The recent visit of President Lee Teng-hui as an official guest of the government of Singapore is bound to raise more than a few curious eyebrows. Why should Singapore accord such treatment, especially when no formal diplomatic representation exists between the two polities? Would there not be protest from Peking, concerned as much as Taipei over the “one China, one government” approach?
What are the implications of this visit, taking into account the recent decision by Indonesia President Suharto to normalize relations with Peking? Is not Singapore pursuing an approach surprisingly different from the other ASEAN countries? And why were there no divergent comments on this visit expressed by Singapore’s neighbors?
The following special analysis for FCR by Professor Seah Chee Meow, Head of the Japanese Studies Department of the National University of Singapore, first examines Singapore’s basic foreign policy postulates and its approach to the “China question.” Professor Seah then assesses the impact of President Lee’s visit to Singapore.
The crux of the “China question” is of course not generated by Singapore, for indeed the controversies surrounding it are matters which theoretically can be resolved only by Peking and Taipei. But these matters are not likely to be resolved in the near future, and even though there has been some amelioration of the strained relationship between the two, the basic differences have not yet been satisfactorily settled.
For Singapore, and indeed many countries elsewhere, the realities and norms of international law still have to be adhered to, and as long as the two parties are not able to resolve the matter satisfactorily, it is difficult not to feel constrained on matters that affect either Taiwan or mainland China.
Thus, while President Lee was accorded a very warm welcome, the events were not especially highlighted by the mass media. Nor did the public pay much attention to certain minor changes in the choice of words, such as the reference to President Lee being “from” Taiwan and not “of” Taiwan. These small matters aside, the feelings toward President Lee were certainly sincere and warm, and were also a reconfirmation that the visit reflects the ongoing state of relationship as well as the further consolidation of ties between these two polities.
Certain general principles of foreign policy must be kept in mind when analyzing these ties. Foreign policy is usually the result of the perceptions of needs and fears vis-à-vis other nations, and the extent to which the strength and frequency of such interactions would assist in attaining the nation’s objectives. Core interests such as political viability are critical to any system. International relations are invariably aimed at enhancing the core interests and, in the process, improving on peripheral interests such as promoting of economic growth.
Analysis of Singapore’s foreign policy presents two immediate observations. First, there is policy stability because there has been no change of government since independence in 1965. Indeed, the same person has been prime minister since 1959, and even though efforts are being made concerning leadership succession, there is no doubt that the same cool logic which has prevailed in the past will still characterize the future. All government leaders are concerned with constant calculation of power dynamics and perceptions of regional and global environments, be these in the form of strategic, power, or economic considerations. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is just as keen to discuss such events and perceptions, and his views are increasingly being sought by his peers elsewhere.
Second, Singapore is not worried about pursuing strategies that differ significantly from its neighbors. The presence of Israeli advisers to help train the land forces during the early stages of independence was one such feature. So was the much later controversy involving the visit by President Herzog of Israel—a visit that resulted in considerable agitation from some neighboring nations. There is thus no lack of political courage, especially on matters regarded as important to the national interest, although this courage is also premised upon known features such as Singapore’s improved capabilities, which allow the leaders to pursue differing policy initiatives without subjecting the polity to unnecessary risks.
The determinants affecting Singapore’s foreign policy have not changed. What have changed are the capabilities to handle them. These are known to most observers: a multi-ethnic population base, small territorial size, an uncertain political region, and scarce resources, including manpower.
First official overseas trip—President Lee and members of his entourage meet with Acting President Lim Kim San of Singapore.
Singapore is of course in a better position to handle these determinants than it was in 1965. The goals adopted by the country in its foreign policy are threefold: to build a strong defensive capability; to restructure the economy in order to exploit the advantages of effective distribution of goods and services; and to ensure political viability. These are tall orders. Foreign policy is always viewed as an adjunct of domestic policies, and should promote the conditions essential for their achievement. Over the years, Singapore has become an active participant of ASEAN, a keen spokesman on free trade and non-protectionist environments, and has generally pursued an active regional role as well. In addition, ties with OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) have also been strengthened, and the results can be seen from the sharp inflow of foreign investors, using Singapore as a base for the manufacture of semi-finished or finished products that are high value-added.
