Ever since the end of World War II, the Communist bloc under the direction of the Kremlin has been manufacturing crisis after crisis. Just to name a few of them: Greece, Iran, Berlin, Korea, Indochina and most recently, Laos. After each crisis, there was always a peace overture of some sort, or else there would be a truce bargaining like the Panmunjom talks. It seems that, in order to achieve their professed aim of communizing the world, the Kremlin has found it best to alternate between hot probes and peace gestures. It must be admitted, however regretfully, that their success to date is by no means small.
As soon as a crisis occurred, or as soon as it was over, many why's and how's were asked and many guesses were made. Foremost in everybody's mind used to be: "What will the Communists do next?" But of these questions, the most important is: "What have we learned from the crisis?" For its answer would undoubtedly lead us to the best counter-measures against future contingencies. And the Free World may not need to ask the question again. Instead of worrying about what the Communists would do next, it should and could develop its fighting will and its fighting strength to counter whatever the Communist bloc might attempt.
Only a year ago, they found it was time to try hot probes again. They created the Taiwan Strait crisis which to most of the free world seemed to have arisen suddenly. But it ended with a tremendous loss of prestige for the Communists. The ferocious beginning tapered off after only a few months to the present strange and meaningless ritual of odd-date firings.
This article is written with a view to answering the vital question offered above: "What have we learned from the crisis?" However, the writer wishes to disclaim for himself an authoritative position. His analysis is neither to be taken as final, conclusive, nor as perfect, but he does wish to point out that every thought or opinion expressed here is based upon his personal, first-hand, close observation of facts, and upon convictions derived from the intimate knowledge of Communism and the bitter experiences which our country gained through fighting against the Communists for so many years.
To go back a little in history.
While the "talkathon" went on in Panmunjom, the Chinese Communists used the time to do two things to exploit their gains? namely to reinforce Ho Chi Minh in order to enlarge the war in Indochina, which resulted in firmly dividing that country at the 17th parallel; and to concentrate their efforts in planning and building a vast chain of modern jet airbases in the Southeastern provinces of the mainland. The construction of airbases was later followed by, first, redeployment of seasoned divisions, battle-tested in Korea, in those seaboard provinces, and, second, other attendant military preparations.
If the Peiping regime did not win the Korean War decisively, it had achieved through it a few other things. Most important of all, it has discovered that the free world, although determined enough to frustrate its aggressive intent at the beginning, was relatively weak, divided at times, and had not the will to fight to a conclusive end. In other words, it has succeeded in portraying the free world as not much better than a "paper tiger." Consequently, Peiping has since been boasting to have valiantly and successfully fought against the overwhelming amalgamation of sixteen powers who had better and mightier arms at their command. Their propaganda produced the inevitable effect of bringing home a war scare to more people of the free world, so that the chances of success of Communist bluffing will undoubtedly increase in the future. Their lies also had the psychological effect of filling the enslaved millions on the Chinese mainland with a false sense of pride and confidence. It made it so much easier for Peking to introduce harsher measures against the masses as well as to whip up an intensified anti-American movement.
The military buildup of seaboard provinces in Southeast China, after the Korean War had been transferred to the Panmunjom conference tables, was nothing if not impressive. Some 47 modern jet airbases were either constructed or re-constructed within the last four years. All of them are located within striking distance of Taiwan, but surely not all are needed to strike at Taiwan. It is of paramount importance to take note of the fact that those airbases are also within striking distances of Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and many other Western Pacific areas.
These air bases became operational one after another as they were completed. When, in late July last year, the seaboard bases were occupied by MIGs, in numbers for the first time, it was plain that the crisis was near.
At the same time, concentration of ground troops went on. By late July, there were about a million in the triangular section, bounded by the Yangtze to the north, the Canton-Hankow Railroad to the west and the coast to the east. Of this figure, some 320,000 were poised for action, with two-thirds against Kinmen and one-third against Matsu. From April through July, artillery positions facing these offshore island groups were increased and occupied.
At sea, however, the Reds were not so free to move about. Only their small units could steal their way into the Strait by hugging the coast under the cover of darkness. Still smaller units, the PTs, etc., were shipped down to Amoy by the newly completed railroad .
By the end of July, the Communists were ready to "surprise" the world. When the guns on Amoy started to bark on August 23, 1958, it was to most of the Free World a genuine surprise indeed. On account of security reasons, the Government of the Republic of China had to keep its intelligence data to itself. It was in mid-July that the Chinese Government saw it fit to release in increasing details her knowledge of Communist military activities.
