Seeing in the forthcoming exchange of visits between President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States and Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union a new phase of the cold war between the two world camps, all local papers called upon the Western Powers to close ranks in their common fight against the Soviets, so as not to leave any room for the Kremlin to divide and weaken them.
Commenting on the subject, the Hsin Sheng Pao stated editorially on August 5 that the impending exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev could well be regarded as a form of political warfare, "for the winning of the first round of which the United States has at least to do the following three things. First, in the course of these visits, the United States has to keep in close contact with her allies, particularly when matters which affect their interests are brought up for discussion. Only thus can she defeat the sinister design of the Soviets to drive a wedge between them. Second, the only advantage the American President can derive from his trip to Soviet Russia is to come into direct contact with the Russian masses. Judging from Nixon's visit to Soviet Russia, there is behind the Iron Curtain another Iron Curtain which prevents the Russian people from getting in touch with foreign visitors. For this reason, the success or failure of Eisenhower's forthcoming visit to Moscow depends primarily on whether he can succeed in breaking through this inner Iron Curtain. Third, the main purpose of the Khrushchev visit to the United States is to create an atmosphere of 'peaceful co-existence' between the free world and Communist world so as to help the growth of appeasement and thereby influence US politics. Therefore, every precaution has to be taken by the United States Government to forestall it." "What will be the result of this exchange of visits," continued the paper, "it is still too early to predict. However, in the light of the objective situation, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that it will bring about any material change in the world situation, least of all a miracle. So irrevocable is the position of the American and Russian Governments with respect to their fundamental policies that the most it can achieve is no more than a kind of 'temporary understanding' between them or, just for face-saving, paving the way for the calling of a summit meeting of big powers."
Judging from the available facts, declared the Chung Hua Jih Pao in its consecutive articles on August 4 and 8, "we have good reason to believe that the initiative for the exchange of visits came from the Russian side." The reason why Khrushchev was so anxious to make a trip to the United States, the paper went on to say, "is probably twofold: to enhance his prestige both at home and among Soviet satellites, which is much needed by him, particularly after a series of purges within the Kremlin and the Hungarian Revolution on the one hand, and to moderate the disappointment which the failure of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers has given rise to on the other. Besides, it has the added advantage of creating misgivings in the minds of the peoples of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, thus neutralizing the effect of the "Captive Nations Week" movement which the United States has just launched. Be that as it may, the wisdom of such an exchange of visits is highly problematical. Should anyone believe that seeing for himself the actual strength of the United States, Khrushchev would budge from his irreconcilable position, he would be utterly wrong." Such an exchange of visits, the paper pointed out, "as far as we can see, will not solve problems. Instead, it may create new troubles. With regard to the Berlin problem, it is true that there is very little room for appeasement. However, there are indications that the Kremlin is plotting for a new Yalta in the Far East. Communist agitation in Laos and intensified activities in the area of the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu by the Chinese Reds are just a part of this intrigue up the Communist sleeve. There is a possibility that the Communists will step up their aggressive activities and create new crises in this part of the world to provide a background for a Yalta-type compromise in the course of the exchange of visits between the two leaders of the East and West. This may just be the devious design of the Kremlin. But the White House would do well to beware of it."
Describing the forthcoming visit of Khrushchev to the United States as a shadow cast over the future of mankind, the United Daily News in its editorial on August 4 observed that to evaluate its possible results, "we have to ask two questions. First, can his visit to the United States change the cold war situation and thus lead to genuine peace? Second, does he believe that he will win in this trip what he cannot get by threats and blackmail?" As to the first question, continued the paper, "our answer is in the negative. The most important issue that divides the free world and the Soviets at the moment is the Berlin problem. How can we expect the bilateral talks between the American and Soviet leaders to solve what the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva has failed to solve? As to the second question, the Soviets have got at least eighty percent of what they asked for at the Geneva Conference. What they failed to win there, there is little possibility that they can get during the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks. This Khrushchev knows only too well. His trip to the United States now is, therefore, prompted by a desire to score a propaganda hit by deluding the non-Communist nations into thinking that it is better for them to align themselves with Moscow than with Washington." At any rate, added the paper, by inviting Khrushchev to visit the United States, "the free world has everything to lose and nothing to gain. It is a pity that this judgment can only be proved by the inexorable facts in future."
