The growing emphasis on democratic values and free markets in international relations is providing Taiwan with a strong basis for its foreign policy and giving it the opportunity to draw attention to the nation's remarkable political and economic achievements.
In 1971, when the Republic of China (ROC) lost its seat at the United Nations (UN) and communist China inherited the megaphone of Chinese opinion in the world's foremost international organization, Taiwan's foreign policy took on a new urgency. No longer could it air its concerns in the UN or its many constituent assemblies. Moreover, nations one after another beat a path to Beijing's door and offered to normalize relations, throwing Taiwan overboard in the process. When the United States, the ROC's World War II ally and chief supporter, formally recognized the People's Republic of China and withdrew official recognition from the ROC government in 1979, Taiwan seemed destined for isolation and a tenuous existence outside the world community.
Yet, despite the limitations imposed on Taiwan by the growing diplomatic quarantine, the country neither faded away nor abandoned its diplomatic efforts. Diplomatic missions to countries that switched recognition to Beijing took on new, nongovernmental names, but the adoption of private-sector-sounding titles for its embassies and the reworking of diplomatic protocol diminished not a bit the effectiveness of the ROC's highly skilled diplomatic corps.
While Taiwan's diplomats adapted to the new environment abroad, even greater changes were afoot at home. Economic modernization resulted in such prosperity by the 1990s that Taiwan's growth was often referred to as an "economic miracle." Political changes proved to be no less impressive. After the end of martial law in 1987, Taiwan adopted a multiparty political system. In 1996, ROC citizens for the first time in their history directly elected their president. In 2000, the election of an opposition party leader to the presidency represented the first transfer of political power in the history of the Republic of China.
The tectonic shifts in Taiwan's domestic environment arrived, as if on cue, at a time when a school of thought known as "Wilsonian idealism" or "liberal internationalism" reemerged as a central current in international debates. Both the UN and the United States, the sole remaining superpower after the Cold War, professed adherence to a system of international organization based on self-determination for all peoples and organized by the rule of law, which would uphold the rights of individuals.
By the 1990s, when liberal internationalism resurfaced in the post-Cold War years, Taiwan stood out as an obvious model for a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy and for the economic transformation to a market economy. The nation's struggle for greater recognition and for acceptance into international organizations today is carried out by trumpeting these successes, for those are the values that much of the international community professes to pursue.
That these values are reemerging today is the result of a changing international landscape. But the struggle for an international community founded on a body of principles that would facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts, spread democracy and free trade, and protect human rights harks back at least to the end of the war to end all wars, when former president Woodrow Wilson, in his self-righteous and overbearing manner, claimed that the United States would make the world safe for democracy.
Mr. Wilson's Dream
At the treaty negotiations that followed World War I, Wilson pressed for a just settlement for the myriad claims presented by peoples around the globe. He hoped the conference would not just settle the questions at hand but would also lead to a new world order built on principle. "It is the principle of justice," Wilson said in his famous Fourteen Points speech, "to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak."
To achieve this lofty ideal, Wilson would first have to convince his chief allies, French Premier Georges Clemenceau, and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who along with Wilson constituted the "Big Three" at the conference. The purity of Wilson's motives aided him not at all in negotiations with these European leaders. Two of Wilson's key points were the fair treatment of the defeated powers and the right to self-determination for small nations and former colonial possessions. Clemenceau, known as "the tiger of France," mauled Wilson over the first point, while Lloyd George, nicknamed "the Welsh wizard," bewitched Wilson with the agility of his arguments, honed in parliamentary debate, and reduced the American president to much the same condition as a cobra swaying to the rhythms of the snake charmer's flute. By the end of the conference, Lloyd George had succeeded in defanging Wilson's proposals for self-determination in colonial possessions. (The British, after all, still had an empire to run.)
When the delegates emerged from Versailles, the former palace of Louis XIV, the Big Three proclaimed that their work was done. It was a grand gesture of folly, for the treaty contained little of Wilson's idealism and a great deal that caused bitterness.
The time for Wilson's idealism had simply not arrived. But despite defeat at the peace conference, Wilson had succeeded in presenting a new outlook on foreign relations. "Wilsonian idealism," as it became known, is today a powerful counterforce to the old impulses of big-power realpolitik and the underlying philosophy of the United Nations.
After the Thaw
In 1945, another world war later, delegates from 50 countries, including the Republic of China, gathered in the American port city of San Francisco and signed the United Nations Charter to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The United Nations, the reincarnation of Wilson's beloved League of Nations, aspired to solve international disputes peacefully and prevent larger nations from riding roughshod over smaller nations. With the founding of the UN, it seemed that Wilson's vision had succeeded.
