Diplomatic ties between the United States and the Republic of China were severed twenty years ago. Subsequently, the US Congress, in a unique piece of legislation, established the legal basis governing its future relationship with Taiwan. Free China Review traveled to Washington to talk with some of the former US congressmen and government officials who helped draft and implement the Taiwan Relations Act. Excerpts follow. (Interviewees appear in alphabetical order.)
Ralph N. Clough is now with the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University .
FCR: The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has been in place for two decades, yet some might not realize the history behind the writing and implementation of the Act.
Ralph Clough: Well, it's composed of two essential parts. The first part, which was prepared by the State Department, is the framework for conducting relations with Taiwan after we no longer had diplomatic relations. This is a unique situation--to have a relationship between two societies without having embassies or formal diplomatic relations. It provided for setting up an institute, the American Institute in Taiwan, and provided for staffing it with foreign service officers and others. That's the first part of the TRA. It was sent to the Congress and the Congress decided that there was one important element missing, and that was it didn't say anything significant about Taiwan's security.
Eventually, [what is now] the first part of the Taiwan Relations Act was added, which expresses the very clear-cut statement that the United States is concerned about the security of Taiwan, that it would view with grave concern any use of force against Taiwan, any attempt to coerce Taiwan by military means or by embargoes or blockades. And also that the United States would make available to Taiwan defensive arms. The United States--the Congress--asked the administration to main tain a capability to intervene if necessary. All this is provided in the preamble to the Act.
As to how well it has worked, you can just judge by looking at what's happened over the last twenty years. Taiwan has made a lot of progress, Taiwan has prospered. It has not succumbed to military pressure from the mainland. And the relation ship between the United States and Taiwan has expanded greatly. We have found that we could conduct trade, we could receive Taiwan's students, and continue to have many kinds of relationships that we had had before.
Once you start pointing out weaknesses, you suggest maybe those weaknesses ought to be taken care of and there should be some amendment of the Act, which I think would be risky. My feeling is that it has worked very well over twenty years, and we shouldn't meddle, we shouldn't try to change it. If we try to make it perfect, we may damage it.
In the past two decades, what key factors have influenced different US administrations' implementation of the TRA?
If you look at what the administrations have done--the Reagan administration, the Bush administration, the Clinton administration--they've been pretty consistent. There's not a lot of difference between one and the other. I think probably the biggest differences were in 1982 when President Reagan signed the communique, the August Seventeenth Communique, which put restrictions on the supply of arms to Taiwan, and the action by President Bush in 1992 to supply F-16s to Taiwan.
Do you think the TRA represents the general opinion of the American public toward Taiwan?
I think in very general terms you could say that. In the first place, most Americans don't know much about Taiwan, and they don't know much about [mainland] China. They're not very well informed on foreign affairs generally. But with those people who are concerned about our position in the Asian Pacific region, there's a great sympathy for Taiwan, I think. I think there's a feeling that Taiwan has developed very successfully, economically it's become a very prosperous, technologically advanced country in many respects. And in the last ten years it has been transformed from an authoritarian political system into a democratic system, with competing political parties and freedom of the press.
So Taiwan has developed in a way that I think makes many Americans feel glad that we have had a part in that. After all, the United States from 1950 on played an important role in helping to prevent an attack on Taiwan and providing economic aid up until 1965, and then after that continued some military aid, continuing to sell weapons. I think on the whole there is a very strong feeling of friendliness toward Taiwan. There are lots of personal connections as well as official and business connections.
David Dean is an adviser to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. He was the director of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1987 to 1989, and chairman of the board and managing director from 1979 to 1987. He was in the US Department of State from 1951 to 1979, serving in Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as in Beijing as chief of mission.
FCR: In your opinion, how has the value of the Taiwan Relations Act been demonstrated over the past two decades?
David Dean: I think there are several points you could make. The first is that it has restored relations between the United States and Taiwan to a very flourishing and ever-expanding type of relationship. This is very important, and you can see it in terms of the commercial relations between the United States and Taiwan. Bilateral trade, for example, has increased. In 1978, two-way trade was in the neighborhood of US$7.4 billion. Last year, twenty years later, it was in the neighborhood of US$52 billion. That's a seven-fold increase. And during that time, there have been large increases in travel, cultural exchange--in everything you can think of in the cultural and economic spheres.
