Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross take
a realistic, scholarly view of international
and domestic factors influencing China's
security, as well as the potential Chinese
military threat to neighboring countries--
including Taiwan.
This book is the intelligent person's guide to considering the "China threat." The able authors, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, political science professors at Columbia University and Boston College, respectively, elevate the discussion about China's contemporary rise and its implications for China's neighbors and for the world. They succeed in making the phenomenon very comprehensible, and less anxiety-provoking than it needs to be. Yet the authors don't simplify the complex matters either, nor rule out grim possibilities if China's legitimate interests are not taken into account and appropriately accommodated.
Nathan and Ross utilize various theoretical lenses but draw predominately on a combination of neorealism and national -interests approaches; they also explicitly avoid explanations in terms of culture, personality, tradition or emotion. They see "China's behavior as a search for security under what international relations theorists call 'conditions of anarchy,' with motives similar to those of other states." They acknowledge that "limited time, imperfect information, perceptual biases, and faulty logic often create strategic missteps." Nor do they overlook the tragic aspects of international relations that occur, as, for example, when a state, in undertaking to improve its own security, commensurately reduces the security of another state, which in turn is stimulated to initiate another round of security-threatening countermeasures.
Throughout the volume, the authors also show the interplay between China's foreign policies and its domestic politics, acknowledging that "most of China's policies abroad are incomprehensible without attention to their impact on interests at home." The first two chapters delineate the country's geostrategic situation and the historical patterns of foreign relations that have arisen from it. The next two chapters cover China's "most important relations"--i.e., with both the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States--as well as with other countries in inner Asia, the middle east, Africa, and Latin America, insofar as these latter relationships revolved around China's attempts to check and balance the strength of the superpowers on its periphery. Chapters five and six give separate attention to China's relations with its chief regional partners in northeast Asia and in south and southeast Asia. Chapters seven through ten shift to analytical foci, covering policymaking, defense, foreign economic policy, and human rights.
The authors' analysis of the divided China issue is a thoughtful one, with due recognition given to the complexity of the matter. This is handled in two chapters: chapter eleven addresses the international dimensions of China's policy toward its border regions, including Tibet, Hong Kong (before July 1997), and Taiwan; chapter twelve discusses the foreign policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The analysis recounts Beijing's view of the territorial/sovereignty issue, about which the authors see an apparent unanimity of opinion on the Chinese mainland--i.e., that Taiwan must eventually submit to Beijing's sovereignty and control. The account includes a review of the evolution of the latter's reunification policy, which errs only in suggesting that Beijing's formula of "one country, two systems" was enunciated in 1984 with Hong Kong in mind and with its applicability to Taiwan seemingly an afterthought. I believe it was actually the other way around. The formula was con ceived with Taiwan in mind initially and was thus fortuitously available for application to Hong Kong, whose reversion to China's sovereignty, determined by the calendar, had, as it turned out, to be attended to first. Of course, now that it has been applied to Hong Kong (with apparent success so far), the slogan remains Beijing's choice for dealing with Taiwan as well. In any case, the authors see that of all the issues of territorial integrity which concern Beijing, "Taiwan carries the highest risk of Chinese failure." This is because it is the only "contested territory that China does not dominate militarily and that would be viable without its acquiescence as an independent political entity."
Taiwan's politics are much more complicated with regard to unification. This is the product of the truly impressive development of democracy in Taiwan and "is shaped by its contradictory position in the world." Thus, Taiwan in the world "alternates among the top three positions in foreign exchange reserves, ranks thirteenth in foreign trade, has the sixteenth -largest army, stands eighteenth in GNP and twenty-fourth in GDP per capita, and belongs among the top one-third of coun tries in population size." Yet, "it is excluded from the United Nations, recognized by only thirty-one countries [note: now twenty-seven], geographically small, and tucked close to China, its main antagonist, and far from the United States, its main supporter." If it is regarded as a component within (greater) China, "Taiwan is again both large and small. Despite its large GNP and foreign trade, it is the second smallest Chinese province in size and sixth smallest in population." Thus, "Taiwan is large as a country but small as part of China; wealthy economically but exposed diplomatically and militarily; a prize and a threat for mainland China; for the rest of the world, a legal anomaly that can neither be abandoned nor protected."