Nevertheless, Singapore does not overextend its formal diplomatic representation, even though many foreign missions are established in Singapore. Singapore has at present only 24 embassies and two trade missions abroad. While a few consulales were also set up in countries such as India, Japan, and Indonesia to supplement the embassies in their capitals, the spread remains thin.
But formal diplomatic links are not essential to the pursuit of foreign relations. When assessing the expansion of trading facilities, it is clear that trade in fact goes beyond areas where diplomatic missions are set up. For example, one item of active sale in Mali—plastic bags—is made in Singapore even though the nearest embassy in the African continent is at Cairo. The establishment of Singapore’s permanent missions is thus based on stringent criteria, such as the extent to which their presence in those areas is viewed as critical to the determinants of its foreign policy.
Singapore’s two permanent trade missions are in Taipei and Peking. In turn, both polities also established trade missions in Singapore. Singapore has not established diplomatic links with Peking, arguing for years that it would depend on an Indonesian initiative. Whether this was just an excuse to delay decision-making, or whether this was based on deference to Indonesia as the biggest country in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, is a difficult question to answer.
Checking the competition—Singapore’s Science Park and Taiwan’s Hsinchu complex both seek to become the “Silicon Valley” of Asia.
Undoubtedly, the “China question” is of paramount interest to Singapore’s leaders. With a predominantly ethnic Chinese population, they feel the weight of culture and history that could be imposed on its own people by either mainland China or Taiwan. Yet, more factors than these have relevance. For instance, it cannot be ignored that the outlawed communist party in Singapore was more oriented towards the Chinese Communist Party, and hence more sympathetic to events in mainland China; and it is true that the Kuomintang has attempted to influence the so-called overseas Chinese. Given these considerations, just how important are Peking and Taipei for Singapore?
Mainland China has always been an active trading partner, although the bulk of its trade with Singapore was in basic commodities. Rubber and tropical produce were the traditional exports to the mainland in return for rice, basic commodities, and simple industrial products such as iron sheets. The importance of these latter import items is now further emphasized because Japanese manufactured products in these areas are overpriced, and there is thus the search for cheaper alternative sources. These cheap basic commodities also help to reduce the cost of living, especially when they are items required by the predominantly Chinese population in Singapore.
In the case of Taiwan, there has been a greater emphasis on manufactured products. Since it, like Singapore, has risen to the level of the NICs (Newly-Industrialized Countries), the interchange of products has been concentrated more in higher value-added commodities. Made in Taiwan products such as computers, electronics, and electrical items are a significant feature of Singapore’s imports, although some of these items are subsequently re-exported to European markets.
A comparison of trade figures is also useful. Trade between Singapore and mainland China was 1.78 percent of Singapore’s overall trade in 1967; the figure was 3.5 percent in 1987; the figures for total trade with Taiwan were 1.9 and 3.7 percent respectively. It would therefore appear that both polities have almost the same trade relationship with Singapore. Given these facts, why then did Singapore not follow the route taken by many other states when Taipei was replaced by Peking in the United Nations, and when countries including major powers such as the United States subsequently assumed diplomatic links with mainland China and ditched Taiwan? Although it is true that 23 countries have maintained diplomatic links with Taipei, the position of Singapore is very different from these states.
Western buildings, Chinese marquees—Singapore’s architecture reflects its history as an East-West crossroads.
Since 1971, Taiwan has suffered from growing diplomatic isolation. Instead of being the recognized representative of China, it was left behind with no proper status. It also had problems in maintaining attachments at the intergovernmental level, eventually finding itself primarily in non-governmental organizations. Even in these, Taipei’s stand has been challenged by Peking on innumerable occasions. Yet Singapore did not ditch Taiwan. What is the logic behind this?
