Newsweek (3/27/78) published this article by Simon Leys: "The elimination of the 'Gang of Four' - which some wits in Peking have called the 'Gang of Five' because, they say, without Mao himself the gang could not have existed - is being welcomed as a second 'liberation' in (Red) China. Especially among intellectuals, there is a sense of euphoria. This should not, however, obscure the following basic facts:
"Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, himself a Cultural Revolution parvenu, is currently indulging in a personality cult second only to Mao's own.
"In denouncing the Gang of Four, the new leadership is using pure Gang of Four techniques and no political debate is being allowed on the central question of how this gang phenomenon became possible.
"The Tien An Men incident of April 1976, in which large crowds spontaneously gathered for anti-Mao and anti-Chiang Chiang demonstrations, has still not been officially re-evaluated. It was brutally crushed by men who are still, some of them, in power, and labeled 'counter-revolutionary' by Hua Kuo-feng himself. Though the 'counter-revolutionary' stigma has been removed, the historical event has been robbed of its anti-Maoist content, and is officially interpreted merely as an act of mourning for the late Chou En-lai.
''There still exists a disturbing ambivalence among present leaders about what attitude to adopt toward the courageous pamphleteer and critic Li Cheng-tien.
''The attitude toward Li is particularly revealing. During the anti-Lin Piao campaign four years ago, Li Cheng-tien dared raise the following point: it was useless, he said, to flog a dead horse (Lin Piao) without at the same time inquiring into the conditions that had enabled him to rise to power in the first place.
"The plucky Li Cheng-tien should by rights have been hailed by the new leaders, for he also attacked the Chiang Ching clique at the time it temporarily pushed Teng Hsiao-ping into oblivion. But the reverse happened. Li was sentenced to life imprisonment after the fall of the Gang of Four. Although the latest reports are that he may have been released, it is clear that the new leadership's attitude toward Li Cheng-tien will be a reliable indicator of the way (Red) China is going - whether, in other words, the system itself is undergoing real, deep-seated changes or whether one set of rulers is simply being superseded by another.
"This central question is a fascinating and delicate one, and is fraught with perils. For the current ruling elite is overwhelmingly composed of anti-Maoist bureaucrats, many of whom suffered grievous abuse and even physical torture during the Cultural Revolution. They are quietly dismantling Mao's policies, burying his legacy, distorting his teachings. But to go further could undermine the legitimacy of the state and their own powers, shaking the very foundations of the regime. The short-lived Soviet experiment in de-Stalinization is an ominous precedent. But in the Soviet instance, there were Lenin, Marx and Engels to fall back on. In (Red) China, Mao is all three rolled into one.
"On the other hand, to fall short of real de-Maoization means that the new leaders run the permanent risk of being branded as traitors should a set of determined, ambitious adventurers challenge the present power holders some time in the future. Did not Mao himself say, in a letter to Chiang Ching, that 'after my death, (Red) China may well experience a rightist coup, but its authority will know no rest and will probably be short-lived. The rightists will grasp power by manipulating my own words, but the leftists will be able to use other words of mine to organize them selves and overthrow the rightists.'
"For the time being, the new leaders are buying time with the old 'bread and circuses' recipe, including long-banned Peking classical opera and Beethoven sym&phonies. This should not blind us to the fact that in various parts of the country firing squads have been executing (mainland) Chinese whose only crime was to hold unorthodox opinions. Teng Hsiao-ping himself defined the new mood as greater relaxation, but, as he recently told a foreign newsman, 'it should not be called liberalization.'
"There are positive elements in the new policies, however, beyond Beethoven and classical opera. A few weeks ago, the Peking People's Daily accused me, along with other writers, of 'looking at (Red) China through tinted spectacles.' Absurdly, we were accused of being a part of the Soviet conspiracy, but on the whole the critical article was surprisingly moderate in tone, stating that our negative impressions merely reflected the situation under the Gang of Four, and inviting us to take a second look at (Red) China.
...Treasuring and loving the manifold expressions of the incomparable Chinese civilization as I do, I indeed hope that changed realities may soon make my earlier pessimism obsolete.
"As I see it, the long-term positive elements in the new constitution are: first, the distinct trend toward 'socialist legality' marked by the constitutional changes; second, the current broader overture to the outside world.
