In the spring of 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election. An event no doubt significant in itself, the contest arguably had much further ranging ramifications than a presidential election normally would generate. During the run-up to the election, the People's Republic of China (PRC) fired missiles at targets around Taiwan in an effort to intimidate Taiwanese voters. As a consequence, the United States opted to intervene on Taiwan's behalf. President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region--the largest deployment of American naval power in the western Pacific since the Vietnam War--and indicated that the United States would help defend Taiwan if it was attacked by the PRC. To some, it appeared that the United States and China teetered on the brink of war.
John Copper's new book, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan, explores the intricacies and tenuous nature of what he describes as the "Washington-Taipei-Beijing triangular relationship." A prolific writer and one of the world's foremost authorities on Taiwan's politics, Copper provides readers with a comprehensive picture of the events that led up to the missile crisis of 1996 and its aftermath.
Copper employs the 1996 missile crisis as a case study to examine the complex, dynamic and volatile nature of the triangular relationship. The unique perspectives of Washington, Taipei, and Beijing are each analyzed in turn, with each government's actions viewed in the context of its own perception of the events surrounding the emergency. Of course, Taiwan's presidential contest is the most significant factor. But Chinese nationalism and the attributes of Bill Clinton's presidency also played critical roles in the crisis. Copper guides the reader through the crisis and shows how differing perceptions can prove to be extremely dangerous in such an explosive environment. Copper observes that, "in short, the crisis was seen very differently in Washington, Beijing and Taipei. None saw it as a defeat. All viewed the crisis as resulting in a blow or setback for its adversary. This was a recipe for future trouble."
A Broader Context
In order to understand the broader context within which the missile crisis occurred and to create an overarching picture of trends within the Washington-Taipei-Beijing triangle, Copper steps back to analyze the events leading up to the crisis. First, he illustrates how the United States, Taiwan and China each interpreted the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident differently and the role that this tragedy played in shaping relations between Washington, Taipei and Beijing. The tumultuous events in Beijing (and in much of China) during June 1989 shattered America's positive perceptions of the PRC. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union largely removed the strategic rationale for US-PRC rapprochement. Further complicating the relationship was President George H.W. Bush's decision to sell F-16 warplanes to Taiwan during the midst of his faltering 1992 presidential re-election campaign. At that time, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) opted not to respond to Bush's decision, although Copper points out that this delay served only to undermine US-PRC relations at a later date. Perhaps one of the most significant events that complicated Washington-Taipei-Beijing relations was President Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to Cornell University, his alma mater. Copper uses the visit to illustrate both the anger felt within the Chinese government over the state of Washington-Taipei-Beijing relations and to show how complex the American domestic political environment had become with respect to US-Taiwan relations.
President Chen and his wife enjoy lunch at the Taste of Texas steak house in Houston as guests of Representative Tom DeLay (standing) during a stopover when returning from Central America in 2001. Chinahas consistently put pressure on the US not to allow such visits. (File Photo)
To be sure, the missile crisis and the fallout from Taiwan's 1996 election complicated Washington-Taipei-Beijing relations and served to further escalate tensions. The US response to the election varied substantially. The Department of State and elements within the White House adopted a cautious approach and appeared reluctant to congratulate Taiwan, while Congress expressed its strong support. In the midst of this fragmented political atmosphere, President Clinton traveled to the PRC. Copper contends that many Asians saw Clinton as an "oaf" and that "the visit represented unreality, when reality was needed." In terms of the Taiwan issue, the trip served to make the US domestic political climate even more fiercely polarized. Some feared that Clinton would abandon Taiwan. In response, Congress passed a series of resolutions designed to strengthen the Taiwan Relations Act and reaffirm America's commitment to Taiwan's security. At the same time, Taiwan began to seek to enhance its security by purchasing advanced weapons systems and a missile defense system from the US. Not surprisingly, Taipei sought to acquire an antimissile system because the PRC had used missiles to intimidate the island's populace. Taiwan's leadership also expressed a strong interest in joining (and bankrolling) any multilateral program launched to develop a theater missile defense system in the region. As for Beijing, China's leaders ordered the PLA to accelerate the deployment of ballistic missiles directly opposite Taiwan--today over 800 are deployed just across the Taiwan Strait.
