By Shin Joe Kang
Verlag Weltarchiv GMBH. Hamburg 1969, 90 pp., DM24
Reviewed by Y. K. Jen
This paperback publication of the Hamburg Institute for International Economics will be indispensable to Asian economic planners and others interested in Asian regionalism. It is not addressed to the general reader.
The author (Kang is the family name) is chief of the Economic Research Planning Bureau of the Economic Board of the Republic of Korea. He did research at the Ham burg Institute for International Economics in 1967 and 1968 and this study, written in collaboration with Dipl. Volkswirt Kalaus Boeck, is the result.
After setting the political and economic stage, Kang considers the postwar history of Asian cooperation and integration undertakings. Included are:
—ANZUS and SEATO.
—CENTO.
—Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia.
—United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (including the Mekong River Development Project, International Highway Project and Asian Development Bank).
—Tasman Free Trade Agreement (New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA).
—Japan-Australian Business Cooperation Committee.
—Pacific Basin Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
—Pacific Free Trade Area Plan.
—Organization for Regional Cooperation for Development (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan).
—Association of Southeast Asia.
—Maphilindo (Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia).
—Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines).
—Asian and Pacific Council (Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and South Vietnam; Laos is an observer).
This review is valuable; the information has never been brought together before.
Writing of ASPAC's establishment in June of 1966, Kang says:
"These understandings were the result of arduous compromise between the two viewpoints prevailing through out the meeting. One standpoint was expressed by the so-called 'hawk group', who were strongly against the expansionism of Communist China and who insisted on the implementation of positive and concrete regional cooperation through ASPAC. This group was made up of China, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. The other group compromising Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia was known as the 'dove group'. This group was against a distinctive anti-Communism coloring, insisting on gradual regional cooperation through ASPAC. In addition to such different standpoints, there existed differences of national interests arising from such various factors as trade relations with Communist China, geographical situation in relation to mainland China, level of economic development, political stability and so on."
Although the Japanese tried to remove ASPAC from politics, they were not entirely successful. In subsequent meetings at Bangkok, Canberra and in Japan, the organization slowly moved toward political action. Even after the first year, Kang could write: "There has been no progress at least during the first year of its operation, and yet all Southeast Asian and Pacific countries are convinced that the region as a whole will progress only by means of mutual cooperation and integration. This is especially true for the developing countries of the region, who are dependent on the assistant of the developed Asian and Pacific countries should they hope to become self sustaining economies in a reasonable space of them. Taking these considerations into account, it is hoped that ASPAC will succeed in spite of its disappointing beginning, since ASPAC has the quality of a comprehensive regional cooperative body, as well as the quality of a functional regional body capable of proceeding with concrete projects."
In the second half of the book, Kang considers the possibility of "An Integration Scheme for the Southeast Asian and Pacific Region". He dismisses what has been achieved as of not much importance. The Colombo Plan and ECAFE "have not proved to be an adequate framework for regional cooperation and integration", he writes. However, he -credits these efforts- with having improved the relations between Asian countries, thus providing more favorable conditions for progress. As for military agreements, he says that they have not been of consequence military but have provided some economic cooperation.
"Southeast Asian countries have been deeply interested in mutual cooperation and integration," he continues, "but in spite of the various plans and agreements on regional co operation and integration there have been few results. This may be explained by the lack of an adequate framework. Thus, an integration scheme is proposed which comprises the whole Southeast Asian and Pacific area. The proposal is based on the ASPAC concept, since the region as a whole will develop prosperously only if both the developed and developing countries of the region are willing to cooperative closely. ASPAC already comprises the three developed countries as well as most of the developing countries of the Southeast Asian and Pacific area and they are already working together at least modestly. These preliminary cooperative attempts may be taken as a basis for further cooperation and integration. Naturally the proposal is not limited to the present ASPAC member countries, but includes the possibility for other Southeast Asian countries especially Indonesia, Singapore, Laos, Burma and Cambodia, to join the agreement."