Answers can at best be inferred. First of all, Singapore does not look at Taiwan as a threat; indeed, more could be gained from a form of partnership. For example, Taiwan and Singapore have more common fronts to present as NICs. The NICs gained prominence as a result of rational economic strategies, an aggressive approach to work productivity, the openness of the free market, and the interflow of international investments. The concept of sovereignty takes a lesser role as emphasis is placed on economic logic, the division of labor, and the development of skills.
The NICs are caught between two worlds—the North and South—and could hardly identify themselves with these two extremes. But they are together in the same economic league, and this fact strengthens their overall desire to thrive and succeed. A strong sense of mutual understanding and the presence of the common will to survive certainly encourage similar thinking among their leaders.
Second, both polities are in a sense concerned with the logistics of survival. Taiwan has to fight for its continued viability; Singapore has been doing the same since its independence. The constraints in military training have been overcome partly by the willingness of Taipei to offer some training facilities to the Singapore military; that their commander-in-chief was recently awarded a national medal by the Singapore government reconfirms the importance of the training and attendant facilities accorded by Taiwan. This has been important to Singapore, for there were serious problems in securing such facilities, and the reluctance of neighboring countries to assist merely aggravated the problem of building a strong military deterrent. The reason Taiwan assisted is perhaps because neither polity feels a threat to security could be posed on the other. It is also likely that these facilities will to be required for quite a long time to come, given the absence of large territorial space for military training purposes in Singapore.
How strong are these links? We know visits among the leaders and policy advisers are quite frequent. Prime Minister Lee, for example, was reported to have made a total of 21 visits to Taiwan since 1972—quite a substantial figure, for there are no other places he has visited that frequently. While these were termed unofficial and private visits, the possibilities for substantive contacts cannot be denied. This is true as well of other ministers and civil servants, some of whom were probably classmates from the same graduate schools in the U.S. Such shared sentiments are critical to the strengthening of links between these two places.
But in comparison, Singapore does not ignore the mainland altogether. The very existence of the trade mission indicates the importance accorded to Peking. So were the visits made by Prime Minister Lee and his colleagues, although not on so frequent a basis as those to Taipei. Moreover, a former senior minister was also a consultant for Peking in certain aspects of economic planning strategies, and the views of Singapore’s leaders have been noted with respect.
Singapore has also participated in some of the industrial and service ventures now that mainland China has begun to open its economy and has invited foreign investments. Some of these investments take a longer lead time, but they are on an ongoing basis. Similarly, the national airline now makes trips to Shanghai and Peking in the same manner as it makes trips to Taipei.
The present strategy adopted by the Singapore government has apparently worked well. There have been no adverse reactions from Peking—at least, no hard denunciations. At the same time, Peking has accepted that, notwithstanding the so-called common Chinese element, the differences of history and physical distance must be recognized as being as critical as the differences in the specific interests of Singapore and Peking. In a sense, the approach to the China question taken by Singapore’s leaders is quite simple—it is an issue for Taipei and Peking to solve.
Singapore’s relations with the Taipei government seem somewhat closer. How can these links best be characterized? In the opinion of this writer, the best way of describing them is to call them collectively the “taichi way.” An understanding of the martial arts and their approach to self-consolidation can be constructively applied to an analysis of this situation.
Presidential pause in a heavy schedule—President Lee takes a rare opportunity to play a round of his favorite sport.
Martial arts are acquired for purposes of self-improvement, and they are learned through two forms—namely, from a master, and through practice sessions with sparring partners. But most sparring sessions in martial arts result in injury to the participants while they are in the process of aspiring to greater heights of self-consolidation. Taichi (sometimes called “shadow-boxing”) is probably the only martial art that is different. Even though the participants are in close contact with each other while practicing their basic steps and improving the finer points of taichi, no one is injured. The results of such practice sessions are apparent: steady improvement in capabilities.
The relationship between Singapore and Taiwan is in a sense just like that found between serious taichi participants. Mutual respect prevails and, just as important, there is common understanding of each other’s problems and difficulties. It is also perhaps true that Singapore can better understand Taiwan’s situation, for during the early stage of independence Singapore’s leaders experienced the worries of what it would be like if the country was not accepted. Since Taipei to some extent currently experiences this isolation, it cannot fail to evoke a certain sense of empathy.
