Armed forces tighten control of mainland
Military domination of the Chinese mainland was reflected in the recent composition of the so called "Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" which "responsible persons" from the major revolutionary committees and military formations at tended in the capacity of full members.
By August 1, on the 41st anniversary of the "People's Liberation Army", this supremacy was pro claimed in the final section of the commemorative joint editorial of People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily entitled "The Firm Pillar of Proletarian Dictatorship" in these words: " ... never before have relations between the army and government been so close". Whether or not this was consistent with Mao Tse-tung's "great strategic plan" for the "Cultural Revolution"-and the communique of the Eleventh Plenum of the' Central Committee in August, 1966, suggests that it was not-the factional quarrels between rival groups of Mao's supporters in all the organs of government had made it necessary to place them under military caretakership. By May Day last year, the majority of ministries and commissions under the "State Council" had come under military control. Charged with the task of "supporting the Left", the "revolutionary rebels" of Chiang Ching and troops of the PLA had been given the wide administrative tasks of "three supports and one military, which were (1) to support the revolutionary masses, (2) to support industrial production, (3) to support agriculture, (4) to give the masses military training and (5) to exercise military control. The military training given by the PLA in various organs and institutions has consisted largely of political indoctrination and necessarily depended on the ideological level of the particular units. Military control was exercised thoroughly. Mass media, railways and communications are all firmly grasped by the PLA.
The situation which has resulted infringes not only the "constitution of the People's Republic of China", but also one of Mao's basic principles - that the Party should control the armed forces, and not the reverse. Of course, the present military caretakership can be regarded as a temporary measure to which Party chairman Mao and vice chairman Lin Piao have had to give their approval in view of the convulsions and disruption brought about by the "cultural revolution"; and to judge from the present confused situation and the host of obstacles still lying in the way of adjustment, this temporary caretakership seems likely to last for a fairly long time. From the point of view of the success of the Party chairman's policies, this might not be objectionable if the PLA were in fact as "boundlessly loyal" to Mao as is claimed, and, at the same time, were united as a force under a unified command. But all evidence suggests that just as the leadership in the Maoist camp is split, so there exists a similar split within the armed forces to which must be added other differences over matters such as modernization and the cultivation of purely military skills.
There is some evidence to support the view that a confrontation exists between Chiang Ching's "Leftist" group in the Party and a group of newly risen upper-level PLA cadres which was headed by the purged former "Acting Chief of Staff" Yang Cheng-wu.
What could have been the first manifestation of this confrontation was the attack on Hsiao Hua, director of the general political department of PLA, in August, 1967, by "revolutionary rebels" of that department. They charged him with being a sup porter of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. His subsequent failure to make any public appearances has tended to confirm Red Guard tabloid reports of his dismissal. The absence from the public scene of deputy directors of the general political department Yuan Tsu-chin, Fu Chung and Hsu ti-ching since November of 1967 suggests that a purge of the general political department has taken place. It is easy to believe that this was the result of a clash between its leadership and Chiang Ching's PLA cultural work group.
When the undeniably pro-Chiang Ching group of Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Lin Chieh and Chi Pen-yu was purged from the central "cultural revolution" group in the latter part of 1967, this was reportedly because they bad organized and manipulated the "anti-Party" "May 16 Brigade" of Peiping students in counterrevolutionary activities. But it can be gathered that their activities were directed against the PLA, particularly against the provincial PLA commanders and against Chou En-lai, who was seeking compromises with these commanders for the sake of restoring order. It will be remembered that Chiang Ching temporarily quieted down after this affair.
Her counterstroke can be assumed to have been launched last March with the announcement of the purge of the acting chief of staff, Yang Cheng-wu; the political commissar of the air force, Yu Li-chin; and the Peiping garrison commander, Fu Chung-pi. The only credible charges against them were those of having attacked the Peiping revolutionary committee's work and its chairman, Hsieh Fu-chih, and of sending troops to enter the central "cultural revolution" group. It is not known just how it was possible to dismiss these three newly risen upper-level cadres, who had so recently been promoted by Lin Piao, but it is probable that Lin was unable to protect them against the "Leftist" assault just as Chou En-lai was unable to protect Tan Chen-lin against the charge of being the author of the "February adverse current" of last year. These failures to protect subordinates testify to the power Chiang Ching then wielded.
