By Edward Y. K. Kwong
One of the most acute problems in the Far East today is concerned with the rearmament of Japan. For the power vacuum created by the disarmament of Japan after the war has enabled the communists to extend their influence up to the very shores of the Japanese main islands. Should the Russians and their Korean and Chinese communist satellites succeed in gaining control of Japan, they would convert her industrial capacity into producing arms and munitions for their conquest of Asia and the world. They could also train her population of 80,000,000 into a fanatical, dedicated vanguard for their long cherished dream of world conquest. In her present impotent state, Japan presents the paradoxical appearance of being totally disarmed and yet posing as a serious threat to the peace of East Asia. For the good of the world as well as for her own good, Japan must be rearmed, and rearmed fast.
But rearmament is a hard-selling commodity at the present time in Japan. There are few takers. Even those who scarcely ten years ago would die for the glory of their emperor and for empire-building have long lost their taste for military pursuits. The same emperor is still there, but the ultra-militarists have no more enthusiasm to make personal sacrifices for his glorification or even for the defense of their homeland. Instead they have banded themselves into groups working against rearmament. The dying out of jingoism and ultra-militarism is a good sign, but does not help Japan's rearmament any. Many among the intellectuals, educational leaders and college students, not unlike those of some other countries, entertain strong sympathies for communism and adopt the communist party line of anti-Americanism and anti-rearmament.
As the political parties have to respect the wishes of their electorate, they have avoided committing themselves on the rearmament issue. The Liberal Party under the leadership of Premier Yoshida, which returned 201 of the 466 members to the Diet, has been double-talking on the question of rearmament. After much pressure has been applied by the Americans, climaxing in the blunt warning uttered by Senator William Knowland during his recent visit to Tokyo and diplomatic demarches made by no less personages than Secretary Dulles and Vice-President Nixon, Premier Yoshida began to address himself to the task. To consolidate his position, he had to seek the support of the Progressive Party with its seventy members in the Diet under the leadership of Mamoru Shigemitsu and the Splinter-Liberals headed by Hatoyama, who broke away from the main Liberal Party last year with thirty-three members under him, thus depriving Yoshida of majority control of the Diet. After much behind-the-scene horse trading, Hatoyama has agreed to come back to the fold under the leadership of Yoshida and the Progressive Party has also agreed to play ball.
However, the obstacles confronting Yoshida and the rearmament issue remains formidable. For he can count on the certain opposition of the minority parties--the Right and Left Socialist and the Farmers. The latter two-Left Socialist and the Farmers--are communist in their orientation and sympathies and may be regarded as unalterably opposed to any form of rearmament unless and until the communists are in power. As the present constitution forbids rearming in any form, the combined opposition of these minority parties will prove formidable, for they have the appearance of legality on their side. Whatever it is, any long-range Japanese rearmament plan will have to be decided by the slow, uncertain process of amending the present constitution.
The rearmament movement recently received a sudden fillip by the action of ROK President Syngman Rhee. In his declaration of the so-called Rhee Line, he has closed to the Japanese fishermen a very productive fishing ground near their home waters. It is estimated that the Japanese fishing interests will suffer a yearly loss of Yen 11-billion or more than US$30,000,000. Those Japanese who used to think they could remain secure under the protective guns of the United States have come to a rude awakening that the American guns do not protect them from Syngman Rhee. They certainly do not fetch them the much needed fish from the disputed waters. Besides, Japanese self-respect is at stake. For it is one thing to be humbled and browbeaten by someone against whom one has fought and lost. It is quite another thing to take insults from a people one has, ruled over for half a century. Rhee's action certainly cleared any lingering doubt in many Japanese minds as to the advisability of rearmament.
This brings up some very cognate questions in connection with the Japanese rearmament. How far will Japan's rearmament go? Can Japan have a military force strong enough to resist aggression without posing as a threat to the security of her immediate neighbors, such as the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China.
According to Keikichi Masuhara, Deputy Director of the National Safety Board, there are under consideration three plans for Japan's rearmament. The first calls for the enlistment of an army of one million men supported by ten thousand airplanes and a million and half tons of surface craft. This plan would undoubtedly be regarded as a threat to their security by Japan's neighbors; but as it entails the expenditure of 70,000,000-million or roughly US$200-billion, it is obviously beyond the resources of the Japanese. The second plan calls for the expenditure of one-tenth the amount and envisages the creation of an army of three hundred thousand men supported by six to seven thousand airplanes and half a million tons of warships. Fortunately for Japan's neighbors; this plan is, also beyond her ability to pay. The third and compromise plan for which the present government is working calls for the building up of an army of 180,000 to 220,000 men with 1,000 to 1,500 airplanes and 140,000 tons of warships. Even such a modest program is beyond the means of the present Japanese economy and cannot be undertaken without American assistance.
Whether such a force will constitute a threat to Japan's neighbors will have to be decided by a number of factors, not the least of which is the attitude of her neighbors toward her now while she is down and out. Owing to the consistent policy of conciliation and tolerance that the Republic of China has adopted toward Japan after the conclusion of the war, there is reason to believe that the relations between the two countries will not be easily strained. The same thing cannot be said of Japan's relations with the Republic of Korea. Whether Syngman Rhee is on solid ground or not, his actions have caused violent resentment in the minds of the Japanese; and if they had means at their disposal, there is no telling whether they would fight the Koreans on the issue of the Rhee Line alone. The Americans who have helped the Koreans to build up their national defense and is undertaking to do the same to the Japanese, may think what they can make they can also unmake. While there is little danger of Japan's invading America again, the prospect of letting two countries helped by America to fight against each other is none too attractive. Before the question of Japan's rearmament has taken form, steps must be taken to guard against the possibility of keeping two parties in the same camp from falling to blows against each other.
