The Chinese of Taiwan are not especially bitter in their feelings about Jimmy Carter. They simply are unable to understand him. During his 1976 campaign and after his replacement of Gerald Ford, Mr. Carter talked of not dumping old friends to make new ones. He had a lot to say about human rights, which are precious on Taiwan but have no existence in mainland China under the Chinese Communists. The Free Chinese understood President Carter's preoccupation with playing a "Chinese card" against the Soviet Union. But they believed that derecognition of the Republic of China was scarcely necessary to persuade the Chinese Communists to raise the status of their Washington liaison office to that of an embassy. As if derecognition were not enough, Mr. Carter scuttled the ROC mutual defense treaty with the United States and removed the American military and all other forms of official U.S. representation from Taiwan.
Mr. Reagan has endorsed these objections of the people of the ROC. Even after he became the presidential candidate of the Republican party, he expressed hope that an official relationship could be resumed with Taipei. He has frequently said that President Carter did not have to give the Chinese Communists everything they demanded in order to raise the liaison relationship to a full diplomatic level. In the wake of Mr. Reagan's election, the ROC government has Joined the people of Free China in expressing hope that the U.S. relationship can be expanded and improved during the four years to come.
Ronald Reagan is a friend of the Republic of China. Once the same assumption was made of Jimmy Carter and he turned out to be something less than that. In Taiwan, the view is that Mr. Reagan will not change because of his new high office. Some of the president-elect's advisers suggested that he soft-pedal the "China issue." That was understandable during the campaign. Many other issues were on American minds and close to American hearts. Even so, Mr. Reagan continued to endorse the Taiwan Relations Act and did not negate the possibility of returning the ROC-U.S. relationship to an official level. There isn't much question but that in his heart Mr. Reagan would like to recognize the Republic of China as the de jure sovereign of China. He hasn't any use for Communism or Communists. He will, however, have to formulate his new China policy slowly and with care.
At the outset of the Reagan administration, the Republic of China expects a more friendly Washington atmosphere. The unofficial organizations of the Republic of China in the United States and of the United States in the Republic of China should operate more smoothly and with less pretense of nonexistence. The efforts of President Carter and pro-Peiping members of his administration to raise up the Chinese Communists by demeaning the ROC are not likely to be repeated. Mr. Reagan is proud of his friendship with the Republic of China. He is not likely to countenance recent U.S. expressions of shame in dealing with Taiwan. Changes are expected in the State Department, where some functionaries who have enjoyed kicking the ROC around may find themselves no longer in a position to do so.
After Mr. Reagan's election, the Chinese Communists were quick to change their tune about him. He was depicted as an enemy during the campaign. Peiping made no bones about backing Jimmy Carter. When the election was over, the president-elect suddenly became a reasonable pragmatist prepared to be friendly with Red China. He even got an invitation to visit the mainland one which he is not likely to accept for a long time to come. The Republic of China doesn't have to invite Mr. Reagan officially. He has been to Taiwan before and knows that he is always welcome to return. Meanwhile, there is concentration on updating Mr. Reagan on the ROC-Taiwan story through friends in Washington and throughout the United States. President Carter made the unfortunate mistake of cutting himself off from the Republic of China and its representatives and friends. Mr. Reagan will never do so. His contacts with Free Chinese leaders will assure that he is well informed. He numbers President Chiang Ching-kuo and Premier Sun Yun-suan among his personal friends and will listen to them and to others acquainted with the Chinese situation.
After President Carter's recognition-derecognition announcement, Ronald Reagan sent this cable to President Chiang Ching-kuo: "I call upon President Carter to come forth and tell the American people precisely and concretely which measures the government will take in order to assure the safety and well-being of the 17 million people of Taiwan. We don't need platitudes or vague expressions of our hopes for Taiwan. We do need concrete reassurances. If we do not provide these, we will have taken the first step in directly violating the human rights of the people of Taiwan. Americans have welcomed improved friendship with the people of mainland China in recent years. Bu t this sudden action raises the stark question: What did we get that we did not already have; and what was the urgency in doing it now?"
