMT could lose its majority in the national legislature. That level of anxiety motivated a lot of voters who had not come out before to come out.

I think the DPP can learn a lot from its victory in the Taipei mayoral election. Chen Shui-bian ran a basically spotless campaign, and he knew what voters wanted. Voters didn’t expect him to talk about the injustice of KMT rule or about repressive measures in the past. They wanted their candidate to concentrate on the quality of life, public policy, the future—issues that really appeal to the middle class. Chen Shui-bian did that. He avoided the controversies of the past and also kept a good relationship with the mainstream, with a lot of professionals. Doctors, attorneys, accountants, professors—they all rallied behind him. This almost guarantees that the quality of his advisers will be very good; he will be accepted by and advised by experts.

I predict that the KMT probably won’t suffer another major split. And if President Lee Teng-hui decides to run, he will win quite easily. But voters can support someone for the executive position and still turn to a different party for legislative positions. In this way, there may be a check on executive power so that no one party can dominate political power. I think the DPP will gain a fair number of legislative seats in the next election; the New Party will gain as well, although it will still be a minority party.

But I don’t buy the doomsday prediction made by some KMT members who worry that the KMT might lose its majority in the Legislative Yuan. I think the KMT will probably adjust enough to pre-empt that possibility, just like this time. About three or four weeks before the election, everyone was talking about the vulnerability of James Soong, a mainlander who had not cut all his ties to the old KMT. But even though the DPP attacked him a lot, he won. In this election, we have seen the voters exercise what I would call their “collective rationality.”

Hsieh Fu-sheng,
professor of political science, 
National Chengchi University:

FCR: How has this election influenced democratic development?

Hsieh Fu-sheng: The elections were good for all three major parties. They all can learn from them, although they probably feel somewhat ambivalent—both satisfied and dissatisfied. Basically, the KMT is still the majority party, the DPP won more seats to compete with the KMT, and the New Party has had somewhat of a breakthrough. None of these results was unexpected.

From the pre-election surveys, we could foresee the winners in the races for provincial governor and Kaohsiung mayor. But in the race for Taipei mayor, the gap between the polls and the results was larger because of the fierce competition and many last-minute campaign rallies. Strategy voting also played a part. Some people voted for their second choice because it seemed unlikely that their favored candidate would win and they didn’t want the third alternative to be elected.

Chen Shui-bian received more votes than expected, while Huang Ta-chou received far fewer than anticipated. Pre-election surveys showed that popular support for Chen and Huang was roughly the same and that there was less support for Jaw Shau-kong. But the campaign activities during the last several days before the election helped shift a lot of votes from Huang to either Chen or Jaw. Overall, the election results were acceptable, although not fully satisfactory, to all three political parties.

In these elections, a key influence on voting decisions was the “stability card.” It’s clear that voters, particularly in the gubernatorial race, were afraid that the election of a non-KMT candidate would cause social instability. My own study of elections indicates that voters give a higher priority to political stability than to economic or social issues.

This was true as well in the Taipei mayoral race. But there was a problem. While the KMT candidate was playing the stability card, the other candidates were playing it as well. Chen’s campaign slogan about “happiness and hope” and Jaw’s slogan for a “new order” could be seen as stability cards. As a result, there was nothing special about the KMT’s position, so a lot of KMT votes went to other parties. This indicated that many voters were not only dissatisfied with Huang’s performance as mayor, but were also dissatisfied with the performance of the ruling party. Because many of these people didn’t have confidence in the DPP, they turned to the New Party.

Another important factor influencing voters was the issue of China unification and Taiwan independence. In the past, although most candidates did not directly bring up this issue, it was definitely taken into consideration when people voted. People might vote for a particular candidate just because he or she was for or against Taiwan independence. In this election, especially in Taipei, the issue was clearly brought up by the New Party and it was widely discussed. The New Party attracted many KMT mainlander voters because they are afraid that Taiwan independence might make them a permanent minority.

Yet another major issue was the “provincialism complex.” Because the New Party brought up its anti-Taiwan independence policy, it could not avoid being trapped in the provincialism issue, which put a limit on its ability to gain votes. The DPP also used the provincialism complex to promote itself. “Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese” was a popular campaign slogan for many of its candidates. But the KMT’s winning of the provincial governorship seemed to indicate that stability weighed heavier on voters’ minds than provincialism.

In Taipei, the DPP candidate tried to avoid discussing Taiwan independence because he knew that most voters were still conservative and support for Taiwan independence was still very limited. From the start, Chen Shui-bian emphasized “happiness and hope,” and his good performance in the Taipei City Council and the Legislative Yuan also drew in many supporters. This was an important reason for his victory. The KMT has not taken the independence and provincialism issues seriously enough, so a lot of its members turned to other parties. I think the KMT needs to address these issues. It is also easier for the KMT to handle them because it has more resources and power than the other parties. Until then, these issues will continue to have great influence on elections.