After discussing the economic dominance of Japan in the East Asian area, Kang concludes that economic integration is possible provided (1) Japan is "earnestly willing to join and lead regional economic cooperation with the increased volume, and improved terms of capital assistance and technical assistance needed, and (2) there is an improvement in the appropriate preferential treatments on export commodities on the part of the developing countries in the region".
As for the politics of the region, he remarks that if ideology and systems are similar, cooperation among the countries and the solidarity of peoples should be comparatively easy. If there is political conflict, regional economic cooperation cannot be expected. He finds no obstacles in the East Asian area. "While ASPAC countries take for granted the differences in the democratic institutions among them," he writes, "they are still based on a capitalistic system, and they are in common agreement, explicitly or implicitly, against Communism as an ideology. In addition to political homogeneity, mutual understanding is growing in this region in the areas of social, cultural and national security which will play significant roles in consolidating their determination towards a regional cooperation scheme."
Kang divides the region into developed countries (Japan, Australia and New Zealand) and developing countries (China, Vietnam, Korea, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand). Attainment of economic integration will be slow, he believes, because of this distinction and especially because of the vast gulf between Japan and the developing nations.
"Although the final goal envisaged is a common market or economic union," he writes, "it is recommended to begin with a manageable and realizeable type of economic integration which may be instituted in the immediate future. In this connection, a partial combination of various integrations is also applicable as the case requires. For instance, the establishment of a free trade area, including a limited free trade area, can proceed with a sectoral common market or a sectoral customs union, at the same time."
It is possible and desirable, he says, for the developing countries to replace imports from Japan and from sources outside the region with purchases from other developing states within the region. Too many regional organizations may hinder the progress of cooperation. As Kang sees it, "ASPAC can be implemented, and work alongside ECAFE and ADB. The others ... can eventually be covered by ASPAC."
For those who want to make various comparisons between countries within the region, there is a Statistical Appendix.
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
By Luke T. Lee
Rule of Law Press, Durham, N. C. 1969, 231 pp., no price
Reviewed by K. W. Liu
By "China", the author means Communist China, and the volume's subtitle is "A study of compliance". In other words, Lee maintains that within the admittedly narrow bounds of his study, the Peiping regime has a good record of treaty compliance. The quarrel is not with Lee's scholarship but with the conclusions that he has drawn from very slight evidence.
His thesis (that Peiping's compliance is such as to suggest that the regime should be brought under as many treaties as possible, including that of the United Nations Charter) rests on a nearly nonexistent foundation.
Compliance is measured by the yardstick of boundary treaties, ambassadorial talks, the Korean Armistice Agreement, fisheries agreements, trade agreements, economic assistance, cultural agreements, double nationality and UNICEF.
Only one boundary treaty - that with Burma - is considered in any detail. He thinks Red China was generous in the settlement and has respected the treaty. AlI that was be fore Rangoon and Peiping fell out. General Ne Win now complains of incessant fighting along the frontier and has told of sizable Burmese casualties. Lee says the Indian border is not defined by treaty. Still, there is at least some definition by usage, and the frontier clashes with India cannot be dismissed so lightly.
Lee claims the Hongkong and Macao borders have not been violated. In the case of Hongkong, the British have frequently claimed violations. Admittedly, the Chinese Communists have not marched across these two frontiers - but for their own selfish reasons. Macao was taken over in a different way and Peiping had hoped to do the same with Hongkong. When subversion failed, the Chinese Reds did not invade the British crown colony only because that action would have brought complications which Peiping was not prepared to accept.
Most observers agree that the Chinese Communists were the initial aggressors along the Manchurian and Sinkiang borders. The location of the border and the "unequal treaties" are separate matters that do not support the picture of Peiping as a treaty abiding regime.
The ambassadorial talks between the United States and Peiping do not involve treaties and treaty obligations. Their inclusion does not support Lee's thesis. To the contrary, he is compelled to admit that the Chinese Communists seem not to have kept their word about prisoner repatriations. He suggests that this may have resulted from textual ambiguity.
