All the leading American newspapers commented editorially on July 11 on the purge of Lavrenti P. Beria, Minister of the Interior and chief of the Soviet secret police, and most of them drew the deduction from the coup that a ruthless struggle for succession in the Kremlin had broken out.
The New York Times maintained that the downfall of Beria "is clearly a cause for rejoicing in the world's democracies. At one blow this news shatters the whole elaborate facade of 'monolithic unity' with which Soviet propaganda has sought to surround the Kremlin since the death of Stalin. We now see the essential reality in Moscow today—the reality of a pitiless struggle for power among desperate rivals who know no limits in their fratricidal strife. Now the man who has sent millions of innocent people to prison and to slave labor is himself a prisoner, accused of crimes so vast that it is clear his jailers plan no mercy for him. Not since the purges of Beria's predecessors, Yagoda and Yezhov, has Soviet 'justice' been so fitting.
"Those who have been deceived in the past by Soviet propaganda have often contrasted the 'strength of Communist unity' with the presumed weakness of democracies, where daily controversy rages about every significant political, social and economic issue. Yet how much stronger in reality in our unity through diversity! We have no need for purges, for fantastic charges and counter-charges, because our society, which permits free and open conflict of ideas and parties, does not build up tensions and conspiracies and supercharged hatred that are inevitable under totalitarianism.
Pointing out that Beria, "who only a few days ago was one of the post-Stalinist holy trinity, is now labeled 'an adventurist', 'a malignant enemy of the Soviet', 'a Bourgeois regenade', 'an agent of international imperialism', the paper commented that "With minor changes, PRAVDA's editorial against Beria yesterday could have been written about Trotsky or Zinoviev or Kamenev or Bukharin, all figures who in their day too basked in the sunshine at the giddy heights of Soviet power. But so far has Soviet totalitarianism progressed that today history is rewritten in a moment's time. It took a decade or more before Stalin's defeated enemies were transformed from great builders of the Soviet state to its supposed worst enemies. In Beria's case it required only the appearance of yesterday's PRAVDA."
"One is tempted to draw from the event specific conclusions about the next turn of Soviet policy," observed the New York Herald Tribune. "Will the satellites be subjected to cruel repressions? Will the comparatively moderate attitude towards the West be reversed? Or will foreign policy continue unchanged despite these swift reversals on the surface? Time will tell; for the moment what stands out is the depth and scope and fierceness of the internal struggle which is shaking the whole Russian tyranny."
"The fact that Beria is charged with having 'activated Bourgeois nationalist sentiments' and worked 'in the interest of foreign capital'," the paper continued, "lends support to the idea that he was indeed a spearhead of the more flexible policy of the last mouths. If so, the Berlin riots and the uprisings in the satellites can be taken as events sufficiently disastrous to have brought about his undoing. An end to hopes for settlement of the cold war could then be anticipated."
The Scripps-Howard newspapers stated that "Now Russia's bill three has become two: Georgi M. Malenkov and V. M. Molotov. But that hardy pair and many others may be purged before a new czar is crowned as Stalin's real successor. The charge that Beria was an agent of 'international imperialism' is, of course, nonsensical. His offenses were his position and his ambition."
The paper went on to say that "The 'axperts,' so-called, differ as to whether Beria stood for a soft or a hard policy toward the West, and as to whether his fall is a good omen or a bad one. Actually no one outside of Russia really knows. In any case, the Beria ouster suggests how idle it is to assume that we could reach a firm understanding with Russia by talking to Malenkov, when there is no way of knowing who, if anyone, can really speak for Russia. Today it might be Malenkov, and tomorrow Molotov, and after that, perhaps someone out of the Red army. A lot of heads may fall before a new boss emerges who can speak with real authority."
"The plain fact is that none of the 'experts' know for sure," observed the Hearst papers along the same line, "what is happening in the Kremlin and you can take your pick of interpretations of the downfall of supreme hatchetman Beria, ranging from fear of war to hope that the Soviet tyranny is disintegrating..... So, until developments point the direction the Kremlin is moving, we are going to take the crash of Beria as what it unquestionably and basically is. And that is: Beria lost to Georgi Malenkov in a fierce, merciless, and treacherous struggle for power. Along with this we want to make three points which we think are very important: The United States should give up any idea, and resist any pressure, of meeting with Soviet Russia in a Four-Power conference. The United States should not under any circumstance enter into commitments with Soviet Russia on Europe or Asia. The United States must not take the fall of Beria as a sign of weakness. It must maintain its strength and increase its strength, particularly its air power, to meet whatever course the Soviet tyranny takes. And it must exploit whatever advantage offers itself. The idea of a Four-Power conference first was advanced by Winston Churchill, and therefore was a British idea in the British interest .. We were not enthusiastic about it then and we are dead set against it now."