Judged by common sense, declared the Kung Lun Pao editorially on August 5, "the impending exchange of visits between the heads of the United States and the Soviet Union at the present moment is quite unbelievable, not only because the Soviets did not yield any of their ground in the course of the long-drawn-out Geneva conference but also because there are still differences among the Western allies regarding it." "So far as Khrushchev is concerned," continued the paper, "he has much to gain from this visit. It will enhance his prestige at home and help to alienate the relations among the Western allies and confuse the anti-Communist nations of the world. In a word, he would make every peace gesture which is helpful to his aggressive purpose. In the case of the American President, he may know that he cannot get anything from it. But he has to do so, not because he likes it, but because he has no other alternative. In other words, he has been forced to take this steps under the strong pressure of his own party in the interest of the coming presidential elections. This is the only plausible reason we can give for this sudden move by the US Government."
Summing up its reaction to the forthcoming exchange of visits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev with the words "harmless but useless," the China Post stated editorially on August 6 that "President Eisenhower .... knows full well how the Russian nation is living; he does not have to visit the Soviet Union to find out the true facts... The case of Khrushchev is certainly different. The trips he has made outside of the Soviet Union are almost wholly confined to the satellite states under Russian domination." However, continued the paper, "nothing he is going to see or hear during his American tour will have the effect of making him change his personal views or the policy of the Kremlin. The best that can be expected of him is that during his stay in the United States he may, in the midst of his heavy drinking and clownish acts, temporarily refrain from threatening the American people with nuclear war." Throughout all these years, pointed out the paper, "we have based our analysis or criticism of Soviet policy or actions as well as our comments on the democratic powers' dealings with the Russian Communists on one fundamental formula: namely, our firm conviction that the Kremlin will never change its policy of aggression and world domination. This formula has never led us astray in our appraisal of the foreign ministers' conferences and summit talks in the past. In each and every case we said beforehand that the negotiations would be fruitless, and the result invariably turned out to be exactly what we had predicted. It was no inborn prescience on our part: it was just a matter of common sense.... This exchange of visits will neither bring about an improvement of Russo-American relations nor make it easier for the Western powers to reach agreement with the Russian Communists in future negotiations whether at the foreign ministers' level or in summit talks."
Terming the agreement to exchange of visits by the United States as a first hit scored by Khrushchev, the China News in its editorial on the same day stated that "President Eisenhower's decision to invite Khrushchev to visit the United States next month is-said to be based on the belief that the Soviet Premier has numerous 'misconceptions' about the United States, which, unless removed, could lead him to make the wrong kind of decisions bearing on war or peace. This view, first advanced by Mr. Averell Harriman, former governor of New York, and recently endorsed by Vice-President Richard Nixon, takes the line that in the interest of world peace Khrushchev should be given a chance to see things for himself. It seems that President Eisenhower has been prevailed upon by his advisors to try to convince Khrushchev that the American people, despite their bickerings on domestic issues, are solidly united behind their government when it comes to relations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and that they are determined to defend the Western powers' rights in West Berlin, even if this should mean war. Now, the Americans may be the best advertising men in the world, but they will be hard put to it in putting the idea across if Khrushchev should simply refuse to accept the notion about American strength, unity, and determination. He may return to the Soviet Union more convinced than ever of American 'weakness, dis-unity, and vacillation,' instead. Then what? Khrushchev is going to the United States because he has certain dangerous 'misconceptions' which need to be corrected. But why is President Eisenhower going to the Soviet Union? Does he have dangerous 'misconceptions' too? Protocol reasons alone are not enough to' justify this return visit by the American Chief Executive at a time like this. If this exchange of visits means anything at all, it is this: Khrushchev has succeeded in browbeating President Eisenhower into accepting him as an equal. A less kind view is that President Eisenhower has at last come down to Khrushchev's level. Whichever is the case, it is hardly the kind of encouragement which nations fighting to regain or retain their freedom expect out of Washington.
