The China Fantasy questions the "soothing scenario" theory, which links economic change in with a trend toward democratization.
In his new book, James Mann scrutinizes how American elites describe the future of the People's Republic of (PRC). Mann is an experienced watcher, a former bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times and currently author-in-residence at 's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Mann's previous works include About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with , from Nixon to (1998) and Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (2004). The China Fantasy, a polemic of less than 150 pages, provides a welcome challenge to conventional wisdom regarding US policies toward . Mann's analysis has important implications for the and other nations that have predicated their economic involvement with on the hope that trade would bring about political change and greater respect for human rights. His appraisal of 's future may have even more relevance for Taiwanese, as they judge their prospects for the future.
watchers usually forecast either of two probable futures for the PRC--democratization or catastrophic implosion, both of which involve change. Mann contends that we should not assume that will transform. He foresees a third scenario--the continuation of 's extraordinary economic growth under an undeviating authoritarian regime. could very well become richer and much more powerful in 25 years and still have a repressive, undemocratic government.
Soothing Scenario
Americans have been promised that trade will lead to 's democratization, which Mann labels a "soothing scenario." Americans are told that through commerce, will evolve into a pluralistic nation enjoying increasing freedom of expression and a democratic form of government. This hopeful scenario of slow regime change has become almost a religion among US policymakers and most of the media. American integration with for the last 35 years has been sold to the public based on the promise of change.
For several years after the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, victims of Chinese political oppression were worthy of American attention, as Hungarians were in 1956, Czechs in 1968 and Poles in the early 1980s. Nowadays, the massacre is rarely mentioned in the West and has become much richer and more firmly integrated into the world economy. Compared to the treatment of other authoritarian regimes, has handled with kid gloves. Since the mid 1990s, American elites have protected against the harshest criticism of the communist regime. The PRC's suppression of religion, expression and any semblance of political life is most often either ignored or excused by apologists in the . The newly emerged giant is either depicted as being too fragile for censure or subject to its own rules of political development. Professors, journalists, diplomats, business leaders and every president since Richard Nixon have contributed to the creation of the notion that democracy is an inevitable part of 's future, despite the fact that political change in the PRC has been almost nonexistent. Meanwhile, the hope that this year's Beijing Olympics would be like those held in in 1988--a coming-out party for democracy--quietly vanished a few years ago.
In 1992, Bill Clinton promised that, as president, he would "not coddle dictators, from to ." But by spring 1994, just five years after Tiananmen and only two years into 's presidency, it had become apparent that commerce would trump human rights as the dominant factor in the molding of elite American views of . promoted free trade as a cure-all for both Chinese and American ills, and the opening of new markets and manufacturing bases took on a moral quality. It became commonly accepted that profits and pluralism would grow together in the Middle Kingdom. According to , economic development in would "increase the spirit of liberty over time."
"I just think it's inevitable," proclaimed, "just as inevitably the Berlin Wall fell." Chinese communism was on the "wrong side of history," said during former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's 1997 visit to the .
The creation and continuation of a pro-trade, all-else-be-damned policy has enjoyed bipartisan support in the . While promising that he would treat as a "strategic competitor" in 1999, presidential candidate George W. Bush forecast in a campaign speech that economic engagement would bring desired political changes. "Economic freedom creates habits of liberty," he said. "And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy ... Trade freely with , and time is on our side."
American pro-China policies were spawned by the Cold War strategy of forcing the Soviet Union to worry about NATO and at the same time. However, the rationale for an anti-Soviet policy disappeared in 1989 as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. Earlier that year, the People's Liberation Army fired upon its own citizens at Tiananmen. The notion that engagement would change was possibly the only way to sell the notion of trade and investment in to Americans in the post-Tiananmen, post-Cold War era.
Shared Responsibility
Mann does not blame Americans exclusively for the creation of a wishful policy. European and Asian business and political elites are just as willing to invest in 's undemocratic present, while ostensibly encouraging a democratic future. Former British Prime Minister John Major's September 1991 visit to contributed to a thawing of relations with the West after Tiananmen. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of "unstoppable momentum" toward democracy in . Seen as a whole, Europe now does more trade with than does the .
Prominent journalists have given credence to the belief in the inevitability of political change in . New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof has articulated his confidence in caffeine-driven democratization, under which the rising Chinese urban middle class, accustomed to choosing from the beverage menu at Starbucks, would inevitably begin to desire choosing from among a list of candidates. "No middle class is content with more choices of coffees than of candidates on a ballot," Kristof wrote.
Mann dismisses the notion that the trappings of modern consumer society inevitably lead to democracy, even if the increasing purchasing power of Chinese urbanites results in a concurrent rise in political consciousness. may have a new thirst for trendy consumer products, but repressive government policies prevent from becoming a focal point in the growth of a national political culture, in contrast to the situations in and in the 1980s.
