Taiwan Today

Chapter I     Introduction

A Presidential Order was issued on August 20, 1955, which reads as follows:

"(1) General Sun Li-jen is hereby relieved of his duty as Personal Chief of Staff to the President, his resignation on the ground of negligence in connection with the case of Kuo Ting-liang, the Communist agent, having been granted. A Commission of Enquiry shall be set up to conduct a fair and thorough investigation of all the facts of the case and shall submit a report of its findings.

"(2) The Commission of Enquiry is to consist of Chen Cheng, Wang Chung-hui, Hsu Shih-ying, Chang Chun, Ho Ying-chin, Wu Chung-hsin, Wang Yun-wu, Huang Shao-ku and Yu Ta-wei, with Chen Cheng as Chairman. The Commission of Enquiry is to conduct a complete investigation of all facts relating to the case of General Sun Li-jen in relation to the Communist agent Kuo Ting-liang and to report the results of the investigation."

A memorandum submitted to the President on August 3, 1955, by General Sun Li-jen, former Personal Chief of Staff to the President, was referred to the Commission of Enquiry. It reads as follows:

"To the President:

"Though crude and mediocre, I have always held dear honor and loyalty. Ever since joining the armed forces upon returning from my study abroad 28 years ago, rising from a platoon leader to my present status, my career has been blessed by Your Excellency's patronage. It has been my life-long wish therefore, to repay in a small part Your Excellency's beneficence, which is comparable to that of a parent to his child, by serving you loyally and to the best of my ability through dedication of all that I have and all that I am.

"I was given the charge of army training during the national crisis at the height of the Communist menace. Eager for results, I often concentrated on the immediate, practicable results without fully weighing the consequences. I was also anxious to obtain the services of as many talented young men as possible. In my anxiety, I often failed to distinguish between the good and the questionable.

"There occurred recently in the Army the sinister case of Kuo Ting-liang. From what the Vice-President has revealed to me about the case and according to the records of testimony by Chiang Yun-chin and others which were made available to me yesterday by Huang Po-tu, Director of the First Bureau of the Office of the President, and Fu Ya-fu, Director of the Second Bureau of the Office of the President, in accordance with Your Excellency's order, it appeared that I was personally under suspicion of being seriously involved. That Your Excellency has refrained from immediately committing me to court-martial is further proof, of course, of Your Excellency's magnanimity for which I am deeply grateful.

"Having served you for almost three decades with unqualified loyalty, I cannot but view with shame and trepidation the facts of the case of Kuo Ting-liang, Chiang Yun-chin and others and wish to bare my heart to Your Excellency. A self-examination in the last few days has enabled me to see my own failings for each of which I request that due penalty be imposed:

"(1) Kuo Ting-liang was my subordinate for many years and, after his arrival in Taiwan, had been given various assignments by me. Yet I was not alert enough to discover that he was a Communist agent using his connections with me to further Communist conspiracy and involving me in unlawful activities. My gross negligence and dereliction of duty can in no way be denied

"(2) Two years ago, hoping to combat the feelings of frustration then beginning to spread among the troops and lower rank officers resulting from the unavoidable delay in counter-attacking the mainland, I directed Chiang Yun-chin and others of the Training Supervision Section to try, along with their regular duties, to channel properly such feelings through closer contact among former schoolmates, so as to give each other encouragement, build up solidarity and create a guiding force for loyal service to the country. My motives in the matter were constructive in nature. The eventual change of its nature must be ascribed to the inadequacy of my leadership. That Chiang Yun-chin and others are now under suspicion not only of forming a factional organization, but also of attempting to engage in unlawful activities, should be ultimately traced, however, to my own naivete, imprudence and inadequate knowledge of men, the combination of all of which almost caused the country irremediable damage.

"In regard to the above two aspects of the case, I stand prepared to accept Your Excellency's severe sanctions. Having served Your Excellency since my early youth till today when my hair is all grey. I sincerely regret the occurrence of this sinister case and my failure to repay Your Excellency's beneficence with deeds. I hereby request Your Excellency to relieve me of my present duties. I shall await further investigation and Your Excellency's eventual disposition. I should of course be all the more grateful if Your Excellency would continue to afford me your protecting hand So as to enable me to reexamine and redeem my past mistakes.

"Respectfully submitted,

(signed) Sun Li-jen."

After the issuance of the above-mentioned Presidential Order and upon receipt from the President of a memorandum, together with a report of investigation, jointly submitted to him on August 15, 1955, by Yu Ta-wei, Minister of National Defense, and Peng Meng-chi, Chief of the General Staff, concerning the conspiracy by Kuo Ting-liang and others, the Commission of Enquiry (hereinafter referred to as the Commission held its first meeting on August 26, 1955, and has, up to the date on which this, Report was submitted, held nine meetings in all. With the exception of Commissioner Ho Ying-chin who was away in Japan for medical treatment for his eyes and by cable requested leave, all Commissioners were present at each and all of the Commission's meetings.

In accordance with the Presidential Order of August 20, 1955, which outlined the Commission's terms of reference, it is the task of the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation of and to report on the case of General Sun Li-jen relative to the Communist agent Kuo Ting-liang. Therefore, all such activities involved in the Kuo Ting-liang case that may have to do with General Sun Li-Jen fall within the scope of the Commission's investigation and report. The present Report represents the result of such investigation and does not propose to cover the entire Kuo Ting-liang case in all its aspects,

In carrying on its task, the Commission took the following steps:

1. Receiving the report by the Chief of the General Staff and examining- all documents relating to the case submitted by the Ministry of National Defense (including written statements and records of interrogation of Kuo Ting-liang, Chiang Yun-chin, Wang Shan-tsung, Chen Liang-shun, Tien Hsiang-hung, Liu Kai-ying and others). The better to understand the various aspects of the case and upon its request, the Commission also received written answers from the Ministry of National Defense on different questions.

