Army leaders in Canton who underwent vehement attacks from pro-Mao/Lin student Red Guards and "rebels" and were even detained in Peiping for a period have now set up and dominate a "preparatory team for a Kwangtung provincial revolutionary committee". The team is under the Canton military region. All "mass organizations" in Kwangtung are instructed to obey it.
The "responsible person" of the team is Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the Canton military region. Team members include Chen Yu (former governor of Kwangtung, former third secretary of the Central-South Bureau of CCP, member of the Central Committee of the CCP); Kung Shih-chuan (probably deputy political commissar of the Canton military region); Wang Shou-tao (former member of the Secretariat of the Central-South Bureau of the CCP, and member of the CCP Central Committee); and Chen Te (political commissar of the Kwangtung provincial military district).
That Kwangtung is under military dominance is clear. Although the team is supposed to be the highest organ of power in the province, it still yields precedence to the Canton military region.
Canton Radio of November 22 twice put the military region before the preparatory team. The broadcast said:
"The revolutionary teachers, students and staff of universities, colleges and middle schools in the Canton area… pledged to launch still more widespread and deepgoing 'support the army' activities, and, under the leadership of the Canton military region and the preparatory team for the Kwangtung provincial revolutionary committee, to launch a new upsurge of revolutionary great criticism and revolutionary great alliance in the Canton area….
"The revolutionary cadres and revolutionary masses of Canton studied the Party center's resolution and pledged to handle the cadre problem under the leadership of the Canton military region and the preparatory team for the Kwangtung provincial revolutionary committee..."
Leadership officers of the Canton military region were fiercely attacked by the "rebels" and student Red Guards as early as March, 1967. The attack began with exposure of the financial misconduct of some top military leaders. It was alleged that they had not returned several tens of thousands of Hongkong dollars to the state treasury but had kept the money in Communist banks in Hongkong and were drawing interest to buy luxuries. The money was part of the Canton military region's fund for carrying out espionage and other activities in Hongkong. So said a Canton Red Guard paper.
The attack later was concentrated on the close relationship between the military leaders and the dismissed Party powerholders, particularly Tao Chu, former first secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CCP.
Huang Yung-sheng, the commander of the Canton military region, was nicknamed "the Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping who carries guns" and "the Tan Chen-lin of Canton".
The Canton Red Guard tabloid said Huang Yung-sheng was promoted to the secretariat of the Central-South Bureau, breaking the precedent that commanders of military regions do not participate in secretariats of Party regional bureaus.
Concerted attacks by the pro-Mao/Lin Red Guards and "rebels" succeeded in driving Huang Yung-sheng out of Canton. He was last mentioned as being in Canton on June 30. He made his first public appearance in Peiping July 31 and apparently remained through October. There seemed to be some truth in the rumor that Huang, together with Chen Te (also attacked by Canton Red Guards) were detained in Peiping by the Mao/Lin faction.
Huang reappeared in Canton November 27. Canton Radio reported his presence at the opening session of a congress of Mao-study activists from the Kwangtung military district. If Huang has regained power, rough times lie ahead for the pro-Mao/Lin Red Guards and "rebel" organizations.
Harbin is case study of exchanges of power
The present stage of the "great proletarian cultural revolution", in which "rebels" and Red Guards are suppressed by local military authorities with the help of Party and government cadres, grows out of the previous stage which lasted from March to August. Provincial military leaders and old cadres seized power from "rebels" and Red Guards who had taken control from Party powerholders in January and February. August was a stormy month and turning point. It marked the irreversible defeat of the "cultural revolution" of Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and their group.
Heilungkiang provides a case study of the power struggle between March and August.
The Harbin Military Engineering College had played an important role in overthrowing the Party powerholders in Heilungkiang. Red Guards from this college had helped students in other cities topple local Party authorities.
When power was seized in the province January 31 and a provincial revolutionary committee established, student leaders assumed important positions. Two of them, Fang Cheng- mei and Yu Hsing-mou, became members of the committee, according to the People's Daily of February 15. They were actually in control of the committee, according to a Red Guard tabloid. More than 40 other students of the college became leaders of various sections of the committee.
However, the old cadres, now supposed to be "revolutionary cadres", soon began to take over power. Chao Chu-fei, a public security chief and former vice governor, had been struggled against as an "anti-Party, anti-socialist, anti-Mao Tse-tung's thought element". He now became a "revolutionary cadre" and sought revenge against the "rebels" who had attacked him. Less than a month after joining the committee, Chao had ordered the arrest of more than 1,000 persons in the provincial capital of Harbin. Most of them were "rebels". More than 5,000 were arrested in the province. He arrested Yu Hsing-mou, the deputy leader of the rcvolutionary committee and a leader of the rebel regiment of the Harbin Military Engineering College. Chao labeled Yu a "counter-revolutionary".
