The Six-Year National Development Plan, begun in January 1991, will soon be two years old, and it's a good time to eliminate some common misperceptions about the NT$8.2 trillion (US$303 billion) move to transform Taiwan's infrastructure.
First of all, duration. Is this really a six-year plan? Yes, and no. In fact, the name is somewhat misleading. Better to view the plan as a six-year-Iong massive boost for Taiwan's economy, rather than a set program with a precise start and finish. When the Executive Yuan's Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) pulled the plan together in late 1990, about 60 percent of it, in terms of financial requirements, was made up of ongoing projects already approved by various government agencies. Thus, the plan's roots actually extend well before 1991. Likewise, some of the plan's projects will likely reach fruition well after 1996.
The plan, by its very ambitious scope and short time frame, forces intense public attention on what actually has to be done to bring the island's infrastructure up to the requirements of the twenty-first century. The huge cost of the program also indicates that the government means business. The plan represents a firm political commitment, saying in effect, "We've got big problems to solve before Taiwan is fully developed socially, economically, and culturally, and we're going to spend the money to do it." While it may actually take a decade or more for the island's infrastructure to be substantially transformed, the six-year plan is a bold, broad-gauge, and highly visible way to get things moving.
But the plan's boldness makes some people nervous. They worry that the plan will be criticized if construction falls be hind schedule or if some projects have to be put temporarily on hold. These concerns raise another common misperception: that the plan is an exact, inflexible blueprint for the future. In fact, the six-year plan sets guidelines and goals, and specifies projects that are needed to fulfill them. While the plan's goals can be expected to remain constant, considerable adjustment can be expected in the ways to realize them.
Common sense, really, although commonly overlooked. It is impossible, for example, to predict accurately the problems associated with building a single mass-transit runnel along Chunghsiao East Road in Taipei. Try multiplying the possible problems by 775 projects administered by close to thirty ministries, agencies, and local governments. The scale of the six-year plan is stunning. Therefore, throughout the plan's implementation, as indicated in its original documentation, the projects will undergo review and revision "in accordance with changes in the subjective and objective environments at home and overseas, the ability to carry out the plan, and the financial resources of the nation."
In fact, review and revision are very much under way. Various projects, large and small, are already behind schedule because of unforeseen complications in acquiring adequate land, labor, and technology. Although these are major bottle necks, it would be a mistake to assume that if these problems were all solved to morrow, everything could be kept on schedule. In fact, a much larger complication has emerged in the process of implementing the plan. It is becoming clear that Taiwan is actually in the midst of transforming two infrastructures at the same time, a fact that puts the plan into a wholly different perspective.
A large portion of the plan's projects are highly visible because they involve building physical facilities: railways and roads, power plants and dams, hospitals and houses, parks and cultural centers, middle schools and universities. Securing adequate land, labor, and technology are essential for completing these infrastructure projects. But another "shadow" infrastructure must also be constructed, a complex array of trained manpower, laws and regulations, and administrative procedures.
Take the high-speed railway as an example. Complicated laws and regulations are needed to govern the operations of such a train because the old ones, which govern everything from grade crossings and roadbeds to safety standards and station management, were designed for slower-moving steam, oil, or electric trains. They are inappropriate and inadequate for the new high-speed rail system. And new laws and regulations cannot be adopted wholesale from France, Germany, or Japan-they must be crafted to fit local requirements. Legislators, administrators, and legal experts will have a lot of work to do before the first load of passengers makes the first ninety-minute trip from Taipei to Kaohsiung. Moreover, maintenance of the system will require an extensive support infrastructure of trained and certified safety inspectors, high-tech repair staff, and computer specialists.
Another example: Hundreds of the plan's projects involve putting up new buildings. But how long will it take to find and train enough building inspectors? Likewise, how many more employees in both the public and private sectors will be needed to handle the huge volume of bond sales, bidding procedures, and banking requirements generated by the plan? Such questions indicate the massive load that is being put on the administrative and legal infrastructure.
Thus, the plan must be understood in a broader perspective. It encompasses projects that predate and extend beyond its six-year time frame, it involves sophisticated fine-tuning during its regular process of review and revision, and besides building the hardware needed for continued economic development, the plan is also forcing an extensive upgrading of the island's administrative and legal "supportware." ▪