Then, point number two is, it has provided through these twenty years for a constant supply of military weapons to Taiwan--mostly for defense purposes--to ensure Taiwan's safety. I think this is very important. In the Taiwan Relations Act, there is a very important paragraph that relates to the supply of defensive military materials, and that has been observed too.
The third point I think is a point that people sometimes would forget. Also in the Taiwan Relations Act, there is a paragraph on human rights, relating to the human rights of all the people living on Taiwan. I had a feeling that it was very important in the early phases, perhaps back in '79 when the Act was signed until about '86 when President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the political reforms. During that period, human rights in Taiwan was a very crucial question. There were many congressional hearingsvery critical ones--about Taiwan. There were many letters written by prominent sena tors and congressmen to the leaders in Taiwan's government. I think there were many concerns in the United States about human rights in Taiwan. I don't have to go through the details of the cases, but I think you know about the Kaohsiung riot's prisoners, the Chen Wen-cheng case, Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and twin daughters were murdered, the Henry Liu case [...]. All these things really gave Taiwan a very dark image in the United States.
As I've said, there was a great deal of concern on the part of everyone who was interested in Taiwan and wanted to bring their relationships closer together about these developments. Although Taiwan has been successful economicallyand that was acknowledged by everyone--politically it was an authoritarian state. It was only when Taiwan became a democratic state that the equation changed. People in the United States felt much closer to Taiwan. They admired Taiwan's ability to move from an authoritarian state to a democratic one peacefully--without the use of force, without a revolution or whatnot. It seems to me that this was very important. This was a development that really has changed the equation. It's very hard for me to see, for instance, how today the United States could support any peaceful solution across the Strait that was not acceptable to Taiwan's voters. So by becoming a democratic state, Taiwan has really gathered to itself not only more US support but more international support. This is a very, very important part, and that's why I point to the section of the Taiwan Relations Act which relates to human rights.
I think those are three of the most important developments that have taken place as a result of the Taiwan Relations Act. I can't say that the human rights provision in the Taiwan Relations Act caused Chiang Ching-kuo or the government to move into a democracy. But I think it stimulated these congressional and other actions. The Act itself made it quite clear that the relations with the United States would improve vastly if Taiwan did move toward democracy--and it has done so, and the relationship has, as a result, become much closer. I think people in the United States really admire Taiwan, not just for the degree of economic success it has achieved, but also for the degree of democracy it has achieved.
If people in the United States feel that way about Taiwan, then would it be correct to say that the TRA represents the US public's general opinion about the kind of relationship they want to have with the people of Taiwan?
I don't think too many people know about the Taiwan Relations Act itself. That's too bad. It's important to us, but I don't know too many students in high school or even in college, or members of the general public, know explicitly about the Taiwan Relations Act. To be very honest, there are many people who don't know the difference between the ROC and the PRC. But I think if you were to ask people about their impressions of Taiwan, they have very positive impressions, because they know that people on Taiwan work very hard. They know that they've been great successes. They know that Taiwanese students in the United States have done very well because they study hard. I think these are all pluses. If you had a public opinion poll, people would react favorably to Taiwan.
Harvey J. Feldman is now a senior fellow for Asia at the Heritage Foundation. He has served in the US Department of State, as the director of the Office of Republic of China Affairs, on the policy planning staff, and in foreign postings in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. He was the executive director of the Joint Presidential-Congressional Commission on Broadcasting to the PRC. He was the co-chair of the Department of State Working Group, which drafted the Taiwan Relations Act.
FCR: In these twenty years, what do you consider to have been the TRA's greatest success?