"Both correspond to vital pressing needs - but both are potentially on a collision course with the very nature of the regime. Which leads to the last, fundamental, question: will Chinese (Communist) leaders opt to serve the interests of the country or those of the regime? Will they, in the last resort, react as Chinese or as Communists? Teng Hsiao- ping, the man who won such tremendous popular support by stating that he did not mind the color of the cat as long as it caught mice, should be the one to answer this question.
"At this stage, and even if they fail occasionally at this juncture, the new leaders should not mind us puny foreign critics. Our insignificant little gibes are, in the words of an old Chinese saying, merely 'scratching the itchy foot without taking off the hoot.' Let the leaders rather fear their Chinese critics - hundreds of millions of them - who may not always remain passive before the summary techniques of the firing squads. As the author Lu Hsun put it: 'As long as there are stones, seeds of fire shall not disappear.' " (Partial text)
S.F. Examiner - Outdated policy
The San Francisco Examiner (3/10/78) published this article by John F. Copper: "In February 1972 President Nixon traveled to (Red) China to sign a joint statement with Chinese (Communist) leaders - the Shanghai Communique. This document has since become the 'constitution' of U.S.-(Red) China relations.
"The Shanghai Communique was cited by President Ford as the basis upon which U.S.-China relations would improve. President Carter has also based U.S. policy toward the Middle Kingdom on this document.
"Last year, when Secretary of State Vance visited Peking, he said the joint communique was the foundation upon which he would conduct talks with Chinese (Communist) leaders.
"Several points of inquiry can be made - it was signed in quite a different environment, both in terms of American politics and U.S. foreign policy:
"The document is vague and confusing - probably intentionally so.
"The provisions of the communique have not been abided by.
"This evokes a serious thought: Should the Shanghai Communique serve as the basis of U.S. China policy?
"First, it should be recalled that the Shanghai Communique was signed in an election year. Nixon attained more than a small amount of free publicity from his trip to (Red) China. It increased his popularity, and he outflanked his opponents on a major foreign policy issue.
''The Nixon administration's foreign policy, it should also be noted, was based upon the concept of power politics. Nixon and Kissinger sought to outmaneuver the Soviet Union - and could do this by altering America's stance toward (Red) China.
"But detente with (Red) China was accomplished through secret diplomacy and by ignoring the interests of U.S. allies. No concern was paid to human rights.
This is certainly not the foreign policy of the Carter administration.
"Also the U.S. sought a rapprochement with (Red) China in the context of the Vietnam quagmire. Kissinger hoped that a new relationship with (Red) China would pave the way for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.
"And Peking sought U.S. help in fending off threats and pressure from the Soviet Union. (Red) China and the Soviet Union were at the brink of war and the Chinese (Communists) were vastly outgunned.
"As it turned out, (Red) China got what it needed from the new relationship with the U.S. Washington did not.
"In any case, this era is over. Nixon left office in disgrace. Mao and Chou are dead.
"Second, looking at the contents of the Shanghai Communique, one is more confused than informed or enlightened.
"In reference to solving the 'Taiwan Question' the document says that 'Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China...' The word either in this case seems to mean both sides. But this is poor English; either, except in very informal usage, refers to two separate entities and does not suggest agreement.
"Further, the United States, in reply to the Chinese (Communist) statement that it 'opposes the creation of two Chinas, and an independent Taiwan, or a separate solution,' that it does not 'challenge this view.' This means that the U.S. is not agreeing or disagreeing; it is choosing to avoid the issue and any controversy it may engender.
"However, the Chinese (Communist) translation of the phrase 'does not challenge' is much more affirmative. It suggests that because the U.S. has not objected, then it agrees.
"Those who negotiated with the Chinese (Communists) during Nixon's visit and wrote the Shanghai Communique admit that the translation was done in haste. But, it could also be that no agreement was possible on this critical issue; so the two sides simply chose their own interpretations.
"The statement that there should be a peaceful solution to the 'Taiwan Question' is also puzzling. Does it mean that the U.S. is bound to such a policy? Or does it refer to Peking? Peking has denied its obligation to a peaceful solution.
''The apparent U.S. repudiation of a two-Chinas policy is also an enigma.
"The agreement also envisioned a U.S. military pullout from Asia, especially from Taiwan. However, Gerald Ford who visited (Red) China as a Congressman shortly after the Shanghai Communique was signed said that the Chinese (Communists) don't want the U.S. to withdraw. Chou later told foreign news reporters that the U.S. should not be in a hurry to take its forces from Taiwan. Peking even rationalized the U.S. buildup on Diego Garcia.
