Two seminars attended by some of the world's leading China scholars - one in Washington in June and the other in Taipei in August - arrived at a virtually unanimous consensus regarding the China policy of the United States. Reduced to a single sentence, the consensus advised the United States to be cautious in developing its relationship with the Chinese Communists and to do nothing at the expense of the Republic of China. Many of the participants emphasized that the peace of Asia and possibly of the world is at stake.
Both these seminars and the thousands of unsolicited letters sent to President Jimmy Carter attested to immense interest in the shaping of U.S. China policy. The scholars were from both the United States and the Republic of China. The letters came from Americans as well as a big outpouring from the pens and typewriters of concerned free Chinese in Taiwan. Countless articles and editorials appeared in both countries. Never has more attention been given to questions involving China's future and international position.
The Taipei seminar was co-sponsored by the Asia and World Forum and the Chinese Association of Political Science with Dr. Han Lih-wu presiding. Views were exchanged by 12 American and Chinese scholars. The Sixth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China in Washington was co-sponsored by the Institute of International Relations of Taipei, the Institute of International Relations of the University of South Carolina, the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of George Washington University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University. More than a score of experts took part in the formal program with many others asking questions or making points in the discussions. The conference chairman was Dr. Ray S. Cline, director of studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.
Dr. Yao Chi-ch'ing, dean of the College of Law at National Taiwan University, told the Taipei seminar that President Carter is to be trusted, despite the argument of some that he may follow a course in which the means would be asked to justify the end. In Dr. Yao's view, President Carter "is a man of vision and principle" who will not go back on his promises to assure the well-being of Taiwan's people.
"Mr. Carter is not merely a pragmatic politician but also an idealist," Dr. Yao said. "He pays tribute to the nobility of ideas. In his inaugural address on January 20 this year, he called for 'shaping a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.' In doing so, he did not relegate national strength to insignificance; a state does not have to depend solely on strength. He said, 'We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so sufficient that it need not be proved in combat - a quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal, but on the nobility of ideas.' He endeavors to inculcate in the American people a 'new spirit' - a spirit 'to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God.' He will run his government with competency and compassion. So far as foreign relations are concerned, he aims at earning trust from others. He said 'to be true to ourselves, we must be true to others. We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our nation earns is essential to our strength.'"
Turning to morality, Dean Yao said: "Foreign policy in Western countries is primarily based on a system of power politics. Morality is relegated to imponderables in the course of formulating foreign policy. But Mr. Carter urges the restoration of the moral bearings of American foreign policy. He appeals for the imposition on Americans of moral duties which would serve the best interests of the United States. He is therefore interested in 'honest discussions' about international issues with the American people. He has condemned the immorality of secret diplomacy and he is disillusioned with detente. In his speech of July 21 to the Southern Legislative Conference in Charleston, S.C., he spelled out in detail his observations in dealing with Soviet Russia. But in application, his philosophy of grafting morality onto foreign policy is not directed at one or two countries. As he pointed out in his speech, 'Our policy is exactly what it appears to be: the positive and sincere expression of our deepest beliefs as a people.' He went on to say, 'It is addressed not to any particular people or area of the world, but to all countries equally, including our own.'
"Mr. Carter is also a realist. His idealistic approach is reflected in actual politics, i.e., the protection of human rights on a global scale. This does not mean that the United States will guarantee the basic rights of individuals everywhere, but undertakes to cooperate with other nations to enhance human values. In this perspective, the United States refrains from serving as an international police force to take positive measures against infringement of human rights. She simply expresses a preference for those societies which demonstrate an abiding respect for human rights. Despite the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, authoritarian states have not ceased to commit flagrant violations against human rights. All international agreements and institutions are relegated to insignificance. Mr. Carter's timely declaration should serve the purpose of salvaging these international agreements and, moreover, reinforcing their utility.
"Moral and human values constitute the cornerstone of Carter's foreign policy. His policy toward China is no exception. In consideration of national interests, he is seeking normalization of relations with Communist China. He is trying to reduce the risks of conflict. It seems that he will not complete normalization at the expense of the Republic of China. He is endeavoring to maintain the security of Taiwan - with or without the defense treaty - and the peaceful life of the people of the Republic of China. This conclusion is supported by his answer to questions at his news conference of June 30 when he was questioned about the possibility of maintaining a defense commitment to Taiwan during normalization. He answered, 'This is a difficult question to answer now.' This implies that it all depends on the negotiations of Mr. Vance during his forthcoming visit to mainland China. It appears to me from a legal point of view that diplomatic recognition runs counter to a defense commitment: that these two things cannot go together. But we can rest assured that Mr. Carter is going to ensure the peaceful living of the people here in one form or another. This is the goal of his foreign policy toward China. It appears to me that this goal is not subject to change, even if expediency calls for it."