Since Yang Cheng-wu's downfall, there has been a remarkable coordinated attack by provincial military commanders on Chiang Ching's revolutionary rebel mass organizations. The success of this campaign is reflected in silencing Chiang Ching again and if she derives power from her husband, an eclipse of Mao Tse-tung himself. This would explain Mao's apparent betrayal of the Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" as an act underduress.
the success of their move against the "Leftists" also explains the military leaders' ability to pack a rump Central Committee with their nominees and put out a communique which provides a program of continued attack against the "Leftist" class enemies, as they are now called.
But this success is by no means decisive. Counterattacks from Chiang Ching's supporters can be predicted. One of these seems to have been successfully launcbed in Kweicbow. "Revolutionary rebels" there were aided by "support-the-left" numbered units that may prove to be a part of Mao's private army. In Yunnan as well, there is evidence that the armed forces are split into opposing groups and in Kwangsi numbered units went to the assistance of "revolutionary rebels" against the local garrison. As the "conservative" Party structure seeks to pursue its consolidation of power, there is a possibility that the "Leftists" will be forced to launch a desperate attack in order to survive. That may well be the time when Mao's private army declares itself.
'Rebels' emerge again in Kweichow province
After some three months during which the "revolutionary rebel" supporters of Chiang Ching in Kweichow were suppressed by the provincial military authorities and pried out of the revolutionary committees, they have managed once more to seize power, in Wweiyang city, at least, and their voice again is being heard in the outside world. They are taking the opportunity to level charges against the "conservatives", who dislodged them from power, and are thereby throwing light on the "struggle between the two lines" and revealing that the Mao-Lin group has been placed in a serious predicament. At the same time, there is a note of urgency in the "revolutionary rebel" announcements that suggests a feeling that the present moment of triumph may give way to a "conservative" counterseizure.
Until last August, the New Kwei-chow Daily was the most outspokenly "revolutionary rebel" provincial news paper in Red China. After the "conservative" counteroffensive of August, the voice of Chiang Ching's supporters was not heard. This silence was broken when the New Kweichow Daily of November 16, 1968, published an editorial entitled "The 'February Adverse Current' Must be Thoroughly Repudiated". It was broadcast by Kweichow provincial radio the same day. This was followed by another editorial, "Further Repudiation of the 'February Adverse Current''', also broadcast by radio on the day of publication (November 19).
The first editorial claimed that the Twelfth Plenum of the CCP Eighth Central Committee had repudiated the "February Adverse Current" and that this was an important victory for Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in crushing the bourgeois reactionary line.
The November 16 editorial proclaimed that the "black generals of the 'February Adverse Current''' were afraid of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and regarded it "as they would floods and wild beasts". However, it proceeds to give details of the current dialogue between the "revolutionary rebels" and the "black generals"- the provincial military authorities - which indicate that the latter must still have considerable confidence. The editorial lists these methods of the "black generals headed by the notorious traitor Tan Chen-lin":
1. "They wave the flag of protecting the old cadres and actually carry out their trick of defending a handful to attack the majority."
2. "They wave the flag of concern for the Party but actually negate the Party's leadership by waging a severe attack on the proletarian HQ headed by chairman Mao and with vice chairman Lin as the deputy."
3. "They wave the flag of concern for the PLA but actually sow discord among the army and the people, directing the spearhead at the PLA."
4. "They wave the flag of concern for production but actually let production take over revolution, attempting to divert the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution onto a devious road."
5. "They create splits and incite struggles by force and instigate the masses to struggle against the masses."
6. "They blow up an evil wind of counterrevolutionary econornism, trying to put pressures on the proletarian HQ. They have tried to sabotage the Great Proletarian cultural Revolution, but they blame the proletarian HQ for all the mistakes. How sinister they are!"
The "February Adverse Current" and the "evil wind for reversal of verdicts" last spring may be said to have become a wholesale rehabilitation of Party cadres and a program for Party-building. The stronger the Party becomes and the larger the number of deposed cadres who are rehabilitated, the greater will be the pressure on the Mao-Lin group responsible for the Party's destruction.