Harvey Feldman: The greatest success lies in the fact that it has provided a security underpinning for Taiwan and its people, making clear that despite the shift in diplomatic recognition, the United States remains concerned for Taiwan and for its future. The preservation of the right of the people of Taiwan to choose their own future was going to remain a central factor in America's East Asian policy. I think that's probably the single most important thing. In 1979, there was enormous capital flight from Taiwan, the real-estate market collapsed, the stock market collapsed, everyone was terribly afraid of what the future might bring. And the assurances contained in the Taiwan Relations Act over the next several months after its enactment provided a feeling of relief for the people of Taiwan so that the economy could recover, so that the capital that had fled from Taiwan would come back to Taiwan. I think this is probably the single greatest accomplishment of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Then if we jump forward in time to March 1996, and the sending of the two carrier task forces, we can see that this is a concrete manifestation of the security guarantees that were contained in the Taiwan Relations Act. The two things [were built for] each other. What two things? The fact that the Taiwan Relations Act contained security guarantees, in effect disposed the American government to certain lines of action. The fact was that it was so clear that it was the will of the American people and the Congress, that this defensive relationship with Taiwan had to continue, so that the administration saw the sending of these two carrier task forces as a natural response under the Taiwan Relations Act.
There is another interesting thing I can point out. I heard Kirk Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security of East Asia, say that a principal reason the United States maintains the true level as it does in East Asia is that the Taiwan Relations Act requires [the Department of Defense] to maintain necessary forces to preserve peace and stability in the East Asian area.
What about the TRA's weaknesses? Does it need to be amended in any way?
I don't think the Taiwan Relations Act itself has any weakness. The weaknesses exist in how successive administrations have interpreted it--or perhaps another way of saying it--ignored the clear language of the Taiwan Relations Act. For example, the August Seventeenth Communiqué is in direct contradiction to the Taiwan Relations Act, which says that the defensive needs of Taiwan shall be determined only by the president and the Congress. So if that's the case, how can an administration be signing a communiqué with the PRC dealing with Taiwan's defensive needs? It's a direct contradiction. So there isn't a weakness in the Act; the weakness is in the behavior of the administrations following the Act.
To open the Act to amendment would be a serious mistake because there is one strong possibility--that we would see amendments proposed that we would not want to see, by friends of the PRC, the supporters of whom are still many. And there is also the possibility that some administration in office at the time might veto the new bill. The Act is fine as it stands. It just has to be implemented correctly.
What is the reading of the new Congress on the Taiwan Relations Act and the Taiwan issue?
I think you can gauge pretty clearly by looking at the vote totals when a Taiwan resolution comes up on the floor. The votes are always very, very lopsided--almost unanimity in both House and Senate in support of a resolution dealing with Taiwan's defensive needs, membership in international organizations, and so on and so forth. So despite the fact that this is a new generation, I think support for Taiwan remains clear and steady.
How about the general American public?
I would have to say when you look at the American public totally, I suppose quite a lot--perhaps even the majority--could not even find Taiwan on the map. But if you look in terms of that part of the American public which follows international affairs, which reads major newspapers--among that public, support for Taiwan is very strong.
Do you think it's appropriate to "celebrate" the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act?
This marvelous piece of legislation is worth celebrating. It is unique. By unique, I mean exactly that. There is no compa rable piece of legislation, as far as I'm aware of, anywhere else in the world. What the Congress did in creating the Taiwan Relations Act was in effect to write a treaty between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan, to pass that treaty over the objection of the Carter administration, and to bind the hands of successive administrations thereafter as to what they could and couldn't do under the terms of the treaty. That is the unique genius of the Taiwan Relations Act. At the time when we were terminating the mutual defense treaty, the Congress in effect wrote a new treaty between the United States and the government we no longer recognized--a state that the administration declared wasn't a state anymore. But Congress said it was, and wrote this treaty. There is nothing else like it in American jurisprudence, or anywhere else in the world. It stands unique.
James R. Lilley is a resident fellow of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He was the US ambassador to the PRC from 1989 to 1991 and the US ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1986 to 1989, as well as director of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1982 to 1984. Prior to that, he served as a national intelligence officer, with overseas assignments in Cambodia, Thailand and mainland China.
FCR: We've been hearing a lot about the successes of the Taiwan Relations Act lately. Let's shift gears for a moment. What would you say are some of its shortcomings?