That question of Mr. Reagan's was never satisfactorily answered by President Carter or the members of his administration. Playing of the "Red China card" did not inhibit Soviet aggression in any way. Only the fierce resistance by guerrilla fighters of Afghanistan has done that. Mr. Reagan has not altered his views since the dispatch of that cable. The safety and well-being of the people of Taiwan supposedly were assured in the Taiwan Relations Act of the U.S. Congress, a measure reluctantly signed by President Carter. It was a much stronger law than the president wanted. As Mr. Carter saw the Taiwan relationship, it should have been whatever he chose to make it. His chief adviser on the subject seemed to be the Chinese Communist regime. The Congress disagreed with him. The protections offered by the Taiwan Relations Act have been implemented through the needling and at the insistence of Congress and not in compliance with Mr. Carter's wishes.
One of the side agreements in recognizing the Chinese Communists was President Carter's one-year moratorium on the negotiation of arms sales to the Republic of China. Not surprisingly, the Carter administration made every effort to conceal or soft-pedal this far-reaching concession to Red China. Never in history had the United States treated a comrade-in-arms with such shabbiness. Weapons discussions were resumed in 1980 but without favorable U.S. decisions on some of the armaments considered most essential for the defense of Taiwan. Still withheld from Ministry of National Defense purchasers were the advanced military aircraft so essential to protect a small island against a continental aggressor. The weapons delivered in 1979 were already in .the pipeline, agreed to while the United States and the Republic of China still had both formal relations and a defense treaty that Mr. Carter renounced unilaterally at the same time he canceled U.S. recognition.
Mr. Reagan may consequently wish to give early attention to the defense situation of the Republic of China so that the people of Taiwan may be protected by something stronger than expressions of good intentions. As a beginning, he might consider telling the Chinese Communists that the U.S. role in defending Taiwan has been stipulated by the Congress, that he is carrying out this directive as the chief executive of the United States and that none of this is any business of the Peiping regime. Mr. Reagan will not have any trouble persuading the military professionals of the Pentagon that improvement of Taiwan's defenses would serve the interests of the United States as well as those of the Republic of China. American military men are compelled to ask themselves which would fight for the United States the Republic of China or the Chinese Communists. They know that the Republic of China would face the Soviet Union, the Red Chinese or any other aggressor. They cannot be sure of the Chinese Communists even against the U.S.S.R. Some of the leading American students of Communism still expect Red China to team up with the Soviet Union in trying to destroy the American heartland of freedom and capitalism.
The Republic of China's role in preparing for relations with an American military establishment presided over by Ronald Reagan as commander in chief is that of supplier of information and compiler of requirements. Requests submitted to the Carter administration are being renewed in expectation that they will be examined in a more objective and friendly light. There is an old saying that the squeaky wheel gets the oil. The Republic of China's military needs are urgent and genuine. Nor is any charity involved. Every weapon delivered to Taiwan in the last few years has been on a cash and carry basis an assertion that few other U.S. allies can make. The Republic of China is a cash customer, a loyal ally and a trustworthy member of the international community.
Presidents of the United States have a great deal of power in the trade field as well as the military. Administration of all the laws passed by Congress must be supervised by the president. The way in which this is done can make almost as much difference as the laws themselves. Presidents have considerable discretionary power. The ROC expectation is that Ronald Reagan will be fair-minded about international trade relationships in general and the U.S.-ROC relationship in particular. Mr. Reagan's protectionist spirit will be exercised on a selective basis.
Japan has expressed fears that the new American chief executive will get tough about the import of Japanese cars. There are reasons why he should. The Japanese have considered that it was quite all right to flood U.S. markets with their products while closing their own markets to American goods. Whatever his decisions with regard to the Japanese. Mr. Reagan is not expected to lower the boom on U.S. imports from developing countries. He will consider the Free World loyalty and friendship for the United States of the country involved. The Republic of China has every reason to suppose that Ronald Reagan will be favorably disposed toward the further increase of U.S.-Taiwan trade. He will of course urge the Republic of China to further reduce its barriers against import of American goods. ROC trade officials are already leaning in that direction. The Taiwan market is growing in size and purchasing power. The United States cannot be blamed for wishing to sell Taiwan many things besides the agricultural products the ROC is now buying in sizable quantities. Another ROC purchasing mission will be going to the United States in March. Groups of the past have been constructively intentioned but have not managed to reduce the favorable balance of Taiwan's U.S. trade to the degree expected. Before departure of the new mission, Taiwan trade authorities will be giving instructions for the purchase of goods which the United States is especially desirous of selling.