Refracting a principal theme of the volume, the authors assert that "nowhere are the linkages between foreign policy and domestic policy more intimate than on Taiwan." But these two levels of policy are connected (and complicated) by a middle level, i.e., Taiwan's policy toward the Chinese mainland. "In all three policy arenas the island itself is the contested prize: at home, among reunification-oriented and independence-oriented politicians; across the Taiwan Strait, between the two parties in the Chinese civil war; and internationally, between mainland China and Taiwan's main protector, the United States." The authors see that most Taiwan politicians have moved toward the center in recognition of mainland power and the need to appeal to the voting public. "The common core of most positions is to avoid unification with the mainland in the foreseeable future."
If Beijing is largely driven by concern for security along its difficult-to-defend southeast littoral, so is security a basic preoccupation for Taiwan. "Taiwan's politics and diplomacy are dominated by the search for security from a fraternal enemy. Long-term possibilities for the future--unification, independence, confederation, commonwealth--are matters of theory rather than policy so long as conditions are not ripe for any of them. For now, Taiwan's mainland and foreign policies are devoted not to resolving its future but to keeping it open."
Taiwan has done remarkably well under the circumstances. Its "ingenuity and full purse gained it a state-like presence in many world areas." On the other hand, however, Beijing's diplomats have managed "to keep the ambit of Taiwan's diplomatic ties narrow." This has meant that the key to each government's strategy in dealing with the other has been the United States. Nathan and Ross review Taiwan's policy toward the United States, noting its ups and downs. President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in 1995 seemed to register the beginning of a fundamental change (for the better) in Taiwan's own rela tionship with the US, but it triggered a crisis in the larger triangular relationship, the new trend having alarmed Beijing. What followed was a series of threatening military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and early 1996. The authors believe that Beijing's strategy seemed directed less at influencing the Taiwan presidential election in March 1996 than at influencing President Lee's post-election mainland policy and Washington's post-election Taiwan policy. Indeed, Taiwan discerned that, despite the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups in the vicinity during the crisis, "the United States cannot easily prevent China from closing the Taiwan Strait and damaging Taiwan's economy," and the Americans could see that "China is determined to prevent erosion of the limits it has placed on US-Taiwan ties."
Nathan and Ross carefully consider the cross-Strait military balance, observing that a direct military clash with Taiwan would be at best costly to China and its economy, and at worst unwinnable. "Even if China could occupy Taiwan, it would gain uneasy dominion over a hostile population and a devastated economy; if it failed, the attempt to invade would have done great damage to the goal of reunification. Win or lose, belligerency would enlarge fears of a Chinese threat throughout Asia and in the United States." But, they warn that the military option is real because of Taiwan's strategic and political importance to China. They recall that on matters of crucial national interest, "PRC policymakers have spoken with one voice and have not uttered empty threats." Certainly in any military contest, each side has its strengths and weaknesses, although ultimately the size disparity between the two sides gives the mainland "certain immutable advantages."
Moreover, the authors note that despite the American security commitment, "it is not clear that the United States would go to war to protect Taiwan, especially if the conflict was provoked by diplomatic assertiveness on the part of Taipei that the United States counseled against." Surely, more recent developments in the overall triangular relationship have underscored the appropriateness of this sober reflection. Yet, the authors make it clear that "Washington must continue to keep Taiwan secure." To do so, it can "remind Beijing of the costs of any use of force against Taiwan, by supplying Taiwan with sufficient military equipment to stabilize the mainland-Taiwan balance of power, and by maintaining economic and cultural ties with Taiwan." Of course, this is to be balanced by the need to accommodate China's interest in preventing international recogni tion of Taiwan as a sovereign state, requiring continued persistence in Washington's one-China policy. This is prudently stated, but it remains to be argued convincingly how Taiwan's participation in some international bodies, including the UN, might not ultimately redound more to China's benefit than otherwise.
