Two recently published books reflect the widespread interest among scholars of Asian affairs in Taiwan's 2000 presidential election--as a watershed in Taiwan's political development and a further challenge in the resolution of the impasse with Beijing.
Given the Taiwan Strait's acknowledged status as Asia's most likely candidate for a military confrontation, Taiwan's 2000 presidential election generated an unusual amount of international interest. To be sure, corruption--"black gold"--and not Taiwan-mainland relations was the major issue in the campaign. Moreover, the public positions that the three leading candidates took on unification differed little from one another. Nonetheless, differences in their backgrounds led outside observers, including the Beijing government, to believe that the consequences for cross-Strait relations would be momentous. Lien Chan, the Kuomintang (KMT) standard-bearer, is ethnically Taiwanese but had spent his youth on the mainland and had married a woman from the mainland. James Soong, who had broken away from the KMT to run as an independent, is a mainlander. In contrast, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chen Shui-bian, was not only Taiwan-born but had in the past made pro-independence statements. The stakes seemed high.
Helped by last-minute endorsements from several prominent citizens and the backlash from mainland Premier Zhu Rongji's attempt to intimidate Taiwan voters, Chen won a narrow victory over Soong. Both his pro-independence stance and the nature of his victory created much uncertainty about the future. These books are the consequence of conferences held to debate the significance of the election--Muthiah Alagappa's the product of a gathering sponsored by the East-West Center in Honolulu in August 2000 and Deborah A. Brown's in New York at St. John's University in November of the same year. Between them, the editors have culled the opinions of most of the major Taiwan analysts from Asia and the United States. Each editor chose participants representing a variety of points of view, although only the East-West Center gathering had a contributor from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and only the St. John's conference included representatives of the DPP. Since neither editor advocates a particular personal position on the totality of the papers, it is easier to compare individual chapters than the books as a whole.
There is consensus among the contributors that Chen's victory was a milestone for democracy. For the first time in the nine decades of the existence of the Republic of China (ROC), a party other than the founding KMT would take charge of the executive branch of government. The authors also commend the peaceful nature of the transition. They agree as well, however, that the narrowness of Chen Shui-bian's victory meant that he could not claim a mandate. One author, National Taiwan University Professor Chu Yun-han, describes Chen as suffering from a "triple minority syndrome": he received less than a majority of the votes cast, his party was not the largest in the legislative branch, and his faction, the Justice Alliance, was a minority force within the DPP.
The chapter-writers who address the domestic consequences of Chen's victory generally concur that the DPP's lack of experience in governing has caused problems. The situation has not been helped by the KMT's lack of experience with being out of power; it has had a difficult time adjusting to the role of loyal opposition. Nonetheless, the seemingly clumsy way in which the new administration sought to cancel the partially constructed Fourth Nuclear Plant--fulfilling a campaign promise made to environmental interests, but taking the action without adequate prior consultation or an alternative plan to provide for the island's expanding power needs--is roundly criticized.
Whether Taiwan's successful transition to democracy can serve as the model for other states is also a topic generating much interest. National University of Singapore Professor Chua Beng Huat's contribution places Taiwan's transformation in the context of a recent trend in Asia toward replacing one-party-dominant states with democracies. He examines the prospects for similar changes in his country and in Malaysia. Parallels are, he finds, much more striking between the KMT and Malaysia's dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO) than with Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP). First, both UMNO and the KMT have been actively engaged in business in their national economies, leading to corruption among political elites and to money politics, which in turn generated popular disaffection and public mobilization against the respective elites and their parties. In Singapore, by contrast, it is the state and not the PAP that directly owns many large corporations and enterprises, which are run by professional managers, either as state monopolies or as competitive enterprises. Singapore's bureaucrats are considered incorruptible, as symbolized by the island state's perennial ranking as the cleanest country in Asia and among the top five or six in the world.
Another difference between the PAP and UMNO occurred when the 1997 Asian economic crisis precipitated a split in the latter, but not in the former. The breakaway Parti Keadilan (Justice Party) began to collaborate with other Malaysian parties to form a coalition against UMNO. Chua compares this to the leadership split in the KMT during the 2000 presidential election. Finally, opposition parties or coalitions in both Taiwan and Malaysia have been able to enlist the support of a mobilized civil society that shares the same anti-dominant-party sentiments. In Singapore, civil society remains largely underdeveloped, as the PAP government continually modifies its policies to accommodate popular demands.