The United States is Taiwan's biggest customer in two-way trade which probably will exceed US$12 billion this year. Sooner or later, the ROC can be expected to make the United States its No. I supplier, a position presently occupied by Japan. Mr. Reagan's interest in free enterprise will no doubt lead him to urge American businessmen to pay more attention to the requirements and specifications of good customers. If the United States provides the personalized attention to orders and the service that Japan offers, many of Taiwan's enterprisers will be ready to switch their buying from Japanese to American suppliers.
Ronald Reagan has often spoken out for improved unity and collective security to protect the free countries of Asia. This is also a principal international objective of the Republic of China. The new U.S. chief executive has a deep appreciation of the importance of Taiwan's strategic location and the Asian defense role of its military defenders. Free China is in a position to renew its suggestions that the Free Asian states do more to help defend themselves in conjunction with the formation of a U.S.-supported alliance or in connection with an informal alignment brought about with American blessings. ASEAN has contributed to the protection of freedom in Southeast Asia. If the Republic of China, Japan and South Korea were similarly united in Northeast Asia, any potential aggressor would be given pause.
Japan has not entered into diplomatic relations with Red China for purposes of defense but to augment trade. The Japanese know that they are still threatened by the Chinese Communists. They continue to regard the Republic of China as a major deterrent to aggression by Red China. However, the problems of this region are such that only U.S. leadership can break through the various obstacles and produce a bigger measure of Northeast Asian solidarity. If Ronald Reagan turns out to be the catalyst, he will be making a major contribution to U.S and Asian and Pacific security.
Mr. Reagan may also recognize that the ROC could be a political and military force as well as an economic power in the world. The ROC position was damaged by President Carter's decision to recognize the Chinese Communists and derecognize the Republic of China. What was done can be undone. Mr. Carter's successor has said that the price for the Red China relationship was too high and that it needn't have been paid. It consistently follows that Mr. Reagan would like to correct the recognition-derecognition mistake to the full extent possible and restore the Republic of China to its proper place in Asia and the world. Everything possible may not be within Mr. Reagan's reach at the outset of his administration. Mr. Reagan will make a beginning with the Taiwan Relations Act and try to go on from there. President Carter found a way to raise the liaison relationship with the Chinese Communists to full diplomatic recognition. In the process, he damaged the U.S. tie with the Republic of China. Ronald Reagan can be expected to seek ways to formalize the ROC relationship once again without damaging U.S. interests on the Chinese mainland. The Republic of China deserves more than a smoothly operating unofficial link with the United States. Mr. Reagan knows that and will be searching for something more satisfactory to both countries.
One of the Republic of China's most pressing problems is its widespread identification with only the island province of Taiwan, whereas the Chinese Communist regime tends to be identified with the Chinese mainland of more than 700 million square miles and a billion people. Taiwan has an area of less than 14,000 square miles and a population of fewer than 18 million people. Despite its tremendous economic success, the Republic of China has lost the recognition of the world's leading powers. Among the secondary powers, it has retained formal relations with South Korea. Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Ronald Reagan has not recently challenged the likelihood of continuing mainland rule by the Communists. He could now be described as an advocate of "two Chinas." which is better than an advocacy of one China under Communism but also a symbolizing of the Republic of China's failure to convince Mr. Reagan and many others of its manifest destiny. That destiny contemplates the choice of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People by the masses of the mainland and the rejection of the political, economic and social failures of Communism. Chinese freedom, which means the sovereignty of the Republic of China, will win out on the mainland not through force of arms but by determination of the Chinese people.