Dr. John Franklin Copper of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University examined the several "formulas" for U.S. recognition of the Chinese Communists and rejected them.
Of the "Japanese formula" he said: "Japan is not a major military power and has no defense pact with the Republic of China. Its foreign policy has little impact on the security of Asia. The Japanese themselves note that their move was not intended to be a model and they do not recommend it to the U.S. Furthermore, to follow the Japanese formula would entail working out a large number of problems regarding what commercial, immigration and other benefits accrue to 'liaison' status as opposed to formal recognition. This would involve a large number of Congressional committees, and for this reason is probably eschewed by the president."
Of the German formula, he said it is accepted by neither Taipei nor Peiping and probably could not be implemented. "Even if could," he said, "it would imply some semblance of equal treatment of the two sides which would put the U.S. in a difficult position. It is also disadvantageous in that it offers little flexibility to U.S. policy- makers in the long run. In short, it covers up more questions than it resolves."
The proposal for "recognition and derecognition is faulty in a legal sense," he said. "Since the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China have different names and have been de facto separate for nearly three decades, it is not simply a matter of switching recognition to a different leadership, as if there were a coup in a country with which the U.S. has ties. Even in practical terms, this solution has little appeal. Considering its trade and investment, as well as its strategic position in Asia, the U.S. has little to gain from the move and much to lose. Further more, it violates public opinion in the United States."
Dr. Copper said that if the United States should break relations with the Republic of China and abrogate the mutual defense treaty, the government on Taiwan would be compelled to follow its own self-interest. He said this could lead to an independent course, to a Moscow connection or to nuclear armament. Although "all these options seem extreme, and they involve serious disadvantages or liabilities for the Republic of China… they must be seriously entertained courses of action in view of the fact that the severance of diplomatic ties by the U.S. and the abrogation of the security treaty would create a threat to Taiwan's livelihood. (Peiping) has adamantly maintained the right to use military force.
"It must also be pointed out that the future hopes and aspirations of the people of the Republic of ' China are involved. If any nation or population has ever come close to unanimously agreeing on anything, here is an example: the people in Taiwan are in unison that they oppose being taken over and ruled by (Peiping).
"Looking at Taipei's options, it is clear they all carry some danger… All of the options mentioned would probably provoke (Peiping), perhaps to the extend that it would exercise military action against Taiwan. Considering the capabilities of the Republic of China's military forces and the adamant stand of the people against (Peiping), the conflict would doubtless be a total one. Commerce in the area would be severely disrupted. Countless lives would be lost. The use of nuclear weapons, if that occurred, would set an ominous precedent. The U.S. and the Soviet Union would probably be involved, maybe to an extent that would lead to confrontation between the two superpowers."
The Hoover Institution political scientist favors an "American formula." With Peiping preoccupied with the Soviet military threat, he said, and "its own internal political problems that portend a breakdown of order and stability, and economic difficulties that run the gamut from food shortages to the need for machinery and technology, the 'Taiwan problem' does not appear to be justified an immediate priority. Moreover, the U.S. bargaining position is strong. The U.S. government can no doubt make some attractive offers to (Peiping) to help it cope with the Soviet threat which has obviously increased in recent years...
"Clearly, the solution is not in offering diplomatic recognition. This will not help (Peiping) with its serious problems. And it would hardly foster a breakthrough in Washington-Peiping relations, which are in stalemate for a variety of other reasons. Nor would it advance the cause of world peace. If Taipei is forced to exercise one or all of its options, which it is certainly justified in doing, a crisis situation or worse would be precipitated...
"(Peiping) is not just asking Washington to derecognize the Republic of China; it is asking for the unprecedented, unjust and absurd act of forcing almost 17 million people against their will to submit to an alien rule.
"Hence the answer to the China question is not to focus on a change in diplomatic recognition or even this kind of solution. Nor should the defense pact be abrogated. Rather, negotiations should seek answers to other issues, with the goals of peace and human betterment in mind. An 'American formula' means putting bigger problems ahead of the mere tidiness of an embassy and formal relations."
Dr. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University said that although he favored improved relations between the United States and Red China, this should not be achieved at the expense of the security of Taiwan and its prosperity and social stability. Peiping's conditions for "normalization of relations" should not be accepted by the United States, he said.
Looking at the forces which shape American foreign policy, Dr. Wilbur found that public opinion does not supply a consensus and that the press is divided with some influential newspapers and periodicals opposing haste in "normalization."