Thus, thoughts of the military cat-and-mouse situation that obtains over the Strait points up another of the volume's principal themes, to wit: "Taiwan-mainland relations are dominated by a dilemma of mutual vulnerability." Each side could do vital damage to the security of the other, while efforts to improve the security of each side increase the sense of threat on the other side. It is the kind of dilemma that might be resolved by mutual trust, "but the dilemma itself makes trust hard to achieve." Nathan and Ross observe that a "solution that serves the needs of both sides is imaginable in theory, but hard to reach in practice." Meanwhile, "there is little prospect that the United States will extricate itself from its decades-long in volvement in what has become the most tenacious international issue of the post-World War II era, or from that involvement's pervasive, baneful influence on US-China relations." This would surely seem to be the case, particularly as long as Washing ton's China policy is shared contradictorily between its executive and legislative branches of government. Of course, it is this division in Washington's policy that has given Taiwan opportunities to exploit for its sake.
The authors contend that "the rise of China need not present a threat if it is properly managed." Aware that the history of rising powers is not encouraging for the peaceful accommodation of China in the world order, they nevertheless point out that not every rising power is a hegemon. "If China is a rising power with enormous assets," they explain sensibly, "it is also a vulnerable power with limited opportunity to be expansionist or aggressive [even] if it wanted to be." They see China's situation as one that "forces it to be concerned with defending its territorial integrity against antagonists who are numerous, near, and strong." Thus, "We can expect conflict over China's role, but not what international relations specialists call a 'hegemonic war,' in which China would bid for dominant world power."
The point is that "China is not a satisfied power," but one with a number of outstanding territorial claims that it wants its neighbors to recognize; also, "it seeks veto power over Taiwan's foreign alignments." It wishes more influence in the regional balance of power and "in the international nonproliferation trade, and human rights regimes." Its security is "hostage to the behavior of potential adversaries and unreliable neighbors, such as the two Koreas and Vietnam." But these considerations give China reasons to favor regional stability and to cooperate with its potential great power rivals. "They create stronger incentives for China to accept a voice in shaping the global order than to opt out of it." Certainly, the alternative of a destabilized China is not in anyone's interest. "Weak Chinese leadership and institutions will continue to plague international cooperation on a wide range of issues." Accordingly, Nathan and Ross advise the facilitating of China's integration into a global order that it will have some say in shaping and which will serve Chinese interests and those of other countries. The challenge will be "to find the balance point of common interests where security can be achieved for all."
According to Nathan and Ross, the West should develop three distinct agendas in order to integrate China into the global order, constituting a more strategic policy toward China. First, in defense policy, the US needs to maintain current deployments to prevent destabilizing changes in the regional power balance. Second, an effective management of conflicts of interest is required, so that cooperation on matters of common interest can be pursued while negotiations handle the disputes--with the understanding that "progress entails some loss and some gain for each side." Third, China should be integrated into multilat eral institutions, so that Beijing will not only play by the rules of the international community, "but also...help develop the rules."
Thus, the issue is misstated by the question, "Does Chinese power threaten the rest of the world?" when it is posed as a question about China alone. The authors argue that "the China threat is a matter not of absolute Chinese capabilities but of Chinese capabilities relative to those of others, not of Chinese interests in isolation but of how these can be served in tandem with the interests of others." The outcome will depend, they say, "on the power structure that the United States, Japan, Russia, and China shape in Asia."
Nathan and Ross might have said more about how long-awaited structural political reform on the Chinese mainland (i.e., more about what Beijing itself might do) could also play a decisive role in facilitating China's optimal integration into the world order and in repairing its relationship with Taiwan. Such reform, after all, should not be left indefinitely in the realm of theorizing and wishful thinking. Nevertheless, this is a solid, thoughtful, well-presented view of a most important phenomen--China's rise in today's world. It acknowledges China's growing power and its vulnerability, and constructively sug gests ways of peaceably accommodating it.
Stephen Uhalley, Jr., professor of history emeritus at the University of Hawaii, is the Kiriyama & EDS-Stewart Chairs distinguished fellow at the Center for the Pacific Rim and its Ricci Institute at the University of San Francisco.
Copyright (c) 1999 by Stephen Uhalley, Jr.