Taiwan Review
'Situation among mainlanders in U.S. like Ching students in Japan'
March 01, 1983
(The following statement was sent to the FCR from a Chinese Communist student in the United States, and is reprinted here in its entirety. The views of the writer are, of course, his own; his courage is deserving of applause. —Editor)
Since 1979, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has sent and allowed thousands of scholars and students (known as CVS to visit the West. A tightly closed country is changing, indeed in a way apparently unprecedented in the history of Communism. Nevertheless, the good program is now being threatened from within. In the U.S., among about 10,000 to 11,000 CVSs, more than one thousand are applying for political asylum. Judging from recent incidents of CVSs taking refuge in Taiwan, the tendency is obviously on the increase. Comrade Wang Ping-chang, a CVS who had just received his M.D. at McGill University, decided not only to defect, but to start a human rights magazine, China Spring, in November, 1982, in New York.
History seems to be repeating. Around the turn of the century, and especially after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Ching Dynasty sent thousands of students to Japan. Nonetheless, contrary to the will of their sponsor, the majority of these students became convinced that the first task for the rescue of China was the overthrow of the Manchu regime itself.
An American professor became somewhat upset when he learned that a CVS under him wanted (or had) to defect. He understood the CVS's righteous motivation, but he really did not want anything to threaten the good pro gram of cultural exchanges, because he believed that in the long run it would help bring democracy to (Communist) China. This is certainly a good point. But, what we need to explain to our American friends, is that we Chinese really cannot afford to be patient any longer.
For CVSs, defection demands a very hard decision. Everyone of them has hostage-dependents left in China. And the West, for various understandable reasons, is far from happy with the defection of visiting scholars. I submit that the rise in defections basically reflects the judgment among CVSs that (Communist) China's recent political development represents a consolidation of neo-Maoism, which is best defined as political Maoism combined with economic pragmatism. In foreign policy, (Communist) China may replace its present position with an "equi-distant" line, or even one favoring the Soviet Union again. Brezhnev's death gave the CCP an opportunity to show its intention of resuming its cordiality towards the Soviet party. Even before this occasion, the reception in Peking of the leaders of the French Communist Party in November, as comrades- "mistaken revisionists" of yester day-had passed a special message to Moscow that the CCP wanted to normalize relationships with the Soviets.
Chinese intellectuals dread neo-Maoism as much as they did Maoism itself. For anyone who indulges in some liberal thinking or has some background in Western education, old-fashioned Maoism is a scourge. As (mainland) political re-tightening becomes obvious, CVSs really have reasons to worry that one day "struggle sessions" will be con ducted to cleanse them of the "Western bourgeois influence" acquired in the early 1980s. For the more radical (liberal, I mean) among them, and for those who left behind "old accounts" remaining to be settled, the potential danger involves more than "struggle sessions."
Personal safety aside, intellectuals are strongly aware that, to a great degree, the Maoist economic debacles were a consequence of Mao's tyranny. By avoiding obvious follies, neo-Maoism may work somewhat better in economic matters than Maoism. But the root of inefficiency still exists, and benevolent patriarchalism can easily revert to irrational authoritarianism. Recently the (Communist) "National People's Congress" once again rubber-stamped another Party-sponsored "Constitution." This new document again includes a "bill of rights," the actual function of which is, according to Maoist tradition, to lure and capture any "newly emergent counter-revolutionaries and rightists."
Thus, from Mao to post-Mao the CCP has not changed its essence very much. Then why did this unprecedented phenomenon occur-that thousands of CVSs are now working and living in America, in Western Europe, and in Japan?
Actually, seeking friendship in the West is not new among Communist nations. Before Stalin's death the courageous Yugoslavians did so. Since Khrushchev, the Soviets and the Chinese have competed in placating the West. First, the Soviets led the race, while the CCP denounced them as "incorrigible revisionists." A turning point occurred when. "brotherly comrades" conflicted bloodily (in border warfare) at the end of the 1960s. Then, both Richard Nixon and Mao Tse-tung became aware of the possibility and advantages of approaching each other. In 1971, the CCP began its essentially pro-West approach. We read from Nixon's writing that when he met with Mao in Mao's study, the senile Chinese tyrant grasped his hand for more than a minute.