"There is a small American business community with investments in Taiwan and with trade here," he said. "But Taiwan does not playa large role in American investment as compared with Europe, Latin America and Japan. There is also a rival business group with its own trade council which hopes to promote trade with mainland China. However, I feel that the stronger voice in business is with the side already involved with Taiwan.
"Church organizations are another interest group, due to the long history of American missionary work in China. The various Protestant denominations and Catholic missionary orders know very well what happened to the Christian church on the mainland after 1949 and they appreciate the very different policy of the government of the Republic of China toward religion.... I am not clear on how united or divided its (religion's) attitudes are toward 'normalizing' relations, but I believe there must be strong opposition, if this would mean danger to Christians in Taiwan.
"Opinion among American scholars specializing on China is very much divided. There are strong proponents on each end of the spectrum and a large wavering group in the middle. My impression is that China specialists in the United States are much less enthusiastic than they were after the Nixon visit to (mainland) China about the possibility for scholarly and serious research on the mainland. They are more realistic about the advantage of continued scholarly relations with the relatively open Chinese society in Taiwan."
U.S. agencies concerned with foreign policy also "are divided in their policy recommendation relative to the China issue," Dr. Wilbur said.
"President Carter will make the final decision on the basis of the best assessment he can get on future advantages and disadvantages in a change of American policy toward the two Chinas, the global and East Asian implications of any change. Global means essentially American relations with Soviet Russia worldwide and East Asia means Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia. In all these areas the U.S. has important strategic and economic interests. Public opinion and Congressional advice are important constraints on the president."
Dr. Wilbur cited two specific problems:
"1. The future security of Taiwan. The mainland leadership says' this is none of America's business. The United States disagrees.
"2. If the United States recognizes (Peiping) as the government of China, what happens to the many treaties and agreements between the Republic of China and the United States which regulate American-Chinese business relationships, cultural relations, diplomatic and military relations? Would all such treaties and agreements become inoperative? If so, this would cause great difficulties for Americans with business and other interests in Taiwan.
"These difficult issues arise from President Carter's repeated assurances - and I believe we should trust him - that the United States will not abandon Taiwan."
The three-day conference in Washington, D.C., brought out some of the leading China scholars of the Republic of China and the United States. Major topics of the addresses and discussions included human rights in Red China, popular feelings and regional and group pressures, political and ideological issues in the leadership struggle, educational policy in the leadership struggle, educational policy and the future of the Peiping regime, economic strengths and weaknesses, foreign trade and trade policy, political power groupings, probable outcome of the leadership struggle, military policy and strategy, and foreign policy.
Cha Liang-chien, chairman of the board of directors of Tunghai University, called on President Carter to pay attention to the lack of human rights on the Chinese mainland and to do nothing to jeopardize the preservation of human rights in the Republic of China.
"The concept of respect for human rights has long been embodied in the Chinese tradition," Dr. Cha said, contradicting some American China scholars who have said that Taiwan can be communized without compunction because the Chinese have never known human rights and the Communist-held mainland is no different from the Republic of China on Taiwan. "Contrary to the belief of some Westerners," he continued, "the concept of restraints on sovereignty and on the sovereign ruler was not alien to Chinese tradition. It is generally true that the Chinese emperor was an autocratic ruler who accumulated all legislative, executive and judicial powers. But his rule was not as absolute as the celebrated phrase 'Oriental despotism' seems to indicate and there were definitely some limitations on his authority, especially his treatment of his subjects, both in practice and in the teachings of ancient sages.
"According to the classical teachings, the emperor ruled in trust from heaven for the wellbeing of the people; and when he misruled, his right to rule was automatically forfeited." As Mencius said, "The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the last."
Dr. Cha called attention to the progress of human rights under the Republic of China. He said there has been a continuous effort to modernize the Chinese legal system in keeping with the Western model and to improve the protection of and respect for human rights. "The Constitution of the Republic of China," he said, "contains many articles concerning the protection of human rights, equality of man and woman, minority people's preferential treatment, judicial independence and others."
By contrast, human rights suffered a setback when the Chinese Communists usurped the mainland in 1949. The legal system was used as an instrument of terror and to crush opposition. The legal apparatus of bar and law codes was abolished. Although the Chinese Communist "constitution" of 1954 gave lip service to judicial independence, equality before the law and various freedoms, the judiciary was under the control of the party and no constitutional rights were implemented. The constitution of 1975 does not even include provision for judicial independence, but places courts under the control of the administrative organs. With the possible exception of Cambodia, Red China is the only land in the world without a pro curatorial system.