In the narrow, surface sense, the relations .of the Republic of China and the United States are bound to improve as a result of Mr. Reagan's election. He is a friend, he is opposed to Communism and he wishes the ROC and the people of Taiwan well. He would like to help within what he and his advisers construe to be the limits of the U.S. presidency and the international situation. So American bureaucrats will have to stop pushing the Republic of China around. Taiwan will no longer be a sort of pariah to which American officials cannot speak officially. Probably there will be increased U.S. attention to the requirements of Taiwan defense, especially that of air space over the island and the Taiwan Straits. Trade discrimination will be avoided. At the same time, the U.S. government will continue to recognize the Chinese Communists and to deal with them, thereby becoming an accomplice in tightening the hold of tyranny on the people of the mainland.
If there is to be a decisive change, it will have to be initiated by the Republic of China, possibly with support of the mainland people. From the beginning, the history of Chinese Communism has been one of internal struggle. There is and never has been any agreement on what Chinese Communism stands for or should be. Today's top dogs among the Communists are said to be pragmatists. They are represented as seeking the modernization of the mainland. Supposedly they have broken with the concepts of Mao Tse-tung and are about to punish the "gang of four" for killing and plundering during the "cultural revolution." Yet these same pragmatists closed down the poster walls and the press of protest, and now have given up any hope that the Chinese mainland can be modernized in this or any other century. The China of Communism is hopeless.
The United States has turned to Red China principally for military and economic reasons. Supposedly the Chinese Communists will be the trump in any game of showdown with the Soviet Union. Almost no attention has been given to the fact that Chinese Communist armed forces have already shown they don't know how to fight and will not fight under their present masters. Also ignored is the reality known to every serious student of Chinese mainland Communism: that the unchanging aim of the Chinese Communists is to combine with the Soviet Union to defeat the United States. If Red China and the U.S.S.R. cannot divide the spoils, they will fight it out later.
Economically, the mainland under Communism is bankrupt internally and a threat externally. There is no market of a billion customers and can never be under Communism because the mainland's people are dirt poor. They can only supply cheap labor to endanger the employment and the factories of the United States and other developed countries. Americans are greatly concerned about the competition of Japanese industry. What would happen to Detroit if the Japanese moved their plants to the mainland and started to exploit Chinese slave labor there? If they are to formulate a China policy in America's interest, Mr. Reagan and his administration must be made aware that the mainland will sooner or later erupt in anti-Communist revolution.
For years, the U.S. government has supposed that the Republic of China wished to go storming across the Taiwan Straits to the liberation of its compatriots there. That is and never has been the case, as was so clearly expressed in President Chiang Kai-shek's dedication to mainland recovery through political means. Mainland China cannot be free without the dedication and action of the people there. The mounting of a revolution is not easy in the face of Communist tyranny. Even against the corrupt dynasty of the Manchus, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had to try again and again before the National Revolution succeeded and the Republic of China was established. In the end, the Chinese people will persevere and win out. In that moment the Republic of China will provide all the help at its command and return legitimate sovereignty and one of the world's great constitutions to the mainland. This will be at the invitation of all the Chinese people and not as an expedient. This is the China of tomorrow, and the Republic of China does not ask for the overt assistance of Ronald Reagan in bringing the victory of freedom and democracy to culmination. It will be enough if the United States extends its good wishes and acknowledges that "two Chinas" is only temporization. The American tradition and spirit compel the United States to support a free and not a slave China. This is the conviction that the Republic of China hopes to impress upon Ronald Reagan and his administration.
Among the most basic and difficult problems a faced by the Republic of China in its relations with the United States is the attitude of the American mass media. Slowly but inexorably, many leading American newspapers and magazines have been embracing the Chinese Communists. Some but not all of them have become hostile toward the Republic of China. The American television networks have given extensive coverage to Red China. Most of this is favorable; the Communists have learned to watch out for and disconnect any "candid cameras." Some of the reporting from correspondents newly stationed in Peiping has been objective, some has not. Any correspondent working in Red China must stay on relatively good terms with the regime. He cannot operate unless he does. The Communists do not have to expel a correspondent in order to get rid of him.