2. Holding hearings by separate teams:

a. Commissioner Wang Yun-wu conducted direct hearings of evidence from Kuo Ting liang, Wang Shan-tsung and Tien Hsiang-hung. Interrogation of Kuo Ting-liang was held at 9:00 a.m., September 10, 1955; Wang Shan-tsung at 4:00 p.m. of the same day; and Tien Hsiang-hung at 9:00 a.m. September 11, 1955; all at Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Ministry of National Defense.

b. Commissioner Huang Shao-ku conducted direct hearings of evidence from Chiang Yun-chin, Chen Liang-shun and Liu Kai-ying. Questioning of Chiang Yun-chin was held at 9:00 a.m., September 10, 1955; Chen Liang-shun at 4:00 p.m. of the same day; and Liu Kai-ying at 10:00 a.m., September 1, 1955; all at the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Ministry of National Defense.

c. During the direct hearings by the above-mentioned teams, Kuo Ting-liang, Chiang Yun-chin, Wang Shan-tsung, Chen Liang-shun, Tien Hsiang-hung and Liu Kai-ying were shown for close examination their respective written statements and records of previous interrogations at the Ministry of National Defense, Kuo Ting-liang was also shown his diary, a small red-covered notebook. They all recognized the documents to be either statements in their own respective handwritings or verbatim records of what they had freely testified. They explained to the satisfaction of the Commission the few instances of minor discrepancies. Further, all the records of the hearings conducted by the Commission were immediately read aloud to them by the recorder and, having found the contents correct or having made necessary corrections, they signed and placed their fingerprints on the records. The hearings were also sound-transcribed.

3. Direct Interrogation of General Sun Li-jen:

a. Before the hearing, the Chairman of the Commission, in a letter to General Sun Li-jen, informed him of the organization of the Commission, the task and the progress of the enquiry, and notified him of the scheduled time for his personal examination of all the Commission's records of hearings and for interrogation of himself. The schedule was as follows:

(1) For examination by General Sun Li-jen of all records of hearings, 9:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., September 19, 1955, at Guest House No. 1, Yangmingshan.

(2) For direct interrogation of General Sun Li-jen on matters relevant to the case, beginning at 4:00 p.m., September 19, 1955, at Guest House No. 1, Yangmingshan

b. At 9:00 a.m., September 19, 1955, General Sun Li-jen arrived at the designated place and the Commission staff made available to him for examination all the Commission's records of hearings. (It is to be noted that, according to information from the Office of the President, most of the documents of the Ministry of National Defense on the case had already been made available to General Sun Li-jen for examination prior to August 3, 1955.)

c. At 4:00 p.m., September 19, 1955, General Sun Li-jen presented himself before the Chairman and Members of the Commission and answered all the questions put to him regarding matters relevant to the case.

d. All questions and answers were sound-transcribed and also placed on written record which was taken down from the sound-transcription and signed by General Sun after comparing the two.

The following are the findings of the Commission on such parts of the Kun Ting-liang case as they involved General Sun Li-jen.

Chapter II. Kuo Ting-liang's Mission as a Communist Agent and the Factors He Utilized

Section 1. Kuo Ting-liang's Connection with the Communists and His Mission as a Communist Agent.

According to his written statement dated June 6, 1955, and his answers to the Commission's interrogation on September 10, 1955, Kuo Ting-liang was stationed in Mukden in January, 1948, as a company commander (major) with the howitzer battalion of the New First Army, maintaining his company headquarters on the premises of the Shan-Yi-Ho Rice Store, Erh-Tao Street, Tieh-si, Mukden. Kuo Ting-liang became acquainted with the store's proprietor, Pai Ching-wu, and, through the latter's introduction, married a women named Li Yu-tsu. On the strength of this relationship, Pai Ching-wu often tried to win over Kuo Ting-liang to the Communist cause. In April, 1948, Kuo Ting-liang's company went up to the front and, as Pai Ching-wu was arrested on suspicion of being a Communist, contact between the two was temporarily suspended. By the end of October, the situation In Mukden had deteriorated and Pai Ching-wu had managed to get out of jail to become active again. On November 2, 1948, the day after the fall of Mukden, Pai Ching-wu invited Kuo Ting-liang to dinner during which Kuo Ting-liang asked for Pai Ching-wu's help in securing a travel permit from the Communist military authorities to enable him to leave the Communist area. Pat Ching.wu tried to persuade Kuo Ting-liang to remain in the Communist area and to meet Pai Ching-wu's brother, Pai Ching-wen, who was at the time "Chief of the Liaison Section of the Northeast Railway Guards under the command of Lu Cheng-tsao," On November 3, Pai Ching-wu accompanied Kuo Ting-liang to the Mukden Railway Hotel to call on Pai Ching-wen and there were three more meetings afterwards. During the four interviews, Pai Ching-wen learned that Kuo Ting-liang was a former subordinate of General Sun Li-jen and had various connections with the personnel of the Government forces, and therefore suggested to Kuo Ting-liang to come to Taiwan to carry out on behalf of the Communists a plan for military subversion. Kuo Ting-liang was told to stay under cover for a prolonged period and to gain influence over army units for two ultimate purposes, namely, (1) to incite large-scale rebellion in the armed forces in Taiwan and (2) to respond from within when the Communist invade Taiwan.

After considering the matter, Kuo Ting-liang indicated his willingness to engage in the suggested military subversive work for the Communists. On the advice of Pai Ching-wen, Kuo Ting-liang then submitted through him his own biographical data and a report setting forth proposed channels and methods to be used for such subversive activities. When the report had been approved by the Communist higher authorities, Pai Ching-wen told Kuo Ting-liang to see another section chief named Ma who then gave Kuo Ting-liang the necessary individual training and stipulated the following two methods of contact:

a. To use the mailing address "Mr. Pai Wu, Shan-Yi-Ho Rice Store, Erh-Tao Street, Tieh-Si, Mukden,"

b. When the Communists should find it necessary to dispatch agents to Taiwan to seek contact with Kuo, the pass-words would be "Mr. Pai asked me to come to see you,"

It was also decided that Kuo was to adhere to the following principles in carrying out military subversion in Taiwan:

a. To find out, to widen and to utilize contradictions existing among high-ranking officers in order to create rivalries and promote division;
b. To forge connections with officers of middle and lower ranks;
c. To achieve effective control of various units;
d. To seek opportunities, before the actual Communist invasion of Taiwan, to ferment large-scale rebellion in order to create instability that would facilitate the invasion.

Ma then gave Kuo Ting-liang the requested travel permit together with ten ounces of gold. On November 12, 1948, Kuo Ting-liang left Mukden for Shanghai via Tientsin, accompanied by his wife Li Yu-tsu. They arrived in Taiwan at the end of 1948 together with other officers and men of the New First Army who had fled Communist areas.

Section 2. Kuo Ting-liang's Relationship with General Sun Li-jen.

Kuo Ting-liang, now 34 years of age, is a native of Hosi District, Yunnan Province. Having graduated from the Provincial Kunhwa Normal School of Yunnan in 1938, he entered through competitive examination the second class of the Officers Training School of the Salt Revenue Police in 1939. Upon graduation therefrom in March, 1940, he was retained by the school to serve successively as squad leader, assistant platoon leader and platoon leader. This was the beginning of the superior-subordinate relationship between General Sun Li-jen and Kuo Ting-liang. General Sun Li-jen was then commander of the Salt Revenue Police.