Chao was in full charge of the revolutionary committee from the end of March to the end of April. During this period he expelled a large number of Red Guards from the committee. In one expulsion alone, more than 40 Red Guards from the Harbin Military Engineering College, including Fan Cheng-mei and Yu Hsing-mou, were removed. Chao brought many old cadres known to be enemies of the "rebels" into the revolutionary committee.
Chao sent large numbers of cadres into factories, enterprises and public utilities to drive out students. Acting under the pretext of "supporting the leftists", these cadres cultivated the "conservative" organizations and reorganized them into "New Dawn Rebel Regiments". In the 20-odd days from late March to mid-April, there emerged more than 200 such "Dawn Regiments". They arrested leaders of "rebel" groups, disbanded the units and seized power from the revolutionary committees. More than 100 committees established in January were overthrown or deprived of power. Revolutionary committees in more than 10 universities and colleges were taken over.
Chao split the student "rebel" groups and set them against each other between March and June.
In April, some of the students united and issued such slogans as: "Bombard Chao Chu-fei, Defend the New Regime!", "Bombard Chao Chu-fei, Liberate the Rebels!" They launched a struggle against Chao throughout the province and were called the "bombardiers". In June, their slogan became "Down with Chao Chu-fei!"
In counterattacking, Chao labeled his enemies as a "counter-revolutionary adverse current" in May. He organized the "Dawn Regiments" and other university and college students into an "Allied Headquarters of Defenders" to suppress the "bombardiers".
Chao Chu-fei mobilized tens of thousands of workers and peasants to smash the Harbin Military Engineering College, the Harbin Building Construction Engineering College, Heilungkiang University, Harbin Forestry College, Harbin Commercial College, Harbin Agricultural College and Harbin Foreign Language School. He arrested and punished large numbers of "bombardiers". Scores of them were reported to have been killed.
Some struggles pit Maoist against Maoist
So complicated is the mainland situation that the setting up of a revolutionary committee in a province may give rise to new conflict instead of extending Mao/Lin influence.
Shansi was the first province to overthrow a pro-Liu Shao-chi/Teng Hsiao-ping Party committee and establish a pro-Mao/Lin regime. This event boosted the morale of Mao/Lin "rebels" in the first quarter of 1967. Then clashes occurred between military and civilian leaders of the Shansi revolutionary committee. The military brought armed peasants into cities. Peiping had to send the acting chief of the general staff of the "Liberation Army" to Shansi to mediate.
Kang Sheng, adviser to Peiping's central group in charge of the "cultural revolution", was quoted by a Red Guard tabloid of July 26 as having said:
"There are persons who incite army units, saying that the troops support Chang X X and oppose Liu Ke-ping." Chang X X is most likely Chang Jih-ching. Liu Ke-ping is chairman of the Shansi provincial revolutionary committee and first political commissar of the Shansi provincial military district. Chang Jih-ching is vice chairman of Liu's committee and second political commissar of the district.
"Shansi X X X mobilized armed peasants to enter cities." "Shansi X X X " presumably is the Shansi provincial military district, which has the power to mobilize the peasant militia. Aside from troops, only "armed basic militiamen" have firearms.
"The Shansi political committee is lawless and unruly! Some X X X, particularly the Central Shansi X X X, oppose Chen Yung-kui in such a way! If this is not solved, big mistakes will be committed. This is not only a problem of Central Shansi. Taiyuan (the provincial capital) is also like this."
In "some X X X" and "Central Shansi X X X", the X X X is most likely the "military sub-districts", which are branches of the provincial military district. Chen Yung-kui is vice chairman of the Shansi revolutionary committee and chairman of Hsiyang county in the Central Shansi administrative region.
It is not surprising that a split developed between Liu Ke-ping and Chang Jih-ching. Liu was exiled to Shansi in late 1964 by the Liu Shao-chi/Teng Hsiao-ping faction, supposedly to be vice governor but actually to be brought under the strict control of the Shansi provincial Party committee. He had no power. When the "cultural revolution" was launched, Liu Ke-ping rebelled against the provincial Party committee and made contacts with "rebel" workers and Red Guards in Taiyuan.
As second political commissar, Chang Jih-ching commanded part of the troops of the provincial military district. On January 12 he helped or incited the "rebels" to seize power from the provincial Party committee. Chang was more powerful than Liu. However, when the Shansi CCP nuclear group was set up in January and the Shansi revolutionary committee was established on March 19 (two months and eight days after the seizure of power, indicating serious difficulty in its formation), Liu was head of both and Chang was under him. Liu also became first political commissar. A struggle for power developed. The reason may be much deeper than personal rivalry. This seems to be a power struggle between the military and civilian sides. Even if both sides were truly pro-Mao/Lin, competition for power would be inevitable. Its outside factors were involved, the struggle would be more complicated and violent.