In the last three years, the American people have changed their fundamental attitude of hostility toward the Chinese Communists to one of friendship and support. The mass media played an important role in the change. Not one major non-Chinese correspondent of the American media is stationed in the Republic of China. This is not said as any reflection on the competency of Chinese nationals representing the American news services and big papers. No matter how able they may be, the Chinese staffers do not have the clout and editorial influence of Americans sent out by the home office. So the Republic of China and Taiwan are given press and TV coverage only on a spasmodic basic — usually by correspondents sent to the island on a junket of a few days—or by a press corps dispatched here in a crisis situation.
A specific example of the American mass media problem occurred recently in the dissemination from Tokyo of a news analysis by the Peiping correspondent of one of the major American news services. After citing a mainichi story indicating that the 15-nation Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Areas (COCOM) is preparing to lift the ban on weapons exports to Red China, the correspondent wondered whether Ronald Reagan "will have the boldness to favor a move which would have been unthinkable Just a few years ago." The reasoning is easy to follow. Richard Nixon, once the leading anti-Communist fighter in the House of Representatives and elected to the Senate on a platform charging his opponent with being "soft on the Reds," was responsible for the opening to Peiping .
"As an avowed friend of Taiwan," the correspondent wrote, "Reagan is perhaps in a better position to (sell weapons to Red China) than Carter has been." This appears to be an attempt to put ideas in the head of Mr. Reagan, who has never shown the slightest indication of favoring the arming of the Chinese Communists in order to support his stand against the Soviet Union. The correspondent's analysis implies that Mr. Reagan could approve weapons deliveries to the Chinese Communists because "tensions between the two old enemies (Red China and the Republic of China) have dropped to an all-time low" resulting from Peiping's "insistence on seeking Chinese unity through peaceful persuasion rather than military means." The correspondent surely should have been aware that contrary to an all-time low in tensions, the Chinese Communists have been alternating all their olive branches with threats to sail across the Taiwan Straits and take the island by force. At about the same time the correspondent's analysis was published, a ranking official of the Peiping regime said the use of force would be considered if Taiwan continued to ignore Chinese Communist pressures for surrender and unification.
The same official said that the Republic of China must be dealt with before the Hongkong problem is tackled, adding that the Hongkong status quo is to the advantage of Red China whereas not to take over Taiwan would be a "negative factor." The correspondent said that "some Chinese" in Peiping had expressed hope that Reagan "might do something just as historic (as Nixon) and encourage the (Republic of China) to reach agreement with the mainland." This might be too much for "so committed a conservative" as Reagan, the correspondent added, but then concluded that the new U.S. president would not lack "opportunities for stiffening" the Washington-Peiping relationship "to the mutual strategic advantage of both."
Reading this analysis, the inadequately informed American (or Asian or European, for that matter) could easily be led to the conclusion that Mr. Reagan would be wise to am the Chinese Communists and that it wouldn't be a bad idea if he twisted Taiwan arms sufficiently to bring about the Republic of China's surrender and destruction. In times past, this correspondent was not unfriendly to the Republic of China. Probably he considers that he isn't hostile even now. His thinking has been changed by the requisites of his Peiping posting, just as has that of some others. This in turn influences the attitudes of millions of Americans, most of whom depend upon the two major American wire services for their news and opinion about Red China (and the Republic of China, too, for that matter).
The Republic of China cannot compel American print and television media to be more objective, nor to cover the ROC -Taiwan story on a more equitable basis. The persuasion has to come from the ROC government and people. Failings of the Communists need to be exposed objectively and not propagandistically, so that the American people will come to understand that peace with the Communists could only lead the 17 million people of Taiwan into charnel houses and concentration camps. For the Republic of China and its people, the stakes are as high as survival. If the Americans should decide to sell arms to the Chinese Communists, would the United States continue to provide the Republic of China with the weapons it must have to defend Taiwan? The paper and picture war with the Chinese Communists could be decisive, and the battleground is in the American mind.
