Taiwan Today

The mid-year assessment, which focused on political developments in the ROC, took as its starting point July 15, 1987, when the Emergency Decree that activated martial law was lifted.

Three of Taiwan's most eminent political scientists joined Dr. Jiang in this discussion: Dr. Lin Chia-cheng, Professor of Sociology at Soochow University; Dr. Jiun-han Tsao, Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University; and Dr. Bertrand Tsai, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. Excerpts follow:

Jiang: Gentlemen, since martial law ended last year, major changes have taken place in Taiwan. For example, many significant laws have been passed, such as the Law on Assembly and Parade. We have also seen numerous demonstrations and even strikes, especially since the early part of this year; and even though the Law Governing the Formation of Civic Associations (including political parties) has not yet been officially passed, the "Democratic Progressive Party" ("DPP") has been formed and has been functioning as a political entity. In addition, all segments of society, from government employees to teachers to office workers to farmers, have become more active socially and politically. We would like to hear your assessment of these phenomena.

A second major point concerns the sudden and unfortunate passing away of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January, and the swearing-in of the new President, Mr. Lee Teng-hui. His assumption of the presidency fortunately proceeded very smoothly and has developed into a positive situation: it has been said that the era of "strongman politics" has ended, and we are entering a new political era. In your opinion, how will this influence the overall democratic progress and stability of our society?

In terms of the Legislative Yuan, though the "DPP" currently holds only thirteen seats, their impact is quite strong and in certain areas unprecedented, as in the case of the national budget bill, from which they managed to slash billions of NT dollars. Other bills in the Legislative Yuan have been argued back and forth in heated disputes. Given these sometimes volatile situations, a major question for the government is how to ensure a normal democratic process. Next year's elections are part of the same picture as well: what sort of impact will the "DPP" have on the outcome?

We would also like to hear what Dr. Tsai, who is an expert on international relations, has to say about the diplomatic breakthrough witnessed recently in the Asian Development Bank situation, and discuss what the future direction should be in this area.

Finally, there is the question of our mainland China policy: in addition to allowing visits to the mainland for family reunions, what other types of policy decisions should be encouraged in this area? Let's start the discussion with Dr. Lin.

Lin: Thank you, Dr. Jiang. In the period extending from the lifting of martial law last year to the present, there have been many dramatic changes and developments in Taiwan. But I think everyone would agree that of all the reforms the government has implemented in this time, the lifting of martial law was the most important and has had the greatest impact. This is because the end of martial law bears a close relationship to the development of democracy.

In its most basic terms, democracy is concerned with political rights, both civil and governmental, and the distinction between them. This distinction should be determined by the people or the people's representatives, and should be spelled out in the Constitution and the legal code. Governmental rights involve the right to govern of both the central and the local governments, and the authority of such bodies as the legislature and judiciary. Governmental rights or powers must be determined in the legislature and enacted as law.

Under martial law, however, the situation is reversed. Because of extraordinary circumstances, military rule replaces the normal political rule. The martial law which was implemented in France was of the military type. The type we had in Taiwan was also military since it was adopted from Japan, which had followed the French model. Under this type of martial law the ultimate political authority, even as regards such civilian matters as publication laws, lies with the military.

Though in Taiwan the exercise of this authority was kept to a minimum as far as most people were concerned, this was by choice: the extent of the military's actual authority can be clearly seen from Articles 8 and 11 of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, which are very strict. So what happens under martial law is that basic democratic principles are turned around.

Rather than the concept of a general guarantee of civil rights as the rule of thumb and limitations on those rights as the exceptions which must be specifically listed, the reverse becomes true: limitations on civil rights become the general rule of thumb, and civil rights become the specified exceptions. Article 11 of the Temporary Provisions, for example, allowed for the suspension of civil rights or freedoms at the discretion of the government, which is a 180 degree turnaround from the concept of a general guarantee of civil rights.

Though there certainly were some positive social changes during the more than thirty years of martial law on Taiwan, such as universal education, the end of martial law is a natural function of democracy and allows for the further development of a democratic order. That is why foreign observers have had such a strong, positive reaction to the lifting of martial law.