's countless villages and hamlets contain a substantial percentage of the nation's population. Though 's confident urban middle class now numbers in the hundreds of millions, they are significantly outnumbered by the 800 or 900 million peasants who have barely tasted the fruits of modernity. 's prosperous regions are so far ahead that they can hardly act as avatars of political consciousness for the entire country. 's Starbucks aficionados might doubt the benefits of political populism that could bring the possibility of being outvoted by peasants who have probably never tasted coffee, much less the expensive varieties at Western-style cafes. As Harvard professor Samuel Huntington wrote in The Clash of Civilizations (1996), "The essence of Western Civilization is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac." Indeed, Chinese may eat Big Macs or even drive cars, but still not care to introduce popular sovereignty into their politics, particularly when they have thrived under government-driven, authoritarian capitalism.
Mann finds scarce evidence for 's democratization. Chinese political activists, religious adherents, ethnic minorities and intellectuals are still subject to harassment or arrest--and persecution accelerated after President Hu Jintao took office. More disturbingly, regression on the part of the Chinese is often seen by the mainstream American media as a "two steps forward, one step back" trend. As Mann explains, "Chinese repression tends to be safely embedded in an assumption of progress, a soft, warm, gauzy wrapping of hopefulness."
Thomas L. Friedman, another New York Times columnist and author of The World Is Flat (2005), predicted nearly a decade ago that the need for accurate financial information would produce a free media in . "'s going to have a free press. Globalization will drive it," he wrote. But the PRC's economic growth has failed to produce a freer market in information, so perhaps the world is not so flat in the case of . The rule of law has been applied selectively in to protect the rights of businesses but does little to protect speech or political protest. Mann envisions further protection of commercial interests but not individual rights, and an environment where foreign investors are kept happy but Chinese nonconformists suffer.
In the 1990s, the Internet looked like a promising way of circumventing governmental controls on communication. Instead, has created a vast "intranet," devoting copious resources to limiting the spread of information. Recent episodes have shown that technology in can be channeled for reactionary purposes, as in rallying Chinese nationalists against a Starbucks located within 's and in the never-ending recitation of Japanese war atrocities.
Corporate Complicity
The terrible reality is that American corporations--including Cisco, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo--have helped the Chinese police state spy on and prevent information from reaching its subjects.
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof thinks the middle class in China will eventually clamor for democracy since they will not be happy with more coffee options at Starbucks than candidates on a ballot. (Photo by Huang Chung-hsin)
Some observers have commended 's village-level elections, but Mann does not, saying that such "elections" are merely a means for the Chinese Communist Party to show its muscle in the countryside, which is hardly a harbinger of democratization. No formal opposition movement is allowed to consolidate in villages. When necessary, the authorities use violence to prevent opposition from arising and block any hint of holding elections on a larger scale.
Unlike writers like , Mann does not believe that Chinese culture necessarily clashes with democratic values. He seems rather hopeful of 's eventual democratization if the Chinese Communist Party were ever to give up its monopoly on power. But, because they cannot vote in a referendum on the matter, it is impossible to know whether Chinese want democracy or not.
Mann also punctures the theory that and can act as models for 's evolution. Most importantly, the bulk of 's population is isolated, both geographically and materially, from the pockets of prosperity in the east. 's relationship with the is radically different from 's or 's in the 1980s, when American pressure was crucial to ending one-party dictatorships. While the has sometimes threatened to retract security guarantees in its relations with and , it has no such leverage over .
Those who place little stock in the possibility that will slowly evolve into a pluralistic state emphasize its inherent and longstanding historical weaknesses, the widening gap between haves and have-nots, corruption, environmental devastation, ethnic and regional divisions and the fragility of financial institutions. Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China (2004), wrote that such weaknesses are more likely to tear apart than lead to a peaceful transition to democracy. But Mann believes that the centripetal forces within remain strong. For most of its history, has been able to maintain a remarkable stability and territorial integrity. Fatalistic views of are just as wrong to assume collapse as is the idea that commerce will automatically lead to democracy.
The China Fantasy leads one to question the relationship between scholarship and money. At the height of the Cold War, American specialists in Soviet affairs enjoyed only very limited opportunities to make money outside of academic, military or foreign policy circles. Legitimate business contacts were few and far between. These days, Sinologists, particularly former government officials who have experience, can command a pretty penny. Even academics, who a few decades ago were limited to teaching Mandarin or lecturing on their esoteric specialties, are influenced by the powerful network of money and business opportunities related to .
A "lexicon of dismissal" has developed that shields from criticism, Mann writes, in which those who criticize Chinese repression are labeled " bashers," accused of being too ideological or said to have a Cold War mentality. The last description is ironic, considering that was the primary beneficiary of American foreign policy during the last decades of the Cold War as the angled for backing against the . was able to keep its one-party dictatorship while becoming 's tacit ally and important trade partner (the Russian Bolsheviks were never so lucky). Mann also complains of pejorative labels borrowed by American media from the Chinese state media. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama, for example, have been branded "troublemakers."
Mann does not obsess over the modernization of 's military, but does find that the odds of a rise in 's belligerence are increased by the nation's inability to evolve politically. In this case, Mann does subscribe to at least one political science theory: that democracies do not go to war against one another.