All the ruling authorities of the Communist nations show some degree of admiration for the West. This attitude arose because Communist inefficiency has been in such notorious contrast with the high productivity of the system of free enterprise: It is not surprising that even Mao and his small coterie lost confidence in their own creations. For example, Lin Piao, once Mao's hand-picked heir-apparent, and later his unsuccessful assassin, in his "selected passages"—which had been used for nationwide ideological indoctrination during the first years of the "Cultural Revolution" admits: "We do not compete with capitalist countries in the matter of economics. By material incentive and fierce competition they can double and redouble their production in a short time. Why should we compete with them in such matters? We compete with them in politics!" Of course, we also know that Communist economic progress is not just delayed by inefficiency, but is periodically ruined by the whimsies of the party bosses.
When the "people's republic" and the U.S. approached each other in the early 1970s, the whole nation of one billion people rejoiced. Yet, apart from admiring Western economic efficiency, the Maoists think very differently from the great majority of the people. The people want tolerance, enlightenment, and democracy, and look to the West with admiration because the foremost among Western nations seek these things. They support the policy of favoring the West because they like its advanced political heritage. They abhor the old Maoist policy of leaning toward the Soviet Union, because that is another totalitarian country, the same as (Communist) China. The people do not like an "equi-distant" foreign policy, because that implies that, domestically, (Communist) China will keep to its traditional intolerance, obscurantism, and authoritarianism.
Maoists do not want the people to enjoy tolerance, enlightenment, and democracy, because these things constitute the greatest hindrance to their dynastic rule. High economic efficiency is good-even to the Maoists; but if it endangers their dynasty, they will drop it by all means-even the neo-Maoists will act in this way. That is why they now realize that a Maoist domestic line and a pro-West foreign policy really cannot complement each other, and they now want to turn back to the "equi-distant" line.
Industrialization without democracy poses a potential danger to the world. Hitler's Germany and militaristic Japan attested fearfully to this threat. Draconian rule (the suppression of freedom of speech in the first place), authoritarian indoctrination (only one official ideology), and strict control of people's access to information channels (the root cause of general obscurantism) transform a country into a monstrosity. If, up to now, Communist China has been characterized by poverty, overpopulation, ignorance, and savagery, then an economically pragmatic and politically old-fashioned neo-Maoist polity may lead the nation to a forbidding future. If in the 1930s and the 1940s the world could get the upper hand over Hitler's Germany and militaristic Japan only with tremendous bloodshed, now, in this era of over-kill, people are justifiably worried whether humanity can afford another worldwide clash between nations that tolerate oppositions and nations that do not.
For years, the CCP has been advertising "four modernizations" to its cadres and to public at opinion at large and, avowedly, "modern science" has the first priority among the four. Nevertheless, especially in politics and social studies, totalitarianism demonstrates a nature alien to science. What is science? Briefly it is a body of knowledge or methods that is verifiable, debatable, and replaceable. Therefore, science is by nature democratic.
Under the slogan "modern science," the CCP commands whole armies of intellectual and technological workers, who labor in various fields of hard science and engineering. One neo-Maoist party patriarch recently enjoined the Chinese intelligentsia to concern itself only with professional work and to rest assured about politics, because the future lies secure in the hands of reliable party bosses like him. This is the very essence of the Maoist slogan: "Be Red and expert!"
My dear fellow CVS comrades, I know most of you are scientists and engineers. I myself am one among you. It is true that this is not a paper in my original field. But I deem it scientific because it tries hard to be objective, it invites debate, and it is open to being replaced by better arguments. I know that on being trained as an engineer, a physicist, a mathematician, or a chemist, one is inclined to concentrate on the solution of one's technical difficulties, and that one's patriotism generally urges him or her to work hard, produce solid results, and thus better serve poverty-stricken (mainland) China. You may create a considerable amount of wealth by technological innovations; you may develop applicable results from theoretical research, or you may attract respect at an international conference of mathematicians. But do you have a say over the wealth you create? Or over the national honor you help to build? No, you don't. Not a tiny bit. You are a slave. You are ordered to work hard in your narrow field, on your specific problems. If you are concerned with China's present and future in a broader scope, you become "an ambitious careerist who intends to usurp power from the Party!" That is, a felonious counter-revolutionary.
