Since 1962, commando forces of the Republic of China have been carrying out carefully organized and highly successful raiding operations against the Communist-occupied mainland. These actions are designed to obtain intelligence, to encourage the anti-Communist people of continental China and, in general, to prepare the way for the government counterattack against the Peiping regime.
Commando activities were stepped up to a new frequency with two sizable raids in June alone, one of them a far-reaching attack on tightly guarded, strategic Lungshanchien at the tip of the Shantung peninsula. The other was against Lufeng, a county of Kwangtung province in South China. More than 50 regular Communist troops were killed in these two actions, while the commandos suffered only a single fatality. Three Communist militiamen voluntarily returned to Taiwan with the Lufeng raiders. They said that the desperate harshness of life on the mainland has turned most of the people against the Reds.
Lungshanohien is 720 nautical miles north of Taiwan, which made it one of the most distant targets attacked by the Republic of China's increasingly active commando forces. Many of 'the raiders were natives of Shantung. Some knew Lungshanchien itself like the back of their hand. All were painstakingly briefed in geography and available intelligence information about defenses.
The Lungshanchien area was chosen not because of weakness but because of its strength. Only 60 miles away is the Communist naval base of Wei-hai-wei, and just to the north is a naval patrol unit. To the south is the important military center of Tsingtao, where another naval unit is stationed. Between Tsingtao and Lungshanchicn there is a heavy and constant traffic of torpedo boats and other armed vessels. At Lungshanchien, which is classified as a "special area," the Communists maintain at least a company of regular troops.
Seas were rough, with 20-foot waves, as the commando force approached Shantung. Rain was falling and winds were strong. Transfer from "mother ship" to smaller vessels was made without mishap, however, and another six hours brought the tiny convoy to shore. It was 2 o'clock in the morning of June 2 when the guerrillas hit the beach.
Warning Shot
Deploying quickly and silently, the force occupied vantage points, brought some 200 buildings and houses under fire control, then began to advance toward the Communist bar-racks only 50 meters from the beach. It was very dark. The attackers were within 20 meters of the building when the first challenge came.
"Who's there?" the sentry barked.
No answer.
"Password!"
Still silence.
Sensing something wrong, the sentry fired his rifle. Two shots by the commando captain silenced the sentry, but the Communists had been alerted. They rushed from the barracks in confusion, signaled for help, and began to fire wildly with rifles and four machine guns.
Commandos lay quiet, not returning the fire, waiting a better target. Communists illuminated the area with flares, sought to pin down the commandos with mortars and bazookas, and began an advance. With targets clearly outlined, commandos began to pick them off one by one. More than 30 fell; the rest fled.
Lt. Li Ping-ming, eager to capture one of the Communist soldiers, broke cover and was hit. His buddies pulled him back but the wound was fatal.
Communist soldiers, now cautious and under cover, shouted to the commandos: "Put down your guns, comrades!" Troops on the east and west sides of the area began to concentrate fire on the commandos. Searchlights and flares sought out the attackers' hiding place.
Rescue at Sea
Mission accomplished and his force out-numbered many times by Communist reinforcements, the commando leader ordered withdrawal. Communist flares facilitated the return to the boats. The rain provided some concealment. Communist firing could still be heard when the commandos were well out to sea. The fire fight had lasted 35 minutes.
These six commandos were adrift almost a week until rescued by a South Korean fishing boat (File photo)
One of the boats developed engine trouble. The six commandos aboard tied their clothes to oars to improvise a sail and steered eastward to get away from the mainland coast.
Food and water ran out on the third day. At first the weather was storming and the seas high. Then the sun came out scorching hot. Thirst was intolerable. But bodies had been toughened by the rigorous training. The commandos were in excellent condition when a South Korean trawler picked them up. They returned to Taiwan and a hero's welcome on June 14.
Maj. Chang Ta-lung (literally Big Dragon), team leader of the commandos and a veteran of the Chinese Youth Army in World War II, reviewed the operation:
"Communist fire power was strong. They had machine guns on our flanks and they also had 60 mm. guns. They used flares but didn't catch us in a crossfire. The light was to our advantage. We could see them clearly. This indicates their lack of combat experience. They outnumbered us several times and held higher ground. Yet they tried to charge directly into our fire and were mowed down. The rest ran away.
"At the same time, we are not satisfied with our own achievement. We did not bring back a prisoner. Next time will be another story.
"We did not waste our bullets. Every shot counted. We were not in a hurry. We waited out the Communist troops. When they charged, we gave them hell. We can set our foot on any part of the mainland coast at any time."
Lt. Yu Tai, deputy leader and a Shan-tung native who was a guerrilla there during World War II, commented:
"The Communists outnumbered us overwhelmingly. They had sufficient fire power—rifles, mortars, and machine guns. But they did not put up a fight, not an iota of what should be expected of a soldier. Their morale is low, they lack experience, and they have no will to fight."
Second June Raid
Three weeks after the Lunshanchien attack, a commando force struck at Shanmen, literally "Mountain Gate," six miles southeast of Lufeng. The locale is a highland at the foot of the "Mount of Lions" (Shihshan), highest peak in the area, and blocks the waterway to Lufeng.
Raiders went in the night of June 20-21, received an enthusiastic welcome and material assistance from local residents and militiamen, and killed or wounded 20 regular Red army troops of a Communist garrison. Three of the militiamen—Huang Mu-hsin, 50, Chou Ah-li, 33, and Fang Huo-tai, 24—returned to Taiwan with the attackers. Six-hundred similar requests had to be turned down because of lack of room in the commandos' boats.