"Better U.S.-(Red) China relations were also to be based on the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.' One of them is non interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. Yet in 1976 Mao extended a personal invitation to former President Nixon to visit (Red) China. Ford aides said that if Ford lost the New Hampshire primary to Ronald Regan it would be because of Nixon's visit; Senator Goldwater suggested Nixon was in violation of the Logan Act which prohibits non-officials from interfering in foreign policy making.
"As a policy statement it merely marked a new thrust in U.S. policy. It is vague, and it has not served as the basis for U.S. policy toward (Red) China except in name. Both the spirit and the intent of the document have been violated in a variety of ways.
"U.S. foreign policy is now being formulated and conducted upon very different ideological tenets: a concern for human rights, openness, fair treatment of our allies. The foreign policy style of the Nixon Administration has been repudiated.
"Hence, the Shanghai Communique should probably be relegated to a position of lesser importance. At least it should not be regarded as the building stone or foundation of U.S. China policy." (Full text)
Baltimore Sun - End of revolution
The Baltimore Sun (3/8/78) published this article by Arnold R. Isaacs: "In a long step away from the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, (Red) China's new leaders have excised one of the late chairman's most cherished doctrines his 'theory of continued revolution' - from the new Chinese (Communist) constitution.
"Continued revolution was Mao's term for his belief that there must be revolutionary upheavals in each succeeding generation to keep (Red) China from falling into the deadly sin of revisionism.
"That was the ideological underpinning for Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's, which splintered the leadership and left the economy and educational system with deep wounds that are only now beginning to heal.
"The last constitution, adopted in early 1975, less than two years before Mao's death, specifically enshrined his formula in its preamble, saying that 'the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road' and 'the danger of capitalist restoration' persist even under socialism, and that 'these contradictions can be resolved only by depending on the theory of continued revolution.'
"That entire clause, along with much else reflecting the radical ideas Mao espoused in the last 10 years of his long reign, is dropped from the new constitution, which was ratified by the Fifth National People's Congress Sunday.
"In practice, the Hua-Teng team has already discreetly abandoned many of Mao's doctrines, but the deliberate deletion of the continued-revolution philosophy from the constitution was one of the frankest de-Maoization moves yet made.
"The message was clearly that no more disruptive Maoist-style upheavals will be permitted and that although Mao-thought remains 'the guiding ideology,' his more extreme ideas will no longer be allowed to interfere with normal processes of government.
"Other changes indicating the not-so-subtle de-Maoization of (Red) China include:
"Recognition of material incentives for workers, scorned as 'bourgeois' by the Maoists. The new constitution says the Chinese (Communist) state 'applies the policy of combining moral encouragement with material reward, with the stress on the former, in order to heighten the citizen's socialist enthusiasm and creativeness in work.'
"The acceptance of material incentives is directly related to the Hua-Teng team's development goals, and it amounts to an open acknowledgment that workers have not, as Maoist theory said they should, produced unselfishly for the good of the revolution.
"A clause on the military structure calling the People's Liberation Army 'the workers' and peasants' own armed force,' an appellation that in 1975 was also given to the Popular Militia. The militia, which was built up as an instrument of the radical wing of the party, thus loses its coequal status with the PLA and reverts to being clearly subordinate.
"To make the point even clearer, the constitution now calls the regular armed forces 'the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat.'
"Revival of the slogan of 'letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend' reflects the cultural relaxation that has taken place since Mao's death and the purge of his extremist followers, the so-called 'gang of four.'
"Mao's widow, Chiang Ching, a member of the 'gang,' is now accused of having stifled all writing and art while she acted as cultural dictator. Even under the new liberalization, of course, 'Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought' remains the only permissible ideology and 'all cultural undertakings must serve the workers, peasants and soldiers and serve socialism.'
"The constitution contains 16 articles on 'the fundamental rights and duties of citizens,' which, as is normal in Communist states, seem to guarantee personal freedoms with one hand while requiring obedience to the state with the other.
"Thus one article assures free speech, a free press, the right of free assembly and the right to demonstrate or strike, but another declares that 'citizens must support the leadership of the Communist party of China, support the socialist system, safeguard the unification of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities in our country and abide by the Constitution and the law.' " (Partial text)