Attending a recent meeting at Perth, Australia, Representative Daniel Crane of Illinois said "I bring you hope" and cited the election of Ronald Reagan as heralding a new era in the worldwide struggle against Communism. The leaders and people of the Republic of China hope he is right. They do not believe that coexistence (or detente) is possible with the Communists. This view does not grow out of the fact that mainland China is held by the Communists but out of the Republic of China's experience in dealing with them and their acknowledged dedication to world domination. The war with Communism is not an ordinary conflict. It is one of free men against tyrants, of free thinkers against closeminded fanatics. In the 1920s, 30s and 40s, the government of the Republic of China made repeated attempts to compromise with the Communists. It was impossible. Communists consider that they are not bound by any agreement. They are right and all who oppose them are wrong, so all means are justified by the ends of Communist victory and usurpation.
Ronald Reagan is an anti-Communist. He fought the Communists in the movie unions. His record as governor of California and as a leading national political figure in the United States confirms that he has not changed his thinking about Communism. Richard Nixon was an anti-Communist once, too. Yet he opened the way to the left in embracing Red China. As president, Mr. Reagan is not likely to be a man of the Nixon kidney. He is not going to stop opposing Communism realistically and at every opportunity.
When Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were soft on Communism, it was at the expense of the United States and American interests throughout the world. Among the nearly 200 sovereignties of the earth, the United States has only Communist enemies. It is threatened only by the Soviet Union and potentially by the Chinese Communists. This doesn't mean that the Republic of China expects Mr. Reagan to lead a crusade against Communism. He is not going to ask Congress to declare war on the Soviet Union and Red China. The United States will fight in its own defense but not until attacked. What can be expected of Mr. Reagan is a policy of making the United States stronger and of taking an adamant stand against further Communist aggression. He will stop helping the Communists and prepare to oppose them with force, if and when that may be necessary.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Reagan took a position against the SALT II treaty. He did not oppose further negotiations with the Soviet Union but said that any agreements must be equitable. His position on China is similar. He has not advocated canceling Jimmy Carter's recognition of the Chinese Communists. He has come out in favor of according equal treatment to the Republic of China. Mr. Reagan knows that showdown with Communism is inevitable. In the end, the world must go the way of democratic freedom or of Communist tyranny. At the same time, he is aware that the people of the Free World are not prepared to risk the destruction of nuclear war at this time.
In fact, there is another way, and it will no doubt be chosen by the new American chief executive. All Communist regimes are built on foundations of sand. They do not command either the love or allegiance of their peoples. They rule by force, not consent. They wield rubberstamps and not free ballots. China is not the only country with a mandate of heaven held in reserve. The people of all Communist lands will rise up when the torment becomes too terrible, when the oppression becomes more than they can stand. The only Communist regimes with anything approaching the good life are the few in Eastern Europe which have permitted a measure of liberty and partial operation of the free enterprise system in defiance of the Soviet Union. Mainland China is coming closer and closer to anti-Communist revolution. When the last hope engendered by the dream of modernization is gone, the people will take matters into their own hands. If a new "gang" is organized to suppress the people, it will be dealt with violently and finally. Supposedly the Soviet Union is not likely to erupt in revolution. The people are poor but have been told that things were much worse under the old regime. Some observers are not so sure the people are deceived. If the economy of the U.S.S.R. goes from bad to worse, people will lose patience with the awful bureaucracy Communism has spawned. Russia has had revolutions before; it can have another.
Several possibilities are open to the Republic of China and the people of Taiwan in encouraging and trying to assist an anti-Communist administration under Ronald Reagan.
First, the Republic of China has a great deal of experience in dealing with Communism. The leaders and specialists of Taiwan can offer counsel and assessments of what works and what doesn't, of the possible and the impossible.
Second, the Republic of China has sizable defense forces which would answer the call of the United States for anti-Communist duty in the Taiwan Straits or elsewhere. It must be made very clear that President Carter's unilateral scrapping of the ROC-U.S. mutual defense treaty has not destroyed the Republic of China's de facto alliance with the United States.
