FCR recently interviewed Professor Chao Chun-shan, associate professor and Dean of the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, for an assessment of the consequences of the Tienanmen event inside and outside mainland China. Excerpts follow:
FCR: What does the Tienanmen event indicate about the current structure of power in mainland China?
Chao: The relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the military is the crucial point worth discussing. It is now clear that the roles of the party leaders and those of the military strongmen overlap. They have always maintained an intimate relationship, because the CCP dominates the military and the party's absolute guidance is the basic principle on which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is organized. The role the military played in the Tienanmen event, and its role in the future, will be the decisive factor in determining whether the CCP is able to maintain stability in mainland China.
In order to guarantee complete control of the party over mainland China, as well as ensure stability, Chiang Tse-min, the new secretary-general of the CCP, is expected to maintain a good relationship with the military. It appears that the CCP so dominates the military that the absolute rule of the party is assured. But in the future, the maintenance of this dominating power will depend wholly on the ability of CCP leaders to continue receiving support from the military. If the CCP leadership fails, the policy of "political power out of the barrel of a gun" will be severely endangered, because the structure of the military is also changing greatly. Young officers have gradually replaced the old ones. This deserves our attention in regard to the civil-military relationship, especially when the power structure of the CCP is being discussed.
FCR: Does Chiang Tse-min possess real power or not?
Chao: The role Chiang plays as the secretary-general of the CCP depends upon how long Teng Hsiao-ping will live, on his success in obtaining support from the military, and on whether he can continue the economic reforms.
I personally think that the scope and the duration of Chiang's power will depend wholly on Teng's longevity. The longer Teng lives, the more stable Chiang's position and power will be. But if Teng passes away very soon, Chiang will be in an unfavorable position to hold onto his post.
Before Chiang appeared on the stage as secretary-general, he was in fact a nobody; at least, he seemed an unlikely person to be appointed as secretary-general of the CCP. Many people have wondered how Teng could have selected a man like him; he was only a local party cadre in Shanghai and did not possess much power. Therefore, Chiang's role as either a real CCP leader or only a transitional figure depends upon Teng's support. If Teng can live long enough for Chiang to consolidate his power—including making ties with the military—then Chiang will by no means be only a transitional figure. On the other hand, if Teng dies in the near future, Chiang will most likely pass from the scene of power rather quickly.
Concerning the economic reforms, Chao Tzu-yang and his followers will always be ready to stage a comeback. They did not willingly leave the stage. Since the CCP usually does not execute dissident members of the party, in an attempt to prevent extreme conflict within the CCP, this gives dissidents an opportunity to come back and hold office when the time is ripe. This has already happened many times in the past. Teng Hsiao-ping himself is an obvious example. Chao also may reappear eventually.
Thus, if Chiang fails to continue the economic reforms, the supporters of Chao Tzu-yang, if they do in fact survive the CCP rectification campaign, will surely return to power. At any rate, people can be expected to continue feeling displeased with their incumbent political leaders, and Chiang could well become a scapegoat and be only a transitional figure.
FCR: What is the impact of the Tienanmen event on the reform movement on the mainland?
Chao: Basically, the policies of reform and openness will not change, because the CCP is not able to return to its old ways. Nevertheless, these policies will stay much more closer to socialist theory. In other words, the party will adopt methods somewhat similar to the reforms in East European countries and the USSR, closer to the restructuring and openness of the "new thinking" proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev.
But it is characteristic of socialist reforms that great efforts are made to prevent economic reforms from having any possible impact on politics and ideology. It is a reformation within the system. This is quite possibly the route that the CCP will take in the future. If so, the CCP's political policies will remain the same in spite of the economic reforms.
Of course, the Tienanmen event will have a considerable degree of impact on its goals. The reaction from foreign businessmen will be one of the most important factors in this—they will either continue to invest, or they may adopt a more conservative manner to wait and see if there will be more political turmoil. It appears that those who have already invested in mainland China will continue to go there, while those who arrived on the scene more recently will at least temporarily adopt a more conservative manner. But if the CCP can demonstrate its ability to keep the mainland stable, businessmen will flock there since they always try to make money.
FCR: Will the CCP eventually have to loosen its control over society? Chao: The CCP, like all Communist parties, always seeks to dominate society. It will not relax its control at any cost. At present in mainland China, unlike in the East European countries, interest groups are not expected to emerge. It is clear that the CCP will continuously attempt to tighten its control over society through control of the mass media. The party will possess power exclusively, and will not allow any social groups or public organizations to share any of its power. This is quite certain.