The fact remains that, on the whole, after three boastful decades, we (mainland) Chinese still do not have much national wealth and honor to be proud of. No, we don't. (Communist) China today is not characterized by the least degree of affluence, but by a general and shameful poverty. Why? The basic reason is that the creators of social wealth have no say at all in its management. What a tremendous irony for Marxist doctrines! What a loud slap for Communist Ideology!
After a parallel development for more than thirty years, the above-mentioned picture does not reflect the "other Chinas": Taiwan and Hongkong. A young student from Taiwan can tell you real-life stories of economic take-off: When the student read a letter from a Peking boss to Mr. Chiang (President) of the Republic of China-a letter that hypocritically conveys Peking's intention of "peaceful unification" of China—he said: "In my judgment, the basis for such a letter is the feudal mentality of the people on the mainland. What would be the upshot, even if Mr. Chiang responded positively to Peking? Neither he nor Peking would have asked the Taiwan people! Shouldn't the collective will of the 17 million people there be regarded as decisive?" True insight! I cannot help admiring his democratic mentality. No matter how much verbal generosity the CCP shows in allowing Taiwan to retain its social system, administration, army, etc., the 17 million people there justifiably ignore the propaganda as sheer deception. The total unreliability of the commitments of the CCP on such matters has been well established by its own history. The true touchstone of sincerity with regard to the unification of China is the abandonment of one-party dictatorship and the institution of bi-party or multi-party democracy. It is, however, unlikely that the CCP would become so enlightened without suffering much severe pressure.
China Spring (a new magazine published by mainland Chinese dissenters abroad) is a good title, a propitious one. Indeed, for too long the Chinese have been paying too high a cost to try to recover the past glory of ancient Chinese civilization-in terms of modernization, to be sure.
World War I offered a good opportunity for liberal development; yet World War II—for China that is the Japanese invasion-ruined it. In China, a vengeful Marxist theory combined with the tradition of peasant revolts, and because of World War II this combination succeeded. It is obvious that the frame of mind of an uprising peasantry does not fit the process of Twentieth Century modernization. The fatal mistakes of Marxist theory have been exposed more and more by the widening disparity between its predictions on the polarizational development of capitalism, and a social reality dominated by a middle class majority and characterized by progressing democracy and humanity.
I do not think it is realistic to undo everything in (Communist) China. Some things that happened in the past thirty years should be accepted. On the other hand, all dissident movements in the Communist world realistically share in the demand for human rights, tolerance, and democracy. These movements are growing; they are gaining strength. I myself, and many others, joined them publicly by taking advantage of the CVS opportunity. Because of our disillusionment about the political reality of main land China, we make great, irredeemable personal sacrifices. We risk a status of great uncertainty in arriving at such a grave decision, because we want to protest against Communist cruelty, hypocrisy, and irrationality!
World Communism is changing, bit by bit, here and there. But, by virtue of all the bloody sacrifices already made, we are qualified to demand much quicker and more radical changes. (mainland) China, particularly, has suffered too long. After breaking its dynastic shackles, it was put into the hands of Communist totalitarianism. The great rock was just about to be removed when another huge boulder was added to it. Prospects for a brighter future depend on an awareness of this on the part of every Chinese, old and young, Maoists as well as non-Maoists.
The CCP will finally identify me as the author of this statement. I know an unequal showdown is unavoidable. I think, or hope, that the CCP will not persecute my dependents and relatives in (mainland) China ... as I have said, Communism is changing.
I do not expect that my personal statement can change the reality of (Communist) China to any substantial extent, though the combined power of China Spring and more than one thousand defections ... may hasten the demise of current programs.