Even then, after the first air clash over the Strait waters on July 29, most observers attracted to this area still did not believe that the crisis was imminent. Outwardly, the Strait seemed calm. Those who visited Kinmen in mid-August, only a week before the bombardment, thought hopefully nothing would happen. But we knew. We knew the Communists. They had intention as well as capability, and they would make a crack at it-namely to "liberate Taiwan and Penghu through the offshore islands, to drive the U.S. and its Seventh Fleet out of the Western Pacific," to quote their oft-repeated words. The matter of making another attempt on Kinmen and Matsu was never doubted. It was only a question of when and how. We could sense its nearness al though not its precise moment.
Let me pause to make a few general observations.
Between crises the Communists would lure the world into a false hope of peace by sweet talks or at the end of a crisis they would present impertinent, rude and stubborn arguments to gain time in order to prepare for another. If they did not succeed in reaching the overt goals of any crisis that they precipitated, the crisis is turned into a psychological attack.
This, in short, has been their strategy.
Although concrete evidences seem lacking, the global adventures of international communism are, nevertheless, well timed and coordinated. Their moves must have been m aster-minded and ordered from a single centralized authority. Conceivably it was not Peiping.
The first seaboard air base became operational with MIGs in numbers immediately after Nikita S. Khrushchev, accompanied by Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky, Soviet defense minister, visited with Mao in Peiping from July 31 to August 3. Heavy artillery were moved rapidly into already-built emplacements against Kinmen. Other air, ground and naval deployment followed. And the Taiwan Strait crisis flared up almost at the heels of the Middle East crisis, while Lebanon was still in the spotlight.
In the previous Strait crisis of 1955, the Communists succeeded in causing the free world opinion to apply pressure on the Republic of China to withdraw from the Tachen Islands, some distance to the north of Matsu off the Chekiang coast. It was natural for the Communists to ask themselves that why not try this technique of getting something for nothing again, this time with Kinmen as the prize?
After the redeployment of the Communist forces was completed, Red air reconnaissance began early in August last year. Air clashes followed in increasing frequency thereafter. Encounters at sea, between the Red gunboats and PTs and our patrol units, also began to take place.
At 1800 hours on August 23, the first salvos were fired at Kinmen suddenly and simultaneously from all guns ranged against the island complex on three sides. Within two hours, more than 157,000 rounds were registered. The artillery pieces used varied from 152 mm. to 37 mm. guns and howitzers, and there were also some 8-inch guns. Virtually all of the Kinmen complex was attacked. The next day, August 24, 36,000 rounds again rained down on Kinmen. The artillery bombardment continued for 44 days, averaging over 10,000 rounds per day.
Apart from the first two days, it is interesting to note that more than 53,000 rounds were fired on September 7, the day after it was made known that the United States would be willing to resume ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communist regime. Again, on September 11 (September 10 in Washington D.C.), the day before the announced nationwide TV and radio broadcast by President Eisenhower, more than 58,000 rounds were poured on Kinmen. Did the Communists think that their show of force was going to affect the stand of the United States of America?
What part did Soviet Russia play? The fact that Khrushchev came to Peiping and that he brought with him Marshal Malinovsky, considered a Far Eastern expert among Soviet military leaders, were worth noting. It was perhaps more convenient this way, for Khrushchev and Company must have wanted to inspect at first hand the preparations made, to discuss the plans with Mao's top military commanders, including "Marshal" Peng The-huai, whose name appeared next only to Mao in the communiqué, and above all to make final decisions, to issue final orders. All these were more suitably and would be more impressively done in Peiping, in person, lest the Chinese Communists might still have doubts in their minds as to what exactly the Kremlin wanted.
The international opinion was to be prepared in their favor. The fear of general war throughout the free world had been exploited in the past to the Communists' advantage. Why not again this time? So, well before President Eisenhower made known officially the firm U.S. stand, Khrushchev pitched in to threaten the world in general and the United States in particular. He warned that the USSR and Peiping have a mutual defense agreement, that war upon the Chinese Communists would mean war upon the USSR, and that Russia would support the Chinese Communist attempt to "liberate" Taiwan and Penghu. But this time his bluff was called, and Khrushchev had .to beat a hasty retreat.
The free world was to be shown that the Republic of China was not worth supporting. So when the world was still in a state of shock, Peng Teh-huai made an international broadcast on August 28 that the Red commander on Amoy had considered the defenders of Kinmen doomed, and their will to fight broken, and that he had already offered terms of surrender and leniency. The intention was to suggest that the fall of Kinmen was imminent. But facts contradicted the Red claims. The Communist commander on Amony never made his so-called offer of surrender locally until several hours after Peng's broad. It is clear that the Reds attempted to falsify the picture. But the free world was not fooled this time, thanks to the great work of the news media of all free countries which had scores of correspondents reporting from the Kinmen scene, risking their lives in order to present to the world with facts.