At the end of 1941, the Salt Revenue Policy was reorganized into the New 38th Division, General Sun Li-jen still retaining command. Kuo served as a platoon leader with the new division, with the rank of lieutenant, and took part in the division's expedition into Burma and India. While in India, Kuo Ting-liang successively attended and graduated from the first class of the Ramgarh Artillery School and the fifth class of the Automotive School. In 1942, when General Sun Li-jen was appointed the Commander of the New First Army to conduct the counter-offensive in Northern Burma, Kuo Ting-liang was also reassigned to the New First Army first as an artillery forward surveyor (Lt.) of its heavy artillery battalion, then assistant company commander (captain), assistant battalion commander and company commander. Later, Kuo Ting-liang went to Kwangtung Province with his unit and therefrom to the North-eastern Provinces (Manchuria) for operation against the Communists. In 1946, Kuo served as a company commander (major) of the howitzer battalion of the New First Army, when his initial contact with the Communists took place as mentioned in the foregoing chapter. General Sun Li-jen was promoted in 1947 to be the Deputy-Commander of the Peace Preservation Forces for the Northeastern Provinces and was, in the same year, further promoted to be the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army and, concurrently, the Army Training Commander. After his arrival in Taiwan via Shanghai at the end of 1948, Kuo Ting-liang was assigned by General Sun Li-jen to be the assistant commander of the 4th Battalion of the Reserve Training Center of the Army Training Command in February, 1949; and was reassigned in March-April of the same year to be a battalion commander (major) of the pre-cadets corps at the 4th Officers Training Center. In 1950, General Sun Li-jen was promoted to be the Army Commander-in-Chief, while Kuo Ting-liang was made in 1951 the commander of the model battalion of the Fourth Officers Training Center and, later, commander of the training battalion of the Military Academy. In January, 1952, Kuo Ting-liang was reassigned to the Headquarters of that Army Commander-in-Chief as a battalion commander of the Search Section and, in January, 1953, was further reassigned to be the commander (major) of the Search Training Unit of the Army Infantry School. In June of the same year, the Search Training Unit was dissolved and Kuo was appointed, an instructor (major), attached to the General Section of the Chief Instructor's Office of the Army Infantry School. He was again transferred in June, 1954, to serve with the Training Supervision Section of the G-5 of the Headquarters of the Army Commander-in-Chief. In July, 1954, when General Sun Li-jen was reassigned Personal Chief of Staff to the President, Kuo was ordered to return to the Infantry School as an instructor, at which post he remained until his arrest on May 25, 1955.

It may be seen beginning from 1939 until recently, Kuo Ting-liang had been a subordinate of General Sun Li-jen for 16 years, during which time he was highly trusted in his various assignments by General Sun, even though he had risen only from lieutenant to major.

Section 3. Factors Kuo Ting-liang Utilized in Carrying out His Mission as a Communist Agent.

According to his own statement, Kuo Ting-liang, after having arrived in Taiwan at the end of 1948, wrote to the Communists in Mukden reporting his arrival, using the method of contact previously arranged. There was no reply from the Communists, however. It was not until one evening in September, 1954, at about 7:00 that a man, about 37 or 38, speaking a northern dialect and wearing a white Hongkong shirt, came to call on Kuo Ting-liang at his home in Fengshan and started the conversation with the previously arranged pass-words "Mr. Pai asked me to come to see you." The man gave his name as Li and asked about the progress of Kuo's mission. Kuo replied that it had been satisfactorily as he had already established connections with some schoolmates. Li said: "Mr. Pai wanted you to proceed actively and he will come to, Taiwan soon." Finally Kuo told Li: "Tell Mr. Pai not to worry." Thereupon Li left.

From the two facts related above, it could be seen that Kuo Ting-liang, after his arrival in Taiwan, had intended from the beginning to carry out his mission as a Communist agent in accordance with the promise he made to the Communists in Mukden. Otherwise, there was no reason for Kuo Ting-liang to communicate with the Communists after he had arrived in Taiwan. Furthermore, he should have detained the man named Li at the time of his call or reported the incident to the security authorities.

Prior to August, 1954, however, Kuo Ting-liang did not engage in any active or detectable activities as a Communist agent. The Commission believes that, while he had intended to carry out his activities as a Communist agent, Kuo could not be expected, as an instructor (major) in the Infantry School, and even with the long-time superior-subordinate relationship with General Sun Li-jen, to achieve more than limited effectiveness. It would hardly have been possible, even with his connections with General Sun Li-jen, for Kuo Ting-liang to achieve his aim of gaining control of army units and inciting rebellion, without some vulnerable circumstances of which he could take advantage. According to the report submitted to the Commission by the Chief of the General Staff, the number of junior and field-grade officers in various units with whom Kuo Ting-liang had succeeded in establishing connection had leached a hundred and odd persons by the time he was arrested on May 25, 1955. This fact indicates that Kuo Ting-liang was able to utilize factors far more useful than his subordinate-superior relationship with General Sun alone. These factors are: (1) that General Sun Li-jen had initiated in the armed forces liaison activities centered about his own person, and (2) that General Sun Li-jen had entrusted Kuo Ting-liang with the main responsibility of guiding such activities.

Chapter III. The Liaison Organization Sponsored by General Sun
Li-jen in the Armed Forces

Section 1. The 4th Officers Training Center under General Sun Li-jen's Direction.

In the Spring of 1948, the Ministry of National Defense established nine officers training centers under the authority of the Army GHQ and under the direct supervision and direction of the Army Training Command. The 4th Officers Training Center was set up at Fengshan, with General Sun Li-jen, then Army Training Commander, as its concurrent Director.

The 4th Officers Training Center consisted of the following units: (1) Cadets Corps, (2) Field Officers Unit, (3) Junior Officers Unit, (4) Non-commissioned Officers Unit, (5) Special Services Unit,(6) Political Affairs Unit, (7) Pre-Cadets Corps, (3) Women's Auxiliary Unit, and (9) Youth Corps.

On October 1, 1950, in order to meet military requirements, the Government reorganized the 4th Officers Training Center into the Military Academy. All trainees who had not yet graduated from the enter were taken over by the Academy and did not complete their training until March, 1954. The Pre-Cadets Corps, the Women's Auxiliary Unit and the Youth Corps had earlier been ordered disbanded by the Office of the Military and Political Commissioner for Southeastern China on the ground that the 4th Officers. Training Center was not set up for pre-officer training. The actual disbandment, was delayed, however, until 1950 when the re-organized Ministry of National Defense further ordered the better educated elements of the Pre-Cadets Corps to be admitted through competitive examination to the Military Academy, while the rest were reorganized into a Training Battalion and a Non-commissioned Officers Corps in the Military Academy. The Women's Auxiliary Unit was put under the Political Affairs Staff Training Center and is now known as the Women's Service Corps. In 1953, the Youth Corps was dissolved by assigning those members over 17 or 18 to the Combined Services Command for training as technicians and the rest to form a training unit in the Political Affairs Staff Training School.