The editorial attacks the "adverse current" and "evil wind". The former, it says, "seriously interfered with Chairman Mao's great strategic plan and seriously obstructed the progress of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". It adds that the aim of the "February Adverse Current" was to oppose the resolution of the Eleventh Plenum. As the resolution of that plenum is identified as part of Mao's "great strategic plan", it must be concluded that pronouncements and policies which run counter to the resolution are directed against the Mao-Lin group. This being so, the rejection of the Paris Commune, the belittling of the Red Guards and the derogatory attitude toward elections must be viewed as part of the anti-Mao/Lin stand.
"Those who insisted on the bourgeois reactionary line," the editorial charges, "also acted as the heroes of the 'February Adverse Current', severely attacking the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, suppressing and dealing blows at the revolutionary rebels and vainly attempting to reverse the verdicts against the bourgeois reactionary line, the traitor, renegade and scab Liu Shao-chi and the handful of capitalist-roaders."
The "revolutionary rebels" and the "conservatives" each accuse the other of supporting Liu Shao-chi's line and that of the bourgeoisie and capitalist-roaders. But until this instance the word "rebel" had not been used, except disparagingly, by the New Kweichow Daily for the previous three months, and was also significantly missing from the resolution of the Twelfth Plenum.
An answer to the question of how the "revolutionary rebels" managed to seize the New Kweichow Daily and the radio station may be contained in a report from Kwelchow provincial radio on November 13 which stated that the "working class" in Kweichow had responded to the "militant call" of the Twelfth Plenum to hold a mass rally to repudiate Liu Shao-chi's crimes. The rally had included the "August 18 Corps" which had taken the opportunity to organize 300 "propaganda teams", and these had "gone deeply into factories, rural areas, streets, lanes, stations, hotels, etc., for the propagation of the communique".
The "August 18 Corps" is a "revolutionary rebel" organization which was responsible for setting up the Kweichow provincial revolutionary committee. Since the military authorities began to clamp down on the "revolutionary rebels", the attitude of the corps has been enigmatic. Its representatives have apparently subscribed to the anti-"rebel" position of the provincial leadership. It would now appear that calmed the authorities' suspicions sufficiently to enable them to worm themselves into the workers' movement upon which the provincial leadership was relying for support.
The November 19 editorial of the Kweichow newspaper is similar to that of 16 November, but a note of increased urgency suggests that the "revolutionary rebels'" position is shaky. Their feelings are summed up in this quotation: "We rebelled in the past,' are rebelling now and will rebel in future against such people (the 'black generals')".
In their rebellion against the "black generals", the "revolutionary rebels" apparently have the support of some elements of the PLA. Evidence to this effect was provided by "a soldier of PLA Unit 7578" and a "Five-Good Soldier", said an article written by "a soldier of PLA Unit 7579" in support of the second editorial broadcast by Kweichow provincial radio.
What's happening in mainland medicine
In more ways than one, medicine has been a storm center of the "cultural revolution". Mao's famous strictures against the "urban lords' Ministry of Health" in mid-1965 mapped out the main lines of attack which shortly afterward was launched on culture, education and medicine, the three areas of the "superstructure" under fiercest attack during the "cultural revolution".
However, little was said about medical reform in the early stages of the "cultural revolution". One of the reasons was that the major medical colleges were preoccupied with violent factional struggle. These colleges produced a disproportionate number of "cultural revolution" activists, many of them supporters of the recently disgraced leftist factions.
Most of them are now playing a small role in the drive to improve rural medical standards. Although much has been written on this subject in recent months, little has been said of the precise form of the new system. However, Canton Radio on November 6 broadcast a detailed account of a rural medical system currently under test in certain areas of Kwangtung province. The account bears out earlier reports in the Hongkong press based on interviews with refugees from the mainland and probably indicates the main features of future developments throughout the mainland.
The new scheme is known as "rural cooperative medical care system" and appears to be in operation only in selected test areas of Huiyang and Foshan special districts. The broadcast said:
The new scheme is known as the under the unified leadership of the production brigade ... in adherence to the principle of voluntary mass participation. Poor and lower-middle peasants and other laboring people of the brigade concerned may join in. Generally, each person pays a monthly medical care fee of 25 to 30 fen (cents).