I was in Japan when martial law ended, and many journalists and scholars there wondered why the people's reaction in Taiwan to the official lifting of martial law was so low-key. I explained that developments in Taiwan were such that by the time it was officially terminated, "martial law" effectively existed in name only. However, there is no denying that its official lifting was an important step forward in the democratic process.

Another key development in the past year has been the establishment of new political parties. Though the Law Governing the Organization of Civic Associations is still under review in the Legislative Yuan, the government has tolerated their formation. In fact, more than a dozen have sprung up this year in addition to the "DPP"—including the "Labor Party"—though some of these are mere "soap bubble" parties with only a few members. The long-term implications are that in the future the power of a political party will be determined by the extent of its popular support, its ability to mobilize its supporters during election time, and the number of seats it holds in the representative bodies.

A major issue of the past twelve months which should be resolved as soon as possible is the rejuvenation of the National Assembly and the voluntary retirement plan for elderly members. Though some progress has been made and a bill has been drafted, the effectiveness of the policy eventually adopted will be an issue of considerable concern.

Another key political issue is the "legalization" of the Provincial Government. Many observers feel that the Provincial Assembly needs to be "institutionalized" and given a legal base.

In social terms, an important development is the manifestation of the power of non-political elements. When the government lifted martial law, the emergence of non-political forces naturally followed. The people began to exercise more openly their basic civil rights, such as free speech. This, as well as the formation of political parties, is a sign of developing social action. It is also significant for our future social progress in the direction of a more open and pluralistic society, a higher standard of living, further improvements in education, and other areas. We're seeing a healthy increase in the power of women as a social force. This is also true of youth, workers, farmers, retired soldiers, and other groups.

Right now we are in the middle of a transitional period where the expression of this social strength in the form of street demonstrations has gotten somewhat out of hand, but this overreaction is understandable since it results from the exercise of a new-found freedom (just as when the overseas travel policy opened up and hordes of Taiwan tourists caught "travel fever"). Sooner or later things will calm down.

I believe, however, that there are other methods of expressing public opinion which should be used as an addition or an alternative to street demonstrations, and which are both more effective and less disruptive—after all, Taipei is not Washington, D.C. with all its wide open spaces for demonstrations. The consumer rights lobby, which resulted in the Consumer Protection Law, is a good example of the alternative I'm talking about. The formation of special interest groups who make concerted, organized efforts to promote their concerns through established channels can be much more effective than a simple street demonstration. Public relations and more efficient use of the media can have a big impact.

Overall, the emergence of non-political social forces, which can effectively make reasonable demands on the government and thereby influence public policy, is a positive and natural development in a democratic country. I feel very optimistic about this.

In assessing the impact of the late President Chiang Ching-kuo's contributions on developments of the past year, it is important to note that in the last three years, up until his death this past January, he made a point of convening the National Security Council (NSC) as seldom as possible. This is quite impressive when one considers his enormous power as both President and Kuomintang Chairman. Now President Lee Teng-hui has publicly announced his determination to follow Chiang Ching-kuo's example as regards the NSC.

What we're seeing here is a gradual return to a Cabinet-led system. This is important, for otherwise a parallel political system could develop with an unclear delineation between the powers of the President and of the Cabinet. Developments such as the establishment of multi-party politics and the rejuvenation of the National Assembly help stimulate further progress toward a Cabinet-led system. Like President Chiang in his second term, President Lee has demonstrated a willingness to allow things to develop in this direction. In addition to following the policy of convening the National Security Council as seldom as possible, the President has also expressed a willingness to see revisions made to the Temporary Provisions, as appropriate.

The establishment of a clear-cut democratic system of government is important also in cultural and social terms. When the structure and organization of a democratic system have been established, a culture of democracy has room to flourish, and a democratic mentality can develop among the people.

