A. Perouansky
Observing Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's antics at the recent UN General Assembly meeting—his rudeness, vulgarity, table-pounding and the shoe-waving acts—one could not help asking the question: why was Khrushchev behaving the way he did, why was he doing practically everything in his power to worsen international relations and to bring the cold war into its most freezing stage since the Korean conflict?
While there may be numerous and diverse reasons for this particular shift in the Soviet policy of so-called "peaceful co-existence," they all stem from one basic rule, i.e. all dictators resort to adventures and aggressiveness in the field of foreign policy whenever they have difficulties on the domestic front. This general rule applies to Khrushchev and those associated with him; it applies to Mao Tse-tung in the Peiping regime; and it covers the whole wide range of troubles the Communist bosses face within the Communist empire.
These troubles include drought, famine and passive resistance of the peasants to communes on the Chinese mainland, restlessness and often open opposition among youth, and increasing influence of religion vs. Marxism in Russia; the failure of Khrushchev's agricultural policies, as a result of which the once fertile Kazakhstan steppes are now turning into a dust-bowl instead of a grain center; and the factional struggle in the Kremlin itself.
The factional struggle which began immediately after Stalin's death, followed by the execution of the hated secret police (MVD) chief Beria and his associates, culminated in 1957 in the ouster of the so-called anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov. This struggle, however, is by no means over, although it seemed for a while that Khrushchev had successfully defeated his opponents and won complete control over the party. Actually, in his efforts to get rid of the Molotov-Malenkov group, Khrushchev gave more power to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) in order to win its support in his struggle against the so-called Stalinists, who—and this is now a known fact—constituted at the time a majority in the Central Committee Presidium.
At the same time, Khrushchev managed to strengthen his own position within the Central Committee Secretariat—a body which actually controls all party affairs—by bringing in his cronies, i.e. Aristov, Pospelov, Ignatov, Brezhnev and Furtzeva.
Behind all these changes and shifts in the Kremlin there was more than mere struggle for personal power. Actually, it was a struggle among various factions, rather than personalities, which was caused by a complete divergence of viewpoints on the cardinal question of how best to maintain the Communist dictatorship without a Stalin-type dictator. Molotov, Malenkov and the people behind them held that the only sure way was to return to the Stalinist methods of mass terror. The other faction which, for the sake of convenience, we shall call "moderate revisionists", argued that this would mean a return to one-man dictatorship—a development which neither of the factions wanted, for fear that with the appearance of a new dictator they would be the first to lose their hard-won privileged positions and, possibly, even their lives. The purges of 1930's could not be easily forgotten.
After the execution of Beria, who had been the most likely candidate for the dictator's throne and who was the first to go, there remained only Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich—all Old Bolsheviks of long standing and considerable experience in party intrigues—who could be expected, under favorable conditions, to grab the throne which Stalin had left vacant. As a result, Khrushchev had no difficulty in convincing the ruling clique, regardless of their faction al differences, of the need to get rid of these three most dangerous men and their closest collaborators, such as the leading party ideologist Shepilov. (It turned out later that ex-Premier Bulganin had also belonged to the anti-party group; so he was kicked out together with Saburov in 1958). Marshal Zhukov had helped Khrushchev most by flying most of the Central Committee members in to Moscow during the crucial June 1957 meeting. He was later removed because of his popularity in the Army which made him also a potential dictator.
All this caused many political observers at the time to believe that Khrushchev was a "second Stalin" and that we were witnessing the rebirth of one-man dictatorship in the Soviet Union. In the opinion of this writer, however, Khrushchev, because of his lack of prestige both within the party and among the people, was a convenient person for all factions to have at the top until such time as they would manage to settle their differences one way or the other. Khrushchev at the time identified himself with the proponents of "limited revisionism," who, after the ouster of the Molotov-Malenkov group, held the upper hand in party politics. He became the mouthpiece and the nominal head of this faction, but on several occasions, he made a bow in the Stalinist faction's direction by uttering such platitudes as "we are all Stalinists." One indication that Khrushchev never did become the "strong man" in the party. can be found in the amount of time he has spent outside Moscow on various trips abroad or to the provinces.
Kremlin Factions
Although it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to state definitely who among the Communist leaders and members of the Central Committee belongs to which faction, one can, on the basis of certain indications (such as statements by Soviet editorials in the Soviet press, etc.) roughly classify the factions per se as follows:
1. Moderate Revisionists-proponents of a policy of limited reforms which would bring about certain improvements in the material well-being of the people but would not affect the structure of the Communist dictatorship itself. As an example of this policy, one may cite the abolishing of MTS (machine-tractor stations) in rural regions without bringing about any changes in the collective farm system itself. Actually, the persons in this group are nothing but pragmatists who care nothing about the people, are only worried about their own privileged positions, and whose limited reforms and concessions are only an attempt to bolster the Communist regime.