It may be noted here that in regard to the question of educational requirements of those officers who have not received formal basic military education but are now holding positions of regular officers, the Ministry of National Defense has decided that, after supplementary training at the Military Academy, all such officers will be granted the status of graduate of the Military Academy in com parable order of seniority and will be accorded equal treatment with the graduates of the Military Academy in point of promotion and in-service training. The Ministry of National Defense has authorized the Military Academy to implement this program, the first class scheduled to begin in October, 1955.

Section 2. The Liaison Organization Sponsored by General Sun Li-jen in the Armed Forces among the Graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center and Its Development.

In the latter part of November, 1953, General Sun Li-jen directed Chiang Yun-chin to designate higher-ranking graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center to be responsible for establishing contact with other graduates serving in their respective units. In January, 1954, General Sun Li-jen again directed Chiang Yun-chin to arrange to "link together" the various designated persons in order to set up the so-called horizontal liaison. This began to cause: suspicion in Chiang Yun-chin's mind. Later, in August 1954, General Sun Li-jen, believing Chiang Yun-chin had "not done the thing well," ordered Kuo Ting-liang to take over the responsibility. Thereupon, these secret liaison activities gained great momentum. General Sun Li-jen regularly received personnel responsible for such activities, gave them financial assistance and told them to test the efficacy of the liaison between persons at the army headquarters and those on the regimental or battalion levels.

In order better to understand the sequence of events, here are briefly the dates of General Sun Li-jen's assignments during this period and the duties he assumed:

a. General Sun Li-jen was promoted in March, 1950, to the Office of the Army Commander-in-Chief, to be in charge of the training and education of the army units and the general administration related thereto. In accordance with the regulations governing the periodical transfer for commanding officers of the armed forces, General Sun Li-jen was reappointed for a second term and was not relieved of his duty as the Army Commander-in-Chief until June, 1954, when his second term had expired.

The Training Supervision Section previously referred to was one of the units of the G-5 of the Headquarters of the Army Commander-in-Chief, its duties consisting of supervising and assisting in training programs.

b. General Sun Li-jen was appointed in July, 1954, the Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President, whose duties, according to the provision of the Organic Law of the Office of the President, are defined as administering to matters relating to the military in accordance with Presidential orders.

It could be seen from these two points that General Sun had indulged in fostering factionalism by sponsoring in various army units the clandestine organization among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center alone, while his duties as the Army Commander in-Chief were to train and educate all the army personnel. He had also incontrovertibly overstepped the legal limits of his official duties when, as Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President, he told Kuo Ting-liang and others to intensify their liaison activities among a designated group of officers.

The Commission had found the following to be verified facts:

a. Regarding his sponsoring the liaison organization among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center, General Sun Li-jen testified that in 1953, he advised Chiang Yun-chin and others of the Training Supervision Section "to make use of friendly school connections" for "establishing side contact" during the performance of their official duties. It may be noted here that Chiang Yun-chin. 37 years of age and a native of Soochow, Kiangsu Province, was a graduate of the15th class of the Army Engineers School and had served as a battalion commander with the Cadres Training Corps of the Military Academy. He was transferred in February, 1952, to the Training Supervision Section of the G-5 of the Headquarters of the Army Commander-in-Chief; and was the Chief of the Section with the rank of lieutenant colonel at the time of his arrest on May 28, 1955. Chiang Yin-chin had also served with the 4th Officers Training Center and this fact explains the remark: "to make use of their friendly school connections."

b. According to Chiang Yun-chin's testimony before the Commission, General Sun Li-jen summoned him in October, 1953, and told him to raise the standard of the training supervisory officers in view of the unsatisfactory state of training in various units. "He (meaning General Sun) wrote out an order" transferring Feng Hao, Chiang Yu-hsin and Lu Hsin-jen to be training supervisory officers. In November of the same year, General Sun further told Chiang Yun-chin to designate in each regiment some one of higher rank, better education and longer service to be responsible for maintaining contact among his fellow graduates of the 4th Officers Training reserving in the regiment. Chiang Yun-chin transmitted General Sun Li-jen's wish to the training supervisory officers (one to each army) for them to carry out the plan during their official visits to the regimental command post. Later, it was arranged to have one such man designated in each battalion. Chiang Yun-chin also stated that, at the time, he believed General Sun Li-jen's directive to be proper as it was aimed at helping the graduates to serve in various units with a steadier heart and that he therefore "told the training supervisory officers to carry out the directive without much thought over other aspects of the matters." "Coming to think of it now" he said, "it is possible that he (General Sun Li-jen) may have had other motives."

In answering to the Commission's questioning, General Sun Li-jen stated that, when serving as the Army Commander-in-Chief two years ago, he wanted the training supervisory officers to give the graduates more encouragement through friendship and school connections. As to organization, he said, it was only a matter of contact at the beginning. General Sun Li-jen further stated: "It has been said that I had private representatives in this regiment or that battalion. The truth is that there were too many such graduates and I could not possibly know them all. I therefore told them to keep in contact with one another as much as possible. Those who serve in the forces with a sense of responsibility all do that."

This is a brief picture of the beginning of General Sun Li-jen's sponsorship of the liaison organization among some of the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center.

c. In January, 1954, General Sun Li-jen fun her told Chiang Yun-chin to "link together" the graduates already designated for liaison responsibilities, in order to establish horizontal contacts in addition to vertical ones. Chiang Yun-chin testified that this suggestion of General Sun Li-jen's aroused suspicion in his mind and he became less enthusiastic over such activities. From January to June, 1954, General Sun Li-jen still persisted in pressing for reports from Chiang Yun-chin on the progress of such activities and considered Chiang Yun-chin's effort not active enough. In answer to the Commission's questioning in regard to the building-up of so-called horizontal connections, General Sun Li-jen did not deny that it was a fact, but explained: "I meant there should be comparison horizontally between different units; that is to say, through mutual competition, each regiment or battalion should try to better the record of another. I did not mean to weave a netlike organization." According to Chiang Yun-chin's testimony, General Sun Li-jen called for, in the latter part of June, 1954, when he was soon to be relieved of his duty as the Army Commander-in-Chief, a name list of all those graduate designated for liaison work. In July, Chiang Yun-chin told the assistant chief of the Training Supervision Section, Yu Hsin-min, to prepare the list to be submitted to General Sun Li-jen. This point was verified by the statement of Yu Hsin-min when he testified in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Ministry of National Defense. General Sun Li-jen testified before the Commission thus: "At the time, in asking him (Chiang Yun-chin) to prepare the list, I had in mind only a test to see whether they had actually been pushing the work. When he submitted a roughly prepared list, I glanced through it without considering it of any consequence."