Taiwan in the past two years has become a focal point of international attention; earlier it was because of our economic prowess, but more lately it is because of our democratic political development. We have been able to move toward democracy without having to pay the heavy price that the Philippines and South Korea have paid. So whether from the point of view of international politics, or from the perspective of domestic social and political change, Taiwan is a place worth watching. Observers from all over the world agree and are coming to Taiwan to observe events first-hand. They too feel positive about the joint effort on the part of both the government and the people to advance together.

Jiang: Thank you, Dr. Lin. Now we'd like to ask Dr. Tsao to comment on the continuing process of democratic development since Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo passed away in January.

Tsao: Thank you. Recently I was discussing the developments in Taiwan over the past year with a group of students from Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States. For them, Taiwan has become the most interesting place to watch—there seems to be something significant happening every minute. When I was in Hong Kong in June last year attending the China-ASEAN conference, I invited the Indonesian director of the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Josef Wanandi, to visit Taiwan and observe developments. He'd been here once before, a long time ago, and his comment was that there wasn't anything worth watching and that he'd already made the rounds of all the scenic spots, Taroko Gorge and so on.

But last November, after martial law was lifted and the policy of allowing family reunion visits to the mainland was being implemented, I touched base with him again and he wrote me a letter saying that he was extremely impressed with the developments in Taiwan and agreed that it was more than worthwhile to make a trip to Taiwan to observe these changes first-hand. My point is that in the period since martial law was lifted, developments in Taiwan have had a high degree of "watchability" and have given much food for thought. This is all the more the case as the future is still undecided and uncertain.

From the lifting of martial law in July 1987, through the implementation of the policy to allow family reunion visits to the mainland that November, to the passing away of Chiang Ching-kuo in January, and the developments in these three months since the official mourning period ended, there have been major events in the civilian sector which relate directly to public policy development. For example, there have been the strike by railroad engineers, street demonstrations by the farmers, and the demands made by retired soldiers for honoring of land deed awards. This period could be called a "holding" period for public policy development.

Other points of major interest include the KMT's redefinition of its future role and the process of adjustment the "DPP" is undergoing. Today, I'd like to discuss this 12-month period—from the July 1987 lifting of martial law to the KMT's July 1988 13th National Party Congress—from the perspective of the political system and public policy developments.

From this perspective, the most significant development in terms of future direction is within the political parties. I'm not talking about the number of political parties, but rather the way each political party perceives its own role and the internal adjustment processes each is currently undergoing. The KMT, for example, cannot afford to maintain its martial law mentality when handling issues in this post-martial law era. It must reexamine itself from a post-martial law point of view and ask itself what its new "positioning" should be.

Since the ending of martial law, the KMT has developed greater lower to upper level movement as opposed to the purely upper to lower level communication that went on before. Whether or not the KMT will be successful in democratizing its party politics in terms of elections, for example, is still an open question. But progress has already begun in this direction, and in fact it is the only viable choice they have.

On the other side we have the "DPP"—and it is not a "soap bubble" party by any means. In the past year, which has been a period of adjustment, the "DPP" has been carefully observing the KMT. Its current situation is rather complex, for the "DPP" is still looking for a political "role model."

At the same time, the "DPP" and the KMT act as mutual stimulants; the interaction between them is significant. While the "DPP" has been watching and learning from the KMT, the KMT has also been influenced by the "DPP." Thus this early stage in the development of a multi-party system is actually one of mutual stimulation.

But for many observers, myself included, the key to determining the real direction party politics are taking will be next year's elections. Currently there are too many uncertain variables at work to allow for an accurate judgement. But next year, with such a variety of elected positions at stake, the future direction of the party system should be much clearer.

There are several important points to watch for in next year's elections. The first is that from the election results and the performance of the KMT and the "DPP" we will be able to see the voters' views of national objectives.

But perhaps the most significant factor in next year's elections will be the question of confidence. Most observers are concerned with the question of stability, but I think the question of confidence is more important, and it exists on many levels. The "DPP" and other opposition forces have always been suspicious of the "old guard," the old soldiers from the mainland who they feel do not have their hearts in Taiwan. But the implementation of the policy of allowing visits to the mainland for family reunions has altered the situation.