Here is another thought for those Americans who think what they can make they can also unmake and want to rush Japan into rearmament. It must be remembered that Japan is a group of tight little, right little islands packed to bursting limits with a population of 80,000,000. With improved modern medical science and with their traditional devotion to propagation, the Japanese people may grow and multiply at a rate far beyond the expectation of Malthus. Now as always the persistent question confronting Japan is to fine room to expand or to fine a market for the goods she has manufactured. As there are few places in the world which welcome the migration of Japanese settlers, she will have to look for markets where she can sell her goods and obtain the raw materials she needs. Western countries will hold little prospect for the Japanese, because the inferior quality of the Japanese goods will prove an obstacle to any large-scale selling there. On the other hand, Russia and her satellites can absorb no small amount of Japanese manufactures, and they can be counted upon to use all their economic power to lure Japan from the democratic fold. A Japan that is overburdened with rearmament cost and whose home market is glutted with un-saleable goods will have little choice. She will eventually gravitate toward the communist block.
Anyone who doubts whether this will happen has only to look at Britain. Britain and Japan have much in common, politically and economically. After the war, Britain has received direct and indirect assistance from the United States government to the tune of billions of dollars. One would think, the British would know which side their bread is buttered and support their benefactor in all his major policies. But no! The British, including Winston Churchill, have surprisingly manifested stronger sympathies toward Malenkov than toward Eisenhower; and in all major world issues, their orientation and first reactions are toward the East. It is only after a good deal of pressure has been tuned on that they would finally be brought around to the view of the United States government. Japan can easily become a second Britain. Under the inexorable population and economic pressure at home, Japan may be lured to desert the people who now assist her in rearming and set her upon her economic feet. This risk may not be great during ordinary times when America can take care of herself. But when the United States is engaged in a life and earth struggle, she will not like to see a country, the rearmament of which she has been working so assiduously, throw itself at the feet of the soviets. And if it is a tragedy to see an unarmed Japan fall into the grip of the Kremlin, it is a world calamity to see a rearmed and economically rehabilitated Japan· served to the masters of the Kremlin on a silver platter. The people who are now clamoring to rearm Japan should give serious thought as to whether or not she is a good risk and what checks they may, have on hand in keeping her from intransigence.
Another contingency that should not be lost sight of by those who now goad Japan on to the road of rearmament is what countermove the Kremlin may make against its realization. Because of the nearness of Japan to Russia, because of the historical hostility between the two countries and because of the defenseless nature of the country, the Russians may be counted upon to give high priority to the conquest of Japan. During the last few years, the only thing that kept them from attempting aggression in Japan has been due to the presence of the American armed forces. Then too they might have counted on a lucky break in the Korea War. For if the whole of Korea should come under the control of the communists, Japan can be made untenable. Now that their design for outright conquest of Korea has been frustrated, the communists may revise their strategy of conquering Japan. They may find it expedient to stop the rearmament of Japan just as they have been trying to stop the rearmament of Germany in Europe. One of the ways open is to start a domestic revolt in Japan after the pattern they have been using in the aggression of the countries in East Asia-China, the Philippines, Indo-China, Burma etc. Once it gets a start, the Japanese communists may count on the Soviets to supply all the needed war supplies from across the narrow seas separating Japan and the Soviet world. Innumerable reinforcements in the form of “volunteers can be sent by the Chinese and Korean communists.” Once such a revolt gets started, it will quickly assume the complexion of a foreign invasion and may be made to continue on and on like the ones in other Asian countries.
The Americans who are assuming the responsibility of defending Japan against foreign invasion should consider seriously now as to what they would do when faced with such a revolt at its incipient stage. From the beginning of the century toward the outbreak of the Second World War, the correct international behavior is abstention from interference in one's neighbor's affairs. What with the infiltration and fifth columnist tactics developed during the war and perfected by the Soviets in the years that followed, to abstain from interfering in another country's domestic affairs often means throwing it to the Kremlin wolves. When faced with such a revolt, it is a sixty-four dollar question for the American government and the American military authorities stationed in Japan to decide what to do. If they give a hand to the Japanese government in suppressing the revolt, the communists would fan up anti-American feelings in Japan, by charging that they are backing a group of imperialist running dogs at Tokyo to overrule and enslave Japan. If they keep aloof from interfering, outside communist aid will become greater and greater in volume till the rebellion has grown to unmanageable proportions.
However, the American-Japanese Security Pact signed simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951, did provide for such a contingency, Article I of the said pact reads:
Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace and of this treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to, contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down-large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.
Article II of the said pact further provides:
During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, power or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third Power.
It will thus be seen that the power or right, for the United States government to take a hand in the suppression of a rebellion is there, provided both the American and Japanese governments are willing to make use of it. Therefore, any attempt at uprising or rebellion on the part of the Japanese communists should be met by the American military authorities stationed in Japan with a determined, overwhelming force so as to eradicate the rebellious elements before they can take root. The Americans may thereafter earn world-wide criticism and meet with adverse publicity campaigns engineered by the communists and their fellow travelers like Nehru & Company; but it will, save lives-both Japanese and American-and will prove to be the most economical, most beneficial to world, peace in the end. To be effective, such plans must be mapped out beforehand. To make it possible for Japan to rearm, those now responsible for her defense must foresee all the contingencies and guard against all the possible interferences.