The Washington Evening Star declared that "What it signifies, as Secretary Dulles has said, is that a new convulsion is under way in the dark motherland of Red totalitarianism. And it is a convulsion whose shocks and tremors are bound to be felt — for good or ill — throughout the globe, particularly in place like Communist China and all the captive lands now seething with rebelliousness behind the Iron Curtain in Europe."
In answering the questions: Why has Beria been accused of treason? Why has he been reviled as an 'imperialist' agent who has plotted " to capitulate to the West and restore capitalism to Russia? Is this a peaceful line of propaganda or is it, on the contrary, a line designed to prepare the way for an end to the Kremlin's recent conciliatory talk and a return to warbreeding virulence?" The paper maintained: "How to answer these and similar: questions is anybody's guess. And it is anybody's guess whether or not what is happening to Beria today will happen to Molotov tomorrow — or even to Malenkov himself the day after tomorrow..... The only certainly is this: That in a situation of this sort, when desperation may govern all the acts of the mutually suspicious men of the Kremlin, the free world had better be on guard instead of blithely assuming that events are breaking beautifully in its favour."
"The only safe deduction to draw from the coup is that a war for succession is really on," commented the Washington Post. "This will change a lot of views about what is going on inside the Kremlin. Up till now many experts have held the theory that one-man rule has given place to collective leadership in the Soviet Union. In the post-Stalin setup there was a Council of Ministers consisting of five members only..... How the five- or six-man collectivity was broken up is what will provoke speculation. Perhaps the workers of East Berlin forced it. The relaxation behind the Iron Curtain was, of course, the collectivity's doing, but Beria must have been the leading spirit, having shown the way in Soviet Russia itself in decrying the terrorism he was himself administering and in returning to the people some of rights under the Stalin constitution. Perhaps the way that the relaxation backfired when put in practice in Soviet Europe was attributed to Beria ...... It looks as if fear of the people, coupled with the personal jealousies which are inevitable in a headless despotism, is bringing back the myth-man in Soviet Russia. But who knows — Malenkov may be the next out of the window!"
The San Francisco Chronicle opined that "Because of that extraordinary system, it is impossible for anyone outside the Iron Curtain — or, for that matter, outside the busy minds of the two surviving triumvirs — to know precisely what has been done in Russia or to predict what will be done. It seems likely that the fallen Beria may shortly appear as the penitent confessor in a 1953 version of the purge trials……What the Western world discovers today is light from the stars, telling not what Russia is like at this moment, but what it was in the dwindling past. Beria's retirement was no doubt decreed weeks ago but whether by consultation between Malenkow and Molotov, or by direct action of Malenkov himself, or by some possessor of power unknown to the world, is a matter of conjecture."
"The West probably will face a tougher Russia and a tougher Russian policy," observed the Christian Science Monitor, "as a result of the ouster of Lavrenti P. Beria as Deputy Premier and Minister of Internal Affairs in the Soviet Union. The change may not come at once; for Prime Minister Georgi M. Malenkov — if he does emerge as the dominant figure — probably will need time to consolidate his power down through the Soviet bureaucracy and to complete the purge which has evidently begun."
The paper went on to say that "any concentration of power is likely in the long run to produce a firmer attitude by Moscow toward the outside world. The sweet cooings of the last few months plainly reflect a vast uncertainty among the men of the Kremlin and a need to have their hands free for grappling with each other. It is far from clear yet that by removing this leading rival Malenkov has completely established himself as a single master of the Soviet Union in the sense that an apparatus of dictatorship demands one master. The Red Army must have backed Malenkov at least tacitly in this move; but what will be its eventual role?"
While the Houston Post believed that the "liquidation of the number two man in Russia is not likely to settle the mortal dog-fight for power in Moscow," the Kentucky Louisville Courier-Journal was of the opinion that "All we can know definitely now is that what the Russians call the troika, the three-horse sleigh, has proven an impossible vehicle for government. It is now to be seen whether two horses can pull together better than three, or whether one more must go the way of the wolves and the deep snows,"
The London Times in its leader on July 11 entitled "The First Stroke" had the following to say: "Beria has been struck down — apparently by Malenkov, apparently with Molotov's acquiescence, but the indictment and the action against Beria are made anonymously by the central committee of the Communist Party. All that is certain is that one of the triumvirs who stepped into Stalin's shoes, the one who was Malenkov's most powerful rival, has been struck before he himself could strike."
"Personal rivalries and antagonisms have obviously played their part," the paper continued, "and they may indeed provide almost the sale explanation of Beria's downfall. Malenkov, as Prime Minister, probably found it intolerable to leave Beria with the degree of power which he exercised when they were equals together under Stalin. Stalin could balance the two, but when he was gone one of them had to rise to the top."