For example, I have a relative, a retired officer, who went to the mainland for a one week visit and came back after two days. He couldn't deal with the living conditions in his old hometown. And he was only 20 when he first left the mainland. So the "DPP" is no longer justified in maintaining that suspicious attitude toward this group of people. I have always felt that I would like to return to the mainland, but now I'm hesitating. There's really no question anymore of a "toothbrush policy" for the so-called "mainlanders" living on Taiwan: this is no longer relevant. But the overall question of confidence still remains. This will have a big impact on our future development in many areas, such as investment and our relations with the Communists.

Another important question is the concrete policy steps to be followed by the KMT and "DPP" over the next year. What will they do? Interestingly, in many policy areas the two parties overlap and are in effect bi-partisan. Especially in terms of public policy, the Consumer Protection Law being a good example, there is a strong continuity between the two parties. This should have some structural effects on the representative bodies.

In fact, if the current problems in the representative bodies are not successfully resolved by election time next year, voters will not be dealing with a clear situation and may feel that it doesn't matter much whether they vote for the "DPP" or the KMT. Therefore, not resolving the current issues in the representative bodies would be to the disadvantage of the KMT. On the other hand it would be clearly to the advantage of the "DPP" to keep that unresolved burden squarely on the KMT's shoulders until the December '89 elections. From whatever viewpoint, next year's elections will be a significant turning point in the development of party politics in Taiwan.

Another point I would like to discuss concerns the policy-making process. From the point of view of public policy, political parties have played a significant role. But if one reviews past governmental policies, to be frank, one will find that they are KMT policies and products of KMT efforts.

Someone once complimented me on my in-depth understanding of the ruling party, but I corrected him by explaining that what I was studying was the degree of involvement of the party in policy-making, not the party itself. At the time I was doing a study of the"10 Major Policies" to analyze exactly how a policy decision is made, and the management and coordination of the ruling party in terms of working to get a policy approved. There was no "DPP" opposition party then, so the study naturally focused on the KMT and its role. Over the past year, however, the KMT's party function has weakened somewhat; there is a sense of impotence and some people have resigned.

There has also been a significant rise during the past year in the influence of non-political forces on policy decisions. The most significant of these is the business sector. The influence of intellectuals, on the other hand, has shown no particular growth. But the growing influence of the business sector on the representative bodies is very obvious.

In terms of the political parties, the influence and involvement of certain individuals outpaces that of the parties as a whole. Other significant new forces include non-professional special interest groups such as the ROC Consumer's Foundation and women's groups. Right now these groups and others like them are organizing to voice demands and opposition to particular policy decisions. Though this does result in a degree of public disturbance, the organization of such groups to express demands denotes a strong trend toward political involvement on the part of society. This is in marked contrast to the situation before the lifting of martial law.

Jiang: Thank you, Dr. Tsao. Now let's turn to Dr. Tsai for a discussion of foreign policy issues.

Tsai: Before I begin a discussion of foreign policy, there are a few key points concerning the domestic scene I would like to mention.

The first is the problem of the stabilization of political power. Many foreign observers, in the U.S., Japan, and elsewhere, have expressed concern about the trends of political development in Taiwan: they feel that the situation has gotten out of hand, that there are too many demands being made, and that the government seems less capable of solving these problems. Moreover, they are apprehensive that if these problems are not solved soon, the situation will become less and less stable, and could affect such things as investments. But I believe that right now Taiwan is in a transitional stage and that we will manage to get through without the negative effects these observers are predicting.

The second is the problem of disruption of the social order. Many people feel that in the past several months there have been too many public demonstrations to voice demands, but I believe that these demonstrations are not in themselves a negative phenomenon. Everyone is still in the learning stages and must gradually be trained in how to apply the methods and behavior suited to a democratic society.