2. Stalinists or, as they are called in official Communist terminology, "dogmatists," who believe that any revision or democratization of the Stalinist system would lead to the eventual disintegration of the system itself.
3. Revisionists–these are the Gomulkatype Marxists (minus the nationalist element, of course) who, while clinging to the basic Communist dogmas, still believe in the necessity of certain changes in the system itself and limited democratization of the regime. (A typical revisionist demand was made in 1957, when two top Soviet Academicians suggested the creation of a second party in the Soviet Union. They were sharply rebuked by Khrushchev himself.) The revisionist group constitutes a minority in the Central Committee but probably has many followers in the lower echelons of the party.
4. Reformists–whose aim is to achieve a complete democratization of the regime through gradual reforms and changes. It is difficult to say whether there are any representatives of this group within the Central Committee of the party itself because, under present conditions, most reformists prefer to disguise themselves as revisionists for safety's sake. Reformists are to be found mostly among technocrats and party functionaries at provincial and regional levels.
As both the revisionists and the reformists support the policies of "limited revisionism" and so far have not been able to exercise decisive influence on party affairs, we shall confine our article to the struggle between the two principal groups—moderate revisionists and Stalinists.
In the field of foreign policy, the Stalinists stand for a harsh, uncompromising and even aggressive attitude, the revisionists and reformists are for "peaceful co-existence," while Moderate Revisionists represent a blending of the two extremes. This is the policy which we have witnessed from 1959 until the breaking up of the pairs summit meeting early this summer.
K's Influence Fading
Parallel to the factional struggle, which revolves around questions of policy, there is also a struggle for key positions in the party, with each faction trying to establish its own control over party affairs. This year's events indicate that this struggle among leading personalities in the Kremlin has been intensified, resulting in gradual diminishing of influence of Khrushchev's faction.
The May 4 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU saw the removal from the Presidium of the Central Committee of Kirichenko and Belyayev, who were given comparatively minor posts in the provinces. At the same time, the ten-man Secretariat of the Central Committee was "purged" of most of Khrushchev's supporters, such as Brezhnev (who was appointed president of the USSR-a purely decorative post), Furtzeva, Ignatov, Kirichenko and Aristov. They were replaced by one man, Frol Kozlov, who cannot be regarded as a Khrushchev supporter. The other persons on the now five-man Secretariat are: Khrushchev (as first secretary); his adherent Mukhitdinov, who is only a minor figure and does not wield much influence; Suslov, who is Kozlov's rival, and Suslov's protégé Kuusinen, also a second-rate figure. After Khrushchev, Kozlov is the most powerful man on the Secretariat. He has been placed in charge of the party cadres—a job which may well lead him to the top position in the party, as it did for Stalin and Khrushchev.
All these shifts and changes among the top leadership of CPSU not only seem to prove that Khrushchev is no longer a "strong man" (if he has ever been one), but also may be an indication that the chubby Ukrainian is on his way to obscurity and even possible disgrace. This view is reinforced by certain developments which preceded Khrushchev's trip to the UN General Assembly meeting.
The most conspicuous of these was the unaccountable behavior of Khrushchev at the Central. Committee's plenary meeting held last July. At this meeting, the Soviet Premier, well known for his lengthy speeches, remained strangely silent throughout the entire conference, although the Committee was discussing such pet subjects of Khrushchev as the development of industries and the application of new technological and scientific methods under the current Seven-Year Plan. The Committee was addressed instead by Kosygin, a Presidium member.
However, even if this unexplained silence on Khrushchev's part had been regarded as coincidental, the subsequent discussion by the Central Committee of the previously unscheduled report on the recent Bucharest meeting of "fraternal Communist parties" dispelled all doubts, and indicated definitely that Khrushchev's failure to address the meeting was anything but a coincidence.
The point is, it was Khrushchev himself who headed the Soviet delegation to the Bucharest gathering, at which, according to reports, he denounced Mao Tse-tung's "dogmatic" approach to the questions of war and peace. The report to the Central Committee on the Bucharest meeting, however, was delivered by Frol Kozlov, who had not even attended that conference.
Also interesting in this respect was the way the Soviet press treated Khrushchev's trip to Stalingrad, Kiev and Astrakhan this summer. While all previous trips by the Soviet government and party head had been given extensive and detailed press coverage (filling pages in Pravda and Izvestia), this time only a brief two-column report was published on the whole tour.