FCR: How will the CCP be able to continue its policy of economic reform while at the same time persisting in its tight controls over society?
Chao: To the CCP leaders, there is no paradox between economic reform and severe social control. Their idea is that politics can and will remain under control while the economy can reform and be open. They expect that foreign capital will be constantly introduced into the mainland, but Western thought, especially capitalistic democracy, can be kept out. In fact, this is a big problem for the CCP. The Tienanmen event is surely a result of this paradox, and the force of arms was finally necessary to overcome it. But this hints at the possible occurrence of similar events in the future, unless the CCP is able to convince the people to be satisfied with what they have and not think seriously about political matters. This will be difficult, for man is a thinking being.
The leaders in the USSR and the East European countries now recognize this, and they have been trying to make some political reforms along with economic reform. In mainland China, however, the CCP has refused to take this route. As a result, social stability is endangered by the inherent paradox of this policy, and the CCP is doomed to be intermittently plagued with it.
FCR: What are the basic differences between the reform movements in the USSR and East Europe and those in mainland China?
Chao: The CCP lags far behind in political reformation. There are several reasons for this, such as political culture, the pattern of leadership, and the problems they face between generations. Of these, the most obvious problem in mainland China is that old and senile leaders are not being replaced, while this is being done gradually and skillfully in the USSR and the East European countries.
The replacement of these old and senile leaders is even more difficult because of their intimate relationship with the military, based on their revolutionary experiences and their involvement in the "Long March" in the early 1930s. This connection with military power helps them stay on the political scene.
FCR: What is the possibility of democratization in the mainland in light of the Tienanmen event and subsequent arrests?
Chao: It is difficult to talk about this matter. I think that democracy in the mainland has many prerequisites: successful education, good treatment of intellectuals, a massive bourgeois middle class, political stability, and economic improvement. These are all basic requirements. From the lesson of the Tienanmen event, it is scarcely possible for mainland China to reach the goal of democratization, especially if they are promoted through pro-democracy movements solely initiated by students and intellectuals.
The hope of democratization in mainland China relies also on changes in thought on the part of the ruling elites. State, military, and social power would have to merge in a general ideological consensus that democratization is a common and desirable goal. Otherwise, the efforts of minor movements for democratization among intellectuals will surely fail. What the CCP should do, if they change their minds in favor of democratization, is to free the intellectuals who joined the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tienanmen Square and let them have the opportunity to be educated in a good environment. But that is not an easy task, even in Poland and Hungary.
FCR: What impact is the Fang Li-chih situation having on relations between mainland China and the U.S.?
Chao: It is difficult to predict how this can be resolved. Fang Li-chih might remain in the U.S. embassy compound for a long time. Some observers think that the U.S. will turn Fang over to the CCP, but I think this is impossible. Others say that the CCP will break into the embassy and arrest Fang by force, completely disregarding international laws. Another possibility is that after a long time he will be sent abroad under the auspices of an international organization, and that the problem will be resolved quietly by both parties when the situation is less noticeable. It is impossible to determine which alternative is the most likely.
The situation is having considerable influence on the relationship between the CCP and the U.S. The U.S. public and the government take this very seriously. The Congress is concerned about the humanitarian aspects of the case, and the Bush administration considers it from the perspective of national interest. Although there is often disagreement between the two branches of government, in this case the U.S. President will have the final say. But both the CCP and the U.S. are concerned about their relationship. If the CCP refrains from reacting to the situation in strong terms, then the U.S. might refrain from taking serious economic sanctions against the mainland. The issue has not yet cooled down.
FCR: What impact did the arrest of Taiwan reporter Huang Teh-pei in July have on the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan?
Chao: Huang's arrest and release sent two messages. First, the CCP made him an example; it clearly informed other Taiwan reporters that they are welcome to visit the mainland, but they are not allowed to write any reports against the CCP nor contact any pro-democracy dissidents. The arrest also shows that the CCP is emphasizing its story that the pro-democracy movement was a riot and counter-revolutionary, and that any contact with the dissidents is against the law.
Second, the CCP tried to avoid, or at least reduce, the overwhelming condemnation and pressure from around the world by releasing Huang from custody. The release was also an attempt to please the people in Taiwan, who were stunned by the ferocity of the Tienanmen event and abhorred the CCP's actions. By releasing Huang, the CCP intended to show its good will toward maintaining an intimate relationship between both sides of the Straits, instead of ruining it, which was possible due to what happened at Tienanmen.