James Lilley: It left vague how Chinese in Taiwan and the United States would conduct their relations. It was interpreted by some guidelines that [said] we couldn't meet in the State Department, or we couldn't go to the Foreign Ministry, or we couldn't go to the Presidential Office, or people from Taiwan couldn't go to the White House if they were members of the government. I think that it was very vague on that, and therefore guidelines were drafted which sort of tied our hands. So I think that was a sort of weakness. I wish it would have been more specific, saying that since the relationship is now unofficial, it's perfectly all right for any Taiwanese official or Taiwanese authority to visit any American office. That wasn't said, so it was interpreted in a negative way.
I think it was actually, overall, a very good piece of legislation that almost covered just about everything, so I do not think any amendment is necessary. I know there is the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act now, which deals specifically with the security portion of theater missile threats to Taiwan, but that's a specific area. That's a new piece of legislation. My own sense is probably it's best to leave the Taiwan Relations Act alone.
Has the TRA played any part in changing US concern about democratization and the human rights situation in Taiwan?
I don't think the TRA has done a great deal on that. As you know, democracy is never mentioned in the TRA, and democracy came to Taiwan roughly around 1987. The TRA was passed when Taiwan was not a democracy, and the situation has changed since then.
On human rights, I think human rights are largely done outside the TRA. Yes, it mentions it, but it's part of our overall human rights policy in the world--similar to our policy in Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and [mainland] China. Taiwan is part of that, and actually Taiwan's human rights record for the past ten years has been very good. Before then, there were problems. There were a number of cases that were human rights problems. When I went to Taiwan in 1982, Congress was stressing human rights violations in Taiwan. But since 1987, I think that problem has largely gone away. What Taiwan has done in its internal structure has little to do with the United States.
It's very interesting to read the Taiwan Relations Act. It says [something] about human rights, and it also says "any threat to the social system in Taiwan...." It uses the term "social system," and that can be interpreted to be a democratic system. So it says the United States would resist any threat to use force against that system. That can be interpreted to say: if somebody threatens a social system--or the democracy--of Taiwan, the United States is involved. I think that's an important clause.
I noticed that President Bill Clinton mentioned in his press conference at the Mayflower that the support of democracy in Taiwan is linked to our one-China policy. But he mentioned support for democracy first. Then he said right after that, that we sent aircraft carriers into the Taiwan area in March 1996 to assure the stability of the area and prevent any miscalculations. So if you put these two together, I think what he's saying is that anybody that threatens the democracy in Taiwan has got a problem with us.
Does today's Congress pretty much share that perspective?
Only nineteen out of a hundred senators who were there when the TRA was enacted are still there. I went to a number of occasions celebrating the TRA anniversary, and a lot of senators were there. Democrats and Republicans are all very strongly supporting the TRA. I think your support in Congress is strong. In the resolutions that they passed, ninety-seven to one [wanted] to give Lee Teng-hui [ß1µn ] a visitor's visa. The recent resolutions concerning Taiwan and [mainland] China were passed by overwhelming majorities. So I think the support for Taiwan in the Congress is still very strong.
Since Congress represents American citizens, does this mean the average American also strongly supports the TRA?
I think most Americans don't even know what the TRA is. I think most opinion makers probably are aware of it. People in the foreign policy establishment, in academia, in Congress, in the media all know about it. And I think almost universally it is supported. There are always people that are against it--a lot of them in the Carter administration. But they are the big boys. They are overwhelmed by the support for the TRA.
What do we gain by celebrating this anniversary? What about the next ten years?
We've got a whole series of events all talking about the TRA, and there is an editorial in the Washington Times on the Taiwan Relations Act this morning. It reminds people who think about the problem--in Congress, in the media, and in intellectual circles--that this is a very important act, that it is a good act, that it has been implemented well, and it is very important in sustaining and stabilizing the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, the United States and [main land] China--and between Taiwan and [mainland] China.