This presents a picture of General Sun Li-jen's effort in strengthening the liaison organization which fell short of his expectation as a result of Chiang Yun-chin's suspicion.

d. General Sun Li-jen admitted that he did not report to the Ministry d National Defense on such liaison activities. Nor did he call a halt to such activities after June, 1954, when he was relieved of his duties as the Army Commander-in-Chief and became Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President. As he was dissatisfied with the liaison work of Chiang Yun-chin, General Sun Li-jen summoned Kuo Ting-liang to Pingtung for a meeting early in August, 1954, when he had already taken over the post of Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President, and told Kuo Ting-liang to establish contact with the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center then serving with a certain unit. Early in October of the same year, General Sun Li-jen again called Kuo Ting-liang to see him at Pingtung, enquiring of the progress of the activities and advising Kuo Ting-liang to establish contact with 4th Officers Training Center graduates serving with the Military Academy and the Army Infantry School. At that time the Communists were clamoring for invasion of Taiwan and the Communist agent named Li had just called upon Kuo Ting-liang to become active in his functions as a Communist agent. Kuo Ting-liang was therefore "extremely interested" in the special mission entrusted in him by General Sun Li-jen, considering it helpful to his activities as a Communist agent. He intensified his effort and was aided by Captains Tien Hsiang-hung and Liu Kai-ying, former intelligence officers of certain units (Tien, aged 30, native of Tehyang, Szechuan Province; Liu, aged 29, native of Hofei, Anhwei Province; both graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center). As a result, the number of the 4th Officers Training Center graduates in various units, who had succumbed to the instigation of and agreed to maintain liaison with Kuo Ting-liang and others, reached a little over a hundred. Kuo Ting-liang and the others succeeded in designating responsible contact men in various units on army, divisional, regimental and battalion levels and were building up a factional organization among the armed forces. Kuo Ting-liang, Tien Hsiang-hung and Liu Kai-ying secretly reported to General Sun Li-jen from time to time on all matters concerning such activities. The Commission questioned General Sun Li-jen on the allegation that, after he had been reassigned Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President in July, 1954, he had ordered Kuo Ting-liang and others to intensify, instead of to abandon, their clandestine activities among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center in various units General Sun Li-jen answered: "Why did I tell them to continue their liaison activities even after had left the Army GHQ? Because, in my way of doing things, I have always hated to pull down the platform on which others still stand." He further stated: "At that time, they (meaning Chiang Yun-chin and others) had not done the thing (meaning the liaison activities) well and Kuo Ting-liang was quite enthusiastic about training work. I therefore told Kuo Ting-liang: 'You keep an eye on them (meaning the graduates) and keep up their morale.''' General Sun also said; "The graduates have considerable confidence in him (meaning Kuo Ting-liang)." This shows General Sun voiced no denial in this regard.

The fact that Kuo Ting-liang and others undertook the liaison activities in a more active manner than Chiang Yun-chin aroused the latter's attention and the suspicion of some of those being contacted. Consequently, in December, 1954, Training Supervisory Officer Lt. Col. Li Cheng-liang who had engaged in such activities under the direction of Chiang Yun-chin circulated a verbal message among various units to the effect that the degree to which Kuo Ting-liang had been pushing the liaison activities was not in accordance with the wishes of General Sun Li-jen and that all the 4th Officers Training Center graduates should follow Li Cheng-liang's advice instead of Kuo Ting-liang's. Upon learning of the message, Kuo Ting-liang reported the matter to General Sun Li-jen in person and bent over backward in suggesting that all the contact work should henceforth be carried out by training supervisory officers. General Sun directed Kuo Ting-liang to continue to be in charge of the liaison work and said he would tell separately Li Cheng-liang what to do. As he learned during this interview of the confidence General Sun placed in him, Kuo Ting-liang had the information broadcast among the graduates so as to strengthen in turn their confidence in his own leadership. Thus Kuo Ting-liang became even more active in the liaison work. In March, 1955, having received reports from Li Cheng-liang concerning Kuo Ting-liang's activities, Chiang Yun-chin called on General Sun Li-jen and made enquiries. General Sun Li-jen told him not to interfere with Kuo Ting-liang's moves. Thereupon Chiang Yun-chin informed all the training supervisory officers under his direction to keep their hands off Kuo Ting-liang's activities. As a result, Kuo Ting-liang's liaison work among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center was able to proceed unhindered. This indicates General Sun Li-jen's effort in developing the liaison organization had entered a more active stage. The following event that took place during that stage may show in part the intensity of such activities:

a. From August, 1954, to May, 1955, General Sun Li-jen not only came into frequent contact with Kuo Ting-liang, Tien Hsiang-hung, Liu Kai-ying and others at his residences in Taipei and Pingtung, but also received from time to time persons designated for liaison duty in the various units. For example, Tien Hsiang-hung said that, in mid-September, 1954, he took several such persons to call on General Sun Li-jen at his Taipei residence and that they were individually received. When asked by the Commission, General Sun Li-jen did not deny the episode.

b. General Sun Li-jen rendered financial assistance to those designated for liaison duty. For instance, according to the testimony of the recipients, there were the NT$7,000 he made available to Kuo Ting-liang, the NT$4,900 to Tien Hsiang-hung, the NT$3,500 to Wang Shen-tsung, and the NT$5,000 to Liu Kai-Ying through the hands of Wang Cheng-teh after Liu Kai-ying had become a fugitive from justice. In answer to the Commission's interrogation, General Sun Li-jen stated he could not remember the amounts involved and explained the various reasons for which the money was given. In regard to Kuo Ting-liang, however, General Sun Li-jen said plainly that it was for helping out the needy graduates being contacted. It could be seen that the funds General Sun Li-jen gave Kuo Ting-liang and others were intended for promoting liaison activities.