Chua concedes the existence of similarities between Singapore and Taiwan: both are island states inhabited by largely Chinese populations, both are East Asian economic success stories, and both were one-party-dominant states for five decades. But there are no political divisions among Singapore's ethnic Chinese such as exist among Hoklo, Hakka, and mainlanders in the ROC. Since English is the primary language of government administration and all levels of education, any "natural" advantages of a particular linguistic community are neutralized. The middle class lacks an independent economic base; its fortunes are linked to those of the PAP government, whose policies have until recently been stunningly successful.
In Taiwan, Chua argues, economic growth was driven by indigenous private enterprises and capital. Members of the business elite tend to be local Taiwanese who oppose the KMT's ideological stance on unification with the mainland. Collectively victims of the KMT's former "white terror," Taiwan's middle class spearheaded the drive toward civil society. Many of them joined the DPP in order to do so, also contributing their financial resources to the effort. No similar material or ideological resources are available to opposition parties in Singapore, where the PAP's long string of repressive measures and legal maneuvers have kept them weak. In sum, Taiwan's example may be relevant to Malaysia, but is highly unlikely to have a comparable effect for Singapore.
George Washington University Professor Bruce Dickson addresses a question that is probably more pressing for the ROC's citizens: whether Taiwan's democratization can serve as a model for the PRC. Dickson has found a high level of interest among his mainland acquaintances in Taiwan's democratization and a positive evaluation of the process. Many seem to feel that if the people of Taiwan can choose their own leaders, Chinese on the mainland deserve a similar opportunity. Their feelings have not, however, resulted in sympathy for Taiwan's continued independence.
Chinese leaders, as opposed to Dickson's acquaintances, seem to have concluded that the immediate risks of democratization outweigh any benefits it might conceivably confer in the future. Rather than respond to the society's changing needs and desires, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has generally opted to repress them, and will probably continue to do so. Hence, ironically, Chen's victory may have reduced support for political reform within the party leadership and actually be serving to delay meaningful democratization. Past actions to limit and suppress political participation have led to a backlog of grievances and a perception that the CCP is both incapable of reform and unwilling to compromise with legitimate and reasonable calls for change. Given the likelihood that this intransigence will continue, Dickson doubts that the PRC will experience a gradual and peaceful transformation to democracy such as Taiwan's. When change comes, it is likely to be sudden and even tumultuous. He believes that the prospects for democracy on the mainland are good, but that it is likely to come about through the replacement of the CCP rather than under its tutelage.
Several authors consider the question of the impact of Chen Shui-bian's election on cross-Strait relations. Beijing University Professor Jia Qingguo's view is the most pessimistic. Deeming Chen's election an accident, Jia describes the cross-Strait relationship as "stuck between a rock and a hard place" due to Chen's "stubborn" refusal to accept the mainland's one-China principle as a condition for resuming negotiations between the two sides. Though praising the mainland for its willingness to negotiate on an equal footing with Taiwan--after acceptance of the one-China principle--Jia portrays the relationship as anything but one between equals. As a case in point, he argues that since the PRC's Office of Taiwan Affairs has made clear that "the Chinese government will not tolerate Taiwan independence activities," there is "little room for Chen Shui-bian to maneuver." That Chen, as an equal, might choose to maneuver regardless of the opinions of the Office of Taiwan Affairs seems not to have occurred to him.
Jia notes approvingly that Beijing has reached out to ROC leaders who embrace the one-China principle, including those from James Soong's People First Party and the New Party's Elmer Fung. He does not mention the pitfalls of doing so from the politician's own point of view, as exemplified by Fung's humiliating defeat, as well as the virtual demise of his party, in the December 2001 Legislative Yuan election. Jia is aware that Chen must respond to strong sentiment in Taiwan against accepting the one-China policy, and that his best policy option is therefore ambiguity. Meanwhile, he says, the conclusion on the mainland is that Beijing's conciliation and patience over the past decades have not only failed to bring unification but have allowed Taiwan to drift further and further away. Some see war as unavoidable, particularly since Chen's election is viewed as a further step toward independence, which no mainland leader can accede to, lest it jeopardize the unity of the component parts of the mainland. ("If the central government tolerates Taiwan's independence, it would be difficult to keep the country together.")