I don't think we can ever relax and say we've won the fight and everything is settled and everybody is confident. No, no. It will be challenged again and again. [Mainland] China's never accepted it. [Beijing] always tries to interfere in arms sales; it is deploying missiles on the Fujian coast. The TRA will be tested again. If strong people are there to implement it, I don't think there'll be a problem. When President Reagan implemented it, he implemented it in a very positive way so that we had a number of important arms sales to Taiwan. He did all the right things to show the people and government of Taiwan that we supported them. And therefore Taiwan had the confidence to open up its relationships with mainland China. I think this is a chain of events that grew out of the TRA and that is very positive. But if you get vacillation and weakness, that would open up the opportunities to create instability and chaos. The TRA is important, and it is important to have the right people to carry it out, too.
Gerald B. Solomon is head of Solomon and Associates, a consulting firm based in Washington, D.C.; and former member from New York, US House of Representatives, from 1979 to 1998.
FCR: So far, four US administrations have had the responsibility of interpreting and implementing the TRA. Has it been misinterpreted by anyone during this time period?
Gerald Solomon: The greatest challenge to the TRA came in 1982, when then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig tried to circumvent the law by his joint communiqué with Beijing, in which the United States pledged to scale down the scope of its arms sales to Taiwan and eventually terminate such sales. I said "circumvent the law" because the TRA is the law, and it explicitly provides for the United States to sell Taiwan what Taiwan needs to defend itself, period. Haig's 1982 joint communiqué is a piece of paper--it has absolutely no force of law.
I have always had serious doubts that President Reagan ever really agreed to the understanding that Haig negotiated with Beijing. Indeed, President Reagan gave President Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan a set of assurances that essentially disavowed the joint communiqué and implicitly reinforced the TRA.
Just how different is the final version of the TRA from the original "omnibus bill" submitted by the Carter adminis tration in January 1979?
The final version of the TRA is substantially stronger than what the Carter administration proposed, particularly on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Remember, President Carter threatened to veto any bill that went beyond the language con tained in his 1979 normalization communiqué with Beijing. And that communiqué said nothing of any substance about the security environment in East Asia generally, or for Taiwan specifically.
An appalling precedent was set when President Carter derecognized Taiwan in favor of Beijing. For the first and only time in American history, our government was breaking relations with a treaty ally--without provocation, and in a time of peace. Even the strongest congressional advocates of the new relationship with Beijing knew that a country which abandons its allies will eventually find itself without any allies.
There were some closely contested votes in both houses of Congress on specific points in the legislation, but the final language of the TRA is the product of an overwhelming bipartisan consensus.
During his recent trip to Taiwan, Jimmy Carter suggested that his administration was responsible for Taiwan's progress in human rights since US derecognition. How would you respond to that suggestion?
No credit should be given to the Carter administration, whose human rights policy largely consisted of hurling insults and abuse at friends and giving kid-glove treatment to left-wing regimes. Human rights conditions at their worst in Taiwan have always been immeasurably better than human rights conditions at their best in the PRC.
The real credit for what we see in Taiwan today has to go to the people of Taiwan, who never lost faith in themselves and in their right to a better future, despite the shock of losing diplomatic relations with America. They may have even surprised themselves a little bit, and in the process they realized that America was still their friend.
Most of the people who served in Congress when the TRA was enacted are no longer on the scene. How do the younger members of Congress today read the TRA and the Taiwan issue?
You've put your finger on something that could be a problem. The new Congress is somewhat different. In the last five years, almost two-thirds of the congressmen are new. That means they have no physical experience in dealing with foreign policy like NATO in Europe or the Taiwan Relations Act, or dealing with the two Koreas, with Japan, with mainland China, [or] Taiwan. And now that the Cold War is over, Congress is increasingly made up of people who have very little interest in other countries and international relations--many of these newer members seemingly make a virtue out of never having traveled overseas and never having a passport.
We all have a job to do in keeping the newer members of Congress educated about the importance of Taiwan. They need to realize that the rest of Asia is watching how America deals with Taiwan--especially in the security area.
Ten years ago the TRA was commemorated in ten-year retrospectives, think-tank gatherings, and various publica tions. How will the next ten years be different?