A Model for Despots
's support for undemocratic regimes worldwide is an unmistakable problem. Wherever the European Union or pushes an authoritarian regime to grant more human rights or increase political pluralism--in , , , and , for example-- lends material and ideological support to the forces of repression. Ironically, the PRC thrives from world trade while promoting xenophobic regimes worldwide. , with its growing clout, offers an attractive model for despots who fear European and American efforts to spread democracy. In a recent Washington Post column (May 20, 2007) entitled "A Shining Model of Wealth without Liberty," Mann proclaimed, "The Iraq war isn't over, but one thing's already clear: China won." With , renegade nations have found a financial backer as well as a protector at the United Nations. In the future, could also serve as a counterexample for two old American allies-- and --as they resist democratization.
Most importantly, Mann is upset that US policies towards have been built upon fraudulent assumptions. He proposes a new American emphasis under which economic, military and diplomatic interests should come first, not the abstract notion that purchasing Chinese-made clothing and toys would somehow convince a hardheaded authoritarian regime to pursue a different sort of relationship with its more than one billion subjects.
Many Taiwanese have assumed that would inevitably shift toward democracy in much the same way as shifted from one-party rule to political pluralism. According to this line of thinking, could afford to wait out , which would either collapse or begin its own democratization, and maybe even lose interest in unification with the island.
But if Mann's vision of continued one-party rule were proven correct, then Taiwanese of all political stripes might have to reevaluate their view of . In light of 's continued belligerence, the notion that Taiwanese democratization in the 1980s and 1990s would serve as a model for is just a pipedream. The failure of this model and 's continued restrictions on free speech and political and religious activity should disturb those in who favor unification. The assumption that will eventually unite with --but only after the PRC "changes" (presumably in 's image)--should be reevaluated.
Mann foresees the possibility of change in American policies, but The China Fantasy doesn't anticipate one likely catalyst--the dangers of Chinese-made products. The pro-trade policies of a long succession of US Democratic and Republican presidents and legislators may flounder over lead paint on toys, poisonous chemicals in toothpaste and antibiotics in seafood. American consumers, who have long been more than happy to buy cheap Chinese imports, are beginning to have second thoughts. Americans can now be heard asking retailers whether they sell products made in as concerns mount over the PRC's product safety record.
The environment in is also changing. In 1996, the Republican-controlled US Congress just barely managed to pass a trade agreement with several Central American nations. Other US trade agreements with important allies (Australia and Colombia) have also proven controversial. Furthermore, the Democratic candidates for this year's US presidential election, as well as a few of the Republicans, have competed to see who can criticize China the loudest. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton has said that she opposes the sort of trade agreements that her husband once boasted about as president.
Critical Eye
Mann is a pessimist when it comes to trade's impact on the United States. However, although there are doubtless problems with the American economy, from August 2003 to September of last year the US added 8.1 million jobs, registering job growth over a record 49 consecutive months. American exports to China also grew from US$13 billion in 1999 to $55 billion in 2006. Thus, extremely positive forecasts for China's economic growth should be viewed with a critical eye, as should excessively pessimistic forecasts for the US economy.
Regardless of whether trade with China is good or bad for the United States, Mann is correct--US trade policies should be shaped for their economic benefit to America, not as a possible means to change Chinese politics. Support for trade has been built upon the assumption that economic growth in China would bring inevitable political change along democratic lines. The question arises that if Mann were right to dismiss such hopes, could there be other policies that would possibly influence China?
The China Fantasy may also paint too simple a picture of American discourse regarding China. Although Mann writes that American elites mostly speak with one voice, dissenting viewpoints are in fact frequently expressed in the US, especially regarding Taiwan and Tibet. Though Bush does often omit China from his list of countries living under dictatorship, he has not been silent about repression in the PRC and has offered Taiwan as a counterexample to China's authoritarianism. In fact, it is possible that Washington's human rights concerns could combine with increasing demands for trade protectionism to destabilize the Sino-American relationship. The China Fantasy also contains almost nothing about how the PRC's belligerence towards Taiwan might cause American elites to grow fearful of Chinese intentions once again.
While Mann is correct in saying that one should not forecast change without empirical evidence, one-party dictatorships of the Leninist variety have not done well in recent decades. A closer look needs to be taken at how China's booming economy might impact political attitudes. Mann may be too dismissive of the impact of hundreds of millions of newly middle class and affluent Chinese on politics. After all, a Chinese Communist Party that encourages capitalists to join its ranks may not remain monolithic.
While The China Fantasy does not provide many answers, it is an important corrective. Mann's warning not to equate economic change with democratization should be contemplated with extreme seriousness. His critique can serve as a refreshing antidote to the diet of cliches that audiences around the world will likely hear in the media's coverage of the Beijing Olympics.
Joseph Eaton is an assitant professor of history at National Chengchi University.
Copyright (c) 2008 by Joseph Eaton