c. In mid-November, 1954, General Sun Li-jen told Tien Hsiang-hung to pay special attention to the question of communications. In answer to the Commission's interrogation, General Sun Li-jen explained that "One must be in a position to know immediately if and when abnormal conditions exist in the forces. One must find out quickly and take preventive or pacifying measures quickly." On March 5 (or 6), 1953, Chiang Yun-chin called on General Sun Li-jen and was told to test out the efficiency of communications by having a particular message relayed among the graduates in various units. Thus, in mid-May when he went to Tainan for troop inspection there. Chiang Yun-chin told training supervisory officer Kuo Li-jen to forward a message to Liu Kai-ying for further relaying to the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center then serving with a certain unit to the effect that they were to meet in Tainan for dinner together. Subsequently, at 5 :00 p.m. on May 18, 1955, some 16 such graduates gathered at the Sparrow Restaurant near the railway station in Tainan. During the dinner, Chiang Yun-chin compared General Sun Li-jen to General Rommel of Germany in an effort to exhort the graduates. Support for General Sun Li-jen. In answer to the Commission's enquiry on this point, General Sun Li-jen replied he did not remember the date on which he gave Chiang Yun-chin die said directive. He explained that it was because the liaison work had not seemed effective that he told Chiang Yun-chin: "You should find an opportunity to test out whether they are actually carrying out the liaison activities." He denied he had told Chiang Yun-chin to test out communications. It could be seen here it was General Sun Li-jen's idea to perform a test on the effectiveness of the liaison work.

The above facts, briefly stated, tell how General Sun Li-jen engaged in liaison activities in the armed forces among lower-ranking officers who were graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center. Answering the Commission's interrogation, General Sun-Li-jen replied: "There was no actual organization as such. I told them to proceed this way and I should of course be responsible even if they have changed the nature of the thing. Why? Because I did not lead them well; nor did I deal with them properly. I did not anticipate that what I did could have turned out like this. It was my mistake not to have reported the matter to the superior authorities." (What General Sun referred to as his failure to report to the superior authorities obviously points to the fact that he did not report to the Ministry of National Defense on the liaison activities sponsored by himself.)

Section 3. General Sun Li-jen's Motives in Sponsoring the Liaison Organization.

General Sun Li-jen's motives in sponsoring the liaison organization in the armed forces may be seen in the development of such activities as related above. As referred to previously, General Sun Li-jen ordered Chiang Yun-chin during an interview in November, 1953 to designate "graduates" in various units to engage in liaison work and told him to "notify them to do a good job in the forces." During the recent interrogation by the Com. mission, General Sun Li-jen stated: "I was anxious to have everything right. Therefore, I told the training supervisory officers to work on the side through connections among friends and schoolmates in order to achieve mutual encouragement and to prevent a lowering of morale." At the time, Chiang Yun-chin relayed a message to the training supervisory officers: "When visiting the units, you should designate in each infantry regiment one 4th Officers Training Center graduate of higher rank to be responsible and to care for the interest of other graduates, so that they could help each other in case of sickness or other difficulties." On the surface, such liaison activities appeared to be quite properly motivated by a desire for mutual assistance. By January, 1955, however, when General Sun Li-jen told Chiang Yun-chin to "link together" all the graduates designated for liaison duty in order to establish the so-called horizontal connections, his intention went clearly beyond the limits of mutual help. When he designated Kuo Ting-liang from August, 1954, onward to be in charge of the task of intensifying the clandestine organizational activities among the 4th Officers Training Center graduates, General Sun Li-jen's action obviously exceeded the limits of law.

In November, 1954, during an interview in Pingtung, General Sun Li-jen gave Kuo Ting-liang further instructions concerning the principles of the liaison activities. Kuo Ting-liang testified: "In November, General Sun Li-jen summoned me to Pingtung and told me (1) that there should be more contact among graduates, (2) that all graduates must try to lead their troops well, and (3) that the graduates should not lightly apply for reassignments. He also wanted me to maintain more contact with graduates serving below the regimental level." Such a directive implies a desire to "gain control over the forces." According to Kuo Ting-liang, it became obvious to him that General Sun Li-jen intended to build up his own power when he asked Kuo Ting-liang in August, 1954, to take charge of the liaison work. After he received the directive in November, Kuo Ting-liang studied together with Tien Hsiang- hung how to "build up a certain force in the troops." In response to the Commission's interrogation, Kuo Ting-liang also testified: "As he was alone and powerless, General Sun Li-jen wished to line up all the Training Center graduates to form a certain force to be used as a weight to back up his earnest recommendations for reform." On the basis of what Genera Sun Li-jen said and implied, testified Tie Hsiang-hung, "I believe he intended to build up enough strength for controlling the armed forces so as to be able to insist on his reform recommendations to the Government." Liu Kai- ying also testified that Kuo Ting-liang and Tien Hsiang-hung told him General Sun Li-jen's objective in ordering them to engage in liaison activities was to carry out his own views through the combined strength of all the graduates of the Training Center. During the enquiry, the Commission tried to find out General Sun Li-jen's motive in sponsoring such activities in the armed forces and found, on the basis of what actually transpired, that the motive was not so simple as General Sun Li-jen explained it. It was not merely a case of inadvertently overstepping the legal limits of official duties. It was action with ulterior motives. Upon closely examining the written statements of Kuo Ting-liang, Chiang Yun-chin, Tien Hsiang-hung, Liu Kai-ying, Wang Shan-tsung, (Lieutenant Colonel, aged 35, native of Chihteh, Anhwei; infantry graduate of the Military Academy; assistant section chief of G-2 Army GHQ) and Chen Liang-shun, (Major, aged 34, native of Foochow, Fukien; graduate of the engineering department of the Military Academy; staff officer of Army GHQ and reassigned to the staff of Personal Chief-of-Staff to the President), and the records of their testimony before the Commission, the Commission found the following relevant background information:

a. On certain military matters, General Sun Li-jen held views which differed from those of Ministry of National Defense or of certain of his colleagues. This should not be considered as anything unusual. One could well submit to his superiors through regular channels recommendations based on his own beliefs or present them for discussion over conference tables, with the hope that national interest could be served through proper adjustments. General Sun Li-jen, however, in his effort to see his views materialize, failed to adopt such lawful and reasonable methods. Instead, he often resorted to displaying his feelings of dissatisfaction to outsiders and especially liked to criticize his superiors and colleagues before his trusted subordinates and students. The details that bear on this point are seen in the Commission's records of testimony by Wang Shan-tsung, Chen Liang-shun, Kuo Ting-liang and by the documents submitted by the Ministry of National Defense on their cases.

b. General Sup Li-jen considered as correct and unalterable the various measures he had adopted when he was Army Training Commander and the Army Commander-in-Chief. When the 4th Officers Training Center was reorganized into the Military Academy, the Ministry of National Defense took steps required by law and actual military factors to transfer the Pre-Cadets Corps, the Women's Auxiliary Unit and the Youth Corps and to determine the educational status of the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center. General Sun Li-jen, however, considered these actions as well-planned attacks on him personally. There are relevant statements on this point in the documents submitted by the Ministry of National Defense on the cases of Chiang Yun-chin, Kuo Ting-liang, Chen Liang-shun and others, and also in the Commission's records of testimonies.

