The war in the Taiwan Straits has come to its most difficult phase both for ourselves and for our American ally. It is difficult because it has become an international football game. As such, it is not fought so much at Kinmen - though hostilities are still going on there - as in places out of control of either the United States or Free China. As far as the war is concerned, the way to fight it is fairly simple. The chief of staff would know what to do. He and his colleagues would see to it that it be fought according to plan.
But once it has become an international football, it moves outside the ken of our war plans and follows an erratic course, because it is now everybody's game, especially for people who are friendly to the Communist cause or who accept the Communist viewpoints. Surfeited with defeatism, these people adore brute force and can see no wrong in an aggressor. The braggings, threats and savage talks of the Communists terrorize them into a frame of mind which makes them ready to betray their best friends to the Communists.
Hence, after the Warsaw talks had started, the United States and China have, in addition to fighting the enemy, experienced considerable difficulty in resisting the pressure of what are regarded as friendly powers or allies to give in to the enemy. These did not make a cent's contribution toward fighting the war, but now they range themselves on our side and try to excel each other in thinking up crazy schemes for appeasement and satisfaction of the Chinese and Russian Communist claims. They make the war in the Taiwan Straits all the more complicated for the Chinese and Americans.
At this writing there is good deal of talk of bringing the Kinmen question up for discussion in the United Nations. If anything, this will make the issue more complicated than ever before. The Soviet bloc of nations, the neutralist member states and the traditional appeasers will join force in an attempt to make the United States and the Republic of China give ground to the Chinese Communists. They will flood the already hesitant world with such propaganda as "Kinmen is not worth fighting for."
The real issue of Kinmen, however, is not whether or not it is worth fighting for. It boils down to the point whether or not we wish to make a stand against the Communists at all. If we do, or rather if the United States does, there are two reasons why the United States should stand firm on the Kinmen issue.
First, if it is costly to stand firm on Kinmen, it is disastrous to make a retreat. For if the United States should do so after so much fanfare, all her allies would entertain doubt as to the reliability of her pledge - all but one or two appeasers, who do not want the United States to be involved in anything but the protection of their homeland. Once one starts retreating with the idea that a place is not worth fighting for, one will find no place is, except one's own town. But long before Communist aggression comes to one's home town it will be too late to put up any fight at all. The best way to fight aggression is to keep it at a distance, far from one's shores.
Second, any appeasement would be a godsend to the Chinese Communists. For once the United States softens down in her stand on Kinmen, the Communists would have gained so much prestige for their ability to defy the combined forces of the United States and Free China, the equal of which is hard to find in Asia. If by intimidation alone the Communists should succeed in gaining any advantage in the talks now going on at Warsaw, they could recourse to threat of force in other countries in Asia and no one would dare stand up against them.
The Americans are leading from strength in the Warsaw talks and should know it. They can with confidence warn the Chinese Communists that if the Kinmen war should result in an open armed conflict, the United States would let loose all the modern, heavy weapons in her arsenal. The Peiping regime would have reeled under the first blows, and the discontented people on the Chinese mainland would have risen in arms and have it liquidated. The Russians may be able to continue the war, but they will not be able to help the Peiping regime after it had been pulled asunder. The Chinese Communists know only too well that they are extremely vulnerable. The United States should take full account of this situation, and take no nonsense from the Chinese Communists.
Her job dealing with the Communists would be much easier if she gets a little more cooperation from her friends and allies. These have tried their best to exert pressure on her to do what they wanted her to do. They have tried to be the tail that wags the dog. From short-sightedness and for selfish reasons, they want the United States to give in to the Chinese Communists. In taking her stand now in the Taiwan Straits, the United States should feel that she is in a morally unassailable position. She should let no one talk her out of it, be he friend or foe. In the final analysis, losing a war or retreating from a well taken position through the foolishness and intervention of one's friends is just as painful as through defeat in the hands of the enemy.