Less conspicuous, but equally significant, was the marked difference between the reports on the All-Union Teachers' Conference in July in the two leading Soviet papers. While Pravda (the party organ) mentioned Khrushchev first and then listed all other "party and government leaders" in alphabetical order, Izvestia (the government organ) treated them all in alphabetical order, placing Khrushchev's name at the bottom of the list. In a democratic country, such an incident would have had hardly any meaning, but in the Soviet Union, where all newspapers are controlled by the State and have no independent policies, such occurrences lead one to the inevitable conclusion that Khrushchev's position in the party has been gradually deteriorating.
Suslov vs. Kozlov
Strange things were happening to Suslov at the same time. In their reports on the above-mentioned Teachers' Conference, Pravda and Izvestia both omitted Suslov's name, although he appeared in a photograph along with other Presidium members attending the opening of the Conference. The Communist Youth newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, on the other hand, included Suslov in the list of VIP's who were present at the Conference. Previously Suslov's name had disappeared completely for two whole months from the pages of the Soviet press. At the July plenary meeting of the Central Committee as already mentioned, the report on the Bucharest meeting was delivered by Kozlov, although for quite some time Suslov had been in charge of relations with the "fraternal Communist parties." All this seemed to indicate that Kozlov had gained a lead in the race and was taking over some of Suslov's functions in the Central Committee.
Soon after the July plenary meeting of the Central Committee, however, Suslov began staging a comeback. On July 14, he addressed a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Press Organization (a Communist-front outfit). On July 17 he played the leading role at a meeting of government and party leaders with "representatives of Soviet intelligentsia" and even made a major policy speech in Khrushchev's presence. Three days later, Suslov visited Lithuania, where he attended the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the "re-establishment of Soviet rule" and again made a major speech. On July 26 Suslov appeared at the Kremlin's Great Hall where he addressed a meeting of the Moscow party organization; two days later he addressed a similar gathering of the party organization in Leningrad. The subject of both speeches was" the results of the July plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU." One cannot fail to notice that Sustov appears to have assumed the role of a "versatile" secretary of the central Committee, speaking on both domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as on ideological and cultural problems. Such a role had been previously assigned to Khrushchev exclusively.
Soviet publications, which for a number of years had been quoting Khrushchev's statements alone on all major policy matters, now began quoting Suslov on these topics as well. The Literary Gazette, in its issue of July 23, quoted Suslov seven times, while quoting Khrushchev eight times. This certainly looks like a very close race:
It is safe to assume that the current struggle for power is primarily between Kozlov and Suslov (or rather between the factions represented by them), with both of them striving for Khrushchev's position.
Kozlov, apparently, has the backing of the Moderate Revisionists, who must feel unhappy about Khrushchev's misdemeanor in Paris and later in New York. Suslov had at one time been regarded as a proponent of the Stalinist policies. It is difficult at this time to determine which of them has the better of chances of winning this race. At present it appears that the Stalinist point of view is beginning to gain more support among the ruling clique—at least in the field of international relations. The break-up of the Paris summit meeting, the Soviet walk-out from the Geneva disarmament talks, Khrushchev's tough attitude at the UN General Assembly session, are all undoubtedly related to this shift of power. Also significant was the sudden "promotion" of former Foreign Minister and Deputy premier Molotov from his obscure post as Soviet ambassador to Outer Mongolia to that of chief of the Soviet delegation to the International Atomic Energy Commission in Vienna, although it was Molotov who earlier headed the "anti-party group" and who was the only one who had refused to admit his guilt at the crucial meeting which expelled him, Malenkov and the others from the Central Committee in 1957.
All this does not as yet mean that the Stalinists are certain to achieve a decisive victory, although in their demands for tougher and more uncompromising policies they will have the wholehearted support of the Chinese Communists and some of other "fraternal" Communist parties, including that of East Germany. Although the proponents of "moderate revisionism" have lost some ground as a result of their failure to achieve any significant successes in the past few years they still have the support of the majority within the Soviet Communist Party, and their man, Kozlov, still holds the key position in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The end of the factional struggle in the Kremlin is by no means in sight.
Any power struggle among the party leadership under the present circumstances inevitably weakens the whole party. If the Chinese Communists are drawn into this struggle, which seems likely at the moment, then it could affect the entire Communist bloc.
Any weakening of the Communist bloc would naturally benefit the free world. There is one danger, however, i.e., that faced with the danger of collapse, the Communist leaders may take the reckless step of unleashing a world war as a last resort. Therefore much depends on whether the current struggle in the Kremlin will result in the victory of more sensible elements who would realize that a new war would spell doom for them and their children, or those Communist leaders who, for the sake of personal power, would not stop even at the risk of a world catastrophe.