This sum is collected and forwarded twice a year by the production team at the time of the sharing out of the early and late season rice. Any deficits will be made up from the collective's welfare fund. The participants in the cooperative medical scheme will be issued a medical care card by the brigade. With this card, they are entitled to have medical treatment at the brigade public health center.
"In the case of doubtful or difficult illness, the patient will be sent to an upper-level hospital for treatment on the recommendation of the public health center. All medical fees will be paid by the brigade ac cording to the hospital bills ... "
The broadcast claimed that experiments along these lines were carried out in 1957 and 1958 and again in 1965 but were sabotaged by "capitalist-roaders and class enemies". Although the broadcast did not say how long the scheme had been in operation, a recent refugee account claimed it was initiated in Shunte county about October of 1967.
Refugee reports have added that people in the "five black categories" are ineligible, although their dependents can join if they are working. Apart from these cases, only entire families are accepted and individual members are not permitted to opt out.
One of the principal advantages of the new medical care system, the broadcast said, is that "state expenditure for relief and loans can be reduced". In one commune, the brigades collected 1,200 yuan more for the medical fund than was spent in the first quarter of 1968. By fostering "barefoot doctors" and "actively making use of native herbs and native prescriptions for curing common diseases", further savings can be made, the broadcast said.
The new system also is said to reduce the difference between workers and peasants and town and country and persuades "the masses to change customs and common practices". At the same time, it "deals vigorous blows at quack doctors and private doctors in society ... "
The account said the system will work only if the masses are involved; otherwise, the failures of the past will be repeated, with bad elements in the medical departments "sending large numbers of patients to the upper-level hospitals for treatment" in "a vain attempt to bring about the downfall of the medical care system",and "some of the masses with relatively strong labor power and living comparatively well" will be reluctant to participate, "fearing that they might lose something ... "
All the news that's fit to translate
Readers of the foreign language translations of the "New China News Agency" inevitably miss something of the flavor of the original Chinese. Often this is less a case of a racy phrase being transformed into imprecise English than of the translator simply ignoring sections of an article which might provoke ridicule or pro test in the outside world.
Some months ago, People's Daily described how the revolution in medicine had transformed a hospital in Shanghai. Readers of the paper were informed that "many nurses have learned to carry out operations. Quite a few nurses can do appendectomies and hernia surgery and some can also do brain surgery ... Some nurses from worker backgrounds who have been steeled in practical work have mastered the surgery of removing brain tumors, which formerly could be done only by doctors who had special training and a comparatively long period of experience".
The official English translation said merely that "nurses learned ... to undertake some routine surgery".
A more recent instance of translator's license occurred in the NCNA version of an article in the People's Daily of November 19 which described the great changes that had swept the Tibetan highlands in the wake of the "cultural revolution". Foremost among these were said to be the changes in the spiritual outlook of the people:
"In the past, every household had its clay Bodhisattva, while now every house has a portrait of chairman Mao. In the past, there were statues of gods and ghosts in every village and by the roadside; now glittering pagodas, pavilions and billboards decked with chairman Mao's quotations can be seen everywhere. In the past everyone carried talismans to seek the blessing of the Buddha but now everyone carries the precious red book of quotations from chair man Mao; in the past whenever people met they wished each other 'good fortune' but now the first thing they do is to wish chairman Mao a long, long life and exchange quotations from chairman Mao. In the past, the masses used to burn incense and recite Lamist scriptures every day in worship of the Buddha but now they seek advice from chairman Mao every morning and make a report to him every evening; every day, they sing 'The East Is Red' ... "
The translated excerpts simply mention that every family has a portrait of Mao, that the millions of "emancipated serfs" have such profound class feelings for chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung's thought that they are all keenly studying his works.
The People's Daily article concludes with a statement attributed to a 75-year-old herdsman who cried "Our victory is entirely due to chairman Mao! Only Mao Tse-tung's thought gives us the courage to do battle with God and enables us to conquer God". The NCNA version waters this down to "we have won the fight thanks to chairman Mao and to chairman Mao's thought!"
Peiping presumably recognizes that the original article's suggestion that Mao has replaced God in Tibet would not go down well in countries where the Buddhist faith is deeply rooted.