Communists permit no freedom of the person, no freedom of election, no freedom of speech, assembly or association. They are atheists and so there is no freedom of religion. "The whole world," said Dr. Cha, "is concerned with human rights advocates such as Andrei Sakharov in the Soviet Union. There are not many Sakharovs in Communist China, not because the Chinese Communist system is more humane or accords more protection than does the Soviet system. Rather, it is because the mainland Chinese system has been more successful than its Soviet counterpart in repressing individuals. As Ezra Vogel and a number of other American scholars have documented for years, Communist China has been effective in using techniques of social control, combined with the threats of punishment under the law, to preserve its political order and maintain what it calls the 'purity' in society. There exists in mainland China today a highly effective system of control and repression under which no dissension on human rights could possibly be registered in public."
Warren Kuo, professor of political science at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University, said that the legacy of Mao Tse-tung permits no Chinese Communist escape from power struggle.
"Based on their dialectical materialism and concept of class struggle, the Communists believe that intraparty struggle is an inevitable and dialectic development and that the party is consolidated if the struggle is waged constantly. Mao Tse-tung further regarded struggle as much of a daily chore as washing one's face and sweeping the floor and as a wonder drug for 'curing the illness to save the patient.' He believed that without struggle, the Communist party would die and the revolution would fail."
Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation was long delayed as a part of the continuing power struggle. The fact that he is now back in the fold does not mean an end of the contest for power. Rather, it implies that Hua Kuo-feng will have his own Liu Shao-chis and Lin Piaos all the way to his deathbed.
Looking at the prospects, Professor Kuo said: "On April 11, 1977, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled 'Carry Out in an All-Round Way the Strategic Policy Decision on Grasping the Key Link in Running the Country Well.' This proclaims, with the usual self-assurance, that initial success will follow 'grasping the key link in running the country well' this year and will have greater success in three years. A closer look into all the existing conditions in the Chinese mainland makes one wonder. If the Peiping regime under the control of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai for 27 years had so many intraparty struggles and so much social unrest, such as the strikes at Hangchow and the Tienanmen incident at Peiping, how may the new powerholders turn back the snowballing crises in politics and especially in the economy? At a time when the party's power is shrinking, ideological identity remains in confusion and policy orientation is uncertain, famine is taking a heavy toll, human blunders are multiplying, popular resistance and anti-Communist sentiments are mounting and the remnants of the gang of four are counter-attacking, is it not unreasonable to conclude that the Peiping can achieve the 'great success in three years' that they are now predicting?
"It is highly possible that the power struggle within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist hierarchy will become more acute along with greater unrest among the people. The following are scenarios of possible developments:
"1. The political foundation of Hua Kuo-feng's coup and the alliance of the incumbent powerholders lies in their common desire to dispose of the gang of four. This foundation is rather feeble and the alliance is fragile. It is probable that once the common foes are completely removed from the scene, acute inner struggles will erupt between the present allies. Hua Kuo-feng is capitalizing at this critical juncture on the campaign to expose and criticize the gang of four in a maneuver to mobilize all positive factors and find a way out of both the political and economic crises in the mainland. If Hua is able to achieve a certain degree of success, his rule, though precarious, might continue for some time.
"2. If Hua fails to achieve concrete results in 'grasping the key link in running the country well,' the temporary alliance will break up, with his former supporters becoming the opposition. In that case, Hua's power base will melt away and he will be replaced by a new leadership.
"3. If unrest in various areas continues, the people's living conditions remain unimproved and military influence expands once again and thus gives rise to localism under which the military cadres and local powerholders form coalitions in the manner of 'independent kingdoms' vying for power with the central leadership, then the incumbent powerholders might be forced to give way to a new leadership resembling a military junta.
"Hua's position as the leader is precarious and his appointment as chairman of both the Chinese Communist party central committee and the military affairs commission can be considered illegal even by Chinese Communist standards." The possibility of military struggle cannot be ruled out, Kuo said.
Li Tien-ming of National Taiwan University said factionalism will continue gnawing at the Hua Kuo-feng regime. "When it became clear in 1976 that Mao was on his deathbed," Li said, "an acute and complicated power struggle ensued. It took the form of a campaign against Teng Hsiao ping and the movement to 'repulse the right deviationist wind to reverse previous verdicts.' The Tienanmen riots brought about the removal of Teng from all his posts and the promotion of Hua, who was merely the sixth vice premier, to the premiership. Less than month after Hua came to power, an intense power struggle between veteran cadres and the gang of four erupted. Although Hua has held power since September, 1976, it is doubtful whether his regime will be able to hold all factions together and create stability in Communist China."