This is an account of the assault by one of the commandos:
"Our convoy approached the South China coast around 8 p.m. June 20. The weather was fine. Under the subdued light of a new moon, with a light breeze brushing our faces and soft waves patting the bows of our boats, we sailed close to the coastline. We used the lighthouse beacon on Tienweishan (Mt. Tin Moi) as a landmark and reached our target area shortly after midnight.
"We waded ashore quickly. Leaving several comrades to guard the boats, we marched toward Shan men village. About 50 feet from the beach, we bumped into six local fishermen, who were also Communist militia members, tending their nets. They were excited when we told them we were from Taiwan, and volunteered to provide details of the deployment of Communist garrison posts in the vicinity.
"Having distributed some informational materials and daily commodities among these people, and led by two militiamen, we stalked a Communist sentry. The Red soldier spotted us and fled.
Village Lighted
"Fearing the main force of the Red garrison might be aroused, we hurried toward the village, hoping to surprise them in their bar-racks. We saw two Communist cadres, who turned and ran at the sight of us.
"Divided into twos and threes, we quickly prepared ourselves for a possible contact. Several of us searched for Red sentries; others ran toward the Red barracks and still others covered accesses to the village.
"As we came closer, the village was lighted by many torches and the sound of gongs was heard. We lay low, our pistols and rifles trained, ready for a fierce encounter.
"Unexpectedly, large numbers of militiamen armed only with spears, poured out of the village, shouting that all the Red troops had run away. The militiamen wanted to surrender their weapons. We came out into the light to be enthusiastically welcomed by militiamen and villagers, who swarmed around us. It was indeed a pitiful sight to see those people, mostly in rags and barefooted, looking at us with pleading eyes. They burst into joyous cries when we presented them with Taiwan-made towels, cloth, children's clothes, and daily commodities. Many asked to be taken to freedom.
"The militiamen willingly yielded their weapons, most of which were crudely made daggers and spears. Militiaman Huang Muhsin told us that the Red authorities, fearing a militia uprising, issue only two old rifles and six rounds of bullets to each village. We also collected a number of flashlights and documents.
"Meanwhile, we sent a unit after the fleeing Reds, who were trying to reach machine-gun positions outside the village. Opening up with sub-machine guns and automatic rifles, we mowed them down. In less than 15 minutes, about 20 Reds lay dead or seriously wounded.
"Hundreds of local people followed us to our boats, pleading to be taken along. We had to decline because there was no room. They reluctantly went back after being told that we would return.
"All 30 of us, bringing Communist militiamen Huang, Chou, and Fang, returned to our base safe and sound."
Attackers attributed the ease of their success to the unhesitating assistance of the mainland populace and the low morale of Red garrison troops. Fang Huo-tai who was deputy militia leader of the "Shanmen Production Team of Kingshan Brigade of Wukang Commune," said that heavy work and inadequate food have made anti-Communists of most members of the militia. Chou Ah-li, a member of the same militia team, said villagers must fish from early morning to late afternoon, then stand sentry duty at night as "volunteer" members of the militia.
The commandos are from the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, which is independent of the Ministry of National Defense. The Army's goal is to establish a "guerrilla corridor" on the mainland, encourage uprisings of the people, and thus pave the way for the all-out counteroffensive by regular forces of the Republic of China.
In the last year alone, more than 40 teams of commandos have been sent to the mainland. They have received support and cover from mainlanders and some have joined guerrilla bands.
Communist have intensified their search for commandos and undercover personnel who have been providing leadership and assistance for guerrillas. Many mainlanders have been arrested for collaboration.
The Anti-Communist National Salvation Army is accepting volunteers for further mainland raids. Both veterans and youths meeting the stiff requirements are being accepted. More than 2,500 volunteers signed up in only 10 days.
Larger Actions
Informed sources say commando raids have led to Communist confusion and even panic, and have tied down large numbers of troops that otherwise could be used for external aggression. Because of the constant threat from Taiwan, the Peiping regime must deploy hundreds of thousands of troops in seven coastal provinces. And because of commando mobility, the Communist defenses are stretched thin, leaving much of the coastline vulnerable to further attack.
Political observers said the Shantung raid has profound significance. They suggested that with adequate logistical support, free Chinese forces can land along the South China coast and quickly recover several provinces, and also penetrate into central China, the heartland of the nation.
A Taipei English-language newspaper, the China News, observed in an editorial June 15:
"The United States could do worse than consider the quiet support and encouragement of an expanded guerrilla offensive. There is no need for manpower. However, if the size of forces is to be stepped up, attackers will need backing from surface vessels and perhaps from aircraft.
"With moderate help, commandos in groups numbering as many as several hundred could hit the mainland coast simultaneously at a half dozen or more points. The alarm and confusion of the Communists is not difficult to imagine. Already jittery, they would rush large forces to the coastal areas.
"The United States has considered—and is still considering—extension of the anti-Communist war to North Vietnam. That would involve the use of Americans and U.S. military machines and weapons. Some Washington authorities have suggested this would lead to a conflict on the scale of the Korean War.
"Raids against the mainland coast—or North Vietnam, for that matter—and involving only the manpower of the Republic of China could achieve the same objectives without so many risks for the United States. This country is already fighting an all-out, hot, shooting war against the Reds. Whether we hit the Communists of Shantung, Yunnan or those a little farther south in Vietnam doesn't make much difference. They are all enemies to be destroyed so the world can be free and peaceful."