Traditional sinological studies have usually taken as their starting point the Chinese and more particularly the Confucian point of view. Although this is natural enough, it is my feeling that we should look at Chinese civilization from a somewhat broader point of view. Many elements of Chinese civilization had their origin outside of the Confucian tradition and outside China itself. My purpose in studying sinology is to discern the variety of influences at work on the development of Chinese civilization and to understand the many elements that were assimilated into it. I hope not only to clarify some special characteristics of Chinese civilization but also to gain some understanding of elements of Chinese civilization that were transmitted through China to Japan. In particular, I am interested in the way in which Buddhist ideas and practices interacted with those of China, for it was through China that Buddhism came to Japan.
The Six Dynasties period is especially appropriate for study. It was during this era that elements of Indian civilization were imported to China and blended with the original native culture. Under the impact of Indian Buddhism, the two major streams of Chinese thought, Confucianism and Taoism, underwent important changes. These were transmitted to Japan when it assimilated Chinese civilization.
Official annals and documents in China were compiled from a pro-Confucian, anti-Buddhist point of view. If we depend solely on these sources, we shall leave many Buddhist and Taoist sources out of consideration. Not a few manuals of Chinese history remain studded with the results of misleading studies. I am primarily concerned with one of them, the so-called ch'ing-t'an, or "Pure Discourse".
Every treatise on Chinese thought mentions the problem of the ch'ing t'an discourse during the Six Dynasties. Scholars of the Ch'ing dynasty were interested in this and their interpretation still dominates Japanese sinology. The conventional interpretation describes ch'ing-t'an as a frivolous conversation centered on Taoist philoslophy-that is, on the theory of non action (wu-wei) , and suggests that it tended to corrupt the society of the time.
This interpretation is a narrow view which reflects the prejudices of Confucianism. One can criticize it on several grounds. First, the content of all ch'ing-t'an discourses did not focus on Taoist doctrines. A close examination of the documents reveals that in ch'ing-t'an meetings throughout the Six Dynasties, there were no special rules governing the choice of subjects for conversation. Sometimes the meetings focussed on Confucian or Buddhist teachings. The corruption attributed to the ch'ing-t'an discourses was devised by the Confucian gentry to impute political failure to Taoist sympathizers.
The subject matter of ch'ing-t'an discourses was of little importance. The essential element was the form itself -that is, the mode of discussion.
One influential theory about the form of ch'ing-t'an discourses is that of Chao Yi (1727-1814). He was the first to put forward the idea that from the Later Han the vogue of ch'ing-yi (pure argument) gave way to that of ch'ing-t'an and that the latter faded away around the 6th century during the Sui dynasty. Under his influence, the ch'ing-t'an was believed to have penetrated even Buddhist ranks. A European scholar wrote, "All Buddhist apologetic and propagandistic treatises have the form of a dialogue between the author (the host) and an imaginary opponent (the guest), in which both parties alternately formulate their views and objections, the opponent finally declaring himself vanquished and convinced. We shall see that Buddhist ideas and theories soon came to be fashionable topics of discussion." In other words, the ch'ing t'an was absorbed into Buddhist ritual and faded away in the Sui dynasty.
At first sight, this theory seems plausible. But investigation of Buddhist and Taoist documents indicates it is actually the reverse of historical reality. I shall demonstrate that the ch'ing-t'an form had its origin in Buddhist rituals.
As an example of a typical ch'ing t'an meeting, let me cite the oft cited case of the discourse between a monk, Bhih Tun, and a government official, Hsu Hsun. Let us consider whether this is really a form native to China, as Chao Yi's theory suggests.
In this example, the two disputants play roles as the fa-shih, a Buddhist preacher, and the tu-chiang, a lecturer. Throughout the Six Dynasties, most ch'ing-t'an meetings were carried on between persons playing these roles. During his discourse, the tu-chiang held in his hand a round fan called a chu-wei. Similar examples attest to the common use of this instrument.
Chao Yi and other scholars left us many good commentaries about this fan but their research did not extend to Buddhist or Taoist sources. They described minutely the form and materials of the chu-wei, but none of them hit upon the functional relation between a tu-chiang and a chu-wei.
Last year, on the occasion of the 27th International Congress of Orientalists in the United States, I read a paper on the function of the tu chiang and the chu-wei based on a comparative examination of non-sino-logical texts. From these, I discovered that Buddhist preachers or disputants usually held in their hands an object similar to a round fan during lecture meetings or discussion ceremonies. Originally it symbolized his post and authority. Later it came to stand for the role of preacher or disputant. I also discovered that the chu-wei was in fact a Chinese version of the Indian fan (fu) . The tu-chiang used it in a ch'ing-t'an meeting to signify that he was the master of ceremonies. I do not mean to imply that the tu-chiang and the chu-wei originated in Indian Buddhism. They may have existed in Chinese culture before the arrival of Buddhism. What I suggest is that the chu-wei and the tu-chiang came to be used in the ch'ing-t'an meeting in China because of their functional similarity to these elements in Indian culture.
The ch'ing-t'an form was not taken over from Chinese culture by Chinese Buddhism. Rather, the ch'ing-t'an form was originally part of Buddhist practice.
If my argument is correct, the traditional theory about the history of ch'ing-t'an requires revision. Chao Yi to the contrary, the vogue of ch'ing t'an meetings did not fade away around the Sui dynasty; it was amalgamated into the so-called su-chiang, a style of religious lecture in T'ang and Sung China, where we encounter once again those two elements of the ch'ing t'an discourse, the tu-chiang and the chu-wei. - Fumimasa-Bunga Fukui
Issues & Studies - New Asia policy
The so-called new Asia policy originated in President Nixon's article "Asia After Vietnam", which pointed out that for their own benefit the Asian countries should immediately establish an indigenous framework of security to cope with Chinese Communist aggression. Should this collective effort fail to deter Communism, Nixon said, U.S. assistance could be requested. This is supposed to be his "short-range policy". The "long-range goal" is to "change" the Chinese Communists and bring them into the international community.