The "cultural revolution" emasculated centralism and regional forces have been on the rise ever since, Li said. "Since Hua assumed the helm, the surge of regionalism has become more conspicuous. As he was once a regional potentate, he is inclined to favor the rise of regional strength. The growing influence of regional leaders, coupled with the counterattack of followers of the gang of four, is now undermining the fragile structure of the central hierarchy."
Stipulating to the increased power of the military, Li offered these tentative conclusions:
"Shortly after Mao's death, the gang of four was soundly thrashed. In the campaign against the gang, Hua was obliged to crack Mao's whip over his patronized revolutionaries. The scourge of the gang was a dire sequel to Mao's leadership of the CCP, bearing the stigma of his leadership.
"In the midst of widespread resentment of the gang of four, Hua Kuo-feng's regime, which was not predesignated to take Mao's mantle, turned to military and special agents for the staging of a coup. Although efforts are under way to consolidate the regime, it is too early to predict that Communist China will enter the era of Hua Kuo-feng.
"Under Hua's leadership, Mao's memorial hall is being built; Volume 5 of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung has been published; Chou En-lai's achievements are now being lauded to the skies; and a selling campaign for Chou's four modernizations is in full swing. Hua's efforts to invoke help from the late chairman and premier to shore up the staggering regime shows its fragility.
"The real, long-term difficulty facing Hua Kuo-feng is the challenge and threat presented by powerful regional military potentates or by an alliance between them. However, one cannot ignore a spontaneous response to the regime by the people of the mainland, most of whom resent it. It is reasonable to predict that Hua will hew to the tenets of Communism. If so, can the people of the mainland abide such a repressive region any longer?"
Post-Mao Red China also faces economic and educational problems.
Jan S. Prybyla, professor of economics at Pennsylvania State University, spoke on the economic prospects and concluded that the severest test of the mainland in the years to come "will be the need to simultaneously raise living standards and upgrade the quality while increasing the quantity of capital assets. The breakthrough in agriculture is still very tenuous; the presumed decline in the birth rate is neither well documented nor (if indeed present) well established; the work incentive system is in urgent need of revision, as is the system of education.
"The repeated spectacle of yesterday's heroes being today's villains, of the late chairman's apparent blindness or ineptitude to see through all the bad people with whom he surrounded himself, all this, plus the bickering and lying and the fooling of the masses has become so gross and transparent as to raise serious questions about the amount of credibility left to the regime among the people. By now worldly wisdom, cynicism, skepticism and disbelief must be rampant in the ranks of the masses despite the masses' dialectical conditioning. All of which bodes ill for the emergence of the new socialist man without whom the Maoist model as presently set up cannot function. Widespread cynicism has a way of showing up sooner or later in production and productivity statistics. If the new socialist man does not emerge, there is a distinct possibility of mainland China's taking the easy path of Soviet-like 'revisionism.'"
Summing up his finding on mainland education, Wang Hsueh-wen, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, said: "Mao discriminated against intellectuals and opposed regular education. He wanted to continue to impose his influence on educational policy because his theories on the subject were incorporated in the 'decisions concerning the great cultural revolution' and in the 'c stitution.' Controversies over educational policy are expected to continue; and in the struggle over what policy to continue to have an impact on the leadership struggle. Whether to make schools an instrument for dictatorship or make them a place to impart knowledge, whether to apply a whole-day or part-time study system, whether to have working class or intellectuals dominate and whether to transform students into laborers or intensify their cultural training will remain controversial questions for a long time. The Chinese Communists themselves have admitted that: 'The struggle is far from over. It will take a very long struggle before the influence of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism can be rooted out from the educational front and a brand new socialist educational system established. The struggle in the past shows that if we do not exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, they will restore capitalism and assume dictatorship over us.' (Kwangming Daily, February 21, 1975)."
Most important of all- on the eve of the Peiping trip by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the continuing speculation about possible "normalization of relations" between the United States and Red China - was the prospect for Washington-Peiping relations. Speaking to this subject was Ch'en Yu-ch'ing of the College of Chinese Culture in Taipei. Professor Chen noted that even Richard Nixon, who engineered the opening to Peiping, was never under any illusions about a common ground between the United States and the Chinese Communists. In his State of the World Message of February 25, 1971, Nixon called attention to the differences in ideologies, interests and views of life and the world. The Chinese Communists have insisted that they would "defeat imperialism headed by the United States," have sought to drive U.S. influence from the Asian-Pacific area and have advocated an American people's revolution against the U.S. government.
"This being the case," Ch'en said, "any improvement of relations between Washington and Peiping is necessarily limited in scope and duration. Both sides know that they can never be true companions. If they get together, it is only because of pressing circumstances. This is why the Shanghai communique, now five years old, has not yet led to 'normalization' of relations despite repeated assurances by the two sides that they would work toward that goal on the basis of the communique. Many factors are involved but Taiwan certainly has been a difficult issue at the bottom of the whole matter...
