Taiwan Today

Before campaigning can start for the year-end
legislative elections, all three major parties need
to resolve some serious internal problems and clarify
their positions on domestic and international issues.

FCR: What major problems confront the KMT?

Chu Yun-han(朱雲漢): One of the differences between the KMT and the DPP is that the DPP is used to solving internal troubles in a democratic way. No single DPP leader can decide everything. As controversial issues emerge, party members make decisions by taking votes. In contrast, it has long been the case that the power of the KMT is concentrated in a single leader, whether the party was chaired by the two late presidents [Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo] or the incumbent [President Lee Teng-hui].

It is quite understandable that the struggle for power within the KMT is intense, because the winner can gain control over all the political resources and the huge organizational and financial resources derived from the KMT's giant party bureaucracy and party-owned businesses, whereas the loser must face complete defeat. For instance, following political struggles between the KMT's mainstream and non-mainstream factions, members of the latter are oftentimes frozen out or relentlessly booted from the party. This is a party tradition, because the KMT hasn't learned the art of compromise. As a result, the party often faces a crisis of massive defection.

But the KMT must now establish rules or standards by which party integration can be assured, especially as President Lee's power shifts to possible inheritors. At present, these political heirs are equally powerful; no one stands out as the only successor to Lee. For the KMT, the age of collective leadership seems to be coming. The party should prepare carefully for this by building a mechanism for integrating the party through compromise and power-sharing, at least at the highest level of the party.

Does the KMT sense a crisis in its development?

After its failure in last year's elections for mayors and county chiefs, some KMT members have recognized the seriousness of the problem. I think they are more willing to make changes in the party to prevent future election defeats. But the KMT's survival depends on close cooperation among high-level party leaders, meaning the middle generation in their fifties or sixties. If these people still choose to follow their predecessors' examples and scramble for the position of party chairman in a winner-take-all manner, the KMT's internal struggle will be severe and the party is doomed to fragment.

Another problem is that the KMT's political power has long been based on patron-client relationships with local factions and business tycoons, while the DPP and the NP rely more on their political idealism to mobilize voters. This doesn't mean that the KMT lacks political goals, but it has lost its idealism. It's more vulgarized, and much more practically oriented. Though any political party should have its secular side, the KMT has gone too far. This leads to instability.

When the KMT was still the single dominant party, local factions were closely united with it because they could derive patronage benefits. Also, big businesses didn't donate money to the DPP for fear of offending the KMT. But if the KMT goes downhill, or the DPP can offer larger benefits, local factions and big businesses would come down on the right side of the fence and defect.

Party loyalty is difficult to maintain if a party lacks idealism as an asset. Those parties that possess it, however, can gain more dedicated support from the electorate. The KMT's electoral success is based more on its past economic performance and collusion with local factions and less on vision for the future, and this indicates a major crisis may be coming. Moreover, the KMT obviously lags behind the DPP and the NP in winning the hearts of young people, especially those with higher education.

Lee's heirs are already in their fifties or sixties, and they have yet to consolidate their positions. Naturally, those KMT elites who are still in their forties have a long way to go before gaining prominence. Also, if people shine early, they are usually quite idealistic and end up being excluded from the KMT's power center--and they may even defect to the NP, the party's breakaway group.

In contrast with the aged KMT, the opposition parties are full of youthful energy. For example, the power nucleus of the NP falls in the age category of 45-50, and it has also succeeded in training new bloods in their mid-30s. Therefore, if the KMT remains unchanged, it will be no rival to the DPP in the long run.

What challenges does the DPP face?

Although the DPP is already quite strong, it must cope with a number of obstacles on the road to becoming the ruling party at the central level. These impediments lie primarily in the worries of three groups of voters--the middle class, public servants, and entrepreneurs. They all worry that the DPP's promotion of Taiwan independence will provoke mainland China and thereby threaten stability. Moreover, public servants are concerned that they might be the victims of a thorough reorganization of the government's structure after the DPP comes to power. And entrepreneurs are afraid Taiwan's prosperity and business opportunities will disappear if the DPP takes over and increases cross-strait tension.

These groups are influential in society. Even if the DPP benefits from a KMT fragmentation and wins at the central level of government, unless it relieves anxieties about the resulting "change of sky," its victory will be followed by hard times for the party, because its success is not based on solid and broad-based public support. For instance, the middle class might start emigrating and entrepreneurs might stop local investment. Yet another question is whether the army will remain loyal to a ruling party that proposes Taiwan independence. The DPP cannot ignore these potential problems.

Accordingly, Hsu Hsin-liang, the chairman of the DPP, is suggesting a two-phase policy for the acquisition of political power at the central level. That is, before the DPP achieves its final goal, it should cooperate with the KMT in establishing a coalition cabinet. Thus the DPP can create a buffer period for the public to see the performance of the DPP cabinet officials and prepare themselves for a DPP-led central government.

