It has been half a century since the first gunshot broke the silence of the dark sky above the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937, the prelude of China's full-scale eight-year War of Resistance against Japan. But to the Chinese people, the war actually began on September 18, 1931 when the Japanese Kuantung Army invaded Manchuria—the Mukden Incident.
The period of Chinese history from 1927, the year the National Government of China was instituted, to the beginning of the War of Resistance a decade later was a time of internal troubles and external difficulties. The Government had been forced by circumstances to adopt an attitude of compromise. In an appeal for peace based upon reason, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1935 warned the Japanese government, through then Ambassador to Japan Chiang Tso-pin, that "The war between China and Japan will be bound to a world war and if a world war breaks out, both China and Japan will perish." Chiang repeatedly communicated his wisdom and foresight to the Japanese government and its people. In his famous article entitled "Friend or Foe?" and published under the name of Hsu Tao-lin, he gave a detailed analysis of how the futures of the two nations were linked, stating that "Sticking together, both will benefit. Standing apart, each will suffer."
It was solely for the maintaining of peace in Asia, and for gaining a few years time to prepare for the eventuality of Japanese aggression, that prior to the War of Resistance the National Government of China made great concessions and endured various kinds of Japanese provocations. Chiang's famous July 17, 1937 speech on "The Limit of China's Endurance," delivered before a gathering of Chinese leaders at Lushan, Kiangsi manifested his concerns: "We are a weak nation; therefore, it is all the more necessary that we should have a true estimate of our strength. Peace is an absolute essential for the reconstruction of the nation. It is for this reason that for the past few years we have striven hard to maintain peace with other nations, in spite of all the injustice and suffering that has been our lot."
Chiang sincerely hoped that the Japanese would realize their mistakes and avoid a disaster at the last moment. The same speech expressed this sentiment: "... while there was the slightest hope for peace, we would not abandon it; so long as we had not reached the limit of endurance, we would not talk lightly of sacrifice." Yet sacrifice was to come. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese army, navy and air forces were both quantitatively and qualitatively superior. Her army had 4.48 million men. Her army and navy had 2,700 planes, and the navy had a fleet totaling 1.9 million tons. In comparison, the total strength of the Chinese Armed Forces stood at only 1.7 million men supported by the Air Force with 300 planes, and the Navy with ships totaling 46,500 tons.
However, once war broke out, the Chinese people could no longer tolerate Japan's humiliating challenges. Chiang's Lushan speech left no doubt of what was ahead: "Let our people realize to the full the meaning of 'the limit of endurance,' and the extent of sacrifice implied. For once that stage is reached, we can only sacrifice and fight to the bitter end."
Throughout the long war years, Chinese troops faced the formidable Japanese war machine by means of a total war. Through the strategy of attrition and guerilla-type war of movement, they dashed the enemy's dream of bringing the war to a speedy end.
Prior to the time the Chinese people were called to "fight to the end" in July 1937, there had been phenomenal developments and renovations accomplished in the period of 1927-1937 that also contributed to the ultimate victory. These included political reconstruction, industrial and economic development, railroad construction, and improvement in education. This period has been called the Golden Decade or the Strenuous Decade. Later, the security and material resources of Szechwan Province made it possible for Chungking to survive as the alternate capital during the war and be an unwavering symbol of the people's iron will.
In the spring of 1941, the United States Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, offering timely aid to China's war effort. In November of the same year, the U.S. dispatched a military mission to China to help equip and train China's new army. Although the meager means of transportation permitted only a small quantity of the equipment to reach China, the knowledge of U.S. assistance to China was unmistakingly a great booster of morale.
On December 7, 1941, in an attempt to assist its plundering of goods and materials in the Pacific, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The United States immediately abandoned her policy of isolationism and her people rose to meet the enemy's challenge. And after four and a half years of fighting the Japanese alone, China now had the Allies to fight alongside. Chiang was appointed the Supreme Commander of the China Theater of the Allied Forces, giving him the highest strategic command on land over Southeast Asia. Yet, regrettably, the Allied strategy placed more emphasis on Europe than on Asia, and failed to bring an end to the war against Japan before the defeat of Germany. The Russians and Chinese Communists therefore took advantage of the situation and grabbed the fruits of victory.