"It is indisputable that Taiwan is a province of the Republic of China and leaves no room for any so-called question of legal status. The Chinese Communists, however, insist that the 'Taiwan problem' is a roadblock to normalization of relations with the U.S. and demand that the issue be settled once and for all. Peiping's intention, needless to say, is to eliminate the Republic of China as a stumbling block to the regime's external aggression and expansion.
"Many world experts on Chinese Affairs and even some U.S. officials are now of the opinion that a solution of the Taiwan problem is the vital key to normalization of Washington-Peiping relations. But how is this so-called problem to be solved? The Chinese Communist stand is that the U.S. should sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, abrogate the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty and pull out all U.S. military units from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Strong objection to these principles by the Republic of China is understandable. The principles also contradict America's national interest in the Western Pacific and should not be tolerated by the U.S. government or people. A Gallup poll in the autumn of 1976 showed that 70 per cent of Americans opposed U.S. establishment of diplomatic ties with Peiping if it meant breaking relations with the Republic of China. Also on record is that as of December 1, 1975, as many as 218 members of the U.S. House of Representatives co-sponsored a resolution that the U.S. government, while engaged in lessening tensions with Peiping, do nothing to compromise the freedom of the Republic of China and its people."
Professor Ch'en took note of four "formulas" which have been suggested for "normalization:"
" - Japanese formula. This is to follow a path similar to the one taken by Japan when Tokyo set up diplomatic relations with Peiping in 1972. That action resulted in simultaneous severance of relations with the Republic of China. The Treaty of Peace signed in Taipei between the Republic of China and Japan in April, 1952, lost its validity as a matter of course, and Japan started respecting the Chinese Communist stand that the Republic of China is an indivisible part of China. Japan thus ceased recognizing the Republic of China on Taiwan as a political and sovereign entity. However, nonpolitical relations - business transactions, cultural intercourse, exchange visits, etc., have been maintained.
" - Consulate General formula. The proposal is to let the United States complete the normalization process with Peiping by accepting the latter's three principles but to have a U.S. consulate general in Taipei for the maintenance of local political relations as well as an assurance of America's various nonpolitical relations and activities in the Taiwan area.
" - Liaison Office formula. U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peiping would take place along with severance of formal ties with the Republic of China, but liaison offices would be set up in Washington and Taipei for the continuation of quasi-diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the ROC. Whether the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty would be abrogated would depend on the outcome of negotiations conducted in line with the actual situation.
" - German formula. This would call for the United States to establish full diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime and at the same time continue its long-standing full diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. The idea of advocates of this formula is that when the United States recognized East Germany and continued recognition of West Germany, a precedent was set. But there is clearly no analogy between the situation affecting East and West Germany and the situation as it affects the Republic of China and the Communist-held China mainland...
"The law and national policy of the Republic of China make ROC rejection of any such formulas imperative and unavoidable." Professor Ch'en said the Japanese formula would be acceptable to Peiping but not to the Republic of China. Besides, "this approach would contradict the U.S. policy of safeguarding the security of Taiwan and the freedom of the island's inhabitants. This is not what the majority of Americans want and also does not serve America's own national interests."
Further rapprochement between the United States and Red China would disturb fundamental power relationships in the Asian-Pacific region, Professor Ch'en said. "Moscow is well aware of Taiwan's strategic importance and the very delicate special role the island plays in international power relations. Therefore, if the United States were to change the status quo and go ahead with normalization of relations with Peiping or show rapport with Peiping in other ways - selling weapons to Peiping, providing grant and concessional economic aid or establishing an alliance in one form or another - the U.S. effort to keep Russia in check might invite a predictable reaction from Moscow. If the Russians were to feel that they had been cornered, they might resort to radical measures."
Japan is also involved and concerned. "The Japanese have not yet fully recovered from the 'Nixon shock of 1971,'" Ch' en said. "If the United States were to improve its relations further with the Chinese Communists in disregard of the rights and interests of the Republic of China, it would be like adding wings to the Peiping tiger, and the regime, with its strength thus reinforced, would quite logically take steps to achieve hegemony over Asia and the Pacific. Japan's Fukuda cabinet, therefore, is very much worried that the U.S. will follow the Japanese example and establish formal ties with Peiping."
Peiping's efforts to relax tensions with the United States are, in Professor Ch'en's opinion, "no more than active application of Mao Tse-tung's so-called revolutionary diplomacy. The Peiping switch from an anti-U.S. to a seemingly pro-American stand is merely on the surface and has never been promoted by any sincerity to enter into a lasting alliance. The Chinese Communists know well that they do not share much common interest - nothing that is durable - with the United States."