Complicating Factors
More recent events have only served to further complicate relations between the United States, Taiwan and China. During an interview with a German reporter in 1999, President Lee declared that relations between the PRC and Taiwan should be on a "special state-to-state" basis. This observation generated far-reaching repercussions and elicited a wide variety of responses from Beijing, Washington and the American media. Predictably, authorities in Beijing were infuriated by the proclamation, while many Americans were caught off guard by it. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected in Taiwan's second direct presidential election. Chen belongs to the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP), a party that supports "self-determination" for Taiwan, and is widely known to support such a position. Chen's election was no doubt the result of a polarized political environment in Taiwan (the Kuomintang had split in two during the election). But Chen's victory was also viewed by many as a distinct step toward Taiwan's de jure independence from China, which angered Beijing and complicated relations with Washington. Taiwan's most recent presidential election, the controversial 2004 electoral contest, brought no relief to the tension mounting on all sides of the triangular relationship. While campaigning for re-election, President Chen and Vice President Annette Lu were shot. The wounds were superficial, and some suspected that the election-eve assassination attempt was staged in order to sway the election in Chen's favor. Amid numerous accusations and despite a problematic first term, Chen was re-elected.
Potential for Conflict
Copper sums up Playing with Fire with an analysis of the potential for future conflict between the United States and PRC over Taiwan. He first outlines arguments suggesting the United States and PRC will not go to war over Taiwan. For example, one argument often advanced is that the United States and PRC will not go to war due to a mutually dependent economic relationship. But Copper rejects this proposition along with other arguments suggesting that war will be avoided. For example, he contends that trade between the United States and PRC is no guarantee of safety, that the PRC has made remarkable military advances in recent years, and the argument that free market capitalism is sprouting democracy in the PRC is questionable at best. Indeed, Copper argues that the United States and PRC approach world politics with dramatically different interpretations of the playing field, that the Taiwan issue is extremely unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, and that the United States will indeed defend Taiwan from PRC aggression.
At one point in Playing with Fire, Copper succinctly expresses what many readers will find to be his book's greatest strength. When Copper describes President Clinton's visit to the PRC in 1998, he writes that "the trip was a landmark event but it also vividly illustrated how one event could be seen so differently by contending players and sub-players in the Washington-Taipei-Beijing triangular relationship." Playing with Fire as a whole is precisely that--a vivid illustration of the differing viewpoints on each side of an important and complex relationship. Copper not only illustrates how Clinton's visit to the PRC is viewed differently by each state in this dispute, but he also illustrates at each point of his analysis throughout the book how each event in this multifaceted relationship is perceived differently by each side. This insight is what makes Copper's book particularly important. Both the reader who is completely unfamiliar with the affairs of Taiwan and the reader who has a well-cultivated interest in the field can read Copper's book and gain a great deal from it. This volume provides readers with an understanding of the often differing perceptions and interpretations of each state, and how these differences have vitally shaped each side's actions.
Another significant strength of Playing with Fire is its comprehensive nature. Copper's expertise in this area enables him to analyze a broad range of topics and events that are essential to gaining an understanding of the dynamics involved in this conflict. Again, this makes Copper's book appealing to a wide audience. A reader with little knowledge about East Asian politics can read this study and quickly gain a comprehensive picture of the significant events and forces at work. But Copper's book is also essential reading for anyone with a strong background in this field. Playing with Fire highlights those important aspects of the Washington-Taipei-Beijing relationship that contribute to a deeper understanding of the seriousness of this conflict. For example, when Copper explains the status of Taiwan's military and its attempts to bolster defense, he provides the reader with an important perspective on the conflict that is essential to understanding the severity of the situation, and is also essential to understanding how each side in the Washington-Taipei-Beijing triangle views the dispute differently.
In sum, Playing with Fire is an essential read for those with limited knowledge of US-Taiwan-PRC relations and for the most seasoned observers of political developments in East Asia. The book raises a number of important issues both explicitly and implicitly that deserve further investigation. In particular, if we hope to avoid a cross-strait conflict, it appears that decision-makers in Beijing, Washington and Taipei will have to work very hard to prevent such a catastrophe.
Dennis V. Hickey is professor of Political Science at Missouri State University and Kim Wilson is a graduate student in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at Missouri State University.
Copyright (c) 2007 by Dennis V. Hickey and Kim Wilson