The defenders of Kinmen were not at anytime shaken. In fact, their morale and efficiency grew higher everyday. Many of the wounded simply refused to be evacuated in order to stay in the fight. With all the heavy bombardment there was very little damage to the fortifications, and casualties were scarce among the military. The results, however, were very costly to the Communists.
In the first week of the crisis, in short, the Chinese Communists attempted to take over Kinmen in a manner they did with the Tachen Islands. The thought the psychological stage was set and the plum was ripe. They were mistaken. By September 12, it became evident that no international pressure was to be exerted upon the Republic of China to give up Kinmen as the Communists had hoped. Instead, rapid shipments of fresh military aid from the United States were made to strengthen our defense.
Whether or not the Communists planned an amphibious attack, their chances of success became dimmer and dimmer. So they were forced to change their plans. They now intensified their artillery siege and sea blockade, hoping to starve the island defenders into submission. That too failed. In the air, they suffered repeated heavy losses. Our navy, after the initial confusion, cooperated with our air force to keep the island adequately supplied.
When Peiping declared suddenly their self-imposed "cease fire" for "humanitarian reasons," the free world had actually won an important victory for its firm stand against an unprovoked Communist attack. The Communist regime extended the "humanitarian ceasefire" from one week by an announced period of two weeks. And suddenly the Reds broke their own imposition, to become barbarous again, by staging another heavy bombardment on October 20, just as Mr. Dulles was on his way to Taiwan. Since then, the crisis has been reduced to the present farce of odd-date firings.
Their "humanitarian" procedure has been presented to the world as a concession. It was not a "concession." It was, in fact, a "confession"- a confession of failure.
In the 44 days from August 23 to October 5, last year, it has been mentioned earlier that the number of shells fired on the Kinmen islands averaged over 10,000 a day. From the many pieces of shrapnel and unexploded shells examined, it is established that 99 per cent of these shells were Russian-made. The cost of this adventure must have been very heavy to the Reds. A conservative estimate puts it at one million US dollars per day at the least. Since Peiping had to pay Russia for all the arms and ammunition chiefly with rice, and since the mainland seldom produces enough rice to feed itself, is Red China a real power to be scared of or is she just a paper tiger?
A Western correspondent, who was recently permitted to visit Red China extensively, came to the same conclusion that she is not a power to be reckoned with in the event of a major war and there is hardly any industry worth speaking of, in spite of all the propaganda that has been put out. That is without doubt, why, in the face of a firm stand, the initial Red ferocity slackened eventually to a face-saving posture. The crisis showed that when one stands up undaunted and when one is firmly supported by the free world, Communist menace is nothing to be feared. Many travelers, both lay and professional, have observed the resulting surge of anti-Communist spirit throughout the Southeast Asian countries since last fall. The lesson is plain: when one is willing to stand up and fight for the defense of one's freedom one need not fear.
To the Republic of China, the battle of Kinmen and Taiwan Strait have other significances. Before the battle, many of our foreign friends, including some of the staunchest in the United States of America, had certain grave misgivings. Would free China's troops put up a good fight? Did they possess the necessary stamina? Did they derive any profit from the training and were they capable of using the newer weapons, that the US Military Assistance Program provided for in the last nine years? Would the new recruits of Taiwan fight steadfastly and loyally, particularly when they were deployed outside of their native province?
All these misgivings were dispelled. All branches of the Chinese armed forces fought well. Those who were born on this island gave as good an account of themselves as those from other parts of China, in Kinmen, in the air or on the sea.
Finally, it cannot be over-emphasized that, once President Eisenhower made known his firm stand on the crisis, the prestige of American leadership rocketed to a new height among the uncommitted and the wavering. Confidence in the United States was never higher. This was amply reflected by the continual manifestation of anti-Communist sentiment in the Southeast Asian countries.
In conclusion, the writer wishes to sound a warning note. It is all very well that the Free World gained from the last Taiwan crisis. But the Communists are persistent in their designs. These recent months seem to be a period of calm from a military point of view, but that there will be storms in the future is to be expected. In this age, the term war ceases to have a proper meaning when one considers alone the shooting as war. It actually takes all forms and is fought by all means. The world, in this sense, is already at war, and has been for a long time.
Strangely enough, the shooting war on any large scale may very well be what the Communist bloc has been trying to avoid. When the bluff was called, in Greece, Iran, Korea or last autumn in the Taiwan Strait, the Communist aggressors never failed to back away. The reason is that the regimes do not have real power, for real power requires the complete and willing support of the people. The many revolts behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtain prove that the various Red regimes do not have this support. The world knows the East German riots, the Polish revolts, the Hungarian revolution and the Tibetan uprising, but it is certain there have been many more the world does not know about.
We have no right to forget the lesson that our enemy—who is so feared—is weak. We of the free world must stand firm and determined in order not to lose the war by default.