Nixon's remarks at Guam were based on this concept and included these points:
1. The United States must play an important role in Asia after conclusion of the Vietnam war. Geographical and historical facts have made the United States a Pacific country.
2. Peiping is developing its nuclear power and North Korea and North Vietnam are following militant lines. This constitutes a war crisis. The United States will support the defensive solidarity of Asian non-Communist countries' but will not provide forces for another Vietnam war.
3. The United States will adhere to its treaty commitments to Asian countries and will encourage them to assume more responsibility for domestic security.
4. The future U.S. foreign policy in Asia and other areas will be marked by decreased involvement.
5. After reducing its military assistance to Asian countries, the United States will continue to provide economic assistance.
Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican leader Gerald Ford have praised this Asian policy. Withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam has begun.
It is reasonable that the United States should want the Asians to solve their own problems. But these problems cannot be readily solved through their own efforts. Peiping has limited strength but imposes a serious political threat, especially to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. These countries cannot be expected to cope unaided with Maoist infiltration, subversion and export of "people's war for national liberation".
During his visit to the Republic of China, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers said the United States would live up to the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and would not change its China policy. However, Washington has' relaxed restrictions on trade with and travel to the Chinese mainland.
The change of the U.S. policy toward Asia is based on the appeasement ideas of the Nixon administration. Consequently, some Asian countries have begun to review their foreign policies. The Philippines is moving toward a neutral stand and has requested the United States to return an unused part of Clark Air Base. It is considering the establishment of diplomatic ties with Communist countries.
Thailand has strongly supported U.S. policy in Vietnam. Recently, however, it welcomed Peiping suggestions of peaceful coexistence. When the Asian and Pacific Council was convened in Tokyo this year, the Thai foreign minister called on the member nations to support a program of "friendly confrontation" with Peiping.
Although President Nixon has declared that the United States will not back out of Asia, some Asian counties-especially the Philippines and Thailand-fear an approaching Asian power vacuum into which the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists will try to move. The Soviet Union has intensified its political and economic moves toward India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, the Philip pines and Thailand. Soviet naval power is moving southward. The United States may be unwilling to give up Asia; without Asian allies it would be forced to do so. Chen Shao-hsien
Issues & Studies- After Ho Chi Minh
Ho Chi Minh was chairman of the North Vietnamese Labor Party and head of the Hanoi regime. He made all the important policy decisions.
After his death, Peiping sent a group led by Chou En-lai and Moscow sent Kosygin to Hanoi. Before Kosygin's arrival, Chou left and Pei ping sent another group. On his way back to Moscow, Kosygin visited Peiping and talked with Chou. However, this will not affect Moscow-Peiping schism and struggle.
The North Vietnamese Communists have disclosed that Ho Chi Minh's will included these points:
1. Solidarity among party members.
2. Victory in the Vietnam war. Ho said: "The anti-U.S. war will probably be prolonged and our people will sacrifice more manpower and material sources. However, we have to resist the Americans until total victory. We have to defeat the American imperialists regardless of the difficulties. They will surely get out of our country, which will be united. We shall obtain highest honor as a small country that has defeated two big powers-France and the United States. We should contribute what we can to the national liberation movement."
3. Unity of the international Communist movement. He said: "As a man who has devoted his life to revolution, I feel proud of powerful international Communism and the workers' movement and also feel heart break over the disagreement among the brotherly parties."
With Ho Chi Minh's death, power has fallen into the hands of Le Duan, first secretary of Hanoi's Communist Party; Pham Van Dong, the premier; Truong Chinh, chairman of Hanoi's National Assembly; and Vo Nguyen Giap, the defense minister. Power struggle will develop among these four. Ho's death affects the North Vietnam situation, the Paris peace talks and the Moscow-Peiping struggle.
After a series of military failures, Hanoi has adopted plans for long term struggle. Political strategies include instigation of South Vietnamese to support the "National Liberation Front", a coalition government and a subsequent Communist takeover.
North Vietnam has sought to pro mote appeasement sentiments and an anti-war atmosphere in the United States. Military bases have been established in Laos and Cambodia to prepare for large-scale attacks after U.S. withdrawal.
The joint leadership of Hanoi will follow Ho Chi Minh's policy line. It will continue a policy of blackmail in Paris and harassment on the battlefield. U.S. withdrawals have convinced Hanoi that the United States cannot endure further sacrifices and will get out of Vietnam.
North Vietnam has suffered large casualties. Vo Nguyen Giap has ad mitted half a million killed but the figure may be 150,000. This summer floods inundated most rice producing areas of North Vietnam. Farm work is mostly done by women.
A defecting Viet Cong cadre said that under the strict control of Hanoi's Labor Party, the "National Liberation Front" has no freedom and that serious contradictions exist between the two. More than 30,000 Viet Cong defected from January through August of this year.
An observer in Saigon said: "A national hero cannot be easily found in North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's death hurts Hanoi" Internal struggle and chaos can be expected in North Vietnam.
The United States should continue trying to win a military victory and should take the initiative at the Paris peace talks. The Saigon government should intensify its political offensive to aggravate North Vietnamese internal turmoil and step up attacks on the Viet Cong. - Chang Yao-chiu