Overseas we've seen many examples of public rallies and demonstrations where, despite the large number of people participating, there is only one policeman strolling leisurely behind to keep the order. This demonstrates that the people are not only accustomed to using these methods of voicing opinion, but also understand that such activities should be carried out within the framework of the law.

In Taiwan, the legal guidelines for these types of activities have already been set. If the people can only stay within the framework of these laws, then we can all advance together in the same direction instead of in the rather disjointed order in which things are progressing now. Ever since my return from abroad in 1973 I've advocated the formation of special interest groups as a positive way of representing public opinion outside political parties. I believe that there will be progress in this area in Taiwan once we get through this transitional period.

Another important question concerns the impact of the "DPP" on next year's elections. One unfavorable factor for the "DPP" is its relative weakness in the area of suitable candidates. For example, if there are 200 seats up for election, where is the "DPP" going to find 200 viable candidates for those seats? Especially when compared to the KMT, which has 2 million party members to choose from, the "DPP" is very weak in this respect. Also, though many people welcome the opposition role the "DPP" is playing, voters would like to see a return to greater stability. This sentiment, when coupled with the problem of finding candidates, indicates that although the "DPP" should have some success at the polls they are unlikely to make any dramatic advances.

As for the KMT, it has been pointed out that there is more lower to upper level movement in the party. But many people have expressed to me that they doubt whether in fact this is really so, and that probably the same group of people as before will be nominated to stand for election.

My own feeling is that this is not necessarily the case; currently there are a number of dynamic young party members emerging from the party ranks. So even though there may still be some problems with the system, such as complaints by younger party members that they will be hard put to get party support in the upcoming election, I believe that there is at least some movement in the party and that it is no longer merely static.

But whether or not a party democratizes its internal structure is really its own concern, and not a national political concern. If a party is unable to meet the demands of its members for positive change, the result will be that party will lack solidarity, will be unable to reach a consensus, and will not be able to develop its political potential. It is a party problem and should be treated as such.

In terms of the crisis of confidence that was mentioned earlier, this relates directly to our position on the international scene. The direction of Taiwan's future relations with the Communist mainland has created a big question mark in people's minds as far as confidence is concerned.

It was pointed out that in many policy areas the KMT and the "DPP" have taken bi-partisan stands. There are many members of the KMT "Old Guard" who express the opinion that "It's all over for the KMT! As soon as the 'DPP' raises a new demand the KMT adopts it into our party policies! What's going 'on?!" But my answer is that they've just described one of the KMT's strongest points. By adopting "DPP" demands into KMT policies they've taken the wind out of the sails of the "DPP" and has left them not knowing what to demand next.

Jiang: Thank you, Dr. Tsai. In the course of discussion it was mentioned that the KMT and the "DPP" are bipartisan in many areas. Though this may be true on certain policy issues, it is less true in terms of respective party stands on national objectives. There is a lack of consensus on this issue, particularly as regards the question of Taiwan independence. Though there has been a lot of theoretical discussion of Taiwan independence, how many people really would support it? The "DPP" has already shown signs of divisiveness over this issue. Would you like to comment on this, Dr. Lin?

Lin: Although the "DPP" is obviously not against Taiwan independence, I think that at this moment—just when the country is democratizing, and when the "DPP" must face the KMT and must face the voters as well—the "DPP" cannot afford to focus too much attention on demands or strategies for Taiwan independence. This is especially true as the possibility of independence is currently very remote. In addition, certain key members of the "DPP" such as Fei Hsi-ping and Yu Teng-fa oppose advocacy of Taiwan independence for pragmatic reasons.

The position of the KMT has been that any move to raise the issue of Taiwan independence with the Communists breathing over our shoulders is impractical because it could provoke them into attack. The Taiwan issue is not the Communists' first priority; they are more concerned with their "Four Modernizations." But if the issue is forced on them and they are provoked into making it a priority, this could only be to Taiwan's disadvantage. I think that many members of the "DPP" appreciate this point. Forcing the issue of Taiwan independence at this juncture would be neither to Taiwan's nor to the Communists' advantage.