The KMT lost its majority on the Taipei City Council. What impact will this have on the council’s operations?

In the future, for anything to pass, it will have to gain approval from members of at least two parties. Negotiation will become very important. There may well be different party alignments on different issues, but in a local-level council, national ideology is not as important as in the Legislative Yuan. Cooperation between parties can be expected to change from issue to issue.

Did illegal radio stations and cable TV influence the elections?

They had both positive and negative influences. The media, especially the three TV stations, are monopolized by the KMT. This has led most cable TV stations and illegal radio stations to support other political parties. Actually, many illegal stations were established because the KMT didn’t allow any different political voices to be heard. But the harder the KMT tried to suppress coverage, the harder the other parties bounced back.

Some of the stations are fair, but most have their own political preferences. As a result, only people of the same political orientation listen to them or call in to their talk shows. These people listen to and encourage one another, and thereby increase the chance of conflict between groups with different political preferences. I think the KMT should adjust its attitude toward the media. It should understand that it isn’t possible to monopolize the media in a developed society, so the best way is to be fair to media with different political views. A fair media environment will reduce the biased opinions on these illegal stations.

What are your predictions for the legislative elections late this year and the presidential election in 1996?

In the December elections, the New Party didn’t put up candidates in many areas, so the results don’t reflect its real power. If it runs more good candidates for the Legislative Yuan, it may have a good chance of winning more than 10 percent of the votes. This would give it a considerable number of seats. If both the New Party and the DPP seats increase, the situation might be similar to the new Taipei City Council, in which no party has a clear majority.

But it isn’t likely that the New Party and the DPP, with totally different ideologies, can work together. So we might have a KMT-DPP or KMT-New Party alignment. The KMT now has about 60 percent of the seats. If it wants to keep its majority in the Legislative Yuan, it has to reform itself and try to win back votes from the New Party. Because of differing ideologies, the KMT is not likely to win votes from DPP supporters, but it is comparatively easier to target New Party voters. The KMT can maintain its majority if it does something about its internal problems, such as corruption and money politics, and if it pays more attention to middle-class concerns and placates non-Taiwanese voters. But even if the KMT loses its majority, it will still play an important role.

Because the KMT won the governor’s race, it is certainly in a better position for the [1996] presidential election. But this election will be very different from the legislative elections because the personalities of the candidates will be a factor. Especially under the current election system, in which the candidate who receives a simple majority of the votes cast is elected, no one can be sure who will win. Maybe what happened in Taipei in this election will happen in the presidential election. But it is the national legislature, according to the ROC Constitution, that supervises the executive branch. Therefore, it is more important for a political party to have control of the legislature than to win the presidential election.

Hu Fu,
professor of political science,
National Taiwan University:

FCR: What worked and what failed in the campaign strategies followed by the three main parties?

Hu Fu: At first, the DPP tried to use the issue of Taiwan independence to win votes. Later, its candidate for provincial governor, Chen Ding-nan, switched to urging “Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese.” He said that Taiwanese should unite. Neither approach was very successful.

The KMT’s emphasis on the need to secure social stability was fairly important. The KMT gubernatorial candidate, James Soong, kept stressing his years of achievement and his industrious personality as a government official, as well as the issue of securing social stability. He emphasized progress cum social stability. It was obvious in the end that most people wanted social stability.

The New Party’s strategy in Taipei city was quite successful. It decided to fight to protect the ROC as a sovereign entity. Although most people felt that Jaw Shau-kong didn’t have much chance of winning, his calls for protecting the ROC and eventually uniting Taiwan and the mainland gradually began to work. He also stressed that Chinese should secure prosperity for all Chinese people. Jaw attracted many mainlanders who opposed the idea of Taiwan independence.

In Taipei, the DPP also tried to stress social stability, much as the KMT. Chen Shui-bian was fairly successful with this. While he did his best not to touch the issue of Taiwan independence, the sense of “Taiwanese awareness” prevailed in his campaign. Most of his speeches were given in Taiwanese. Although he did not address it directly, he still tried to win voter support by appealing to Taiwanese identity.

The KMT also wanted to attract voters in the Taipei mayor’s race by stressing the issue of stability. But that was not enough for Huang Ta-chou to win. A successful campaign depends on three things: the candidate, the issues, and the party’s reputation. Huang had failed to be a satisfactory mayor. He didn’t solve the traffic problem, for example, and he didn’t do a good job of taking care of the illegal KTV [karaoke parlor] problem. His campaign stressed his humble personality rather than his achievements as mayor. Even his ideas for securing social stability were not clearly defined.