Third, the Taiwan economy is one of the most successful in the developing world. This know-how is at the disposal of all anti-Communist countries. The Chinese people are to be found everywhere. They are the people on which the sun never sets. Most of them are ready to help advance the economic cause of free countries.
Fourth, the leaders of the Republic of China have consistently dedicated themselves to the proposition that strength lies in unity. The Republic of China is prepared to join the United States politically on a world or regional basis. In trying to assure the safety of Northeast Asia, the people of Taiwan do not have even the ax of mainland recovery to grind. Their first interest is the protection of the continuing freedom of Japan and the Republics of China and Korea.
Fifth, the Republic of China can offer conclusive proof that Red China is the implacable enemy of the United States and the Free World. If Americans will consider the record laid before them, they will approach the developing relationship with the Chinese Communists with the greatest caution.
Ronald Reagan is being told to proceed carefully in expressing his opposition to Communism. The Republic of China's counsel would not be so much different. Leaders and people of Free China would add the cautionary suggestion that Mr. Reagan be guided by what the Communists do and not by what they say. To put stock in their promises would be a disastrous mistake. If he does nothing more than stop the U.S. drift into a cooperative relationship with the Chinese Communists, he will have served his country well and provided new hope that the China problem can be solved in a way acceptable to the 220 million people of the United States and the 1,000 million of China.
President Reagan will be in a strong position with regard to Taiwan in consequence of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is much stronger than the legislation Jimmy Carter requested. The Congress said it found the law to be necessary "(1) to help maintain peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan."
Setting forth the policy of the United States in the Western Pacific, the Congress said that the objectives were:
"(1) To preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area.
"(2) To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.
"(3) To make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with (Red China) rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.
"(4) To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
"(5) To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
"(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."
The Congress made it unmistakably clear that Taiwan was to be protected from Chinese Communist aggression. AJ though the Republic of China is not mentioned in the Taiwan Relations Act, it is clearly implied as the voice and vehicle of the people of Taiwan. In the end, this was no unilateral declaration of the legislative branch of the U.S. government. President Carter affixed his signature to the act and thereby gave it the force of law and made it the policy of the executive branch as well as the Congress.
As the administrator, President Carter may not always have been as sympathetic with needs of the Republic of China as he might have been. Some more advanced weapons have been withheld from sale to the ROC. Although ROC officials have gone to the United States in an unofficial capacity, U.S. officials have not been allowed the reciprocal privilege of visiting Taiwan, although they would be warmly welcomed by the Republic of China. Military men of the Republic of China formerly went to the United States for routine and special training, and to learn the use and maintenance of new weapons. Although not prohibited by any U.S. law or enunciated policy, this privilege has not been made available since the change in the ROC-U.S. relationship. Approval has not yet been given for additional ROC offices in the U.S. despite TRA authorization. These are matters which Mr. Reagan will have the power to correct, and he is expected to do so.
The ties between the United States and China go back almost to the beginnings of the American Republic. Once China had put aside dynastic trappings, the relationship became even closer. Dr. Sun Yat-sen raised part of the money for the National Revolution from Chinese and American friends in the United States. American missionaries and doctors of medicine helped usher China into the 20th century. The aspirations of Dr. Sun received a sympathetic response in the United States. When the Japanese attacked China, American sympathy and moral support were almost entirely on China's side. After Pearl Harbor, the United States and China became comrades-in-arms. President and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek went to Cairo in 1943 to confer with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. At the end of the war, Taiwan was returned to China as agreed at the Cairo Conference.
In modern times, this Chinese-American relationship has involved the Republic of China, never the Chinese Communists, who had no official status in the United States until President Carter's recognition of January 1, 1979. American history and American precedent stand with the Republic of China and not with the Chinese Communists. So does the American tradition of associating the power and moral influence of the United States with free and democratic countries and governments as opposed to tyrannical and oppressive regimes. With a new president taking over the White House, the people and government of the Republic of China hope that the China policy of the United States will be returned to the mainstream represented by the legitimate authority on Taiwan. There is conviction that this would greatly help in the process of returning that authority to the mainland of China where it belongs and where the Chinese people wait for the resurrection of their rights and liberties.