A celebration of the TRA is really a celebration of Taiwan itself--and of the friendship between our two countries. In my opinion, we can't celebrate enough! And given the unusual circumstances that attend the relations between our two countries, anything either side can do to reinforce our ties will always be worthwhile. Taiwan and America are inseparably linked by history and by our shared beliefs about what constitutes a free and decent society. We need to support each other. I'm convinced that if Taiwan's freedom were ever taken away, America would inevitably lose its freedom as well.
Lester L. Wolff is the president of the International Information Agency, the Trade and Development Agency, and Lester Wolff Enterprises. He was member from Virginia, US House of Representatives, from 1965 to 1981; house floor manager for the US House of Representatives; co-author of the Taiwan Relations Act; and co-editor (with David L. Simon) of The Legislative History of The Taiwan Relations Act.
FCR: Could you say something about your role in the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act twenty years ago?
Lester Wolff: There are two very, very important elements in the Taiwan Relations Act that I feel somewhat responsible for, because of the fact that I put them into the Act. One was the fact that the Act never says that we have "unofficial relations" with Taiwan. The Act said "relations"--and those meant traditional relations, where we should have face-to-face meetings. It was interpreted differently by the Carter administration and subsequent administrations who say this is supposed to be unofficial relations. But if you adhere to the position of the Act itself, it said that we would have continued "relations" with people in Taiwan. And it also said "the people on Taiwan" or "the authorities on Taiwan," so therefore that's another point that has been missed because "the authorities on Taiwan" meant very clearly...elected representatives.
We said that Taiwan was supposed to be supplied with arms of a defensive nature. That was fully spelled out. We said that the mainland should not have input into what arms Taiwan shall have. Therefore, it was opposed to the Act itself. When we receive the recommendations of the PRC--when they say, "You should not ship any more arms to Taiwan"--that's totally inconsistent with the Act.
We have an expression here that says, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." I think very strongly that the Act itself was a unique document, and having had a lot to do with the original Act, that it has survived the test of time.
It's been said that the Taiwan Relations Act is very flexible in its interpretation and implementation.
The Act created a balance. When those people on the United States side wanted to make greater advances toward the mainland, this was a stabilizing element. I recall the meeting that I had with Deng Xiaoping was the turning point in the entire situation. I was chairman of Asian Affairs at that time, and I had a meeting with Deng Xiaoping. And he pulled me aside and, through his interpreter, he said, "We shouldn't let the Taiwan question be a problem between us." And I immediately said on the settlement on that, it was the US position that the differences between Taiwan and the mainland should be settled by peaceful means alone. That part of the Act has been a caution to mainland China, that they cannot--even though they have never renounced the use of force--that they cannot use force, otherwise the United States will step in, as was indicated at the time of the missile crisis.
The Act itself has strengthened the defense capabilities and security provisions of Taiwan because there are certain elements there which I inserted into the Act. I read recently that President Carter took credit, but he was actually the greatest impediment we had at the time. You might have [heard what happened] when Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Unger came to Taipei. What happened was that their car was assaulted during these big demonstrations. Well, I came to Taiwan three days later, and [people from the administration] at the time told me I couldn't go. I said, "When you get elected from my district, you can tell me what to do." And I went. We reaffirmed the United States decision in support of Taiwan in showing that the administration itself would not speak for the American people, that it was the Congress that spoke for the American people.
How do you see your responsibility to the American people today, in relation to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act?
People have to be reminded. Again, we have an old saying, "People go to church on a regular basis, but they still ring the church bell every week to remind people to go to church." I think the same thing is true with us: we have to do the same thing to remind the people that Taiwan is a separate state, that Taiwan has a relationship with the United States, and that it's a continuing relationship. And the people of Taiwan and the American people have had strong ties for many, many years, and we continue to have them.
The Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land of the United States. Nothing can contravene that except having it repealed by the Congress. It was passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and signed by the president, so that's the law of the land. All of these other elements [that] have been brought forth in the statements made by both the PRC and the various administration people down the line are executive communications and have no force of law. The only law is the Taiwan Relations Act.