Keng Piao, the head of the international liaison department of the CCP central committee, expressed this a year ago when he said: "From the viewpoint of overall strategy, we can say that once we are relieved from conflict with the United States, we can bring forth all of our strength against just one side (the Soviet Union) and furthermore have the needed time to settle our internal problems first. Our effort to improve 'Sino-American' relations is to cut down the number of our enemies by one and unite with more friends. This is a concrete expression of chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line.
"When talking about our relations with the United States, certain impulsive revolutionaries and adventurists have failed to see exactly the two-sided nature of the American ruling class. Most of them have their eyes only on the reactionary side and emphasize the need of struggle. These people are not aware at all that there is a weak side that can be made use of. They therefore negate the approach that while being soft toward the Americans, we can proceed with necessary struggle and utilization. No matter from what angle we view the matter, we should have a correct concept of our policy toward the U.S. First, we should not forget that America is still an imperialist country. Second, as demanded by development of the situation, we should in certain aspects positively improve Sino-American relations. These two points involve the philosophy of combining unity with struggle. It is a matter of prosecuting an established policy through active tactical maneuvers without departing from the principle. As long as we are adequately aware of the two-sided quality of American imperialism, we shall never for a moment doubt our U.S. policy of today, although it may appear to be contradictory."
Professor Ch'en urged the United States to stop, look and listen carefully before going further down the road of "normalization." The Carter administration, he said, "attaches much importance to human rights and morality. It does not have to feel bound by the Shanghai communique. The status of the Taiwan Straits has remained frozen for 27 years. There is no reason whatever for the United States to attempt a breakthrough of the Washington-Peiping stalemate by following the Japanese formula. If action in that direction were to come to pass, what John F. Kennedy worried about 27 years ago would quite certainly become a reality. America would not be free from holocaust if the communization of Asia were to take place."
Looking at the relations between the United States and the Republic of China and other aspects of the situation, he found these obstacles to "normalization:"
"First, the U.S. and the Republic of China, which fought shoulder to shoulder in World War II, have remained close to each other and, after the Korean War, entered into a bilateral mutual defense treaty. Profound friendship with frequent exchange of visits has characterized the long historical relationship. Two-way trade between the two countries last year totaled nearly US$5 billion. As the most faithful long-standing ally of the U.S. in Asia, the Republic of China has continued to support America strongly in the international political arena. Throughout the cold war period, the ROC as a key link in America's Western Pacific defense line worked the hardest to facilitate the U.S. containment of Communist forces in the region. If the U.S. were to push the ROC aside as a price of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists, America's national spirit, international moral reputation and realistic interests would all suffer irreparable losses.
"Second, the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty was signed in 1954, about five years after the government of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan in 1949 following the fall of the Chinese mainland. In the more than two decades since it entered into force, the treaty has contributed conspicuously to the stabilization of the Western Pacific international order and power equilibrium. The ROC has always been thoroughly faithful to the letter and spirit of the treaty. In addition to strengthening its military forces for the fulfillment of its part of mutual defense duty, the ROC has striven for enhancement of freedom, economic progress and social welfare as stipulated in the treaty. A prosperous society with full protection of human rights has been built. The status of the Republic of China today is much better than it was when the treaty was signed. There is little that the ROC asks of the United States, but the free Chinese earnestly hope that the U.S. will continue to respect the dignity of the treaty, fulfill its treaty obligations and maintain the trust held in the U.S. by the rest of the international community.
"Third, if this mutual defense treaty were to be abrogated unilaterally, the U.S. and the ROC, instead of continuing as allies, would be deplorably separated. Asia and the Pacific would be plunged into a highly unstable and tense situation, for the Chinese Communists would surely take advantage of the opportunity and resort to wily tactics for the early 'liberation' of Taiwan. For its existence and growth, the Republic of China may be forced to take offensive defense measures against Peiping's aggressive forces. The other free nations in the region, seeing that the U.S. can no longer be trusted, would find it necessary to seek other means of self-protection. New wars in the region, particularly in Northeast Asia, would become unavoidable.