The author makes much of Red Chinese compliance with the Korean Armistice Agreement. In fact, the Chinese Communists lost most of their interest in Korea after 1953 and have virtually ceased to participate in the discussions at Panmunjom (as Lee admits). Chinese Communist troops were pulled out of North Korea for several reasons: disagreements with Pyongyang, need for these forces on other fronts and the probability that nothing was going to happen in Korea for a long time to come. If Peiping has abided by the Armistice more zealously than the North Koreans, that was principally because the regime had no immediate objectives and little interest in Korea.
The unofficial fisheries agreements with Japan were undertaken despite a lack of diplomatic relations between Peiping and Tokyo. However, Lee seems to presume that most of the advantages were on the Japanese side. To the contrary, the Chinese Reds accepted these accords because of their inability to prevent the Japanese from fishing about as the latter pleased. In fisheries, the Japanese were strong and the Chinese Reds weak. The agreements cut down on mainland loss of coastal fish. Japan complained in 1966 that the Chinese Reds were still detaining 109 Japanese fishing boats. That is not exactly a demonstration of friendship.
Trade agreements considered are those with Japan, Canada, Cuba and the Scandinavian countries. The first two were unofficial. Cuba complained that Peiping broke its word. Japanese traders have been imprisoned for periods of years. In all trade matters, the Peiping regime carefully keeps its word when Chinese Communist interest is served. Lee says Peiping has a sound credit rating. Naturally. If the Chinese Reds didn't pay up, they wouldn't get any more credit.
An example of the loaded-dice approach is found in the chapter on economic assistance. The author cites the favorable terms of Peiping aid and names the countries to which it has been extended (including Indonesia, Burma, Ghana, Cambodia, Cuba, etc.). Then he lets himself off the hook by saying that lack of information pre vents "a systematic evaluation of (Red) Chinese compliance". There is no mention of broken relations with many of the countries supposedly aided, nor of the nonperformance in every country with the possible exception of Tanzania.
On the subject of cultural agreements, Lee excuses failure of Peiping to keep agreements on student exchange on grounds that Chinese Communist universities were closed during the "cultural revolution". The closing, he observes, was a "proper exercise of national sovereign power". Even so, the fact remains that the Chinese Communists did not keep their word and didn't even apologize for failing to do so.
Double nationality involves overseas Chinese, and the book makes much of the 1955 treaty with Indonesia. Lee paints the picture of a liberal Red China which no longer insisted that one drop of Chinese blood makes a Chinese. He takes up the treaty in detail but does not go into what Peiping actually did - which was to conspire in Communist efforts to take over Indonesia. Where is the Peiping-Jakarta treaty on double nationality today? It is a dead letter, and the Chinese people of Indonesia have suffered grievously because of Peiping's duplicity.
As for UNICEF, Lee admits only in a footnote that in Nanking and Shanghai, the Chinese Communists refused to recognize the agreement with the Chinese National Government and pushed UNICEF personnel around. In fact, he implies that UNICEF, not Peiping, was to blame for departure of the mainland mission.
The author's conclusions have already been indicated. They do not follow from the evidence. His basic mistake, which may be honest enough, is to conclude that li (ethical and moral right-doing) continues to dominate Chinese conduct on the mainland rather than fa, the sanctions of a harsh legal code going back to the Legalists on Ch'in. Dr. Lee's brief Appendix treatment of the Chinese concept of law is admirable. His fault is in failure to understand that the Confucian concept of Ii does not and could not motivate the Chinese Communists. They threw li out along with Confucius.
Luke T. Lee received his bachelor's degree in economics at St. John's in Shanghai, his M.A. in economics at Columbia, his J.D. from the University of Michigan and his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has written two standard treatises on consular law. Unfortunately, such credentials have not produced an equitable and truly scholarly treatise. Most of the evidence he presents to prove Peiping's treaty compliance argues more convincingly the other way.
The evidence he ignores or barely mentions would fill another book.