As shown above, General Sun Li-jen, holding personal opinions on certain military matters, did not follow proper channels for their vindication. Judging from this and from the directives he gave Kuo Ting-liang and others in 1954, especially during the latter part of the year, it is clear that General Sun Li-jen sponsored the liaison activities among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center for the purpose of creating a certain force to support the materialization of his views. This situation provided the Communist agent Kuo Ting-liang with opportunities better to carry out his military subversive mission in the armed forces.

Chapter IV. How Kuo Ting-liang Utilized His Relationship with General Sun in Carrying on His Subversive Activities

Section 1. General Sun Li-jen's Entrusting Kuo Ting-liang with Liaison Duties and Kuo Ting-liang's Utilizing the Trust for His Activities as a Red Agent

Kuo Ting-liang came to maintain even closer contact with General Sun Li-jen after having been entrusted with the responsibility for liaison activities among the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center. He was enabled also to maintain regular contact with the graduates in various units. According to his testimony, he had "found that contradictions existed between General Sun Li-jen and a few other high-ranking officers and that the appointment of General Peng Meng-chi as Acting Chief of the General Staff after the death of the late General Kwei Yung-ching had caused dissatisfaction among some of the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center." Kuo Ting-liang further explained: "Thus, there could be seen weak spots both among the higher-up and in the rank and file. It was a rare opportunity for anyone engaged in subversive activities in the armed forces. From then on, I often resorted to rabble-rousing whenever talking to the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center." It may be recalled that, among the "principles of methods and tactics for military subversive activities" as the Communists instructed Kuo Ting-liang in Mukden, the first is "to find out, to widen and to utilize contradictions existing among the high ranking officers in order to create rivalries and to promote division," and the second "to forge connections with officers of middle and lower ranks." (See Chapter II, Section 1) The situation then existing fitted well the Communist program for military subversion.

Kuo Ting-liang then proceeded to carry out the third of the "principles of methods and tactics for military subversive activities," that is, "to achieve effective control of army units." According to Kuo Ting-liang's testimony, his program of military subversion could be divided into three stages. During the first stage, from September to December, 1954, preliminary connections were established with the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center and active leaders were selected from among the discontented. In the second stage, from January to March, 1955, the meaning of General Sun Li-jen's three-point directive previously referred to was expanded and transformed into the fol. lowing three points which were relayed in the name of General Sun Li-jen to those in the units with whom contact had been made: (1) To achieve greater solidarity, (2) to gain control of the units and to better lead the troops, and (3) to investigate whether or not commanding officers and political officers could be utilized and to study methods for the control of them. Kuo Ting-liang said that he aroused some suspicion on the part of some graduates during this stage, but suspicion disappeared when they had learned of General Sun Li-jen's confidence in him.

According to Kuo Ting-liang's testimony, the third stage of his military subversive activities was from April to May of 1955. His plan for this stage was (1) to place definitely responsible liaison men on different levels in various units and offices; (2) to gain control over unit commanders and political officers; (3) to locate and control centers of communications; (4) to select sites for command posts; (5) to submit to the President in person during a military review a memorandum reporting on the unsatisfactory conditions existing in the armed forces and recommending reform measures; and (6) when circumstances permit, to incite the offering of recommendations with the support of force in his testimony in answer to the Commission's interrogation, Kuo Ting-liang also stated that efforts would be made to transform the above mentioned demonstration of force into armed rebellion "in order to achieve the Communist objective of military subversion." It may be noted that, if the whole plan for the third stage had been carried out, the actual result would be tantamount to the materialization of the fourth and the most important of the "principles of methods and tactics for military subversive activities," which reads as follows: “To seek opportunities, before actual Communist invasion of Taiwan, to promote large-scale rebellion in order to create instability that would facilitate the invasion."

Section 2. Kuo Ting-liang's Conspiracy to Create Rebellion in the Armed Forces and Its Exposure.

According to his own testimony, Kuo Ting-liang's plot to create rebellion in the armed forces consisted of "submitting to the President in person during a military review a memorandum reporting on the unsatisfactory conditions existing in the armed forces and recommending reform measures, staging a demonstration of force when circumstances permit, and further inciting armed rebellion in order to accomplish the Communist objective of military subversion."

As to General Sun Li-jen's relations with this seditious plot, Kuo Ting-liang testified that he received instructions from General Sun Li-jen at the end of April, 1955, to the effect: (1) that all the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center were to intensify their liaison activities; (2) that responsible liaison men in all units were to be definitely placed; and (3) that a name list of all liaison men was to be compiled and submitted. Kuo Ting-liang availed himself of this opportunity to circulate among the designated liaison men in different units, in the name of General Sun Li-jen and through the help of Liu Kai-ying, Tien Hsiang-hung and others, a verbal message consisting of three points: (1) All Training Center graduates were to strengthen solidarity among themselves and to gain effective control over the different units, unit commanders and political officers. (2) Responsible liaison men were to be definitely placed on army, divisional, regimental and battalion levels. (3) A name list of all responsible liaison men was to be compiled. Early in May, 1955, General Sun Li-jen summoned Kuo Ting-liang to Pingtung and enquired into the progress of the liaison activities. After the interview, Kuo Ting-liang had another message relayed in the name of General Sun Li-jen to all liaison men to speed up preparations for action.

Kuo Ting-liang further testified that, on May 15, 1955, he came to Taipei to report to General Sun Li-jen on the progress made in the liaison activities and to urge him to take action. He told General Sun Li-jen (1) that the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center, owing to unsatisfactory conditions existing in the armed forces, were prepared to submit a memorandum to the President, and (2) that best-time for action would be during the ten-day rest-period between the evening of May 22 when the battalion-level training for a certain unit was to be concluded and June 2 when its regiment-level training would begin. Kuo Ting-liang further testified that General Sun Li-jen told him than to notify all Training Center graduates not to take any rash action and, if they had any opinions, to wait until he came to Pingtung on or about May 25. In spite of this, however, Kuo Ting-liang informed all the graduates that as General Sun Li-jen would be proceeding southward by automobile and would use a certain place as the command post for action at the end of Mayor the beginning of June, all the graduates should be pre pared. He then designated personnel to make the necessary arrangements.

