The heart of the difficulty is the understandable yet vain hope that importing foreign technology, management techniques, and products can be done without introducing non-Chinese "cultural baggage." The fears of "spiritual pollution" of a few years ago are no different from those inspiring the current campaign. What has changed, however, is the level of sophistication in assessing the problem While the earlier conservative backlash against things Western focused on such corrupting items as blue-jeans and disco music, this time critics are taking on the big Issues that threaten the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought "pollution" from Western ideas of democracy, political freedoms, and freedom of the press.
Viewing the current attempts to root out "counter-revolutionaries" and expose "rightist tendencies" as the worry only of the "conservatives" within the CCP can lead to serious misconceptions of the underlying problem that must worry all factions of the party's leadership: a challenge to CCP power. That power is based upon the party's right to rule, and is reinforced by the "doctrine of democratic centralism" that says party members cannot openly oppose party decisions. But economic reform has been linked to political reform at the cost of ideological adjustment, and the price has been major economic change without a concomitant reinterpretation of theory.
Questions of orthodoxy have now become higher priority issues. One of the pillars of Teng's reform plans involved major restructuring of the party itself. Technical and management skills soared in importance over the Maoist emphasis on being "Red" or ideologically pure. The nine categories of "enemies of the people," of which intellectuals were the lowest, faded into memory as aberrations of the Cultural Revolution that could not be repeated after the revelations during the trials of the "gang of four." Teng realized that modernization required the services of intellectuals, and that the generally abysmal educational level of party cadre would have to be raised before economic reforms could penetrate society with any degree of significance. This led to his attempts at streamlining the bureaucracy and forcing older "Red" but inexpert cadre into retirement. In light of the repercussions from the student demonstrations and Hu Yao-pang's fall from power, these at tempts are now dead, or at best in intensive-care.
A key problem behind these events has been the introduction of Western ideas in mainland China as adjuncts to changes in the economic structure Part of this has come through joint-ventures with foreign investors and part through contacts with Hongkong. These channels have been further augmented by the large number of mainland Chinese students studying in the West and the vast array of official Chinese delegations that have Circled the globe in the past decade who have returned home with attitudes, abilities, and expectations radically changed. While this phenomenon is not unusual, the impact upon normal CCP order of operation has caused ideological turmoil.
Beyond rising consumer expectations that come from exposure to the simple joys of TV, fashionable clothes, motorcycles, and refrigerators, for those who have once been to the West, first hand views of systems that allow genuine popular election of government leaders, media criticism of that leader ship, and other wide-ranging political freedoms—all in environments that are obviously economically modern—provide the essential ingredients for "cultural shock." The desire to criticize and compare after returning does not necessarily mean that things "outside" are seen as flawless models for emulation. But this exposure does provide grist for analyses that often lead to criticism, and ultimately to perceptions by those back home as threats to "the way things have been done" by the CCP.
While all of this strikes at root problems within the Communist approach to governing, it may also be seen as a problem faced by all developing societies. Complaints about "cultural imperialism" are common throughout the developing world of the 20th Century, just as they are found throughout world history, though with a different tag line. Contact between societies of unequal social, political, economic, or military development has always created tensions, some times of cataclysmic severity. The challenge lies in managing the results of those contacts. In the case of mainland China, attempts at economic modernization have led to basic criticisms of the political system and the rather dysfunctional ideology upon which it rests. While all of this may not be surprising, what is particularly saddening is the orientation of the current campaign. Slogans make weak arguments.
The calls for "plain living and arduous struggle," and appeals to Mao's 1942 "Talks at the Yenan forum on Literature and Art" conjure up unhappy memories of the Cultural Revolution. No one expects another catastrophe like that to evolve from the current attempts to eliminate "bourgeois" elements, but the employment of the same rhetoric indicates a deeper flaw: analysts remain satisfied with vague labels that have unclear definitions, fluctuating with political exigencies. Intellectuals who presumably could add critical depth to discussions of how best to graft Western ideas onto attempts at modernization cannot feel particularly inclined to contribute in light of the old anti-intellectual rhetoric being directed against them.
While it may be true that the agitation over "bourgeois liberalization" will dissipate by the time of the 13th party congress in October, it is clear that its cause is a long-term dilemma of modernizing societies. Until there is a more open and comprehensive environment for discussion of foreign cultural influences—be they economic, political, or otherwise—observers can expect similar campaigns in the future.