"Fourth, the concerned U.S. sources have always been hopeful that the Taiwan problem can be peacefully settled. In the presidential campaign platform of the Democracy Party last year, for example, is this clear-cut statement: 'Our relations with (Red) China should continue to develop on peaceful lines, including early movement toward normalizing relations in the context of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan.' Some Americans are even of the view that once the U.S.-Peiping relationship were normalized, the Republic of China would have to conduct negotiations with the Chinese Communists. However, Peiping has perpetuated its tyrannical rule in complete disregard of human rights. The Republic of China has repeatedly made clear that its stand of never negotiating with the Communists is immutable. For the ROC to talk with Peiping is to contradict the wishes of the more than 800 million people on the Chinese mainland who are waiting for deliverance from their suffering. Furthermore, no constructive outcome can be expected from such talks. If the U.S. authorities were to expect that in the course of its normalization of relations with the Chinese Communists, Taipei and Peiping would reach an agreement of some sort through negotiation, the consequences would be tragically injurious not only to the freedom-loving Chinese but also to the Americans themselves.
"Fifth, the Chinese mainland is still in turmoil and remains tom into pieces. The Hua Kuo-feng regime is sitting on top of a volcano. Supporters of the 'gang of four' are hiding everywhere, and even those who seem to be backing Hua are divided among themselves. Each provincial military leader is eager to hold his own sphere of influence. As things stand today, Hua Kuo-feng may at any moment turn into another Teng Hsiao-ping. Furthermore, the people on the mainland, long subjected to oppression and material inadequacy, hate the regime implacably. This is reflected in the continuing strife following the Tienanmen incident of April, 1976, and in the widespread sentiment of the people that if they are to remain ruined, they will make sure that the rulers also fall. Under such circumstances, overtures of peace and friendship by the United States will only embolden the Chinese Communists, prolong the agony of the suffering mainland masses and hamper their campaign for freedom and democracy. Moreover, with the dust of the power struggle still unsettled, the United States should be giving second thoughts as to whom it ought to talk about normalization of relations.
"From the viewpoint of the Republic of China, the United States went as far as it should when liaison offices were set up in Peiping and Washington. Normalization moves should have been halted at that point because the United States was already in a position to benefit the most strategically from the triangular arrangement. Washington should have realized that any further step - be it diplomatic recognition of Peiping according the Japan formula, sale of weapons to the regime as suggested by some people, or a certain degree of military cooperation with the Chinese Communists - would not merely sacrifice the Republic of China but bring harm to America's own rights and interests as well, because once Moscow feels provoked, it will certainly take steps to create unrest in free Asian-Pacific nations and give a twist to the existing international power structure. Regional or global conflict would then become unavoidable."
Professor Ch'en said the people of free China hope that President Carter's ideals and religious beliefs will persuade him not to accede to Peiping's demands but rather to provide support to the struggle of the Chinese mainland people against Communism and for freedom. By not obstructing the endeavors of 800 million people on behalf of liberty and democracy, he would be helping the Chinese to create a new reality conforming to the ideal of the majority.
Among the thousands of letters to President Carter that backed up the academic papers of these seminars was one which said: "President Carter, please leave the settlement of the China problem to the Chinese. Do not take sides with the Communists, who stand for everything which you oppose, who have ruled through tyranny and whose stamping out of human rights makes the Russian Communists look like amateurs among the ranks of the authoritarians.
"We don't ask you to help us, although we wish that you could. We only ask that you not deliver us into the hands of the enemy. That is not your intention, of course. But such are the terms laid down by the Communists. They have said that the United States must get out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and that what they do after that is none of your business.
"Even if they told your secretary of state that they did not plan to attack Taiwan militarily, that affirmation would have no legal and binding effect. The record of Chinese Communism is one of broken promises and anti-Americanism.
"Mr. President, the Chinese Communists are sworn to destroy us. They cannot fail to attempt this, because we are the thorn of freedom which threatens their existence. If they cannot bring us down with measures short of war, they must sooner or later employ military means. That is why it is so important to them to get the United States out of Taiwan and the Straits.
"The United States has nothing to gain, really, from proceeding further with 'normalization' at this time. To be pragmatic, you have the best of both the mainland and Taiwan Chinese worlds. The thought that the Chinese Communists might get angry and pull out of Washington is ridiculous. You couldn't drive them out with a Sherman tank.
"Mr. President, those 900 million people have not voted for those you would recognize. They have not indicated approval. In fact, they have been far more inclined to register disapproval. Give them the chance to assert themselves. Do not help destroy their alternative of the Republic of China and freedom. Do not help fix Communism on them in perpetuity.
"Our advice and our appeal are simple. Leave well enough alone for yourself and the American people. Leave China to the Chinese. We shall solve our own problem in the goodness of time. We cannot say exactly how or exactly when. Do not try to accelerate this process by embracing the Chinese Communists, who have fought against the United States, and deserting the free Chinese, who fought with you.
"Listen to your own people, President Carter, and you will not hurt the Chinese people and endanger Taiwan by recognizing the Chinese Communists."