"Captive Nations Week"
Acting on a resolution of the US Congress, President Eisenhower announced on July 18 the designation of the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and called upon all Americans to hold appropriate ceremonies and activities in memory of nations made captive by the Soviet imperialistic and aggressive policies. This step taken by the American President was well received by the local press which, however, expressed the hope that it would lead to the policy of liberation enunciated by President Eisenhower in 1952.
Attaching much significance to "Captive Nations Week" the American President proclaimed on July 18, the Central Daily News recalled that "back in 1952, President Eisenhower enunciated the policy of liberation to replace the policy of containment that had been followed by the democratic administration. However, he has failed to carry it out because of many obstacles that have been in his way. The Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the anti-Communist uprisings in Tibet were all crushed one after another under the iron heels of the Communists just because freedom fighters in both cases could not receive effective assistance from the free world. Their failure also means that the policy of liberation for which the American President stands has not been put into full operation." "It is our hope," continued the paper, "that this 'Captive Nations Week' movement can be spread to the whole free world so as to make all free people understand the plight of peoples in captive nations on the one hand and to unite them in the common effort to support the enslaved people in their struggle for freedom. Finally, we wish to add that so long as captive nations are not liberated, so long will the aggressive force of Communism exist. The continuation of this evil force will inevitably bring about either of the following two results: to cause the outbreak of a destructive war or to place more nations and peoples under Communist domination."
In the midst of intensified cold war between the .two world camps, said the Hsin Sheng Pao editorially on July 24, the announcement of the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" would not fail to give great encouragement to freedom-loving peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The policy of liberation, the paper went on to say, "which the American President proclaimed back in 1952 means in fact no other than the support given to captive nations. The outbreak of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 was a chance to put it into full operation. But for one reason or another, the United States simply let it slip out of her hands. Since then there have been repeated anti-Communist uprisings behind the Iron Curtain both in the West and East, the best known of which is the anti-Communist uprising staged by the Tibetans early in the year. So the time for carrying out the policy of liberation is more propitious now than it has ever been." "What concerns the Americans most," added the paper, "is how to avoid war. The answer to this is not far to seek. It lies in giving help to captive nations. Dedicated to world conquest, the Communists would never give up their policy of aggression. So the greater their strength is the more likely will be the outbreak of a global war. By the same token, the weaker they become, the less will be the possibility of war. In order to weaken them, the best way open to us is to extend our support to captive nations to help them regain their freedom."
Commenting on the same topic, the Chung Hua Jih Pao expressed the hope in its editorial on July 22 that "this movement may help the Americans understand that so long as Communism is not uprooted from the surface of the earth, there will be no peace for the people of any country in the world." In the midst of the "Captive Nations Week," continued the paper, "we cannot refrain ourselves from thinking of the miseries of our compatriots on the other side of the Taiwan Straits. Their plight is more tragic than that of peoples shut behind the Iron Curtain anywhere. Mao Tse-tung has done what even Stalin and Khrushchev did and do not dare to do. He has not only disrupted families but made people no more than productive tools. 'What is exacted from them is to pay tribute to their Soviet masters On the one hand and to make preparations for aggression on the other. Thus, the Communists on the Chinese mainland are slaves of the Kremlin and people under their domination are slaves of slaves. Such being the fate of our brethren, how can we not give them help? Let us hope that the 'Captive Nations Week' movement will remove all sentiments for appeasement from the free world, encourage the enslaved peoples behind the Iron Curtain to make an all-out effort to regain their freedom, and at the same time hasten the day of the recovery of the Chinese mainland and deliverance of our unfortunate compatriots from the clutches of Communist rule.