What was learned about party platforms and campaign strategies from this election?

It would be worthwhile for the KMT to examine its platform now that the election is over. Its platform had historical antecedents, but it wasn’t in line with modern democratic trends. Actually, the New Party’s criticism of the KMT has helped stimulate changes in the KMT. In particular, the mainstream KMT members need to examine the party’s platform carefully, because it has led to factions. That’s why the New Party left the KMT to become a party of its own.

For the DPP, the biggest platform problem is its stance on Taiwan independence. During the election campaign, DPP candidates actually tried not to talk about it. Chen Shui-bian and Chen Ding-nan both tried to keep it a low-profile issue. The party’s next step is not clear. Does the DPP want the issue of Taiwan independence to be decided by a public ballot? Does it really want a public vote for that? If the DPP keeps promoting Taiwan independence, will it have a major impact on Taiwan’s future by affecting the island’s security?

I think the DPP needs to discuss its stance more carefully, especially since the issue of maintaining social stability was so important in these elections. Of course there are different factions within the DPP; some support Taiwan independence and others are more pragmatic. The two groups have a lot to talk about. But in the past, the issue of Taiwan independence had a priority status within the party. I dare not say that the DPP will rewrite its platform, but the party is now aware of the problems raised by its stance.

The New Party’s platform was too simple and not very clearly defined. The party now realizes that it must take a much more serious attitude toward its platform. Among the three parties, the New Party’s platform is the weakest. The New Party has not covered many important issues, although it has made numerous criticisms of the mainstream KMT.

How does each party interpret the election results?

The KMT has mixed feelings about the election results. Generally speaking, it had a tough fight in the elections and it feels as though it is now in some sort of danger. The KMT not only lost in the Taipei mayor’s race, it also failed to elect a majority in the city council. That was the first time it failed in this.

The DPP now has more cities and counties supporting the party in northern Taiwan. Its reputation is bound to rise in the future. And because the New party won eleven seats in the Taipei City Council, I think it can claim a victory. But it must work harder to expand its political influence in Taipei as well as the whole province. In Kaohsiung, the New Party didn’t expect much support, so it did very well to win two seats in the city council.

Will the China unification and Taiwan independence issues be major election issues in the future?

Since the election, both unification and Taiwan independence have gradually become matters for policy discussion. Will the Taiwan independence issue gradually disappear? Not necessarily; the discussion may just quiet down for a while. Maybe after a while it will be brought up again. No one can tell. We’ll have to wait and see.

What is the possibility of a divided population evolving based strictly on the provincialism complex?

I think the problem of the provincialism complex will be gradually solved. Basically, the problem shouldn’t be taken so seriously. Both Taiwanese and mainlanders are Chinese. This can’t be denied. At least Taiwan has no religious conflicts as in other countries, such as in Eastern Europe. Many of Taiwan’s problems come from historical developments.

Taiwan’s Chinese people all came from the same place. Even the languages are pretty much the same: they are all part of the Han language system. As a result, if the leaders of the three political parties are able to reach some understanding and try to avoid stressing the differences among different provincial groups, Taiwan will be able to maintain its social stability.

What role did the media play in the elections?

The media played a very important role. In the past, the three main television stations were very one-sided in their coverage of elections. This didn’t change much this time. All three stations favored James Soong in the gubernatorial race—after all, they are controlled by the KMT.

For a different view, many viewers turned to TVBS [a Taiwan cable station based in Hong Kong] around 7:30 PM, after the three stations finished their election reports. Viewers could choose from many cable television stations. This had quite a good effect on the election campaign. Even though the debates on the cable stations were often little more than campaign rhetoric and the content often was too superficial, the stations still played an important role in educating the public.

In addition, the radio stations had listener call-in shows during the debates or discussions they hosted on the air. Few people could actually get through [because of limited phone lines], but there were many listeners. The shows were a sign of respect for voter individuality. Oftentimes the callers even received compliments from the hosts, who encouraged them to express their viewpoints freely. The media were able to transmit political messages quickly to the public, and that was very different from previous elections. The effect was amazing. Many people felt much more involved in the elections. Also they learned to understand politics better. In short, the media helped upgrade Taiwan’s democratic culture.

One media weakness during the elections was that each party had its own radio stations to promote its stance on the issues. The content of the programs was usually one-sided; it wasn’t balanced reporting. Just as the three television stations had their political stance with the exception of TVBS, so did the many underground, illegal radio stations. Poor quality was a persistent problem with the media throughout the elections. Many radio stations attacked political parties by hurling abuse on their programs. And the radio stations themselves didn’t seem to have much tolerance for opinions different from their own.