It could be seen from the above that, when General Sun Li-jen entrusted him with the charge of liaison activities, Kuo Ting-liang gained the understanding that General Sun Li-jen desired to build up his own power and it gave him the cover to carry out his Communist plan of military subversion. Later, Kuo Ting-liang was given to believe General Sun Li-jen had intended to create an organization and a certain force through liaison activities for the ultimate purpose of carrying out the idea of backing his advice to the Government with strength. He considered this an even better opportunity for military subversion. He played the role of a broker between General Sun Li-jen and a small number of the graduates of the 4th Officers Training Center, using General Sun Li-jen's name to influence the graduates on the other, creating false impressions in the mind of General Sun Li-jen by telling him half-truths about the status of the graduates. By so doing, he tried to convert "advice from strength" through "demonstration of force" and further into open rebellion. He demonstrated his taco tics for the last time when, during his interview with General Sun Li-jen on May 15, 1955, he urged General Sun Li-jen to carry out a demonstration of force on the basis of what he termed the discontentment of the Training Center graduates, while on the other hand misleading some of the graduates to believe that General Sun Li-jen intended to take personal command of the forces in the south for "action." Obviously, Kuo Ting-liang hoped to utilize the opportunity to be provided by General Sun Li-jen's accompanying the President on a military inspection tour of the south scheduled for the end of May, 1955, to create incidents, to cause confusion and "promote large-scale rebellion," and to carry out the conspiracy of overthrowing the Government.

General Sun Li-jen, while highly trusting Kuo Ting-liang, stated that he had no knowledge whatsoever of Kuo Ting-liang's being a Communist agent. Having examined Kuo Ting-liang's written statement, the record of his testimony and other relevant documents and having interrogated him, the Commission failed to find any evidence, direct or indirect, that would point to General Sun Li-jen's knowing Kuo Ting-liang to be a Communist agent. However, General Sun Li-jen believed that "Kuo Ting-liang enjoyed the confidence of the Training Center graduates" and therefore entrusted him with liaison duties. Although Chiang Yun-chin and others had more than once reported to him on such behavior of Kuo Ting-liang's as they had discovered, General Sun Li-jen 'continued to trust him and was therefore taken advantage of by the Communist agent. General Sun Li-jen's motive in contacting the Training Center graduates and in trying to create an organization in the armed forces was clearly to build up a certain force which, he hoped, could help bring about the materialization of his own views. On the other hand, Kuo Ting-liang was invested with the Communist mission of military subversion for the purpose of fomenting rebellion and overthrowing the Government. The two men's motives and purposes were not identical. In point of action, however, they tended to supplement each other to a certain extent as a result of the one making use of the other.

The Commission has closely examined the written statements of Kuo Ting-liang, Chiang Yun.chin, Wang Shan-tsung, Chen Liang- shun, Tien Hsiang-hung and Liu Kai-ying and their interrogation records, submitted by the Ministry of National Defense. It has also conducted direct interrogation of the six men and evaluated their respective answers. While Kuo Ting-liang admitted to being the mastermind of the plan to stage a "demonstration of force" and to incite open rebellion and to trying to transform the nature of General Sun's original idea of "advice from strength," all the others pointed to General Sun Li-jen not only as a participant but even as the prime mover in the conspiracy. However, the Commission has fail­ ed to uncover any evidence, direct or otherwise, that could prove General Sun Li-jen's role as the chief conspirator. The Commission, giving him the benefit of doubt, does not find General Sun Li-jen the prime mover in the conspiracy to rebellion. Nevertheless; the following facts have convinced the Commission that General Sun Li-jen could not have been entirely ignorant of the conspiracy engaged in by Kuo Ting-liang and others:

a. Kuo Ting-liang had long been engaged in a conspiracy to rebellion. In answer to the Commission's interrogation, General Sun Li-jen said: "I did not know of any large-scale plot or action" -thus denying any knowledge of Kuo's overall plan of conspiracy. But he admitted that many officers had talked frankly" with him as they “did not feel restrained" in his presence, and that, as he believed it best to iron out things quietly, he usually decided against reporting such things to the superior authorities in order to save them distress, and that he always felt sure that people concerned would not take any action when he told them not to. It may be noted that, throughout his answers during the hearing, General Sun Li-jen repeatedly used the expression "to iron out the wrinkles quietly." Taking into consideration the sequence of events in the entire case, the Commission cannot but conclude that General Sun Li-jen knew that there were wrinkles which had better be ironed out quietly and that he could not have truthfully claimed complete ignorance of Kuo Ting-liang's plot. When Kuo Ting-liang urged action on March 15, 1955, General Sun Li-jen told him to notify the Training Center graduates "not to take any rash action," apparently for fear of the situation getting out of hand. This remark in the testimony constitutes the most favorable piece of evidence for General Sun Li-jen's case. But it indicates at the same time that General Sun Li-jen was not completely ignorant of the impending move. This point was also borne out by his testimony that eel thought there would be no further troubles if they did not carry this thing out; and I felt I would keep this to myself as there appeared no need to report."

b. Kuo Ting-liang was arrested on May 25, 1955. In the evening of May 27, Liu Kai-ying came to report the news to General Sun Li-jen at his Taipei residence. General Sun Li-jen decided thereupon to proceed to the south the next day, May 28, but, upon asking for leave, was told by the President to depart together by air on May 30. General Sun Li-jen then sent Chen Liang-shun, his aide, to go to the south by car the night of May 28 and, according to his testimony before the Commission, Chen contacted many persons enroute. When asked by the Commission about this, General Sun Li-jen presented some justification for his action, but did not deny the action itself. The names of persons contacted and the time and place of contacts, which were told the Commission by General Sun Li-jen were identical with what were related by Chen Liang-shun, Tien Hsiang-hung, Liu Kai-ying and the chauffeur, Chou Ying-nien. This also shows that General Sun Li-jen was not completely ignorant of the impending move.

c. As referred to above, Liu Kai-ying came to report Kuo Ting-liang's arrest to General Sun Li-jen at the latter's residence in Taipei in the evening of May 27, 1955. On June 1, Liu went into hiding and, on the night of June 2, turned up at General Sun's residence in Pingtung to see the General. Asked by the Commission as to why Liu Kai-ying came to see him that night, General Sun Li-jen replied: "When he came to my place that night, I asked him: 'Why do you come at this time?' 'I have gone AWOL…’ he said. I told him to go back quickly and he said:’ I don't you dare to go back?' I asked him and he was afraid he would be implicated," It may be pointed out that the news of Kuo Ting-liang's arrest was brought to General Sun Li-jen by Liu Kai-ying whose relationship with Kuu Ting-liang must be known to General Sun Li-jen and that Liu Kai-ying's expressed fear of being implicated and his hesitancy to go back to his unit clearly indicated his intention to be a fugitive from justice. If General Sun Li-jen had no knowledge of the