The idealism of the moment quickly faded, however, with the outbreak of the Cold War, a throwback to realpolitik calculations based on military strength and strategic maneuvers. Faced with possible nuclear destruction, much of the world sheltered under US or Soviet umbrellas to weather the storm. Despite the acceptance of the new idealism of the United Nations, the world proved just too dangerous for the time being. Strategic concerns trumped the idealistic impulse to foster democracy and bolster human rights.
It is only since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War that calls are once again being heard for the end of big-power politics and the adoption of a set of guiding principles that will allow countries to settle their differences peacefully and construct an international order based on democracy and capitalism.
The lure of capitalism has proven so far to be the stronger of the two, and the most stunning change in the relations between states in recent years is the new interdependence of economies. Many non-democratic governments are eager to reap the benefits of free trade and market economics. Because Taiwan's economy is export-oriented, this trend has bolstered Taiwan's position internationally. That foreign computer firms, for example, rely on Taiwan's computer chips, makes them vocal supporters of Taiwan's inclusion in international trade groups. Business lobbies in foreign countries therefore pressure their own governments to run the Chinese diplomatic blockade and insist that Taiwan be allowed to sit at the table when discussing important trade matters.
Taiwan's diplomats and trade representatives have capitalized on these trends and secured for Taiwan membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and a host of smaller intergovernmental organizations that deal with trade or economic matters. One extraordinary result of Taiwan's entry into groups like the WTO and APEC is that China has been forced to negotiate with Taiwan within the framework of these organizations. This might not lead to a political breakthrough, but it certainly allows representatives of these two very important Asian economies to rub elbows in a controlled environment. It is also a symbolic victory for Taiwan, in that the tremendous economic vitality of the island is represented independently for all other members of these international organizations to see.
Acte de Presence
Visibility of this sort is so important in the world of diplomacy that it has earned its own entry in the diplomat's dictionary: it is the acte de presence--the act of being in attendance. In foreign relations, symbolic acts carry real consequences. Because Taiwan is accepted as a full member of important international trade organizations, for example, members of those organizations often ask why Taiwan is not allowed to participate in other important international organizations, such as the UN. Visibility, in other words, prevents the shadow of China from eclipsing Taiwan on the international stage.
In recent years, Taiwan has wisely trumpeted not only its economic but also its political successes, reminding members of the international community who regularly extol the virtues of democracy not to forget that Taiwan has already adopted this form of government. But the reality is that Taiwan's campaign to improve its standing politically has lagged behind its successes in entering international economic forums. Although market reforms have been adopted even by non-democratic nations scurrying to cash in on globalism, those governments are naturally suspicious of the political agenda of countries seeking to spread democratic reforms. For Taiwan, this means the Chinese behemoth across the Taiwan Strait struggling to check its every move.
Although China has adopted market reforms, it vigorously plays the old game of realpolitik. The Chinese position was best summed up in an interview with Zhou Enlai in the Saturday Evening Post of March 27, 1954. "All diplomacy," said Zhou, "is a continuation of war by other means." This inversion of the oft-quoted dictum of the military strategist Karl von Clausewitz ("War is a continuation of politics by other means.") is equally applicable to the strategy China employs today in an attempt to draw Taiwan into Beijing's orbit.
Despite China's efforts to close off Taiwan's room to maneuver, China, because of its growing engagement with the rest of the world, is feeling the pressure of the new emphasis on human rights and democratic reforms. Moreover, there is evidence that Wilson's breed of liberal internationalism is spreading. Today, an international court in the Hague treats as criminals leaders who violate the civil rights of their own people, and pressure is growing to include in trade agreements protections for the environment and the working conditions of laborers. These changes are radical and indicate a willingness to sculpt the political environment into a more ideal shape.
This shift in international relations could be vital for the survival of Taiwan. That Taiwan has developed a democratic form of government and actively cooperates with the global community on a range of important issues, from trade to international relief efforts, goes a long way toward ensuring Taiwan's external security and economic prosperity--central pillars for the foreign policy of any nation.
Countries clamoring for the spread of democracy and free markets would suffer an enormous loss of prestige if they allowed Taiwan, which has embraced these values, to be swallowed up by force. This fact leads to greater security for Taiwan, and illustrates the usefulness of Taiwan's constantly putting out more flags, drawing attention to the successes of its economy and the freedom of its political system in an appeal to the better instincts of a civilized community of nations.
Our Man in New York
From the office of the director-general of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York, which overlooks the UN headquarters, Andrew Hsia, Taiwan's top diplomat in New York, leads Taiwan's campaign to join the United Nations and its constituent organizations.
TAIWAN REVIEW: Taiwan has in recent years been unsuccessful in its bid to enter the WHO and other UN organizations. Is it important that Taiwan continues along this path?