Wilson Tien, director of the DPP's Division of International Affairs, argues otherwise. Taiwan will not declare independence--there is no need to do so, since the island is already a sovereign independent country. He describes his party as flexible and willing to exchange part of Taiwan's sovereignty in return for a permanent peace across the Strait, so long as the arrangement is reasonable, worthwhile, and acceptable to the ROC's people. The political arrangement being proposed by the PRC does not, however, conform to these criteria. "One country, two systems" promises Taiwan its own army and its own leader, as well as the pledge that everything will remain the same after the ROC accepts the one-country, two-systems model. But these are slender assurances, since they depend solely on the goodwill of the PRC's leaders, without any third-party guarantor.
Tien welcomes the somewhat softer formulation that mainland Vice Premier Qian Qichen made in 2000: "there is only one China, the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China, and China's sovereignty and territory cannot be divided." But he notes that Qian's statement conflicts with the official position, also stated in 2000, that "there is only one China in the world; Taiwan is part of China, and the PRC is the only legitimate government of China." Moreover, Qian's remarks were made in an informal venue--a meeting with Taiwan visitors and members of its media--raising the question of whether they represent a formal position that could be announced to the international community or merely propaganda for Taiwan's consumption. This must be clarified before progress in cross-Strait negotiations can take place. A fraction of the mainland's size in population, geographical area, and military might, Taiwan must be careful. Tien compares it to a rabbit confronted by a tiger, who enjoins the rabbit to cast its fears aside. As long as the rabbit comes into its lair and accepts its terms, the tiger promises that it will not eat the rabbit. Should the rabbit believe the tiger? A more democratic and progressive PRC, he says, would certainly be more credible to Taiwan. Hence the wisdom of the Chinese leadership will be the ultimate determiner. In the meantime, the DPP will respond not stubbornly, as Jia characterizes it, but cautiously.
Yet another author, National Taiwan University Professor Wu Yu-shan, concludes that Chen's election makes relatively little difference to the cross-Strait relationship. Employing a geometric approach to relations among the three major political actors--Taiwan, the mainland, and the United States--Wu describes democratization in the ROC as pushing its parties toward convergence in the center. American policies, by contrast, vacillate between idealism and realism in accordance with the electoral cycle. As a presidential election approaches, the incumbent's realist China policy is criticized by idealists, whom the president then takes steps to appease. After the election, the winner tends to change course to reflect the country's business and security interests. Although no meaningful national-level elections are held in the PRC, different factions and bureaucracies compete for power, and policymakers face constraints as well. This results in great intransigence toward Taiwan as party congresses approach and maximum flexibility toward the island in between party congresses. The interactions of politics among the three entities mean that a change of leadership alone will not bring sharp changes in cross-Strait relations, and the election of a DPP president does not lead Taiwan toward independence. Interestingly, Chen's attitude toward Beijing has thus far been softer than that of his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui.
Authors who focus on the impact of Taiwan-mainland economic interactions on the cross-Strait relationship are cautiously optimistic. Auburn University's Cal Clark views the expansion of cross-Strait trade since Chen's election as the triumph of low politics over high. Peter C.Y. Chow of the City University of New York urges the two sides to pursue prosperity through trade and investment flows for mutual benefit, based on the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). He also suggests, however, that contingency plans be drawn up against a worst-case scenario. Co-authors Chen Tain-jy of Taiwan National University and Cyrus C.Y. Chu of Academia Sinica address fears about their country's economic competitiveness after both sides join the WTO. Their data indicate that although Taiwan's trade surplus with the mainland is apt to turn into a deficit, the ROC's overall trade balance will remain in the black since increased Chinese imports will mainly replace imports from Southeast Asia and other developing countries. Nonetheless, the short-term adjustment costs are likely to be substantial. Taiwan's government can help by aiding the restructuring of businesses, improving global competitiveness, and upgrading its own efficiency through reorganization and streamlining. Correctly handled, bilateral relations can be a self-fulfilling process in which good intentions drive a virtuous circle. Chen and Chu echo Chow's advice on the need to build confidence on the basis of common economic interests, adding that neither government should impose a political outcome on its citizens.
It is difficult to do justice to the nuances of sophisticated arguments in a short space. Even those who are quite familiar with Taiwan's political system will find much worth reading in these volumes. Both the fascination and the frustration of the country's politics are encapsulated in their chapters, as well as their ability to confound the predictions of at least some experts.
June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political
science at the University of Miami, is author
of China's Political System: Modernization
and Tradition, and a senior fellow
of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
She is a member of the US-China Security
Review Commission.
Copyright 2002 by June Teufel Dreyer.