There are other areas of common understanding and experience. Both polities are concerned with many similar matters, such as the challenges of being NICs, the smallness of the territories, and the social challenges resulting from rapid modernization. In fact, each can learn from the other. Taiwan, for example, could learn more from Singapore’s housing, port development, and transport planning, and Singapore could study in greater depth the techniques Taiwan used to spearhead growth in high technology.
This background is useful when assessing the implications of President Lee Teng-hui’s recent visit to Singapore. The invitation was especially important since it followed Indonesia’s announcement of its decision to normalize relations with Peking. For Singapore to extend its invitation was even more significant since it does not have full diplomatic ties with Taipei. Neither was Singapore one of the countries in search for grants or loans from Taipei. It was thus a meeting of equals.
Some of the achievements of this meeting have already been mentioned in the press, including an agreement signed mainly to protect investments and related matters. More important was that the visit formalized the strength of the two-way relationship. Most of the important ministries were visited, and courtesy calls were interspersed with those with policy consequences.
Taiwan has undoubtedly reached new heights in its economic strength. It is now in a position to offer development funds to other nations through such means as its US$1 billion Overseas Cooperation and Development Fund, and it has participated as one of the NICs in dealing with the EEC.
Taipei clearly considers the Southeast Asian nations (especially ASEAN) as important, as evinced from the statement made by Foreign Minister Lien Chan during an interview with the Straits Times. He mentioned that Taiwan considers itself a key part of this geographical region not just because this is a strategic area with developmental potentialities, but also because there are already substantial investments from Taiwan. On the other hand, other countries in the region will no doubt monitor the results of President Lee’s visit to Singapore (and assess the possible consequences), and new directions in their foreign strategies could well emerge.
Beyond President Lee’s visit to most of the areas that are usually shown to other dignitaries—such as the housing projects, science park, science center, and waterfront—what could be new from this visit is that there is an open indication that these leaders and their ministers are on cordial terms and, more important, are seen in public together.
For Singapore, the visit demonstrates that the leaders are never short of political courage. If a job has to be done, it will be done. There was no dissent this time from Singapore’s neighbors, nor was there any note of dissent from Peking (at least there was no indication of one). Presumably, the Singapore representatives abroad were told of this trip, for all of them met together in the same week to be briefed on changing international and regional developments and their influence on Singapore’s foreign policy.
Another implication that can be gleaned from the visit is that the consolidation of linkages could occur not only between the two heads of government, but also among like-minded ministers. But will Singapore’s leaders assist their counterparts in Taipei with bringing their views to other leaders? This cannot be known for certain, although on some of the matters of common interest, such as concerns about open trade and anti-protectionist sentiments, what is expressed by Singapore will certainly have positive impact on Taipei’s interests. If Singapore’s leaders have better knowledge of developments in Taipei, that knowledge could possibly be put to use in determining policy directions.
Whatever evolves in Taiwan, investments from there to Singapore will continue. There is also likely to be greater interest in Singapore’s financial market. These are areas for hope, especially for those looking for an inflow of part of the investments that the government in Taipei and entrepreneurs in Taiwan are anxious to make abroad. Singapore is still a safe haven, but also a place that will yield good returns.
Foreign policy decisions are rarely quick to produce yields. A visit may not prove to be very much, just as one swallow does not make a summer. But there is room for optimism. Like taichi, there are no certificates awarded on the level of skills attained. Unlike other martial arts (such as karate) where gradings and colored belts are used to indicate level of attainment, taichi is less conspicuous. Nonetheless, no one can deny its importance as an extremely efficient martial art, especially since it can be used to improve both health and self-development. The final test of the “taichi way” is that partners find their skills enhanced, their capabilities improved, and recognize a continuing dependency on each other for further consolidation—at least at the level of skills maintenance. In addition, they will also learn to trust each other better.