In October 1942, as a gesture of sympathy and encouragement to the Chinese people's perseverance and fortitude to resist aggression, all unequal treaties imposed on China by Western powers in the past century by Great Britain and the United States were abolished. When the Declaration of General Security was signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, China was recognized as one of the four powers of the world along with the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia.
On August 10, 1945, the Japanese Government announced the acceptance of the proclamation of the Potsdam Conference and five days later surrendered unconditionally to China, the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia. On this occasion, Generalissimo Chiang made these remarks in his broadcast to the nation's people and to the whole world: "We have won the victory. But it is not yet the final victory. The universal power of righteousness has not simply achieved one more triumph. We and the peoples of all the world fervently hope that this war may be the last war in which civilized nations engage.... "
Specifically to the defeated Japan, Chiang emphasized that the Chinese people "will remember no evil against others" and "will not seek revenge." From the Mukden Incident in 1931 to August 1945, the Chinese people lost countless lives and had vast properties destroyed. But even in the face of such human tragedy, Chiang carried out a magnanimous policy of "returning good for evil." The Chinese Government did not ask for any reparations from the Japanese people. It was because of this policy that the Japanese territorial integrity was kept intact, and two million Japanese soldiers and civilians were repatriated safely to their own land.
Nevertheless, the victory did not promise China or the world an everlasting peace. The eight-year War of Resistance nurtured and expanded the influence of the Chinese Communists.
Originally a small group of rebels, the Chinese Communists expanded their armed rebellions and grew in strength by taking the advantage of Japanese aggression, especially after the Mukden Incident when the Japanese militarists occupied Manchuria. Through the slogans of "Fighting Japan but not the Communists" and "Chinese must not fight Chinese," they used every means to sabotage the government's policy of "effecting internal pacification before resisting external aggression."
However, on May 5, 1936, when they were cornered in northern Shensi and unable to undertake military activities, the Chinese Communists sought surrender and accepted four principles laid down by the National Government: they promised to abide by the Three Principles of the People, to obey Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's orders, to abolish the "Red Army" and have it integrated into the National Army, and to abrogate the soviets and have them reorganized into local governments. By way of these "promises," the Chinese Communists obtained the numerical designations and equipment for their "18th Army Group" and "the New Fourth Corps."
Later, taking advantage of the war, they gradually expanded their sphere of influence. In a secret instruction to the "Eighth Route Army" in October 1937, Mao Tse-tung admitted the actual Communist strategy by saying that "The Sino-Japanese War gives us, the Chinese Communists, an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy is to devote 70 percent of our efforts to this end, 20 percent to coping with the government, and 10 percent to fighting the Japanese."
After the war, Mao confirmed this strategy when he received a group of Japanese Socialist Party members who in 1964 went to apologize for the Japanese invasion of China. Mao said that "Without the Royal Japanese Army's invasion of more than half of China's territory, the Chinese people would not have been able to unite against Japan. And in turn, the Chinese Communists would not have been able to take power." He then reiterated: "Japanese militarism benefited China greatly, enabling the Chinese people to seize power. Without the help of the Royal Japanese Army, we would not have been able to take over the country."
At the beginning of the war, Chinese Communist troops numbered no more than 25,000. But after the Japanese surrender, their number had reached 1.4 million. Thus, in eight years their manpower increased 55 times, constituting a significant accumulation of human "capital" for their usurpation of political power after 1945.
Despite these facts, up to two years ago the Chinese Communists always boasted that the War of Resistance was fought entirely by themselves. But how could they defeat Japan if they only exerted 10 percent of their efforts to fight with the Japanese militarists? Besides, of the more than 40,000 battles fought during the war, the Chinese Communists' reorganized "Eighth Route Army" only took part in a single battle in Shansi Province and a guerilla war in the south of the same province during the spring of 1938. Even the recent admission by the Chinese Communists that the armed forces of the National Government also contributed to the War of Resistance, the change of tone was, as their regular practice has always been, designed to suit their current purposes.
In his short yet eloquent speech accepting the Japanese unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945 on the U.S. battleship "Missouri," General Douglas MacArthur revealed his concerns over the future: "Today the guns are silent. A great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won.... A new era is upon us. Even the lesson of victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security and the survival of civilization." The Second World War has left us a divided world, and today—fifty years after the Marco Polo Incident—his words still ring painfully true.