On the question which of the two, Beria or Malenkov, was chiefly responsible for the "loosening" of the Stalinist rule at home and abroad, the paper opined that "Such inquiry opens up the more urgent question whether the downfall of Beria spells a return to bleak Stalinist orthodoxy under Malenkov. There can be no certainty about the answer, but part of the PRAVDA article against Beria seems to blame him for some of the unexpected consequences of the experiment in "loosening" ..... The PRAVDA charges are significant at this time, not because they prove anything about the part that Beria played in the new policy, but because they convey a warning to Russian and satellite peoples that concessions may be suspended for a time after the Berlin riots and other disturbances."
2. Armistice in Korea
The New York Herald Tribune in its editorial on July 20 commented that "The question remains as to why, after so long and often fruitless a negotiation, the Communists have finally come around, to the point of really wanting a truce. Every assurance they have, every material advantage they now possess, could have been theirs at earlier periods. Again and again our side has made clear that an armistice was entirely up to them. Conceivably events in Moscow of which little is known, or events even less known to the outside world taking place within Red China, have brought them to the point of Saturday night's statement. The change may come from weakness; or it may come from a strength that plots some new adventures. Whatever the explanation, the United Nations course is clear. It is to go forward with the armistice to shape an honorable peace, and at all times and above everything else to be alert to any shifts in the situation."
"There is bitter irony in the fact that just at the time when there seemed to be a substantial prospect of truce in Korea," commented editorially the New York Times on July 17, "There should have been launched the heaviest Communist attack in many months and now severe counter-attack. More lives are being lost at a time when we had hoped they could be saved…… Regardless of the immediate motive, the situation again illustrates the low value that the Communists put on the lives of individuals. We are repeatedly placed in this position of working on humanitarian grounds for a truce with an adversary who has no humanitarian to be served. That has been frustrating in Panmunjom. It is tragic in every home in every part of the world where there is a loss because of this needless conflict at this time.
"There is, of course, still some substantial doubt as to the genuineness of a Communist desire for a truce. The negotiation seems to be on a familiar treadmill and the Communists propagandists are again making all the capital they can out of the delay for which they themselves are responsible."
The Washington Evening Star in its editorial two days later opined that "The Panmunjom negotiations have now reached a stage where the American-led United Nations Command can hardly avoid resorting to all-out action for a military decision if the Communists do not put a definite end to their off-again-on-again tactics and actually sign a Korean truce--not just talk about one--without further delay. To put it mildly, there has been far too much delay already. By his systematic haggling, his impossible demands, his periodic walkouts, his calls for recesses, and all his other dilatory tricks, the enemy has succeeded in deliberately stretching out the armistice talks for a period of more than two years."
"If the U. N. lacks the courage now to put a time limit on those talks and mean it," warned the Philadelphia Inquirer editorially on July 17, "the Reds have every incentive to drag the talks out for two long years more……."
"Despite the billions of words, written and spoken, about the Korean truce," observed the New York Daily Mirror editorially on July 8, "literally nobody, except a small group in the Government, knows precisely what is happening there ..... Russia wants a victory in Korea by an American capitulation. The value of that is that at a moment of upheaval within the Soviet world….. a victory in Korea would be a shot in the arm..... The Eisenhower Administration has a campaign promise to fulfill to end the Korean war but without capitulation to the Soviet world. To what extent this promise has been kept, we cannot know until we read every word of the truce agreement."
The Cleveland Plain Dealer in its editorial of July 7 stated: "When he took office President Eisenhower had a plan to get the boys home. It consisted of two parts (1) to take the wraps off Chiang Kai-shek and thereby to threaten the Reds on the Chinese mainland with the possibility of Nationalist attacks from Formosa and (2) to train and equip more South Korea divisions so that eventually they could take over the entire battle line and American and other allied forces could be withdrawn.
"The President started to put this plan into effect. He announced that the United States Seventh Fleet no longer would shield the Chinese mainland from attack….. Almost immediately the Communists suggested a renewal of truce negotiations. Washington saw a peace mirage on the horizon and the plans for greater participation in the war by Chinese Nationalists and South Koreans were promptly forgotten:
"It looks now as though the Reds feared the Eisenhower strategy. So they baited a trap and we fell into it. So anxious were we to find a short-cut to end the war that we made shameful concessions to the Communists. We accepted truce terms that would weaken our own military position in Korea, while the Reds would be free to build up theirs. We agreed to negotiations without time limit on the future of Korea, knowing full well that the Reds could prolong these negotiations indefinitely and that Korea would be permanently partitioned."
Tests of an Educated Man
He who prefers virtue to beauty in his wife, who does his best to serve his parents and sacrifices all that he has for his king, and whose word can be relied on by his friends—such a man, though he may not have received any schooling, is, in my view, highly educated.
—From The Confucian Analects.
Translated by Durham Chen.