In Taiwan the distinction between "Taiwanese" and "mainland-born" is becoming more and more vague. Even the "DPP" refers to the "20 million people of Taiwan." That extreme division into categories is becoming less relevant all the time.

In terms of international politics, the Taiwan independence issue also gets complex treatment. The U.S., of course, would definitely be opposed to Taiwan's reunification with a Communist mainland. But at the same time it also discourages advocacy of Taiwan independence. So the best thing for all concerned is to put the issue on the back burner for now, which would allow for greater concentration on domestic issues on both sides of the Straits.

However, there are two important reasons why young activists are concerned with advocating Taiwan independence at this time, and I think we should take a look at them. The first is that they believe the Chinese Communists currently do not have the military strength to risk an attack on Taiwan, and that this situation should be taken advantage of to declare Taiwan independence. They feel the longer this move is delayed, the less chance there will be for success as the Communists are sure to strengthen their forces and increase their ability to snatch Taiwan back.

The second reason, which is harder for me to accept, is that they believe the setup of a multi-party political system in Taiwan has created the right conditions for coming to a resolution of the independence question, with the "DPP" and the KMT playing the major policy-making roles. I believe the reasoning here is faulty and that using this approach at this time could instead create social unrest among Taiwan's people.

Jiang: From your comments it seems that discussions of the issue of Taiwan independence are best kept to the theoretical level, as discussion of concrete policies or strategies on this issue at this time would not be to anyone's advantage.

Tsai: In any case, we are entering a new era of "normalizing" the political process in the democratic sense. The era of strongman politics has come to an end, though it will take time to get things working according to a clear-cut democratic system. But the process has begun and I am optimistic that things will progress in the right direction.

Jiang: Dr. Tsai, would you care to comment further on foreign affairs?

Tsai: The implementation of the policy allowing visits to the mainland for family reunions marks the starting point of a whole new approach to foreign policy, and not only as regards the mainland. Establishing contact with the mainland allows not only for an easing of tension in our relations with the mainland, but also in the Asia-Pacific region in general, thus contributing to the stability of the area.

In the Asia-Pacific region, as we know, there are three potential hotspots: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and peninsular Southeast Asia. There are American troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, which currently help maintain stability in the area. Under Soviet pressure, the Vietnamese are likely to begin troop withdrawal from Cambodia, which should ease tensions there. And as for the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan has taken the initiative in implementing policy moves to improve the situation there; the allowing of family visits is being followed by expanded contact in other areas, which one expects will increasingly diminish hostilities.

Another important effect of the policy of allowing family visits to the mainland is that it increases the faith of the people of Taiwan in the effectiveness of our system. In international terms, we're adding to the stability of the area.

The question of Taiwan's "China Policy" is constantly being emphasized. I think that what we should aim at here in policy terms is more than just establishing people-to-people and business contacts. We should have as our goal the opening up and peaceful democratization of the mainland, and the eventual reaching of a consensus where there is unification of the two sides under a free and democratic system.

But there is a problem to overcome here, which is that we lack any kind of systematic strategy to achieve this goal. Some people urge the further establishment of cultural and business ties.

But this isn't enough. It's too haphazard an approach. Thankfully the ruling party has raised the issue of Taiwan's mainland policy and will focus on it at the 13th National Congress in July. This is a healthy development, and hopefully will help to point out the fallacy of the approaches some people have been advocating, such as donating large sums of money to the people of the mainland to help them develop their economic power in defiance of the Communists' economic development policies.

To think that it is possible to do anything on the mainland without the Communists' getting involved is indeed naive. Using this type of direct approach to try and help our mainland brothers improve their standard of living is only pouring money into the Communists' coffers and is no help to Taiwan.

What is needed is a well thought out mainland policy with a clear goal and a viable strategy to achieve that goal. From the time the policy allowing family visits to the mainland was implemented until the present time, over US$100 million has poured into the mainland from Taiwan. But how is this money being used?

Only one thing is certain: the Communists are delighted. At the same time their attitude toward Taiwan is very clear: "You say you're from the ROC? Where's that?" Their attitude is basically one of condescension.