But Chen Shui-bian has become more confident since winning the Taipei mayoral election in 1994. He believes his party can skip such an "experimental period" and directly obtain power through the year 2000's presidential election. If this is the case, then the DPP must win the hearts of these three major groups in a very short time.

Whatever approach is taken, the DPP must prove that they're not radical about mainland affairs. Voter hesitations about the DPP cannot be totally eliminated unless the party line is revised in a significant way. Yet anyone who tries to do so will surely come in for harsh criticism from fellow party members and therefore risk being kicked out of the party. This is the DPP's dilemma, which will most likely persist for some time.

  
Are both the United States and Japan concerned about the DPP's position on Taiwan independence?

A conflict between Taiwan and mainland China would not only cause concern but might also necessitate these nations' involvement. Therefore, Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh [another prominent DPP leader] have visited the United States and Japan with a view to explaining to them that the DPP is willing to deal with the independence issue pragmatically. The response to the DPP is usually, "It doesn't matter whether we understand you or not--you must make Beijing understand you." This poses another challenge for the DPP.

How can Beijing's deep-rooted concern about the assertion of Taiwan independence be changed? No doubt, to the DPP, any obvious concession on this point would be a gesture of surrender to mainland China. At the same time, Beijing's attitude is always central to Taiwan's future. So the DPP is stuck. But politics is an art, and although problems are hard to solve, none are insoluble. For example, despite the lack of mutual trust between the two sides, the DPP is still likely to find a way to communicate with Beijing.

What problems does the New Party face because of its position on China's reunification?

Part of Taiwan's populace has strong feelings for mainland China. As the idea of "Taiwan comes first" gains popularity, these people naturally feel a sense of crisis and seek solace in the NP. At first, the NP grew rapidly, until it grabbed between 12 and 15 percent of the votes islandwide. But this figure seems the upper limit for the party's growth. The party's position conflicts with the growing trends, such as a concern with a unique Taiwan identity.

Although some people doubt if the NP is loyal to Taiwan's people, the party members themselves believe that it is the mainland government, rather than its people, which stands in opposition to Taiwan. But opinion leaders in Taiwan who represent the mainstream power have forced the NP into a false dichotomy: Is the NP loyal to the people of Taiwan, or to those in mainland China? The NP thinks there's no need to make such a choice.

When Hsu Hsin-liang [of the DPP] mentioned the possibility of setting up direct links [in post, transportation, and trade] between Taiwan and the mainland, his ideanot his loyalty to Taiwan peoplewas criticized. But when the NP promoted the same idea, they were accused of collusion with mainland China.

What is Beijing's attitude toward the New Party?

Of the three major parties on the island, the NP has the deepest kinship with the mainland on the issue of China unification. But the NP represents only a minority voice of the people here, so Beijing is pragmatic and therefore keen to reach out to Taiwan's majority parties. Naturally, Beijing would want to focus on contacting the larger parties, the KMT and the DPP, in order to exert more influence on Taiwan society. So the NP confronts frustrations not only in its domestic political standing, but also in its status with the mainland.

Will the NP end up being a short-lived political party?

Aside from its unpopular stance on reunification, the NP has other barriers to its development, such as the infighting among its leadership. Furthermore, the passion of its supporters has faded with time. Even so, I don't think the NP will disappear. People still will vote for the party because it can provide checks and balances in Taiwan's politics, and also stimulate the KMT and the DPP to become more politically mature. Some people who are dissatisfied with the other two major parties might turn to the NP.

Concerning the potential for further development of the NP, the decisive factor is change in the KMT. There's little chance of the NP's reunifying with the KMT as long as Lee Teng-hui is in office, because the courses they follow are so different. But if the KMT fails to win half the seats in this year's legislative election, more KMT legislators may seek some sort of consensus with the party. If this happens, the NP could extend its influence and cause some revisions in the KMT's platform.

Another possibility is that the KMT could fragment before the next presidential election and defectors from the party could form a strong "third force" in opposition to both the KMT and the DPP. To be influential in the election, such a third force would try to cultivate NP supporters. For the present, however, the NP will have its hands full preserving the strength it already has.

Do you think a stable, two-party political environment is emerging?

Not yet, anyway. To achieve this, there should be two powerful parties that constantly grab more than 90 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections. This would mean that the NP would pull in less than 10 percent of the votes, which I think is impossible. Given the structure of our election system, small political parties usually can bring their strength into full play during elections and can win at least a few seats.

In past legislative elections, the DPP obtained about 34 percent of the votes at most. That hardly makes it an equal rival to the KMT. Moreover, Taiwan's major political parties still have many factions, which could cause them to break up and then realign to form a much different political map. Given these possibilities, I think there's still a long way to go before we have a stable, two-party political environment.

                                                                                         --interview by Oscar Chung