ANDREW HSIA: There are two goals that we set for our United Nations campaign. One is that we want to keep this issue of Taiwan's exclusion from the UN and its various organizations warm and alive so that people won't forget about it. In that respect, we have been successful. Ask any mission at the UN about the issue of Taiwan, and they will tell you that they are well aware of it.
The second goal is probably even more important for us, but few people realize it. The decisions that are made in the UN affect the lives of the people in Taiwan, so we have to know what's going on in the UN. Any treaties that they sign, or conventions that they sign, these are legal obligations, so we need to keep close watch on the proceedings. We also need to let the UN know what we are doing in Taiwan. This is a two-way channel.
How do you go about drumming up support for Taiwan's campaign?
Taiwan has only 26 diplomatic allies, and there are 191 members of the UN, but we manage to retain channels of communication with more than 100 of these. Although we have been invited into the UN for certain functions, we also meet with them privately. Some of them are very sensitive about meeting with us and some not at all.
Do you see any way to break the deadlock with China, and does it ultimately depend on improvements in bilateral agreements between Taiwan and China?
The UN is a very sensitive and political organization. It will take a lot of effort and time. Of course if we improve our relations with China and reach some sort of agreement, there is always a possibility for improvement. But so far, over the years that I have served as the director-general [of Taiwan's diplomatic mission] here, I have never seen China voluntarily express its desire to improve relations. We have joined several international organizations, not because China supported it, but because China was put in such a position that they had no alternative but to negotiate with us or with the international organizations, like the World Trade Organization.
The reason that we became a member of those organizations is that firstly we have the strength, economically. Secondly, the major players in the world have reached a consensus that Taiwan must be included, and they have told China. In the WTO, it was the Americans and the Europeans who went to Beijing and said, we have to take the world's 17th largest trading partner.
In APEC, for example, in 1991 the 12 members of the group sent a Korean representative to Beijing and said we've got to take Taiwan. The Chinese then had no alternative but to negotiate the capacity in which Taiwan would join, the representative we would use, our level of representation, and so on. I believe this will be the case in other organizations as well, such as the WHO. We need the WHO and the WHO needs us as well. The SARS outbreak proved that you cannot exclude a single country from the international network. So I think the international community needs to tell China to leave politics out of it, we're talking about the health of all of us.
Is it fair to say that Taiwan's economic development has been more important than its political development for gaining support internationally?
Statements by various American leaders indicate that not only Taiwan's economic development is important to the rest of the world but also Taiwan's democracy, and we have to take them at their word.
There has been a lot of concern over Chinese diplomatic activity recently and China's willingness to take center stage, for example in negotiations with North Korea, which has caused a warming of relations between China and the United States. Many have argued that this bodes ill for Taiwan. Do you see this as a threat to Taiwan?
Well, we certainly hope not. I don't think the international community should play this game as a zero-sum game. China is admittedly an important country, in the UN, in the US war on terrorism. But in this war against international terrorism, you need everybody that you can get. So the US doesn't have to make a choice, either one or the other. The Bush administration has indicated that this is a good time for relations between Washington and Beijing, but from what I have witnessed here in New York, this is also a time of excellent relations between Washington and Taipei. We have to maintain that relationship very carefully, because there is a third party trying to separate us.
How important is congressional support, such as that expressed by the Taiwan Caucus, in the relationship?
Well, we actually have a very good relationship with the administration. It so happens that historically we have always enjoyed very, very good relations with Congress. You can see that from the sheer number of legislators joining the Taiwan Caucus, which is probably the largest of its kind. We don't try to involve ourselves with internal US politics, and we try to work both with Congress and the executive branch.
The city administration of New York and especially the last two mayors have been very supportive of Taiwan's diplomatic mission in New York and treated its representatives as full diplomatic personnel. Do you think this can translate to larger diplomatic gains for Taiwan?
The mayors of New York City have always been very involved with the foreign missions simply because the UN is here. They treat us as a consular organization here in New York, and we are very grateful for that. I think, for one, it's a reflection of the large Taiwanese community in New York, which has been very supportive of the mayors. I think they are also aware of the reality of Taiwan and its democracy and its relations with the United States. The fact is that when issues involving Taiwan arise, people come to our office, and not to China's. That is the reality, and I think they are aware of it and supportive of us.
What have your greatest achievements been in your post in New York and what are your greatest hopes for the mission to New York City?
People told me that New York was a busy post, but they never told me just how busy. Since I first arrived, everything that could possibly happen has happened--Madame Chiang Kai-shek passed away, September 11 in which we lost Taiwanese citizens and a number of banks in the World Trade Center, two visits by President Chen to New York. The visits were so successful, and I believe critical, in raising visibility.
As for the UN, we have managed to give our issues a much higher profile. Professionally, I feel quite satisfied with this.
Robert Green is a freelance writer currently living in New York City.
Copyright (c) 2004 by Robert Green.