Common sense compels one to admit that the choice left to Japan as to whether she should treat with Taipei or Peiping is not an easy one. As early as the end of 1950, Premier Shigeru Yoshida said in an article published in the January, 1951 issue of the quarterly Foreign Affairs: "In some quarters a fear is entertained that a separate peace might permanently sever Japan's trade with Red China. Red or white China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers." Subsequent discussions with United States representatives concerning the multilateral peace treaty with Japan apparently caused Premier Yoshida to reverse his tack. It may not be presumed that Japan, in choosing to treat with Taiwan, is willing to sign a bilateral treaty with China in the form of a copy, mutatis mutandis, of the multilateral peace treaty; nor may it be presumed that she will be able to alter the factors relative to geographical proximity of China and Japan or the operations of the inexorab1e principles of economics.
Against such a background, the various statements made by Hideki Mazaki, the spokesman for the Japanese Plenipotentiary, concerning the desire of the Japanese Government to see the conclusion of a concise and short treaty and its doubts about the ability of the Government of the Republic of China to excise effective control over all of its territories may be read with understanding by the people of the other contractual party.
As indicated by our Plenipotentiary, George K. C. Yeh, in his opening speech at the first session of the Peace Conference, the position of the Republic of China is that "we must expect that there will arise, in the course of the negotiations, certain divergences of views." In brief, the Government of the Republic of China maintains: (1) that the restoration of peace to our two peoples is highly desirable; (2) that peace be restored along the lines of the principles of the San Francisco Treaty of Peace; (3) that this Government approaches the negotiations not only as the Government of the Republic of China but also as one of the Allies in the late war against Japan. By eliminating those articles of the San Francisco Treaty of Peace which have no direct bearing on Chinese-Japanese relation, by retaining all articles of that treaty which China should have as one of the Allies, and by adding such articles as deal specifically with problems pertaining to the termination of war between China and Japan, we shall, in fact, obtain a document that would fulfill the requirements of the foregoing statement of Chinese policy.
It must be remembered that the non-inclusion of China at the San Francisco Conference was a bitter pill to the people of the Republic of China. To them, the conclusion of a bilateral treaty of peace on substantially the same terms as the multilateral peace treaty merely serves to sugar-coat the pill. That Taiwan is a going concern as an economy and that it has shown amazingly rapid progress in other fields is generally conceded by disinterested observers. That, up to this day, Taiwan has the best-trained and largest armed force for combating Communist aggression in Eastern and Southeastern Asia is something that few critics care to gainsay. Were Japan to decide definitely to ally herself with the democratic states, it may be statesmanship to give recognition to Taiwan regarding these statements. Acceptance of China's stated position as the basis of discussion may be necessary to the successful conclusion of these negotiations.
The protracted haggling about the title of the treaty, though hardly surprising when considered in the light of the letter of December 24, 1951 from Mr. Yoshida to Mr. John Foster Dulles, does little to buttress the professed sincerity of approach on the part of Mr. Isao Kawada, the Japanese Plenipotentiary. The equivocation regarding the full powers of Mr. Kawada is probably occasioned by the domestic political situation of Japan and the fact that Mr. Yoshida's Government will be facing a general election in a matter of months, but it is not conducive to smooth and quick proceedings in the negotiations. That the Chinese Plenipotentiary, representing the host nation, has to bear the full weight of pressure of public opinion and that of his constitutional superiors is a fact which any experienced diplomat would concede with grace.
The announced area of understanding has not been as extensive as the time consumed has been protracted. In the words of Mr. Yeh, "the will to find common ground for the solution of such divergences will not be lacking" on the part of his Government. It is assumed that the same assurance must have been given by Mr. Kawada. The times call for demonstrations of extraordinary statesmanship on the parts of Messrs. Yeh and Kawada. The main consideration should and must be the uniting of strengths for combating Communist aggression. As Mr. Yoshida rightly remarked, Red or white, China remains Japan's next-door neighbor. We cannot conceive the development of a free, independent and democratic Japan with a Red China poising a dagger at her heart; nor can we conceive the restoration of Japan to her status of a first-class power if the Japanese island empire is hemmed in by a sea of hammers and sickles. Security considerations in the face of this common threat calls for wise leadership on both sides. For same reason, exaggerated consideration should not be given by either party to the sensibilities of his people in connection with these negotiations. Since this treaty is in no way thrust upon either party, concessions must be made from both sides. The plenipotentiaries would prove themselves unworthy of the confidence of their respective peoples if they were to ignore such a simple truth. The people of China and Japan would be failing in their support of their duly commissioned delegates if they chose to close their eyes to this plain fact.