In addition, the Communists have not abandoned their threat of taking Taiwan by force. Thus, it is absolutely essential that we have clear guidelines for relations with the mainland in the form of a well-thought out mainland policy.

Our government has made some headway. At his February press conference, President Lee emphasized Taiwan's demands that the mainland must abandon its "Four Cardinal Principles" as well as its threat of using force against Taiwan. In a meeting with the Legislative Yuan, Premier Yu reiterated the two demands stated by President Lee and added a third: that the Communists do not act against the ROC by attempting to isolate it from the international community. Getting the Communists to abandon their "Four Cardinal Principles" would be very difficult, as difficult as convincing the ROC to abandon the Three Principles of the People. But the other two demands are more feasible.

In the short term, it's important to take things step by step and assess the effectiveness of our approach by the behavior of the Communists. For example, are there indications that they are becoming more inclined to abandon the use of force against Taiwan? Are they being less disruptive in terms of Taiwan's relations in the international community?

All this discussion going on about first accomplishing a "cultural unification" and an "economic unification," to be followed by national unification, is completely unrealistic. These things cannot be separated. We need a sound politically-led policy to guide relations, with the goal of unification under democracy.

As I said, this opening up of foreign policy is not only in terms of the mainland; as we can see, there is a gradual move to establish contact with Eastern Europe as well, and indeed economic relations have already progressed with Yugoslavia and East Germany. None of this would have been possible without the opening up of the policy on visits to the mainland.

Another important result of this new openness is that we are more flexible in our approaches to foreign policy issues. For example, having the right to vote in an international organization gives us national status; having to use a revised national appellation is a relatively minor point when measured against the benefit we get. We can't hope to successfully apply the method used in the recent Asian Development Bank meeting [where the ROC representatives wore the national flag in protest against a name change] every time, because the Communists have been dealing with such issues on a case by case basis, particularly since 1982. We have to be flexible.

One last problem I'd like to address concerns the fact that we have not managed to come up with a middle of the road alternative that might be more acceptable to the Communists in terms of our approach to mainland policy. Here in Taiwan it's either total reunification under the Three Principles of the People or Taiwan independence, neither of which the Communists can be expected to consider.

The Communists at least talk about their "one country, two systems" idea which, though not acceptable to us, at least has the merit of being less of an extreme. We should try to develop a model that is more moderate but one we can live with. The German model has been discussed and rejected. "Political pluralism" is unacceptable. What alternative, then, is acceptable? The support for Taiwan independence is in large part the result of this lack of a less extreme alternative.

More importantly, we should develop this more moderate model on our own initiative, thus giving ourselves a more realistic direction for policy development. This would avoid the current mentality that says the Communists must accept our policy first before we begin to act upon it. Why should they accept it first? It's our task to implement the policy successfully so that it gradually achieves the desired effect.

If we work with this sort of policy direction and improve relations with the mainland, as the Communists begin to discover the advantages of working with a more open system, they will eventually have to abandon their "one country two systems policy" and may be willing to consider a new approach of an "equal international society." But we must have an alternative to offer, as well as a consistent policy. By telling the Communists that we will not consider establishing direct relations with them, or allow direct investment until they meet our demands (such as abandoning the threat of using force against Taiwan), and at the same time having a workable alternative model to strive for, we may be able to bring about an improved situation which will allow us to pursue our goals more effectively.

On the international scene, Taiwan has to begin to assume some leadership responsibility. Especially with the democratic progress we have made since the end of martial law, we should expand our role as a development model for Third World countries. Also, by opening up our domestic market and diversifying our export markets, we're contributing to the health of the developed countries as well.

I never thought I would sec the day when an American expert like Prof. Robert Scalapino would turn to me and say: "Professor Tsai, it's important that Taiwan not only continue its democratization process, but also that it help the U.S. to solve our economic problems." Therefore we must learn to take on this new role of international responsibility. We must learn to turn our power resources into power capabilities.