Yu Ta-wei, 91; ballistic expert, former Minister of Defense (1954-1965) and now senior advisor to the President. He served during the Sino-Japanese War as army chief of ordnance and vice minister of war.
"Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's most praiseworthy contribution to the Chinese victory was his firm refusal to compromise with the Japanese militarists, despite the fact that the latter proved more than a match for the Chinese troops. In his Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to the Secretary of War (July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945), General George C. Marshall also pointed out that China's determination to fight to the bitter end was vital to the Allies: 'If the armies and government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been finally defeated, Japan would have been left free to exploit the tremendous resources of China without harassment ... and continue the war on a great and rich land mass.' If so, even though the combined Allied forces would have been able to defeat Japan eventually, it would undoubtedly have taken very long time and would have been very costly
"Most important of all, our victory over the Japanese should be attributed to all the Chinese people. The Chinese people had long harbored a deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment ever since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, during which the Chinese troops suffered humiliating defeat on land and sea. Therefore, even though the Japanese occupied many places, our people simply refused to cooperate with them. Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime in Nanking in 1940, for example, was never supported by the Chinese there. So in my view, it is only fair that we let all Chinese receive credit for winning the war."
Chao Hsiao-may, 76; retired major general, Chinese Army (the first female general in the ROC); now founder and principal of West Lake Industrial and Commercial Vocational High School in Taipei, and chair of the Education Association of Taipei. During the war, she followed Madame Chiang Kai-shek who summoned Chinese women for saving and nursing orphans, looking after wounded soldiers, and giving shelter to armed forces dependants.
"I can give witness on behalf of all the suffering the Chinese people had to undergo half a century ago. To me, as well as to any Chinese now over sixty, the war was much more than a mere historical event. It was a heart-rending personal experience. After the outbreak of the war, we fully realized that 'the critical moment for sacrifice had arrived,' and we were ready to fight. In addition to our regular army, ordinary people also organized guerrilla forces to fight the enemy or volunteered to help our troops in various ways. None of them ever got paid by the government or thought of any reward. They only knew that they were Chinese, so it was naturally their war.
"The Chinese Communists have always claimed all the credit for the Chinese victory over Japan in 1945. If that were true, then why was it Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, instead of Mao Tse-tung, who was recognized as the Supreme Commander of the China Theater from 1942. And why was he the one who was asked to attend the Cairo Conference with U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill in 1943? And why did all the Japanese troops surrender to our Central Government rather than to the Chinese Commonists? Obviously the Communists are telling lies, but if we do not make it clear again, it just encourages them to continue lying."
Cheng Tien-chieh, 77; retired rear admiral, Chinese Navy; former military staff to the office of the President. During wartime he led one of the naval mine-laying groups working along the Yangtze River.
"This is not generally known, but the Chinese Navy—though outnumbered by the enemy in warships and personnel—had effectively blockaded the waterway in the middle course of the Yangtze River, which the Japanese attempted to use for transporting their troops and ammunition. Our naval commandos often risked their lives by advancing into Japanese occupied areas and, while working under enemy fire, placed numerous fixed and floating mines in the river. They thereby destroyed lots of enemy vessels. As a result, the Japanese Navy could not freely utilize the Yangtze for transportation, and our naval forces successfully delayed and interdicted their advance and their attempts to close in on inland areas along the river. Although we also suffered great losses, and many commandos were killed in action, these sacrifices were valuable because they contributed greatly to our final victory."
Lo Ying-teh, 76; retired CAF general and former deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force. He rendered meritorious service in the air battles with the Japanese, and received the Medal of Freedom from the U.S. Army Forces Headquarters in China in 1946.
"On August 14, 1937, the day our Air Force first engaged the enemy over Hangchow, Chekiang Province, six Japanese warplanes were shot down straight away, while ours all came back safely. This first victory was extremely important not only to the Air Force, but also to the Chinese people. With only 300 aircraft, and less than half of them fighters, the Chinese Air Force at the outbreak of the war was extremely inferior to the enemy, which had an estimated 2,700 aircraft. The August 14 triumph, therefore, consolidated the self-confidence of our men, boosted our morale, and furthermore proved to the Japanese as well as our people that we could fight. And we really did, though bitterly, fight to the end. Besides, thanks to the American volunteer group-the Flying Tigers led by General Claire L. Chennault—and later the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, we did not fight alone after 1941. The Chinese will always remember our American friends in need."